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Abstract 
Radical democratic politics in the digital age is characterized by the widespread emergence 
of participatory spaces generated by state actors and social movements. These new formats 
of citizen engagement are situated in the context of social inequalities and discrimination 
of marginalized identities. To counter this problem, feminist debates in democratic theory 
associated with the term “difference democracy” advocate a politics of presence through 
physically embodied representation of marginalized groups, providing visibility in the 
space of appearance. This strategy, however, entails essentializing tendencies as subjects 
are judged by their physical appearance rather than the content they utter, a problem de-
scribed as the “dilemma of difference”.  
This thesis seeks ways out of the dilemma of difference by advancing both freedom and 
equality in participatory spaces. It explores the relations of freedom and equality that are 
described as competing values in the democratic paradox. To make the freedom to explore 
the multiple self compatible with the equality facilitated through the presence of the mar-
ginalized, the thesis engages with a range of radical democratic perspectives. To the estab-
lished participatory, deliberative, and agonistic approaches it adds feminist and transform-
ative perspectives. On these grounds, it develops the concept of a politics of becoming, 
which is seen as part of a progressive strategy of systemic transformation. Inspired by queer 
and gender theory, the politics of becoming reinterprets presence as the performative act of 
self-constitution. To enlarge the free spaces of the subject to change, the thesis suggests 
radical democratic practices of disidentification through anonymity that affords the oppor-
tunity to reject hegemonic identity interpellations and contributes to a democratization of 
self-constitution.  
Drawing on new materialist thought allows for an interpretation of both spatial configura-
tions and the subject as agentic assemblages. Anonymity and other modes of disidentifica-
tion enable an interruption of such assemblages and reassemble spaces and the self. Digital 
means of communication provide new affordances for identity expressions. The emerging 
cyborgian subjects reassemble identity and reconfigure the space of appearance. This re-
sults in a new politics of presence that expresses embodied difference but still provides 
freedom for the subject to change. 
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1. Introduction  
The Disorder of Things: Masks, Veils, and Conchita’s Beard 
1.1. Introduction 
Pitch black. An entirely black image covered the smart device screens of Instagram users 
who clicked on a post by Conchita Wurst. While the pop singer and drag artist, known for 
her public appearance as a bearded lady, usually posted selfies in glamourous dresses, on 
this occasion she had posted an image of total obscurity. Her only comment under the image 
was a date in a week’s time “08.03.2019”. Some of Conchita’s Instagram followers were 
in apparent disarray. “im scared”, posted a user under the pseudonym emine16; “What? Plz 
im scared” echoed nasfala.1 Tom Neuwirth, the man behind Conchita Wurst, stated in a 
previous interview in reference to his public persona Conchita: “[Tom] wants to get out, 
show himself. I have to kill her”.2 The black image in the place of a selfie signalled the end 
of a life.  
Five years earlier, Conchita had won the Eurovision Song Contest, impressing and polar-
izing with her disruptive gender performance. The creation of Conchita troubled gender – 
to borrow Judith Butler’s (1990) terms – by assembling an image of pure femininity dis-
rupted by a beard. Paradoxically, though it was widely known that the character of Conchita 
was performed by a biological man, it was still the beard – the only element in line with 
the biological sex of the performer – that appeared artificial and irritating. The beard as an 
alien thing troubled the coherent assemblage. Images of both male and female fans with 
artificial beards went viral on social media. The artificial beard on male fans was now con-
noted with femininity – the beard crossed gender boundaries and came full circle, from 
male to female and back. Other men in opposition to Conchita’s gender crossings shaved 
off their facial hair in protest and shared before and after selfies on social media. The beard 
had been appropriated by queer identity (Pilipets, 2018). Five years later, the black image 
on Instagram articulated an interruption of Conchita’s continuous identity performance. 
After a week of anticipation, on the sixth day – obviously in reference to the biblical crea-
tion of “man” – Neuwirth brought light into the darkness. The new persona created by Neu-
wirth through digital images on Instagram and videos on YouTube showed him in male 
clothing with white short hair and a white beard – but with mascara and in high heels. Both 
 
1 Pseudonyms have been changed to protect the users’ anonymity. 
2 https://www.mirror.co.uk/3am/celebrity-news/eurovisions-conchita-wurst-embraces-new-
10406831, accessed 29 March 2019. 
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Conchita and Neuwirth’s new self are disruptive of the spatial assemblage that Butler de-
scribes as the heterosexual matrix. 
The example of Conchita Wurst/Tom Neuwirth points to the central role that identity and 
its disruptions and reconfigurations play in contemporary Western societies. With the de-
cline of stable class identities and the increasingly fractured nature of everyday identity 
expressions our selves seem to be in disarray. A series of seminal publications over the past 
three decades have discussed these identity ruptures, from Harrison White’s Identity and 
Control (1992), to Manuel Castells’ The Power of Identity (1997), and Francis Fukuyama’s 
Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment (2018). While articulated 
from highly diverse perspectives, all three books point to the deep economic, social, and 
cultural ruptures that destabilize our sense of who we are. This disorder of things that define 
us causes fear of a loss of control over the self, but at the same time this disorder also creates 
new opportunities to challenge and break down entrenched structures of domination.  
The crucial role of such identity ruptures and reconfigurations becomes particularly evident 
in the current digital age marked by new modes of participatory engagement. The availa-
bility of new communicative channels provides new means to articulate a politics of pres-
ence (Phillips, 1995) that serves the articulation of gendered, sexed, raced, and classed 
identities. The #MeToo movement, for example, illustrates how active identity expressions 
– what Michael Saward (2010; 2006) terms representative claims – continue to facilitate 
the disruption of established power asymmetries and can contribute to a more radical de-
mocracy. By narrating the self in personal stories of sexual harassment and rape, and by 
linking these stories to personal social media profiles that reify digital identities as net-
worked selves (Cohen, 2012; Papacharissi, 2011), public identity performance can chal-
lenge domination. Social media provide a space of appearance (Arendt, 1958; Butler, 2015) 
– a stage exposed to the gaze of wide audiences that were unreachable for citizens before 
the digital era. Yet, these new modes of everyday cyborgization reconfiguring the human 
subject through technology do not simply harness emancipatory potential, but are them-
selves, in many respects, tools of control and domination. The multi-billion giant Facebook 
epitomizes a new culture of personal exposure in a social economy of appreciation (Cambre 
2014, 305; van Dijck 2013). The personally curated faces on Facebook profiles compete 
for attention in the currency of likes, shares, and “friends” producing data streams that serve 
the commercial benefit of a few.  
The commodification of personal data shared on social media that function as a new re-
source fuelling digital capitalism (Srnicek, 2017; Chandler and Fuchs, 2019) and online 
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surveillance by governmental actors (de Lagasnerie, 2017) inspire a surge in activism for 
and through anonymity. While the #MeToo movement is primarily known for its insistent 
self-revelations that link online and offline identities, it is less known that many victims 
also report abuse anonymously. Rather than a mere technique to avoid public exposure, 
anonymity today becomes the core radical democratic practice of many protest movements. 
Groups such as Anonymous, Pussy Riot, and the Zapatistas all utilize masks as a way to 
conceal identities and signal collectivity. After the uprisings in parts of the Arab world in 
2011, Time Magazine declared the anonymous protester the person of the year, depicting a 
face with female eyes peeking out from between a winter hat and a cloth covering her 
mouth and nose. The white, impishly grinning Guy Fawkes masks worn by many in the 
Occupy movement has become an emblem of political contestation along with the black 
balaclava of the Black Bloc and the hoods of Black Lives Matter. The series of laws intro-
duced around the world that prohibit publicly concealing one’s face are developed in tan-
dem with new means of governmental surveillance on the internet. Both of these trends 
coalesce with the controversy and legal action around the public wearing of veils by Mus-
lim women who are “using the deliberately assumed invisibility of the burka as a form of 
protest” (Zakaria, 2017, 59). These contestations result in a complex discursive clash 
around privacy rights, political freedoms of expression, and gender, cultural, and racial 
identity. Hence, “the political struggle over anonymity when one acts is among the defining 
struggles of our time” (Isin & Ruppert, 2015, 67). 
The things that facilitate anonymity, such as masks, veils, and digital avatars, interrupt con-
tinuous identity performances in the space of appearance. Butler explains the space of ap-
pearance as a highly regulated discursive realm that restricts who can appear and who is 
rendered invisible. For those who are granted access, the spatial arrangement regulates the 
appreciation and credibility of democratic subjects along their identity markers of gender, 
sexuality, race, and class. Through the disruptive power of things, however, new spaces 
that subvert the established rules can be created: “only through an insistent form of appear-
ing precisely when and where we are effaced does the sphere of appearance break and open 
in new ways” (Butler, 2015, 37). 
While spaces of appearance are characterized by internal hierarchies, they are often con-
structed as participatory spaces for citizens’ engagement with the aim of overcoming social 
inequality. Just as masks, veils, and Conchita’s beard serve to disrupt established identities, 
so participatory spaces fulfil the function of breaking up established modes of governmen-
tality: “participatory approaches explicitly seek to disrupt the order of hierarchical institu-
tions, creating new and different spaces in which different rules of the game offer otherwise 
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silenced actors a chance to speak and be heard” (Cornwall, 2002, 7). The term “participa-
tory spaces” brings together insights from studies of state-sponsored democratic innova-
tions (Smith, 2009), social movements’ participatory assemblies (della Porta, 2009), and 
representative state institutions (Bächtiger et al., 2005). Shielding their participants from 
external social inequalities, these participatory spaces strive to facilitate freedom and equal-
ity through their structural settings. They interrupt external hierarchy with internal democ-
racy. 
Freedom and equality have long been understood as core values that define democracy 
(Evans, 2001, 342; Jones, 2001, 364). When trying to make sense of how these two values 
relate to one another in the context of participatory spaces, there are two competing ap-
proaches. Chantal Mouffe understands freedom and equality as being in an unresolvable 
tension. She describes this antagonistic relationship as the democratic paradox (Mouffe, 
2005 [2000]). Freedom is conceptualized in liberal terms as a divisible good that – in dem-
ocratic societies – is regulated by the principle of equality.3 This tension, seeing equality 
being compromised by freedom and vice versa, is contested by the anarchist concept of 
equal liberty, which understands the two values as mutually dependent. Freedom can only 
be realized through equality and vice versa (Newman, 2016). Whether understanding free-
dom and equality in liberal terms as in tension or in anarchist terms as mutually dependent, 
it is the spatial arrangement that affects their constellation. The interruption of the estab-
lished order through participatory spaces, then, allows for the reconfiguration of the rela-
tions between freedom and equality.  
In societies dominated by social hierarchies, freedom and equality are affected by the iden-
tities inscribed in the subjects’ bodies and performed through culturally coded objects and 
discursive concepts. The politics of presence advanced in feminist democratic theory under 
the term “difference democracy” advocates the visibility of marginalized identities in the 
space of appearance to draw attention to inequalities and particular standpoints. This strat-
egy to increase equality, however, also curtails the freedom of the democratic subject to 
explore the multiple self. It restricts the subject to its embodied identity performance as 
extensively elaborated by difference democrats who speak of the dilemma of difference 
(Young, 1989, 268). Here the democratic paradox appears to be at work, whereby equality 
restricts freedom. 
 
3 That Mouffe’s work is rooted in liberal thought is often overlooked, although it is clearly stated 
by Mouffe and Laclau themselves (1985, 176). 
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This thesis will seek ways out of the dilemma of difference and toward the democratization 
of subject constitution. It will explore how interruptions can be employed to advance free-
dom and equality as core values of democratic politics in the digital age. It investigates 
participatory spaces that facilitate new ways of political engagement for democratic sub-
jects and asks how novel identity configurations through anonymity can offer the freedom 
to explore the multiple self. The subject itself is perceived as subject to change.  
This thesis will address the following questions: 
How can various structural settings of participatory spaces that afford different 
identity performances advance freedom and equality in the digital age? 
Which strategies lead out of the confining tendencies of the dilemma of differ-
ence? 
How are subjects constituted in participatory spaces and in particular in digital 
spaces? 
What role does anonymity play in democracy and how can anonymity be em-
ployed as radical democratic practice? 
How is the politics of presence reconfigured in the digital age? And how can it 
be employed as part of a progressive democratic strategy of social transfor-
mation? 
To answer these questions, this thesis will engage with various sources inside and beyond 
democratic theory and enrich them with insights from various empirical studies to generate 
theory with a robust empirical grounding. In doing so, it will develop a concept of partici-
patory spaces as assemblages consisting of affective things. The constellations of these 
things afford, suggest, and restrict particular identity performances. Their constellations 
configure the potentials of freedom and equality. Yet, the spaces themselves are also the 
creation of democratic subjects. Identity and space are thus in a dialectical process of mu-
tual constitution. Understanding democratic subjects and their identities themselves as spa-
tial assemblages consisting of human bodies, cultural objects, and discursive concepts al-
lows for an exploration of how participatory spaces enable the rearranging of identity and 
how subjects may rearrange participatory spaces. From this perspective, the thesis develops 
the concept of a politics of becoming, which does not stand in opposition to, but rather 
augments, the politics of presence. Presence is reconfigured through disidentification and 
anonymity in both analogue and digital spaces. This does not entail a negation of identity 
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and the body, but a rearrangement of embodied identity articulations that allow for freedom 
and equality, while still affording the expression of difference and diversity. 
The endeavour of this thesis addresses various blind spots in democratic theory and con-
tributes to innovation and progress in debates on democracy. First, democratic theory has 
been surprisingly quiet on the topic of anonymity. While anonymity is arguably one of the 
most prominent features of liberal democracy, as evident in the secret ballot, as well as in 
various unconventional modes of political participation such as wearing masks in public 
protest, pamphleteering, political graffiti, and online discussions, to date there is no coher-
ent concept of anonymity in democratic theory. To fill this gap, this thesis will generate a 
complex understanding of anonymity rooted in democratic theory. Second, in light of the 
recent spatial turn in the social sciences (e.g. Massey, 2005), democratic theory increas-
ingly employs spatial metaphors to speak of new spaces for political engagement (Dryzek, 
2009; Mouffe, 1993, 20). This metaphoric use of space has yet to be substantiated. Expla-
nations as to why such new modes of participation take a spatial form are still missing. This 
thesis will develop a spatial theory of democracy that explains the workings of participatory 
spaces. Third, although many democratic theorists are enthusiastic about new means of 
political engagement through digital communication, they have yet to address new modes 
of identity creation online. What is overlooked is that digital media not only provide a 
means for political participation, but also harness democratic potentials for self-expression 
through an increase in variability and agency in relation to the presentation of the self. By 
employing theories of assemblage, this thesis will contribute to an understanding of how 
subjects are constituted in participatory processes online. Fourth, while some recent texts 
have engaged with the significance of things (Honig, 2017), bodies (Machin, 2015), and 
assemblages (Bennett, 2005) in democracy, an exploration of how such new materialist 
perspectives contribute to an understanding of democratic innovation and processes of 
democratic self-constitution is lacking. Far from developing an entire new materialist read-
ing of democracy, this thesis takes inspiration from debates in new materialism, while hold-
ing some reservations. And fifth, the thesis will explore new ways of engaging with demo-
cratic theory. Rather than adhering to single models of democracy, as has been recently 
criticized (Saward, 2003b; Warren, 2017), this thesis will explore multiple perspectives in 
democratic theory to assemble and compare different ways of making sense of democracy 
(Parkinson, 2012, 9; Smith, 2019 forthcoming). To broaden the scope of democratic theory, 
it will also engage with strands in democratic thought that have often been neglected by the 
textbooks on democratic theory, such as feminist and anarchist approaches. This pluraliza-
tion of democratic thought will support the core argument of this thesis calling for a 
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pluralization of various participatory spaces in society that afford different and diverse 
identity performances. 
1.2. Participatory Spaces as Interruption 
Beginning in the 1960s, democratic theory has shifted its focus from democratic state in-
stitutions and conventional forms of participation such as voting and petitioning to new 
participatory modes of public engagement. Theories of participatory (Pateman, 1970), de-
liberative (Dryzek, 1990), and agonistic democracy (Mouffe, 1992c), which I subsume un-
der the term “radical democracy”, explore how new spaces for citizens’ engagement can 
reinvigorate and transform democracy. Such participatory spaces include both formalized 
institutions such as participatory budgets and citizens’ assemblies and social movements’ 
organizations, occupations, and protest formations (Cornwall, 2004a). The experience of 
participatory spaces is not confined to Western imaginations but spans the world, thus en-
riching the Western concept of democracy with innovations from the Global South (e.g. 
Aiyar, 2010; Roque & Shankland, 2007; Wampler, 2007). While radical democrats tend to 
agree that “we need to invent new social and political forms that introduce radical disloca-
tion in the present forms of domination” (Wenman, 2013, 17), the reformist agenda of cur-
rent debates about democratic innovations promoting a reinvigoration of democratic par-
ticipation to maintain the functionality of the system (e.g. Geissel & Newton, 2012) is 
looked upon with suspicion by some radical democrats. There is a rift running through 
radical democratic theory between those arguing for a mere augmentation of existing de-
mocracy in a reformist sense on the one side and those arguing for radical transformation 
through systemic change on the other (Wenman, 2013). With Aletta Norval, I argue in 
favour of looking beyond this divide and understanding both democratic augmentation and 
radical transformation as steps in a continuous effort of radical democratization (Norval, 
2007, 185; see also Cornwall, 2004b, 85). While it is crucial to always question the power 
relations in which participatory spaces are embedded and the intentions with which they 
are created, they all signify a democratic potential (Cornwall and Schattan Coelho, 2007). 
By bringing people together who would otherwise not meet, by rearranging the constella-
tion of bodies that potentially constitute democratic space, new modes of participation can 
work to challenge the established order of things. In Butler’s (2015, 85) words: “In wresting 
that power, a new space is created, a new ‘between’ of bodies, as it were, that lays claim to 
existing space”. 
I will argue that the intentional rearrangement of bodies to form democratic space always 
constitutes an interruption. It temporarily brings the established order of things in disarray 
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and provides the ground for the emergence of new democratic subjectivities. Participatory 
spaces, whether in the form of governmental democratic innovations or of social movement 
formations, always function as an intervention that allows those who are usually unheard a 
chance to speak. By giving voice to the governed, democratic innovations “can challenge 
the existing institutional order” (Smith, 2009, 3). Against the neoliberal credo suggesting 
that there is no alternative, they demonstrate that things can be otherwise. 
The term “interruption” is of particular value in comprehending democratic innovation. 
Interruption features differently in radical democratic thinking. In Antigone, Interrupted, 
Bonnie Honig (2013) discusses interruption as a conversational intervention that can have 
either democratic or dominant effects: “interruption postulates both equality, as when two 
people interrupt each other to knit together a conversation in tandem, and inequality, as 
when one party must yield the floor as it were, to the other” (13). Nancy Fraser, in contrast, 
focuses exclusively on the negative workings of interruption as it thwarts mutual under-
standing and hinders justice (Fraser, 1997). Jacques Rancière, on the contrary, conceptual-
izes interruption as inherently democratic. For him, interruption introduces a moment of 
deeply experienced freedom and equality that disrupts modes of domination: “Politics oc-
curs because, or when, the natural order of the shepherd kings, the warlords, or property 
owners is interrupted by a freedom that crops up and makes real the ultimate equality on 
which any social order rests” (Rancière, 1999, 16). It is the Rancièrian notion of interrup-
tion facilitating experiences of freedom and equality that participatory spaces potentially 
harness.  
What makes interruption such a curious concept is that it does not articulate a permanent 
break. Rather, it establishes a recess – a pause – within continuity. The prefix inter – the 
Latin “between” – indicates that after this interlude, things go back to normal. Just like the 
two interventions marked by dashes in the previous two sentences, the inbetweenness of 
interruption makes us pause and think. “To conceive rupture as a systemic or total upheaval 
would be futile. Rather, rupture is a moment where the future breaks through into the pre-
sent. It is that moment where it becomes possible to do something different in or by saying 
something different” (Isin & Ruppert, 2015, 57). It is in this sense that I believe a separation 
between reformists and revolutionaries in progressive debates is often counterproductive. 
What is needed are interruptions of modes of domination as part of a continuous process of 
radical democratization. Interruptions open up spaces. By defining the boundaries of a be-
fore and an after, interruptions provide openings in which things can be different. Such 
openings can also be conceived of as think spaces, as realms in which different thinking is 
possible. Innovation and interruption thus go hand in hand. 
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The key realization is, however, that while it might appear that after the interruption things 
simply go back to normal and the disorder of things ends as things return to their naturalized 
places, this is not the case. After the interruption, things are never entirely as they were 
before. Ostensibly, after citizens’ assemblies and university occupations end, participants 
go home. Their bodies shift back to their assigned place in society. But the experiences of 
equality, of speaking freely, of being taken seriously do not go away. While experiences 
might not be directly carried over into people’s daily lives and the hierarchies of capitalist 
societies might remain unaffected, traces of the democratic experience persist. They change 
how political issues are perceived, they challenge established attitudes, and induce critical 
reflection. By affecting perception, participatory spaces alter the order of things. 
Participatory spaces do not just constitute an interruption of the established order of things; 
rather, they themselves consist of a certain arrangement of things. The spaces that facilitate 
new forms of participation consist of physical things such as walls, pavement, and chairs 
that both limit and afford human interaction. These physical infrastructures are populated 
by human bodies that relate to each other in contingent constellations of power structures, 
sexual attraction, and emotional ties. These social and physical relationalities are inter-
twined with discursive structures of words, concepts, ideas, themes, and notions that enable 
and bound verbal expression. The disruption of the dominant order through participatory 
spaces consists of a rearrangement of things that constitute the respective participatory 
space. 
The established study of new modes of citizens’ participation explores how the design of 
participatory institutions can contribute to democratic goods such as inclusion and equal 
respect among participants (Barnes et al., 2007; Cornwall & Schattan Coelho, 2007; Fung 
& Wright, 2001; Saward, 2000; Smith, 2009; 2005). I believe that the insights of this ap-
proach can be further advanced by exploring the concepts of spaces, things, and bodies. 
Hence my aim is to enrich thought on new modes of participation with new materialist 
inspirations. Although at first glance the two fields of study appear to be rooted in quite 
distinct ontologies, there are surprising overlaps in their core assumptions and potential for 
mutual enrichment. In a first attempt of “rethinging” democracy from a new materialist 
perspective, Honig (2017, 5) claims: “Public things are part of the ‘holding environment’ 
of democratic citizenship; they furnish the world of democratic life… They also constitute 
us, complement us, limit us, thwart us, and interpellate us into democratic citizenship”. 
Here things constitute an affordance structure through their mutual affectivity – a notion 
relatable to the debates on institutional design in democratic innovations. This thesis will 
examine the constellations of things that constitute participatory spaces and ask how the 
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disruption of the dominant order through a rearrangement of things allows democratic sub-
jects to express themselves freely and equally. 
1.3. Freedom and Equality in Participatory Spaces 
Many democratic theorists define democracy as being constituted by its core values of free-
dom and equality. They conceptualize democracy as an equal division of freedom among 
subjects within a given space (e.g. Evans, 2001, 342; Jones, 2001, 364; Mouffe, 2005 
[2000], 19). Chantal Mouffe famously describes the relationship between freedom and 
equality as the democratic paradox. Her argument starts from the tension between two dis-
tinct traditions, liberalism and democratic thought, that together constitute liberal democ-
racy.  
On the one side we have the liberal tradition constituted by the rule of law, the 
defence of human rights and the respect of individual liberty; on the other the 
democratic tradition whose main ideas are those of equality, identity between 
governing and the governed and popular sovereignty. There is no necessary 
relation between those two distinct traditions but only a contingent historical 
articulation. (Mouffe, 2005 [2000], 5) 
The traditions to which Mouffe points have also been discussed by other authors. They 
explain the marriage of capitalism as a market-driven ideology of competition with the 
republican democratic values of popular participation as an odd construct (Abensour, 2011 
[1997]; Meiksins Wood, 1995). The liberal tradition understands freedom in terms of indi-
vidualism and entrepreneurship, as the freedom from state interference in private matters 
and the protection of private property. This liberal concept of freedom is then translated 
into the political realm where individuals are free to exercise democratic rights of voting, 
standing for office, and expressing opinions. Freedom here is conceptualized as the means 
to pursue our own interests as rational actors in a competitive market setting (see Downs, 
1957; Schumpeter, 1947). The democratic tradition, in contrast, rests on the experiences of 
the Athenian polis, Rousseau’s direct democratic thought (Rousseau 1998 [1762]), and the 
republican premises of popular sovereignty and widespread participation (Arendt, 2009 
[1963]; Habermas, 1992 [1962]). The two traditions are in tension because the logic of 
capitalism rests on the assumption of meritocratic hierarchy and the accumulation of power, 
while the democratic tradition insists on equality. The capitalist need for the ever wider 
expansion of the market to maximize profits calls for an ever wider extension of democratic 
jurisdictions, which makes representative governments unavoidable. Representative 
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institutions, however, stand in contrast to popular sovereignty. The curious hybrid of liberal 
democracy combines the capitalist logic of competition, hierarchy, and self-interest with 
the democratic logic of popular participation (Meiksins Wood, 1995). Thus, it must be ac-
cepted, Mouffe (2005 [2000], 5) argues, “that the tension between equality and liberty can-
not be reconciled and that there can only be contingent hegemonic forms of stabilization of 
their conflict”.  
What remains unanswered, however, is why freedom and equality are in tension. What de-
termines their antagonistic relationship? This question can be answered by understanding 
that Mouffe’s own work is situated in liberal thought, which has long proclaimed freedom 
and equality as competing values, since “[e]very man has freedom to do all that he wills, 
provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man” (Spencer, 1851, 103). In the 
tradition of Hobbes’ Leviathan, the freedom of one individual will be used to infringe on 
the freedom of others due to the frightened and aggressive nature of “man” (Hobbes, 1968 
[1651]). If we think of the participatory spaces in which this thesis is interested, we can see 
how the democratic paradox plays out. Within participatory spaces, democratic subjects are 
limited by the actions of others. Speaking time, for example, is limited. The more one per-
son speaks, the less others are able to express themselves. The louder or more assertively 
one person speaks, the less others feel like their contributions will be appreciated. As will 
be discussed in Chapter 2, those suffering from such limitations of expression are often 
subjects with marginalized identities (Karpowitz and Mendelberg, 2014; Young, 2000). 
The ideal envisaged by radical democrats in spatial terms, then, is the equal division of 
freedom to act within a given space.  
But things are not so simple. While speaking time might be limited, words do not always 
limit. Their effects also depend on their content. Words can encourage the marginalized to 
participate, they can open doors to new thinking, or provide representation for those who 
are not physically present (Dryzek and Niemeyer, 2008). The freedom of one must not 
always infringe on the freedom of others. When Habermas speaks of the freedom from 
domination, curiously the concepts of freedom and equality become synonymous. Freedom 
from domination denotes that all present within a space have the same potential to express 
themselves (Habermas, 1984 [1981]). What is more, consider the situation in which the 
freedom of marginalized groups to participate increases. In this case both freedom and 
equality are advanced, so they appear not to be in tension. From the perspective of the 
dominator, freedom to dominate decreases, however. But this can also be seen as an in-
crease in the freedom of the dominator, who is now free from dominating. In other words, 
it is not only the dominated who is freed from suppression; the dominator too is freed from 
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committing gruesome acts of suppression. This understanding resonates with Anne Phil-
lips’ (2015) words, when she argues: “If those people still have power over us or we over 
them, we are not yet engaging fully with what it means for us both to be human beings” (1) 
since being human “is about claiming our equality” (9). So if the dominator is unfree be-
cause of her acts of domination, then equality is the condition for freedom. 
This is the core argument of anarchist conceptions of the relationship between freedom and 
equality, which define the two values as mutually enriching, even as co-dependent. The 
unfreedoms of others makes the self unfree. This is expressed in the concept of equal liberty 
that understands the two values as one and the same. There is no trade-off between freedom 
and equality; there is only equal liberty (Newman, 2016, 176). 
This thesis will explore the relationship between freedom and equality within participatory 
spaces. It will ask how such spatial configurations can aspire to realize equality while af-
fording freedom for the subject to change. Is an increase in freedom used by subjects to 
dominate over others, as suggested in the liberal-inspired democratic paradox, or does more 
freedom lead to equality, as suggested by the anarchist concept of equal liberty? Does free-
dom call on subjects as wolves or as humanists? 
1.4. The Democratic Subject as Agentic Assemblage 
When asking the question of how freedom and equality can be advanced in participatory 
spaces, the identity of the democratic subject is paramount. We live in capitalist societies 
that are characterized by deeply entrenched inequalities along the lines of identity catego-
ries. These inequalities concern financial resources just as much as respect, recognition, 
and political power. In fact, all of them are inherently linked. This is pointed out by a fem-
inist discourse in democratic theory that promotes an understanding of difference as a re-
source for democratic engagement (Young, 1997b). These debates associated with the term 
“difference democracy” argue for a politics of presence (Phillips, 1995), giving marginal-
ized groups visibility in the space of appearance. The identified body claims equality 
through its corporeal performance of the self (Phillips, 2015). Examples of the politics of 
presence include parliamentary quota regulations (Mansbridge, 2005) and protest for-
mations such as SlutWalks and groups such as Femen that expose the naked female body 
to advance women’s rights (O’Keefe, 2014; Betlemidze, 2015). From a new materialist 
perspective, here the body is conceived as an agentic thing that affects others. Without the 
need to speak, it is filled with content that acts (see Mansbridge, 2005, 62).  
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In respect of the democratic paradox, it becomes apparent that while the politics of presence 
effectively advances equality, it works to limit the freedom for democratic subjects to ex-
plore multiple sides of their selves, to experience that which is marginalized within our-
selves. To this end, this thesis is interested in how equality can be advanced while simulta-
neously affording the freedom of the subject to change. This endeavour calls for a different 
conception of the self, identity, and democratic subjectivity, one that allows for disidenti-
fication and resignification (Rancière, 1999; Butler, 2004) as part of a politics of becoming 
(Connolly, 1996). From this vantage point, the stabilizing of identity constructions is an 
artificial act of domination through the internalization of discipline. Here I borrow Sheldon 
Wolin’s attribute of fugitivity, which he applies to democracy (Wolin, 1994), and under-
stand the subject as being on the run. The fugitive self constantly tries to escape the reifi-
cation of identity. It behaves like eye floaters – the spots in our eyes we never can get a 
hold of. As we try to focus on them, they move away. The coherent public persona, then, 
is an act of masquerade (Butler, 1990, 50).  
To generate an understanding of the self as inherently fugitive and transformative, I employ 
the assemblage theory introduced earlier. Not only spatial arrangements, but identity and 
the self can be explained as an agentic assemblage of things. Jane Bennett explores how 
food enters the body, nourishes it, is converted into energy, and leaves it. Similar explora-
tions could address medicine that not only enters but alters our bodies and our perception 
of them. Such an approach advances “a conception of the self… as itself an impure, human-
nonhuman assemblage” (Bennett, 2010, xvii). The body appears as an assemblage of body 
parts, blood vessels, veins, fat, bones, cartilage, brain cells, eyeballs, guts, skin, hair, and 
so on. It is not the body alone and in itself that defines who we are. The assemblage of the 
body interacts with discursive concepts of gender, sexuality, race, class, age, etc. and with 
political affiliations, personal experiences, motives, and desires. These concepts relate to 
social practices, such as social protocols and gender or racially coded body language, and 
culturally coded things such as makeup, clothing, and hairstyles (see Young, 1994). As an 
agentic assemblage, the democratic subject appears as a network of things that affect and 
are affected by each other.  
This assemblage is well explained by what Jon Elster (1986) refers to as the multiple self. 
According to this notion, we are constituted by different, competing parts such as desires, 
emotions, reasons, and passions. The conflict between reason and desire plays a particularly 
important role. The Freudian theory of the id, ego, and superego is one approach to the 
multiple self, the notion of a homo sociologicus pursuing the common good and a homo 
economicus pursuing self-interest is another, and the successive self, changing over time, 
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is yet another. People feel and act differently according to their current body chemistry, 
blood sugar levels, hormones, etc. The multiple self can thus be explained as an assemblage 
of affective things which together develop a decentred kind of agency akin to swarm intel-
ligence. This is what Bennett (2010, 21) calls “distributive agency”.  
Understanding the democratic subject as assemblage has far-reaching consequences for the 
study of participatory spaces. First, spatial arrangements bring out different sides of the 
multiple self. The constellation of physical, social, and discursive things at a given moment 
affects some things and not others. Second, who the democratic subject is changes space. 
As the bodies of subjects present constitute space, alteration in their identities, how they 
express themselves and are seen by others, alters the entire space. 
The role of the democratic subject that this thesis examines clashes with some new materi-
alist views. Many new materialist thinkers insist on collapsing the subject/object division. 
The “democracy of objects” is constituted by the equality of all things (Bryant, 2011). One 
of the key normative motivations of new materialist thought is to consider nonhuman things 
including animals, forests, the climate, and so on as agents within democratic processes. 
From this perspective, democratic theory’s preoccupation with human subjectivity is an 
outgrowth of modern humanist Enlightenment thought, which develops an anthropocentric 
conception of the world with humans as explorers who conquer nature and civilize the wild 
(see Bennett, 2010). While I sympathize with this criticism, I am not convinced that the 
solution is to overlook human consciousness and intentionality, complex features that I 
would not attribute to a chair or a tree. I feel that such radical equality between all things 
including humans also has dangerous political implications, freeing human subjects from 
conscious political action. I am afraid that the democracy of objects approach (Bryant, 
2011) and the promotion of enchantment (Bennett, 2010) might obscure intentions behind 
things. Many artefacts are created with the intention to affect others in certain ways – online 
spaces are a prime example (Beyer, 2014a). This intentionality is often overlooked and the 
democracy of objects approach merely obscures it further. 
In this thesis, I see humans as fulfilling a double role. On the one hand, they are indeed 
things as part of spatial assemblages. As social things, humans affect others through their 
physical presence – just like other things that constitute space. In this regard, it also makes 
sense to think about how human bodies should be arranged – along with other things – to 
facilitate equality and freedom. At the same time, humans fulfil the role of subjects who 
reflect on their actions and consciously engage in politics. This conscious engagement is, 
however, to be understood in terms of distributive agency. Humans as subjects do not 
  15 
simply act rationally; rather, their actions result from a conscious and unconscious negoti-
ation between various sides of the multiple self. They are influenced by different states of 
bodily chemistry, different experiences, different positions in social structures, and shifting 
motivations. While the approach proposed here does not see humans and other things as 
equal – all things have different qualities, human consciousness and intentionality among 
them – it does indeed open up a more democratic perspective on the relationship between 
humans and nonhumans. The multiple parts that make up the individual human assemblage 
are interconnected with other human and nonhuman things outside the individual subject 
that afford, restrict, and suggest democratic subjectivity.  
1.5. Anonymity and Disidentification as Radical Democratic Practice 
As a child in the early 1990s, I enjoyed watching a Saturday night TV show called “Her-
zblatt” (German: sweetheart). This show was modelled after the American “The Dating 
Game” and followed a simple plot. One candidate of one sex had to choose a romantic 
partner by interviewing three candidates of the opposite sex through a panel wall that pre-
vented the contestants from seeing each other. The premise was that a partner should be 
picked on the basis of what they said rather than how they looked. Today, new dating show 
formats are popular. I enjoy watching the show “Naked Attraction”, in which a candidate 
picks one of six entirely naked candidates who do not (or hardly) speak. The show entails 
an examination of different body parts and discussion of sexual practices including personal 
experiences and statistical facts. The two shows follow the entire opposite logic: attraction 
based on content vs. attraction based on looks. It might be easy to understand “Naked At-
traction” as part of a trend of objectification and even commodification of the body (see 
Phillips, 2013) – a trend that is also reflected in current dating apps. Indeed, the choice 
between several naked people elevated on podiums for bodily inspection does call to mind 
the image of slave markets. But there is also another side to the coin. “Naked Attraction” 
fulfils an important role in sex education: it promotes diverse body images including fat 
and skinny bodies, different skin colours, and relationships of different sexes (and num-
bers). These qualities of diversity are undermined by the concept of “Herzblatt” which con-
ceals difference.  
It could be argued that while the two shows ostensibly seem to follow opposite logics, they 
actually perform the same function: they interrupt identity. While “Herzblatt” interrupts 
visibility, “Naked Attraction” interrupts the voice. In the latter show, the body is the affec-
tive thing that expresses meaning, while in the former, it is the spoken word. In both cases, 
candidates maintain a certain degree of anonymity. 
  16 
The anonymity of silent, naked humans is puzzling and speaks to the complexity of the 
phenomenon. Anonymity is literally about the “unnamedness” of people or their unknow-
ability more broadly. So how can we know a naked person if we do not know their names, 
their occupations, and what they think? Such complex thinking about anonymity prompts 
the question of how to draw the line between anonymous and non-anonymous encounters. 
What makes Alcoholics Anonymous anonymous insofar as people identified by their first 
names sit in a circle and have face-to-face conversations about intimate aspects of their 
lives? How is a person anonymous who wanders about an unknown city filled with people? 
How does a sexual act – possibly the most intimate thing imaginable – between two people 
who have met very recently and have no intention of seeing each other again qualify as 
anonymous sex? Is it the face, body, name, content, occupation, family status, social secu-
rity number or IP address of a person that needs to be hidden in order to facilitate anonym-
ity? 
This thesis will explore anonymity and its application in participatory spaces as the inter-
ruption of continuous identity performances as part of a politics of becoming. This tempo-
rary interruption relies on things that enter, disrupt, and reconfigure the identity assemblage 
of the subject. Masks, for example, interrupt everyday identity performances. Walls often 
work to interrupt identity. Think, for instance, of voting booths for casting a ballot, confes-
sion booths to whisper words through a grid, public toilet booths whose walls serve the 
scribbling of graffiti, public walls that display street art or panel walls through which can-
didates speak in a game show, a piece of paper filled with words of political instigation or 
a computer screen filled with racial slurs. Online nicknames, pseudonyms, avatars, and 
digital images can also serve as things that interrupt identity. They are improper names 
(Rancière, 1999), artificial things that reek of their recent creation.  
Yet, these things do not simply negate and do away with identity. Rather, the things that 
interrupt identity assemblages are always interfaces; they are the means for new identity 
constructions. The things that efface the democratic subject at the same time serve as the 
surface for new, temporary faces. They not only interrupt but simultaneously mediate iden-
tity. In the time period of the interruption of the officially identified persona, a new identity 
is created. The gap is not empty; it is full of newness. The interruption is a moment of 
innovation of the self. And in the context of participatory spaces, it is potentially a demo-
cratic innovation. It is this moment of innovation as democratic self-transformation that 
this thesis will explore.  
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In the case of Anonymous it is the Guy Fawkes mask, for Pussy Riot it is the colourful 
Balaclava, for the Guerrilla Girls it is the gorilla mask, for some Muslim feminists it is the 
veil, and for the Ku Klux Klan it is the white hood that both interrupts and constitutes 
identity. While we have undoubtedly witnessed a rise in the use of the mask in social move-
ments, the idea of anonymity is nothing new. The hood that conceals identity in the Black 
Lives Matter movement to protest racially motivated police brutality is mirrored in the tale 
of Robin Hood stealing from the rich and giving to the poor. The ubiquitous use of avatars 
in virtual online role play environments, which plays an increasingly significant role in 
staging online protest, strangely relates to the tale of the long-nosed Cyrano de Bergerac 
who employed a handsome human avatar to convey his beautiful words to the lovely Rox-
ane. From the uncertain origin of many texts attributed to William Shakespeare to the rev-
olutionary writings now attributed to Thomas Paine and Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, 
anonymity has historically played a crucial role in Western societies.  
As the diversity of these examples demonstrates, anonymity does not always have positive 
effects. While this thesis is interested in the employment of anonymity for radical demo-
cratic acts of disidentification (Muñoz, 1999; Rancière, 1999), anonymity plays a highly 
ambiguous role within the sphere of democracy. In her investigation of the history of the 
hood as an object of political relevance, Allison Kinney (2016, 71) states: “For as long as 
powerful forces have weaponized hoods… wearing them to conceal their own violence, 
other people have relied on hoods’ anonymity and everyday ubiquity in order to fight back, 
escape, and protest”. I will argue that the things that afford anonymity always have liberat-
ing effects. They free the democratic subject to act. This newly acquired freedom, however, 
might have detrimental effects for equality. Anonymous subjects can use their freedom to 
exclude, submit, and deceive, thereby exacerbating power asymmetries. These observa-
tions confirm the tension between freedom and equality described in the democratic para-
dox. However, anonymity can also work to include the marginalized, to subvert concentra-
tions of power, and to vent honest sentiments. In these cases, anonymity has equalizing 
effects. The anarchist equal liberty appears to be at work.  
These reconfigurations of the relations between freedom and equality are facilitated by the 
spatial rearrangement of the assemblage that constitutes democratic subjectivity. The sta-
bility of the identity assemblages of body parts, skin pigments, sex organs, discursive iden-
tity ascriptions, social expectations, and so on is destabilized as it is interrupted by masks, 
avatars, ballots, walls, and screens. This interruption rearranges the elements in the assem-
blage, bringing to the fore elements of the multiple self that were previously hidden: “An-
onymity engages a type of practice and a type of subjectification that cast our unconscious 
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in a critical light; it provides the means to question conventional modalities of political 
subjectification and expose the effects of power that bear on us through these same channels 
without our awareness” (de Lagasnerie, 2017, 58). The rearrangement of the assemblage 
of the self, I will argue, is intertwined with the rearrangement of democratic spatiality. The 
different constellations of things that constitute participatory spaces afford, restrict, and 
suggest different identity performances. In turn, it is the anonymous subject as agentic as-
semblage that arranges democratic spatiality: “Anonymity… redefine[s] the contours of the 
democratic sphere, that is, the way we conceive it and the relations we are able to establish 
within it” (de Lagasnerie, 2017, 58). 
1.6. Behold the Rise of the Cyborg 
Through the increasing ubiquity of technologically mediated communication today ano-
nymity shifts to the centre of everyday life. Spanning large distances between interlocutors, 
digital communication tools both mediate and interrupt identity. To answer the question of 
who the democratic subject is becoming through the everyday use of smart communication 
devices, we need to investigate the role of the interfaces that mediate our identities. This 
thesis contends that the interruption of our identity assemblages through interfaces gives 
rise to new subjectivities that have new qualities and different self-perceptions. These new 
subjectivities emerge on the basis of a reconfigured spatiality and at the same time they 
also reconfigure space. By realigning digital and analogue things, cyborgian space and cy-
borgian subjects emerge. 
Consider the following observations I have made over the past years: I am on a bus in a 
city I have never visited before. To check where I am, I don’t look out of the window. I 
look on the screen of my smartphone. I am a blue dot moving around on a street map. My 
blue dot is just passing a church. I look out of the window, yes, there it is. *** I want to 
know if it is raining and I should take my umbrella with me before I leave the house. Instead 
of going to the window and checking for rain, I look on my weather app. *** Working on 
my thesis at 3pm, I feel a bit sleepy. But I slept well, didn’t I? I check the sleep app on my 
smartphone. Last night I slept 7 hours and 42 minutes and my sleeping pattern was quite 
consistent. So no, I can’t be sleepy. *** On the deck of a boat travelling along the Canale 
Grande in Venice, tourists are lining the ship rail to look at the beautiful architecture of the 
buildings along the channel. They do not look at the buildings directly, however. Rather, 
they look at the architecture on the screens of their smartphones and tablets with which they 
take pictures and film the spectacle to share on social media. Their assembled smart device 
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screens build a dense wall of digital representation between onlookers and represented, 
physical space. 
Smartphones have become an important feature of everyday life. They wake us up in the 
morning; their calendars tell us the tasks of the day; during the day they remind us of im-
portant meetings; through their social media apps we communicate with our friends and 
acquaintances; they count our steps and monitor our fitness; on the way home from work 
they buzz in our pockets when we pass the local supermarket to remind us that we have run 
out of toilet paper; at a certain time they remind us to go to bed; their sleep apps lull us to 
sleep; and they monitor our sleep patterns to report it back to us in the morning, when the 
alarm rings and the cycle begins anew. 
The everyday use of smart devices signals a profound shift in who we are. In Seeing Our-
selves Through Technology, Jill Walker Rettberg (2014) discusses how the quantification 
of the self through smartphone apps alters how we perceive the self and others. Such re-
configurations of the self are well captured by Donna Haraway’s metaphor of the cyborg 
(Haraway, 1991 [1985]). The science fiction notion of the cyborg as the configuration of 
physical human body parts and technological prosthesis is currently realized through the 
increasing use of cardiac pacemakers and robotic limbs. Everyday cyborgization goes much 
further, however, and has deep implication for politics (Asenbaum, 2018b). Just as robotic 
limbs extend the physical abilities of humans, so too do hearing aids, eyeglasses, and con-
tact lenses. Smart devices follow the same logic. They can make us hear and see things that 
are far away (Gergen, 2000, xviii). Moreover, the cyborgian transformation of the self 
through online engagement involves the design and curation of alternative self-representa-
tions and the potential expression of previously hidden elements of the multiple self. The 
term “cyborgization” then signifies a process of reconfiguring the assemblage of the self. 
By including smart devices, computer screens, apps, and digital self-representations into 
the assemblage of physical body parts, discursive identity ascriptions, and social conven-
tions, the definition of the self changes. Today we are constituted amid a web of cloud 
computing, big data, wireless connectivity and the Internet of Things that connects us to 
our refrigerators, thermostats, and light bulbs in our homes.  
The connection between our bodies and our smart devices is growing ever closer as mouse 
clicks are replaced by touches, swipes, and taps, which makes the use of smart devices 
more intuitive, natural, and organic. The haptic engagement with smart devices also further 
develops an intimate, personal connection with the device. The link between the human 
subject and the communication tool, which no longer simply constitutes an object of use 
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but instead becomes a part of the cyborgian assemblage, is further strengthened by finger-
print and face recognition technology. For authentication the early generation of 
smartphones required personal passwords – pin codes consisting of four-digit numbers. 
These passwords granted access to whoever knew it so that multiple users could use the 
same device. The introduction first of fingerprint and then face recognition to access 
smartphones signals a major shift. The smart device is now exclusively accessible by one 
individual person via the organic body. This is of particular relevance in respect of govern-
mental surveillance and commercial tracking. While for the early generation GPS could tell 
where a smart device was located, for the current generation GPS can tell where the actual 
person is located (Eve, 2016, 59ff).  
Cyborgian self-constitution heavily relies on social media as a mirror. Every image of the 
self shared online functions as a digital thing in the cyborgian assemblage. The audience of 
such communications is not exclusively and maybe not even primarily the other, but always 
also the self: “When we share photos of our children or a new home or a night out with 
friends our target audience is not just our friends, but also ourselves” (Walker Rettberg, 
2014, 12). Social media create spaces that give the subject a certain degree of control over 
the arrangement of digital things that assemble the networked self (Cohen, 2012; 
Papacharissi, 2011). This creative process is possible through the interruption of identity. 
Even if users create performances of the self that continue identity expressions from offline 
to online, the interruption of communication by an interface always calls for the active 
(re)creation of the self – a representative claim (Saward, 2010), which can never be true to 
the original (Adorno, 1973 [1966]). This provides the potential for democratic openings of 
freedom: “No longer the site of an embodied identity with a rich biography, [the body] 
becomes instead, in this instance, a space of exploration” (Saco, 2002, xxi). 
1.7. Radical Democracy in Perspective 
To understand the implications of the cyborgian subject and modes of disidentification in 
participatory spaces, this thesis builds on a wide range of radical democratic thought. Ra-
ther than devoting the thesis to a single view in democratic theory, I draw on a diversity of 
perspectives, which in my understanding all contribute to the project of radical democracy. 
Throughout the thesis, I will take inspiration from participatory, deliberative, agonistic, 
difference, and transformative approaches in democratic thought that all provide different, 
enriching insights. I do so in response to an ongoing debate in democratic theory about how 
to move the field forward. The deductive model approach that designs ideal normative 
models of democracy and then studies them in the real world has recently been criticized 
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as it is seen as standing in the way of more innovative thinking in democratic theory (Fung, 
2012; Saward, 2019 forthcoming). Mark Warren (2017), for example, argues that “model 
thinking” leads to dead-ends, as models construct a narrow focus and define democracy 
along single practices such as deliberation, voting, or protest. To counter this, Warren de-
velops a problem-based approach that prioritizes problems over norms. Similarly, Michael 
Saward (2003) contends: “We do not need more ‘models of democracy’” (161). Instead he 
proposes a reflexive pragmatism in order to “move beyond a notion of separate… models 
– or beyond ‘modelism’” (168).  
I want to add to this debate, both moving forward beyond single models but at the same 
time making use of the firm normative foundations and the clear outlook that models pro-
vide. Warren (2017, 40) aptly observes that the function of models of democracy is to “clar-
ify normative presuppositions, enabling critical debate about better and worse forms of de-
mocracy”. In the same vein, David Held (2006 [1987], X) claims that a variety of models 
is needed because “[d]emocracy, as an idea and as a political reality, is fundamentally con-
tested”. I follow Parkinson (2012, 9) who argues that “ideal models are useful because they 
help us ask better questions of political activity. They help us attend to what is present in 
the real world, and what is not, especially when we use multiple models to highlight differ-
ent aspects of political action”. This argument not only promotes the value of different 
perspectives in democratic theory, but also suggests their combination to generate a rich 
understanding of the research subject. Smith (2019 forthcoming) advances a similar ap-
proach by arguing: “The theoretical enterprises of deliberative, participatory, agonistic and 
other approaches to democracy differ in significant ways. It is precisely where these differ-
ent theoretical lenses offer alternative perspectives on the same object of study that we can 
gain novel insights”. Rather than speaking of models, which implies a building block ap-
proach for empirical operationalization, I will speak of perspectives, drawing on Iris Mar-
ion Young (2000, 148) who explains: “a perspective is a general orientation on the political 
issues without determining what one sees, and without dictating particular conclusions”. 
I think that such an approach is promising because it combines various angles, generates 
multiple insights, and allows for innovative, normative thinking. In addition, it is particu-
larly well suited to the research interests of this thesis. The metaphor of perspectives is 
rooted in spatial thinking. It suggests that from a particular position within discursive space, 
some things can be seen while others are obscured. Looking through multiple perspectives 
then describes the cognitive task of researchers to create relationality by arranging and 
mapping discursive things. Understanding thinking itself as a sensory or aesthetic 
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experience of space (Dikeç, 2015), different perspectives in democratic thought can con-
tribute to a more intensive experience of the meaning of radical democracy.  
Lastly, an explanation is needed as to why I identify these various perspectives with the 
term “radical democracy”. There is some confusion about the meaning of radical democ-
racy, which stems from its association and at times its equation with agonistic conceptions 
of democracy. This conflation is a relatively recent phenomenon. The original use of the 
term contrasting socialist and anarchist conceptions of council democracy with representa-
tive democracy (Muldoon, 2018) was revived in debates on participatory democracy that 
emerged in the 1960s. In this sense, Carole Pateman (1989, 14) writes about “radical dem-
ocratic theory, which argues for the active participation of all citizens”. In the late 1980s 
and early ’90s, however, the term became closely associated with the work of Chantal 
Mouffe (1992; 1989). Since then, the term has been used in varied ways. Joshua Cohen and 
Archon Fung (2004) equate radical democracy with deliberative democracy and Mark War-
ren (1996) discusses deliberative democracy as a prime example of radical democracy. 
Paulina Tambakaki (2017), in contrast, reserves the term for a wide range of postmodern 
democratic thought including agonistic and autonomist Marxist writing. In an attempt to 
distinguish agonistic democratic thought from the broader discourses described by Tamba-
kaki, Mark Wenman (2013, 5, 89ff) and Ed Wingenbach (2011, xvi) use radical democracy 
only to describe the autonomist Marxist camp. 
In this thesis, I make a case for adhering to the original meaning of radical democracy as 
used by Pateman and indeed prior to her. If radical democracy is taken to mean what its 
etymology implies – the roots, original meaning or essence of the rule of the people 
(Holman et al., 2015) – then neither agonists, participatory nor deliberative democrats can 
be excluded from this term since all of them focus on participation and equality vis-à-vis 
the current representative model. Such a broad meaning of radical democracy as the um-
brella term for several perspectives in democratic theory is currently being used by a grow-
ing number of authors (Dahlberg & Siapera, 2007, 7; Little & Lloyd, 2009, 2; Norval, 2007, 
13, 38; Saward, 2003, 150). In this sense, Aletta Norval (2001, 26) writes: “Radical democ-
racy may be characterised as an ethos of radicalisation. This ethos is constitutive of ago-
nistic, antagonistic and discursive, as well as deliberative models of democracy, all of 
which form part of contemporary radical democratic theory”. 
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1.8. Facing Challenges 
Before delving into the central debates of this thesis, I will address three points of conten-
tion that can be raised against the arguments articulated here.  
The first concern is that an argument for anonymity in political participation threatens to 
make groups in society that suffer from historic marginalization invisible. Recommending 
masks, avatars, pseudonyms and the like for those who are structurally made invisible, dis-
regarded, and pushed to the margins in public debate has potentially detrimental effects. 
Phillips (2015, 36) is right to argue: “We should not have to pretend away key aspects of 
ourselves, ask for forbearance in the face of our particularities, or appeal to people to see 
who and what we are ‘beyond’ our gender, skin colour, sexuality, or disability”. Some 
cyberdemocratic discourses discussed in Chapter 6 indeed argue for leaving the body be-
hind when entering cyberspace to experience freedom from identity. Julie Cohen (2012, 
40f) adequately responds to these conceptions: “we cannot simply leave bodies and space 
behind as we enter the networked information age… To understand the emerging net-
worked information society, we must take bodies and embodiment seriously and inquire 
how networked information technologies reshape our embodied perceptions and experi-
ences”.  
At times this thesis might be interpreted as coming close to such a position of endorsing 
disembodiment and masking inequalities. The core argument here, however, is entirely dif-
ferent. I go along with Phillips’ notion of the politics of the human constituted by a subject 
combining universal humanness and particular identity affiliations (Phillips, 2015). I follow 
the core ideal articulated by Young (1990) and Fraser (1990) of a society that celebrates 
the differences of equals. The core argument of the thesis is that such a diversity among 
equals cannot always be achieved through a traditional politics of presence facilitated by 
the visibility of the physically embodied and officially identified person. Instead, presence 
needs to be re-interpreted as being constituted by various expressions of the multiple self 
through diverse media in various participatory spaces. The interruption of continuous 
modes of identity articulation allows for the experience of new forms of presence – some 
might even feel truer than the performance of continuous identity. Rather than seeing a 
politics of presence and a politics of becoming as mutually exclusive alternatives, I see 
them as complementary and even overlapping. It is the diversity of various participatory 
spaces allowing for different identity expressions that constitutes radical democracy. 
The second point that might concern the reader regards the limited accessibility of digital 
communication to disadvantaged strata within societies and globally. Indeed, digital 
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divides and digital inequalities constitute significant barriers to participation on both a 
global and a national scale (Robinson et al., 2015). Exclusion from online participation 
along gender, race, class, age, and geographic divides leaves these new possibilities of en-
gagement beyond the reach of many. The factual increase in participatory possibilities thus 
also widens gaps in political engagement. Here, I go along with Kenneth Gergen, who 
stated two decades ago: “There is surely a gap between the technological haves and have-
nots, but there are good reasons to suspect it is shrinking” (2000, xxi). This suspicion has 
been confirmed in recent years with digital divides dramatically narrowing globally and 
even disappearing in some countries such as the US, where women now have more internet 
access then men. A racial divide remains, but this is also shrinking (Campos-Castillo, 
2015). Some studies have even shown how homeless people use the internet in their daily 
lives (Franklin, 2013, 93ff), which demonstrates how far digitization has currently pro-
gressed and hints at how far it might go in the future.  
Lastly, and in connection with the two points discussed above, since poststructuralism has 
acquired prominence, there is an argument made against the focus on identity. From a (his-
torical) materialist perspective, the focus that this thesis takes on gender, racial, sexual, and 
socioeconomic identities does not do justice to the overarching problem of the unequal 
distribution of economic resources along the class divide. Following this argument, explor-
ing means of rearticulating identity and exploring the multiple self is oblivious to the fun-
damental inequalities that determine who has resources for such explorations and decon-
structions. To this, I respond with an argument articulated by Nancy Fraser (1997). She 
criticizes the “increasingly bitter split between ‘the social left’ and ‘the cultural left’”, a 
split between the politics of redistribution along the category of class and the politics of 
recognition along diverse identity groups: “critical theorists should rebut the claim that we 
must make an either/or choice between the politics of redistribution and the politics of 
recognition. We should aim instead to identify the emancipatory dimension of both prob-
lematics and to integrate them into a single, comprehensive framework” (4). I go along with 
Pateman who claims that it is crucial to always keep the bigger picture in mind and account 
for structural inequalities in which participatory spaces are embedded in (Pateman and 
Smith, 2019; Pateman, 2012). While this thesis clearly focuses more directly on questions 
around the politics of recognition, it sees these questions as being closely related to and 
overlapping with questions of distribution. The marginalization and disrespect of identity 
groups is deeply intertwined with the unequal distribution of economic resources. To think 
recognition and redistribution together, this thesis situates itself in a transformative per-
spective in democratic thought introduced in Chapter 4, which understands the 
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democratization of self-constitution and the transformation of society toward social equal-
ity, a just distribution of resources, and ecological sustainability as inherently linked. Dem-
ocratic transformations of the self and society go hand in hand. 
1.9. Chapter Overview 
To explore how radical democratic practices of disidentification in participatory spaces can 
reconfigure the relations of freedom and equality, this thesis will proceed as follows.  
Chapter 2 will develop a democratic theory of space. It brings together two strands of the 
literature on democratic spatiality and thus combines insights from the study of physical 
sites of democratic engagement (Parkinson, 2012) with studies that use the term space in a 
metaphorical sense to conceptualize social and discursive interaction (Dikeç, 2015). Draw-
ing on Hannah Arendt (1958) and Judith Butler’s (2015) work on the space of appearance 
and taking inspiration from new materialist thought, I introduce a concept of participatory 
spaces as agentic assemblages consisting of physical, social, and discursive things. It is the 
mutual affectivity of these things that bound space and afford, restrict, and suggest possible 
action. Democratic subjects themselves understood as assemblages are both constituted by 
such democratic spatiality and constitute participatory spaces through their actions. The 
things that make up the assemblages of democratic subjects are intertwined with the things 
that constitute space. Alterations of the self trigger alterations in spatiality and vice versa.  
Having developed a concept of democratic spatiality, Chapter 3 asks how equality can be 
advanced within such participatory spaces. It revisits difference democratic thought as fem-
inist debate in democratic theory that draws attention to modes of devaluation and discrim-
ination along the lines of identity markers of gender, race, class, and sexuality within par-
ticipatory spaces (Mansbridge, 1999b). Their argument for a politics of presence (Phillips, 
1995) giving marginalized subjects visibility within the space of appearance constitutes a 
conscious intervention in the social composition of participatory spaces. The presence of 
members of marginalized groups constitutes democratic space differently (descriptive rep-
resentation), potentially also reconfiguring discursive space (substantive representation). 
Yet, the politics of presence is overshadowed by the dilemma of difference (Young, 1989, 
268). As difference democrats elaborate, equalizing mechanisms such as quotas in partici-
patory spaces afford presence, but also entail essentializing tendencies confining the dem-
ocratic subject to its identified body. While the politics of presence successfully advances 
equality, the freedom to explore different sides of the multiple self is compromised.  
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Chapter 4 seeks a way out of the dilemma of difference and asks how equality in participa-
tory spaces can be accompanied by freedom for the subject to change. It first consults par-
ticipatory, deliberative, and agonistic perspectives in radical democratic thought in the 
search for modes of self-transformation. As these three perspectives render limited results, 
the chapter introduces a recently evolving perspective that so far has received little attention 
in the mainstream of democratic theory. What I term the transformative perspective calls 
for a radical transformation of society as a deep experience of freedom and equality that 
interrupts domination (Hardt & Negri, 2004; Newman, 2016). This perspective harnesses 
the greatest potential to understand self-transformation. The notion of disidentification sug-
gested by the transformative perspective conceptualizes the rejection of hegemonic identity 
interpellations as part of a politics of becoming that results in the emergence of new col-
lective subjects with improper names (Rancière, 1999). What remains unexplained, how-
ever, is how disidentification can be experienced on an individual rather than a collective 
level. To answer this question, the chapter infuses radical democratic thought with queer 
theory. Understanding identity performances as masquerade (Butler, 1990, 50) allows for 
thinking about how the everyday masks subjects are wearing can be resignified and decon-
structed (Butler, 2004; Muñoz, 1999).  
Chapter 5 asks how such radical democratic practices of disidentification as part of a poli-
tics of becoming can be practically exercised. It explores anonymity in various modes of 
democratic participation. The chapter generates an original conception of anonymity rooted 
in democratic theory. It shows how anonymity rearranges space by interrupting the estab-
lished order of things through interfaces. This spatial rearrangement channels discursive 
things from private into public spaces. This concept of anonymity allows for a reinterpre-
tation of the politics of presence. Instead of interpreting anonymity as mere absence of 
identity, anonymity facilitates a different mode of presence. Presence is facilitated through 
the absence of certain aspects of the coherent assemblage of the physically embodied and 
legally identified persona. This new mode of presence is made possible through the inter-
ruption of continuous identity performances, which allows for hidden aspects of the multi-
ple self to appear. This also entails a reinterpretation of the concept of the space of appear-
ance, which has wrongly been associated with the visibility of the physical body. Anonym-
ity, I contend, allows for new modes of appearing through improper names. The space of 
appearance is thus better understood as allowing for perceptibility rather than visibility. 
The concept of anonymity developed here shows that anonymity is always liberating; it 
privileges freedom over equality. The discussion of anonymity, however, also reveals that 
freedom and equality are not always in tension. While the anonymous freedoms to exclude, 
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submit, and deceive undermine equality, the anonymous freedoms of inclusion, subversion, 
and honesty contribute to equality. Anonymity appears as inherently contradictory, as both 
constructive and destructive forces are set free in the becoming subject. 
As the digital age establishes the interruption of identity through anonymity as a core fea-
ture of everyday communication, the sixth and final chapter explores how modes of dis-
identification come into play in participatory spaces on the internet. It revisits the poststruc-
turalist-inspired debates on cyberdemocracy of the 1990s that explain the digital self as 
existing only by the words it utters in a world that is overcoming the restraints and inequal-
ities tied to the identified, physical body (Poster, 1997; Rheingold, 1993; Turkle, 1995). 
They imagine an increase in personal freedom by “leaving the body behind” and concep-
tualize cyberspace as a separate realm that follows its own logics. This discourse has been 
criticized from the perspective of cyberfeminist and critical race studies, which claim that 
disembodiment masks the subjugation of the marginalized and thus works against a politics 
of presence (Nakamura, 2002). Current debates, in contrast with the cyberdemocratic con-
ception of cyberspace as separate from analogue space, insist on collapsing the digital and 
the physical (Isin & Ruppert, 2015). The chapter develops a new theory of digital space 
beyond these two positions. It explains digital space as an assemblage of physical, social, 
and discursive things that is characterized by interruption. This theory of digital space al-
lows for rethinking the politics of presence in the digital age. Explaining the subject of the 
digital age as a cyborgian assemblage of human bodies and technological devices 
(Haraway, 1991 [1985]), the chapter explores a digital politics of presence. Several studies 
of empirical examples demonstrate that a digital politics of presence articulates marginal-
ized identities in digital spaces but at the same time renders identity transformative by ex-
tending the agency of the subject to reassemble the self both online and offline. 
The conclusion asserts that the reformulation of the politics of presence in the digital age 
developed in this thesis is to be understood as one aspect of a politics of becoming which 
forms part of a progressive, radical democratic strategy for social transformation. The ar-
gument that the thesis makes is not one for particular kinds of identity performances af-
forded by particular kinds of spaces. Rather than pursuing the development of ideal spaces 
as democratic theory has attempted in the past, it needs a pluralization of spaces that afford 
different kinds of identity expressions to fulfil the democratic ideal of diversity. 
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2. A Spatial Theory of Democracy: Exploring the Dimensions of 
Participatory Architectures 
 
If democracy were a building, 
the “under construction” sign 
would never be removed. 
Michael Saward, 2003a 
 
2.1. Introduction 
In a scene from the 2015 film Suffragette, which tells the story of the movement for 
women’s right to vote in the UK in the early 20th century, the laundry worker Maud Watts 
gives testimony in a parliamentary committee. The committee is to make an important de-
cision regarding women’s suffrage. The 24-year-old from a working class background, and 
no stranger to hard work and poverty, is evidently intimidated by the situation. Seated in 
one of the richly decorated committee rooms of the Palace of Westminster with high win-
dows and gold decorum on the walls, Maud finds herself surrounded by men in elegant 
suits densely filling the benches of the committee room. Maud is positioned at the front of 
the room in a chair facing a panel of committee members. The other onlookers are posi-
tioned in rows to Maud’s left, right, and back, so that Maud is surrounded by their gazes 
from all sides. When the committee speaker invites Maud to give her testimony, after a 
long silence, Maud responds: “I don’t know what to say”. 
This example, although fictive, illustrates the powerful effects of space on participatory 
processes. It is the physical room itself, its decorum and grandeur that signals social status 
and causes those who do not dress, speak or behave accordingly to feel inferior. It makes 
them feel out of place. The room puts the people within it in their place. By signalling 
identity it creates class and gender hierarchies. The arrangement of the seats focuses peo-
ple’s attention on only a few people. The room thus assigns clear roles of listeners and 
speakers. It creates hierarchies of attention. Maud’s silence followed by “I don’t know what 
to say” highlights not only the limits imposed by the social protocols, but also the discursive 
boundaries of the words available in a given spatial arrangement. The bodies assigned to 
the seating order, exposed to the social protocols, and limited by discursive affordances 
have a choice in submitting to these structures or rebelling against them. The spatial 
  29 
structures, however, are in place. They are real and they are powerful, whether consisting 
of bricks and mortar, social conventions or discursive terms. Thus, freedom and equality 
are afforded and restricted by assemblages of physical, social, and discursive things that 
constitute space. 
The ample metaphorical language evoking spatiality in everyday communication indicates 
the central role that such spatial imagination plays in current thinking. Metaphoric space is 
invoked, for example, when we try to make sense of society, understanding it in terms of 
different social positions, social strata, or high and low levels of education. Space is also 
used to explain inequality when we speak of power asymmetries and hierarchies. Spatial 
metaphors are used to indicate time when we say: “In this debate, I had no space to speak 
because others took up all the space”. Space may also refer to content when we express 
“positions” in a discussion. Or space can indicate emotions when we say: “I was not in the 
right place to talk about this”.  
The relevance of space in a metaphoric sense is at the forefront of the recent spatial turn in 
social sciences, with influential work such as Henri Lefebvre’s The Production of Space 
(1991 [1974]) leading the way. Democratic theory has been eager to employ this meta-
phoric sense of space to conceptualize new forms of democratic participation. John Dryzek 
(2009) traces the transmission between public space and empowered space (governmental 
institutions) in the deliberative system. Chantal Mouffe (1993, 20) observes: “Our societies 
are confronted with the proliferation of political spaces which are radically new and differ-
ent”. And Andrea Cornwall and colleagues speak of new participatory spaces, differenti-
ating between closed spaces such as parliamentary committees, invited spaces such as cit-
izens’ assemblies, and claimed spaces such as social movement meetings (Brock, Cornwall 
& Gaventa, 2001; Cornwall & Schattan Coelho, 2007; Cornwall, 2017).  
Such metaphoric use of the term “space” in democratic theory has been heavily criticized 
by geographers and urban scholars, who point to the missing connection between “real”, 
physical space and its metaphoric citation. And indeed, the use of “space” in democratic 
theory remains unsubstantiated for the most part. Authors such as Mouffe and Dryzek still 
owe an explanation of what space actually means. Rather than explaining what is spatial 
about these new participatory spaces, these authors often limit their definitions to the par-
ticipatory character of the spaces under discussion. John Gaventa (2006, 25), for example, 
writes: “In this article… ‘spaces’ are seen as opportunities, moments and channels where 
citizens can act to potentially affect policies…”. Elsewhere Gaventa and others explain the 
spatiality of new participatory processes by highlighting social relationality and power 
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structures. But their work fails to show a direct connection of such metaphoric spatiality to 
physical spaces (Parkinson, 2012, 6). The “failure to discuss the implications of material 
space on political engagement suggests that ‘the geographic imagination’ of political theory 
is underdeveloped and unsubstantiated” (Brown, 1997, 14).  
The alternative provided by these critics, however, only partly solves the problem. While 
through meticulous descriptions of rooms, buildings, and public squares they investigate 
the effects of physical space on human behaviour, they hardly acknowledge the social and 
discursive spatialities that are intertwined with physical space. John Parkinson’s Democ-
racy and Public Space (2012), for example, argues “that democracy depends to a surprising 
extent on the availability of physical, public space” (1). The book extends “the idea com-
mon in political science – that institutions structure political behaviour – and ask[s] whether 
this is true in a physical, bricks-and-mortar sense as well” (6). In other words, the shape of 
physical things shapes human interaction. While such an endeavour pays close attention to 
physical spaces, it understands social and discursive elements of participatory encounters 
as consequences of physical spatiality and thus as external effects. This envisions a unidi-
mensional causality: physical space affects human behaviour. While these authors convinc-
ingly deny deterministic intentions, traces of determinism linger in their account of unidi-
rectional effect.  
So the current state of theories of democratic spatiality is characterized by a disjunct result-
ing in unidimensional conceptions of participatory spaces. The literature on physical 
spaces, on the one hand, focuses on the effects of physical spatial arrangements on social 
behaviour but does not consider social and discursive spatiality. The literature on social and 
discursive spatiality, on the other hand, does not relate to insights on physical spaces and 
uses the term “space” as unsubstantiated metaphor. What is needed is an integration of the 
conceptions of physical and socio-discursive spatiality to generate a holistic, multidimen-
sional understanding of participatory spaces.  
By reviewing the literature that theorizes the relationship between democracy and space4, 
this chapter will develop a concept of participatory spaces as multidimensional constructs 
interrelating physical, social, and discursive architectures.5 Rather than just adding these 
 
4 This focus ensures the coherence of this thesis and supports its interest in democratic thought. 
Beyond the texts discussed here, there is a wide array of literature on social and discursive spatial-
ity, from the early writings of Lefebvre (1991 [1974]) and Foucault (1986 [1967]) to Massey’s 
(2005) more recent texts that will only be featured here indirectly.  
5 By choosing to speak of multidimensionality to describe democratic spatiality, I engage in dis-
cursive spatialization myself. I could have spoken of different levels, aspects or elements of spati-
ality, each of which would have implied a different discursive spatial arrangement.  
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three dimensions of space as if stacking three layers on a pile, I argue that together the three 
dimensions are more than the sum of their parts. Drawing on new materialist theories of 
assemblage, the three architectures are understood as consisting of the relationality between 
affective things that produce and bound space. These various constellations of physical, 
social, and discursive things are characterized by mutual affectivity diffused in intricate 
spatial arrangements. Space is not defined as objectively measurable relationality between 
these things. Rather, it is the subjective movement between things that makes space expe-
rienceable. Subjects are not the only ones who are capable of movement. Things themselves 
are restlessly in motion as they assemble and reassemble space (see Barad, 2008, 139). This 
can be understood in an objectivist manner: things have a life too – they come into being, 
exist, and decay. But it can also be understood in a subjective manner: things are always 
perceived differently. This understanding of space as agentic assemblage provides new in-
sights into what happens in participatory spaces. Rather than thinking in terms of cause and 
effect, I suggest thinking about the agentic nature of the different spatial dimensions, which 
through their mutual affectivity – with human subjects as a social part of the spatial ar-
rangement itself rather than an alien exteriority – constitute participatory spaces. The dif-
ferent spatial constellations of affective things that bound space produce different contexts 
for the interaction of freedom and equality.  
These reconfigurations of freedom and equality in the context of different constellations of 
things do not just affect what democratic subjects can and cannot do; they are also deeply 
intertwined with how democratic subjects see themselves, others, and the world. Demo-
cratic spatiality is woven into and partly inseparable from the constitution of the self. To 
explore how spaces constitute subjects, I draw on Hannah Arendt’s concept of the “space 
of appearance” as the configuration of social relationality through public speech and action: 
“without a space of appearance and without trusting in action and speech as a mode of 
being together, neither the reality of one’s self, of one’s own identity, nor the reality of the 
surrounding world can be established beyond doubt” (Arendt, 1958, 208). But space does 
not simply constitute us in a unidirectional way; rather, spaces are at the same time the 
product of our making. In her recent work, Judith Butler further develops Arendt’s space 
of appearance by studying the public assemblies that emerged in 2011 across the world, 
most notably in the Occupy movement (USA, UK), the Indignant movement (Spain, 
Greece), and the Arab Spring (North Africa, Middle East): 
So though these movements have depended on the prior existence of pavement, 
street, and square, and have often enough gathered in the square such as Tahrir, 
whose political history is potent, it is equally true that the collective actions 
  32 
collect the space itself, gather the pavement, and animate and organize the ar-
chitecture. As much as we must insist on there being material conditions for 
public assembly, and public speech, we have also to ask how it is that assembly 
and speech reconfigure the materiality of public space and produce, or repro-
duce, the public character of the material environment. (Butler, 2015, 71) 
I will pick up these lines of thought from Arendt and Butler and enrich them with inspira-
tions from new materialist assemblage theory. By conceptualizing the democratic subject 
itself as comprising multiple affective things, I will further explore the interrelation of space 
and self understood as agentic, interwoven, and at times inseparable assemblages. These 
assemblages of space and the self create different affordances for the subject to change. 
This chapter will lay the theoretical groundwork and clarify the core concepts of this thesis. 
It will first engage with the literature on participatory spaces that discusses participation in 
invited, claimed, and closed spaces. In the next step, this concept will be deepened by draw-
ing on new materialist thought. The next section will introduce a multidimensional theory 
of democratic spatiality differentiating its physical, social, and discursive dimensions. The 
last step will then consider the role that such spaces of appearance play in constructing 
identity and constituting democratic subjectivity.  
2.2. New Participatory Spaces: Inviting, Claiming, and Closing Democracy 
The notion of participatory spaces emerging in feminist development studies describes 
“new architectures of democratic practice” (Cornwall, 2002b, 1). One of its central achieve-
ments is drawing attention to commonalities between three areas of democratic participa-
tion that are otherwise studied separately in different academic fields: the study of demo-
cratic innovations, social movements, and representative governmental institutions (Brock 
et al., 2001; Cornwall, 2002a; 2017; Cornwall & Schattan Coelho, 2007; Cornwall & 
Shankland, 2013; Gaventa, 2006).  
What Andrea Cornwall and colleagues call invited spaces describes participatory formats 
that are the domain of the study of democratic innovations (Fung & Wright, 2001; Geissel 
& Newton, 2012; Grönlund et al., 2014; Smith, 2009; 2005). Invited spaces are created by 
resource rich actors such as state agencies or NGOs for the participation of citizens. A wide 
array of studies on invited spaces have analysed different participatory formats around the 
world such as the Gram Sabha village assemblies in India (Aiyar, 2010), local forums for 
citizens’ engagement in South Africa (McEwan, 2005) and Angola (Roque & Shankland, 
2007), participatory budgeting in Brazil (Wampler, 2007), and referenda in Switzerland 
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(Cheneval & el-Wakil, 2018). Cornwall sees such invited spaces as an important element 
of a long-term process of democratic transformation (Cornwall, 2004b, 85). She also points 
to potential dangers, however. Invited spaces are sometimes created to co-opt participants 
and legitimize decisions already made by governmental institutions (Cornwall, 2002b, 8; 
see also Font et al., 2017). Although attempts at co-optation can be made and participatory 
processes can be structured by their creators to favour certain outcomes, what actually hap-
pens within such spaces can never be predetermined. Participants can challenge the original 
purpose of invited spaces and use them in unintended ways. As such, invited spaces always 
foster the potential to challenge established power arrangements and facilitate innovative 
thinking and social change (Cornwall & Shankland, 2013, 316). 
Claimed spaces describe participatory formats emerging in citizens’ self-organized partic-
ipation and are the academic domain of social movement studies (della Porta, 2009; della 
Porta & Rucht, 2013; Polletta, 2002). The dynamics of invited and claimed spaces are fun-
damentally different. Whereas invited spaces are created by one set of actors for the use of 
others, so that creators and participants might have different intentions, claimed spaces are 
created and used by the same people (Cornwall, 2002b, 17). The process of designing these 
spaces thus raises a different set of questions for designers. Rather than asking, how do I 
want others to participate?, the key question here is, how do I want to engage with others? 
Spatial formations of participation in social movements and civic initiatives have been sub-
ject to a wide range of studies including analyses of the global justice movement that 
formed around the protests against the WTO meeting of 1999 in Seattle (Shukaitis, 2005), 
the squatter movement in Athens (Poulimenakos & Dalakoglou, 2017), the Indignant 
movement against austerity policies in the government debt crisis in Greece in 2011 (Kaika 
& Karaliotas, 2016), public assemblies of the Arab Spring (Lopes de Souza & Lipietz, 
2011), and anti-AIDS activism by the civil society organization ACT UP in Canada 
(Brown, 1997), to name a few. 
Lastly, closed spaces are participatory institutions to which access is highly restricted 
(Cornwall, 2004, 5; Gaventa, 2006, 26). Participation is possible through channels of public 
legitimization such as election or through party delegation or appointment. These channels 
of access are highly exclusive and privilege white men with high incomes. This exclusivity, 
in my view, justifies the term “closed spaces”. It is noteworthy, however, that access to 
such spaces is not entirely closed and that through legitimization processes such as elections 
or public polling they fulfil an important function in democracy. Taking a different per-
spective, Dryzek calls the same institutions empowered spaces (2009, 1385). The study of 
closed spaces is the domain of legislative and parliamentary studies which focus on the 
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physical architecture of parliamentary buildings (Dovey, 1999; Goodsell, 1988; McCarthy-
Cotter et al., 2018; Puwar, 2010) and deliberation in legislative processes (Bächtiger et al., 
2005).  
The concept of participatory spaces then relies on the question of who creates participatory 
designs for whom. By focusing on the role of creators and participants, the concept of par-
ticipatory spaces puts power at its core. It asks about the intentions behind participatory 
design (Cornwall, 2002b, 8). Apart from the central question of power, closed, invited, and 
claimed spaces also differ in terms of their durability and degree of institutionalization. 
While closed spaces are highly formalized institutions following clear protocols and often 
adhering to traditional procedures over centuries, invited spaces have a more experimental, 
semi-institutionalized character and are of shorter durability; meanwhile, claimed spaces 
are often short-lived and exhibit merely emergent traces of institutionalization as activists 
develop common decision-making rules (Cornwall, 2002b, 17ff). 
2.3. The Stuff Participatory Spaces are Made of: New Materialist Inspirations 
The concept of participatory spaces developed by Cornwall et al. provides a broad picture 
of participatory processes bringing into view different democratic formats. These concep-
tualizations are sensitive to socio-discursive spatialities, but they neglect the physical di-
mension of space. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the literature on physi-
cal spaces that facilitate democratic participation, in contrast, neglects socio-discursive di-
mensions of space. Here I will develop a concept of participatory spaces, which recognizes 
how physical, social, and discursive dimensions of space interrelate in participatory pro-
cesses. To bridge the divide between the two sets of literature, I draw on new materialist 
thought. This will not only help to explain how physical, social, and discursive dimensions 
relate to each other, but it will also show that social and discursive interaction is not a 
simple effect of physical space. Rather, all three dimensions affect each other in spatial 
assemblages that afford and bound participation. 
To better understand the role that things play in new materialist thinking and what this can 
contribute to a democratic theory of participatory spaces, I will take a brief look at some of 
the central ideas in debates on new materialism. In doing so, it is imperative to keep in mind 
that new materialism is not a coherent theory but a diverse and ongoing debate. Many new 
materialist thinkers situate themselves in equidistance to positivism and poststructuralism, 
both criticizing and creatively building on their foundations. From positivism, new materi-
alist thought takes the focus on the body and material objects but rejects its assumption of 
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an empirically measurable and quantifiable objective reality. From poststructuralism, it 
takes the notion of the relativity of subjective viewpoints and the mutability and contin-
gency of things, while it rejects its sole focus on language and the notion of all-powerful 
discourses determining reality. This morphological or transformative aspect of new mate-
rialist thought is of particular interest for this thesis’ undertaking of finding ways for the 
subject to change:  
New materialists are interested in exposing the movement, vitality, morpho-
genesis, and becoming of the material world, its dynamic processes, as opposed 
to discovering immutable truths. New materialism sees a physical and biologi-
cal world operating not according to fixed laws and blueprints, but rather one 
teeming with dynamism, flexibility, and novelty. Such a world is not deter-
mined; rather it is constantly in the process of its making. (Pitts-Taylor, 2016, 
4) 
New materialist debates strive to overcome the binaries produced by both positivist and 
poststructuralist assumptions between language/ideas/reason and matter/body/flesh, be-
tween representation and the represented, with a simple concept: the vitality of all things 
(Dolphijn & van der Tuin, 2012, 107). They declare everything – even thought and abstract 
concepts – to be things and all things to be alive and carriers of agency. In this way, new 
materialist thought revokes the core dualism between object and subject. Things are not 
fixed, opaque, explorable, and definable entities that are acted upon by subjects. Instead 
things are always active in continuous processes of materialization; they are always becom-
ing (Barad, 2008, 139). New materialism thus describes the world in procedural terms as 
in constant flux. It observes “objects forming and emerging within relational fields, bodies 
composing their natural environment in ways that are corporeally meaningful for them, and 
subjectivities being constituted as open series of capacities or potencies that emerge haz-
ardously and ambiguously within a multitude of organic and social processes” (Coole & 
Frost, 2010, 10). 
In the field of new materialism, theories of assemblage are of particular relevance for this 
thesis. The agentic nature of things does not just come into play when looking at things 
individually. Rather, things interact with other things, thus constituting networked affilia-
tions resulting in assemblages of various shapes and sizes and composed of various ele-
ments: “Assemblages are ad hoc groupings of diverse elements, of vibrant materials of all 
sorts. Assemblages are living, throbbing confederations” (Bennett, 2010, 23f). Every thing 
within an assemblage consists of an assemblage itself. The furniture in a room consists of 
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chairs, tables, lamps, etc.; the chair consists of wooden parts and cushion, the cushion con-
sists of wool, the wool consists of fibre, fibre consists of particles, and so on. Of course, 
assemblages do not merely consist of physical parts, but also contain social and discursive 
elements: the terms that denote them and the social conventions around them. The agency 
of such assemblages does not simply consist of the added agentic powers of each individual 
element that makes up the assemblage. Instead the sum is more than its parts as the assem-
blage develops an agentic force on its own (Bennett, 2010).  
Consider what you as a reader are doing right now. Reading means not only comprehending 
the meaning of individual words, but connecting their meanings to form coherent content. 
The cognitive process of assembling meaning links words to each other. The words consist 
of letters, written on pages made of paper assembled in a book or words appear as assem-
blages of pixels consisting of zeros and ones in code on a computer screen. These letters, 
words, punctuations, pixels made of bits and bytes are reflected through light into your eyes 
and transmitted through millions of nerve cells into your brain, where they interact with 
brain cells, neurons, blood streams in your body, pumped through your throbbing heart. 
This cognitive interaction with words on paper and screens assembles images in your mind 
that relate to personal memories. The emerging meanings through this process of assem-
bling things is different for everybody as assemblages of images, memories, hormones, and 
blood flows are different in every body and at every time.  
The democratic potential of new materialist thought insofar as it understands anything as 
an assemblage of things, then, rests on the realization that the constellation of things can be 
rearranged. Things can be changed. In this chapter, I will look at participatory spaces as 
assemblages of affective things. It is the mutual affectivity between such physical, social, 
and discursive things that set the boundaries of participatory spaces and constitute the 
power relations within them. These things both affect participants but are also arranged and 
can always be rearranged through democratic subjectivity. 
2.4. A Multidimensional Concept of Participatory Spaces: Exploring the Relational-
ity of Physical, Social, and Discursive Things 
Here I will pick up the debate on participatory spaces and deepen it through new materialist 
insights to bridge two sets of literature discussing the physical and socio-discursive dimen-
sions of democratic spatiality, respectively. I will first summarize the key elements of the 
multidimensional concept of participatory spaces developed here and then elaborate them 
in more depth in the following sections. 
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One of the central omissions in the existing conceptualizations of participatory spaces is an 
apparent shying away from the notion of boundaries. It may be a democratic ethos of in-
clusion, a constructivist emphasis on contingency or an aversion to the positivist Newtonian 
notion of space as stable and measurable that leads current debates on participatory spaces 
to neglect boundaries as a defining category. In contrast, I believe that it is exactly the 
boundedness that defines participatory spaces, which raises the crucial question of inclu-
sion and exclusion (Gaventa, 2006, 26). What defines participatory space is the relationality 
between things that separate an inside from an outside. I take inspiration from Laclau and 
Mouffe’s (1985) concept of the constitutive outside, which defines identity and reality. In 
their radical democratic discourse theory, discursive concepts always rely on the definition 
of the other – that which is not included (Butler, 2015, 4f). Relations between outside and 
inside, however, are not defined by pure exclusivity, but rather by permeability: elements 
of the outside are always reflected in the inside and vice versa. Applying the notion of the 
constitutive outside to the concept of participatory spaces makes it apparent that such 
spaces are not only defined by boundaries, but also that the reality outside of bounded space 
is reflected within it. Cornwall (2004b, 80f), for example, draws attention to the partial 
continuation of social power asymmetries within participatory spaces against the intention 
of their design to disrupt external inequality. 
Such an understanding of participatory spaces does not reduce space to a stable and meas-
urable category. Rather, participatory spaces are volatile constructs because their physical, 
social, and discursive boundaries are demarcated by the relations of affective things that 
are never stable but ever creating and recreating their existence (Connolly, 2013; Coole & 
Frost, 2010; Dolphijn & van der Tuin, 2012; Pitts-Taylor, 2016). I do not understand non-
human things as agentic in the sense of intentionality or consciousness, which I reserve for 
humans. Instead, I describe things as affective insofar as through their interpretation by 
humans they create affordances and limitations – they create what Lorenza Mondada 
(2011) calls “interactional space”. It is the mutual affectivity between physical things such 
as walls and chairs, social things such as human bodies with their identity inscriptions, and 
discursive things such as concepts, ideas, symbols, and themes that defines participatory 
spaces.6 The affectivity and, in new materialist terms, vitality of things – whether organic 
or not – derives from the relationality of human perception. Participatory spaces are ephem-
eral and in constant flux since they are continuously reinterpreted and reproduced by dem-
ocratic subjects. Physical space can never be perceived in the same way through different 
 
6 Bennett (2010, x) makes a similar distinction. What I call physical and social things, she refers 
to as thing-materialities and people-materialities.  
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perspectives rooted in diverse social positions and from the vantage points of different bod-
ies with individual histories and experiences (Robinson, 1998, 534).  
When defining participatory spaces as relational assemblages of affective things, then, what 
do these boundaries consist of and how does concrete physical space relate to abstract met-
aphoric space? I propose to imagine participatory spaces as consisting of three interrelated 
dimensions. The first dimension consists of the physical architectures defined by the rela-
tionality of physical things which limit, afford, and suggest movement (Parkinson, 2012). 
These physical spatialities are intertwined with social relations between organic bodies, 
human emotions, desires, power relations, and sexual attractions (Hénaff & Strong, 2001). 
Both physical and social dimensions of space are interwoven with discursive architectures 
of the written and spoken word affording and limiting what can be said and thought (Dikeç, 
2012). These three interrelated spatial dimensions constitute assemblages that afford and 
bound the potentials for freedom and equality. 
The three dimensions described here are not to be understood as sealed off, mutually ex-
clusive categories. Parkinson (2012, 77) is right to ask: “can we separate the influence of 
physical forms from its social, cultural, and political context?” It is often hard to tell where 
the social dimension of emotive relationality among human bodies ends and the discursive 
dimension of linguistic expression begins. What is often overlooked is that the same goes 
for the physical dimension. Physical things are always perceived through socialized eyes 
and through the discursive terms assigned to them (Butler, 1990), hence they can never be 
sensed outside of social and discursive spatiality. So, although the boundaries between the 
physical, social, and discursive dimensions are indeed liminal and the three dimensions are 
endlessly interwoven, an analytical distinction still makes sense.  
It is, then, the mutual affectivity of physical, social, and discursive boundaries, which both 
limit and afford agency, that defines participatory spaces. Together these three dimensions 
put in motion unforeseeable and not easily controllable dynamics, which make them more 
than the sum of their parts (see Bennett, 2010, 24). Affectivity, here, does not go in one 
direction and is not explainable as a simple calculation of cause and effect. The question is 
not only how physical space affects social and discursive potentialities. Rather, social rela-
tions, subjective feelings, and discursive constructions co-produce space in a relational web 
of affectivity. Thus, participatory space is indeed more than a metaphor, but it is also more 
than physical space affecting human behaviour. The interlinked spatial architectures of 
physical, social, and discursive things produce and limit potential action and are in turn 
produced and limited through human agency. Just as the space of the committee room in 
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Westminster Palace – with its physical setting of walls and chairs, its social relations be-
tween human bodies, and its discursive limits – was perceived in a radically different way 
by Maud Watts than the committee members present, so any participatory space restrains 
and affords the doable and sayable in complex ways.  
To gain a better understanding of participatory spaces, I will now explore more extensively 
the literature on democratic spatialities along the three dimensions outlined above. 
2.4.1. The Physical Dimension of Participatory Spaces  
Considering the bounded nature of physical space, it is necessary to examine which physi-
cal things demarcate space. It is the physical boundaries of nation states consisting of 
fences, border crossing points, gates, mountains, seas, rivers, and sometimes even walls 
that demarcate the outside from the inside of state territories (see Wolin, 1994, 13). Parkin-
son (2012, 72ff) draws attention to how physical boundaries can impose social hierarchies 
as in the case of the infamous gated communities in South Africa instituting racial segre-
gation or the border wall between Israel and Palestine. Public squares, streets, and bridges 
can, however, enable human encounter. Physical boundaries do not always hinder but might 
advance democracy, for example, when they facilitate what is referred to as democratic 
community by bringing together like-minded people or those with a shared sense of identity 
(Chapman & Shapiro, 1993). Walls can protect deliberating groups from external interfer-
ence. Democracy, whether conceived of as a nation state, small community, or instantane-
ous activist meeting, always needs an outside that defines the inside – a demarcated space.  
Alongside the notion of physical spaces for democracy arises the question of institutional-
ization as the perpetuation of democratic practices. Here building democracy can be taken 
quite literally. It is thus not surprising that much of the literature on the physical dimension 
of democratic spatiality focuses on parliamentary buildings. These closed spaces are char-
acterized by the inscription of democratic practices into physical spatial arrangements. Nir-
mal Puwar (2010, 298) claims that “parliament consists of living scripts” as human bodies 
within them move through spatial arrangements that prescribe and regulate democratic per-
formances. It is important to note, however, that such physically inscribed protocols do not 
always prevent and mandate, but often merely suggest (Parkinson, 2012, 77ff):  
A physical environment is created that indirectly influences behaviour within 
parliaments and by governments. While the physical setting does not by any 
means deterministically control the attitudes and behaviour of people, it does 
condition their thoughts and actions in preliminary, subtle and interactive ways. 
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Buildings may be seen as a form of non-verbal communication in which mes-
sages are encoded by builders and then decoded by occupants, with probabilis-
tic but potentially powerful cueing effects as a result. (Goodsell, 1988, 288)  
Ample scholarly work illustrates how social relations and discursive expression within par-
liamentary closed spaces are influenced by their physical settings. The confrontational cul-
ture of the UK Parliament, for example, is inscribed in the walls, furniture, and room layout 
of Westminster Palace. The chamber of the House of Commons is among the smallest par-
liamentary assembly halls in the world. It is a quarter of the size of the German Bundestag, 
which ranks among the biggest. The House of Commons only provides seats for 437 of its 
650 members. Debates thus literally become heated as the room temperature rises when the 
chamber is filled with human bodies. Members of Parliament (MPs) sit shoulder to shoulder 
due to limited space and the fact that seating consists of benches rather than individual 
chairs as in the US Senate, for example. Latecomers often sit on the stairs in the aisles 
between the benches, further contributing to a caged and at times aggressive atmosphere 
with shouting, jeering, and cheering interrupting speakers (Goodsell, 1988, 298; McCarthy-
Cotter et al., 2018, 54). Such audience interruptions are also common in parliamentary 
debates elsewhere. But while, for example, in the German Bundestag the size of the space 
places a distance between MPs, and the sole microphone at the speakers’ lectern diminishes 
disruption, the small size and the distribution of microphones throughout the chamber con-
tributes to the adversarial character of the debates in the House (Dovey, 1999, 88; Goodsell, 
1988, 298; McCarthy-Cotter et al., 2018, 54, 56).  
Positioning MPs shoulder to shoulder not only dials up the heat, but also gives expression 
to political allegiances and alliances. Here the metaphorical standing shoulder to shoulder 
as an expression of comradery and unity in confrontation with others becomes physically 
manifest. The political confrontation is physically arranged by positioning two blocs of 
seats opposed to each other. Political opposition as a metaphorical term draws on spatial 
imaginations that materialize in these seating blocs, which were originally conceptualized 
for a two-party system and still to this day stage the confrontation between the government 
and the opposition (Dovey, 1999, 87f). When MPs from the government and opposition in 
the House confront each other, their physical territory is demarcated by a line on the carpet, 
which they are not supposed to cross during debates. These lines place speakers at a sword’s 
length from each other so that if they were to engage in a physical sword fight, blades could 
cross but not reach the body (Dovey, 1999, 88). 
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The fact that MPs in the UK Parliament sit closely together in party blocs including cabinet 
members does not mean that they are spatially arranged as equals within each bloc. Rather, 
the seating arrangement inscribes a clear hierarchy between frontbenchers, including cabi-
net and shadow cabinet members, and backbenchers, who are often at the beginning (or in 
the twilight) of their careers. This hierarchy has significant consequences when frontbench-
ers and backbenchers compete for speaking opportunities (McCarthy-Cotter et al., 2018; 
56; Puwar, 2010, 309).  
To add another point that is not mentioned in the literature, the adversarial culture that 
prescribes confrontation between clearly demarcated political blocs is further inscribed in 
the spatialized parliamentary decision-making procedures. When a voice vote by MPs does 
not render a clear result, a division is called. This performance takes the word “decision” 
quite literally. The term “decide” comes from the Latin “cut off”. Making a decision means 
to eliminate other options (Asenbaum, 2016, 3). This cut is physically performed when the 
speaker announces: “clear the lobbies”. MPs then separate, walking either into the aye 
lobby on the right or the no lobby on the left. Opinions are separated by walls. The speaker 
then announces the result of the division: “the ayes to the right…, the noes to the left…”  
The adversarial setting of the UK Parliament differs from most other parliamentary assem-
bly halls in which MPs are seated in a semi-circle or horseshoe shape, which indicates a 
more consensual orientation. Apart from the UK’s adversarial blocs facing each other, the 
typical semi-circle shape can also be contrasted with the Chinese National People’s Con-
gress, which arranges seating in a single bloc facing a stage in a theatre-like setting – indi-
cating quite openly that democracy is just a show. Speakers are elevated and look down on 
listeners, rather than the other way around as in the European Parliament, for example. In 
the common semi-circle-shaped parliamentary seating arrangements, the different factions 
are seated in blocs and separated by aisles. Particularly in the US Congress the expression 
“working across the aisle” is widely used to address inter-party cooperation. This fan-like 
seating arrangement emerged in the French Revolution and is the origin of the terminology 
of left-wing and right-wing politics – yet another spatial metaphor. The parliamentary set-
ting also inscribes the relations of different governmental branches, particularly between 
the legislative and the executive. While in the UK Parliament members of the cabinet in-
cluding the Prime Minister sit together with other MPs of their party, in many continental 
European parliaments the legislative, including the MPs of the parties in power, is seated 
opposite the cabinet. In the US with its strong division of power between governmental 
branches, cabinet members are entirely absent from Congressional debates (Goodsell, 
1988). 
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Such practices of physical spatialization are not only observable in closed spaces. Much of 
the attention of those designing invited spaces is devoted to the effects of the spatial ar-
rangement on the participatory process. As we have seen, the seating arrangement of par-
ticipants can influence social interaction. If the bifurcated space of the two oppositional 
blocs in the UK Parliament contributes to confrontation and the semi-circle in many other 
parliaments contributes to a more consensual orientation (Goodsell, 1988, 299; McCarthy-
Cotter et al., 2018, 56), then the full circle in invited spaces further pursues this logic. Cit-
izens’ assemblies and open forums often seat participants in full circles to facilitate egali-
tarian and consensual communication: “The ideal arrangement for interaction or consensus 
forming and negotiation is a circle. Not only does a circular arrangement permit eye contact 
among all participants, it also removes any head of the table, so everyone is equal in status” 
(Creighton, 2005, 174). When there are so many participants that one circle does not suf-
fice, invited spaces are often split into several smaller circles, often around tables, so that 
everyone has an equal position.  
This circular shape is also characteristic of activist meetings which often arrange partici-
pants in concentric circles. They thus combine the principle of rows characteristic of par-
liamentary closed spaces with the circle shape characteristic of invited spaces. The egali-
tarian intention is combined with the reality of large numbers of participants and the need 
to share information and make collective decisions that include everyone. An activist re-
ports from a meeting of the Indignados movement with its slogan “toma la plaza!”, “take 
the square!” 
Some of the older or less-able participants were given chairs to sit on while 
others stood around the outside and the more physically flexible sat on the 
ground so that the meeting was structured in concentric circles going outwards 
from those sitting on the ground, to those in chairs, to those standing. This con-
centric circle formation is also an important political statement… People faced 
each other, listened to one another and did not privilege the role of facilitator 
or speaker above the role of participant. (Maeckelbergh, 2012, 220) 
What parliamentary buildings are for closed spaces, public squares are for claimed spaces. 
William Mitchell points out that what the various protest movements of 2011, with their 
different causes and cultural contexts from the Arab Spring to Occupy and the Indignants, 
have in common is the squares. While other movements are represented in media discourses 
by the faces of their leaders, it is the leaderlessness of the movements of 2011 that makes 
the square their public face: “This is why the iconic moments, the images that promise to 
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become monuments, of the global revolution of 2011 are not those of face but of space; not 
figures, but the negative space or ground against which a figure appears” (Mitchell, 2012, 
9). This leads Paolo Gerbaudo (2017) to term the diverse movements of 2011 the “move-
ment of the squares”. Public squares are the result of the architectural intent of city plan-
ning. Such physical openings in urban landscapes can afford democratic openings of dis-
cursive and material change (Mitchell, 2012, 18; see also Lopes de Souza & Lipietz, 2011; 
Parkinson, 2012, 73).  
Yet, squares as architectural openings of the city are not all the same. Their particular struc-
tures afford particular types of engagement. Anastasia Kavada and Orsalia Dimitriou’s 
(2017) study of the Greek Indignants describes the occupied Syntagma square as a bifur-
cated space consisting of the upper square and the lower square. The upper square was 
characterized by its proximity to the Greek parliament, which allowed for verbal protest 
addressing politicians through shouting and chanting. The hostile atmosphere of the upper 
square soon provided a fertile ground for racist and xenophobic sentiments. The lower 
square, in contrast, was physically separated by stairs leading down from the upper square. 
The distance from parliament and the hostile protest allowed for quiet and peaceful encoun-
ters. In the lower square, political action happened literally on another level. The popular 
assemblies took place here; it was also the organizing site for the occupants’ food supply, 
medical aid, and temporary accommodation. The political ideals of the activists on the 
lower square centred on equality and inclusion (see also Kaika & Karaliotas, 2016).  
As we have seen, physical space is a precondition of democratic engagement. However, 
only the interaction of physical things with social and discursive things constitutes partici-
patory spaces as agentic assemblages. 
2.4.2. The Social Dimension of Participatory Spaces  
The discussion above addresses social interaction as effects of physical space. The point I 
would like to establish here is that social interaction is not well accounted for if understood 
as effect, implying a unidimensional relation from the physical to the social. Rather, I will 
argue that social relationality is part of space itself. While in the physical dimension of 
participatory spaces, participants’ bodies appear as objects affected by physical agentic 
things (Puwar, 2010, 299), in the social dimension this relationship changes. Here human 
bodies appear as democratic subjects who constitute social space. Social space is generated 
through human presence and is thus in constant flux. As the composition of human bodies 
and their relations change, so does social space. Consider the power of one glance across a 
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room. If two people look at each other, a third person might avoid crossing the room be-
tween them. It might feel uncomfortable to intercept their visual communication. Human 
bodies, their communications and relations, create space. 
An insulting remark in a conversation, for instance, immediately alters the social configu-
ration of the given space. A new person entering the room, changing the constellation of 
people, can lead to different topics being discussed or discussions being shut down alto-
gether. A conflict between two people can result in one of them leaving the room feeling 
that there is not “enough space” for both of them. Social space is thus rather an event and 
a process than a static arrangement. Space does not so much exist as it occurs (see 
Daskalaki, 2018).  
We can begin to grasp how the affectivity of bodies constitutes the social dimension of 
participatory spaces, considering Butler’s work on the movement of the squares:  
assembly enacts a provisional and plural form of coexistence that constitutes a 
distinct ethical and social alternative to ‘responsibilization.’ As I hope to sug-
gest, these forms of assembly can be understood as nascent and provisional 
versions of popular sovereignty. They can also be regarded as indispensable 
reminders of how legitimation functions in democratic theory and practice. 
(Butler, 2015, 15f) 
Here the coming together of subjects, who by assembling their bodies form another collec-
tive body, constitutes space. On the grounds of an empty physical space, a public square 
deliberately built as an opening between densely positioned buildings, a social space 
emerges constituted by the social relations of emotive bodies. These social relations bound 
space as they afford, suggest, and restrict action. The emotivity of these social relations is 
a central aspect of social space. Butler (2015, 15f, 26) points out the shared anxiety and 
anger of the assembled bodies. Both this emotive articulation directed at others outside the 
assembly and the solidarity felt among participants within the assembly produce social 
space. The emotive outside constitutes the inside and vice versa through the demarcation 
of boundaries (see Laclau & Mouffe, 1985).  
The emotivity of social relations goes along with the power structures that assemble social 
space. Cornwall (2004a, 1) notes: “Thinking about participation as spatial practice high-
lights the relations of power… that permeate any site for public engagement”. These power 
structures between agentic bodies constitute the relations of freedom and equality within 
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participatory spaces. Power that “springs up between men [sic]7 when they act together and 
vanishes the moment they disperse” (Arendt, 1958, 200) is also the defining element of 
Arendt’s space of appearance, on which Butler (2015) draws. For Arendt, the space of ap-
pearance is independent of physical locality. As it consists of the social relations between 
subjects, it is directly linked to their bodies. Human bodies thus function as things, whose 
relationships constitute and delimit social space. Addressing the Ancient Greek polis as the 
original and ideal form of democratic spatiality, Arendt (1958, 198) claims: “The polis, 
properly speaking, is not the city-state in its physical location; it is the organization of the 
people as it arises out of acting and speaking together, and its true space lies between people 
living together for this purpose, no matter where they happen to be”. Arendt further elabo-
rates the mobility of social space: 
The space of appearance comes into being wherever men [sic]8 are together in 
the manner of speech and action… Its peculiarity is that, unlike the spaces 
which are the work of our hands, it does not survive the actuality of the move-
ment which brought it into being, but disappears not only with the dispersal of 
men… but with the disappearance or arrest of the activities themselves. (199) 
Looking at the history of parliamentary democracy in the UK, the dependency of partici-
patory spaces on human presence, rather than physical space, becomes apparent. The closed 
spaces of the great councils which functioned as royal advisory assemblies as incipient 
forms of parliamentarianism did not always meet in the same location. They were called 
upon by the king or queen in different places according to their convenience and only in 
the mid-13th century started convening more regularly in Westminster Palace (Maddicott, 
2010, 163). It was thus the presence of council members, their embodied identities and the 
roles they performed, rather than the physical location that constituted the participatory 
space.  
In the same vein, Marcel Hénaff and Tracy Strong (2001, 2) contend that public political 
space does not primarily consist of physical, geographic location, but of the social relations 
and political interaction of human agents. The authors invert the relationship between phys-
ical space and social effects discussed in the previous section and stress that physical sites 
are the product of human creation: “Public space is a human construct, an artifact, the 
 
7 The use of the English term “men” is misleading here. In Arendt’s own German translation of 
the English original The Human Condition, Arendt uses the word “Mensch” (Arendt, 1981 
[1960], 194) which translates to the English “human”. “Men” often equated with “human” at Ar-
endt’s time of writing would today be more accurately translated as “human”. 
8 See previous footnote (Arendt, 1981 [1960], 249). 
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result of the attempt by human beings to shape the place and thus the nature of their inter-
action” (5; emphases in original). The authors echo Winston Churchill’s famous saying: 
“We shape our buildings and afterwards our buildings shape us” (Commons debates 28 
October 1943, col. 403). 
The literature on participatory spaces records several examples of how physical space is 
repurposed and altered through the presence and action of human subjects. Puwar (2010, 
299f) claims that physical space is never fixed, but always contested by human agency: 
“Inhabitation of space enables bodies to move in planned and co-ordinated ways but also 
in unpredictable ways. Boundaries etched in architectures of stone and iron grids do not go 
unchallenged”. Such contestation changes the structural configuration of physical space 
and may produce alterations in the relations of freedom and equality. For instance, the re-
built UK Parliament of 1834 for the first time included a women’s gallery in the House of 
Commons chamber from which women – formerly entirely banned from attending parlia-
mentary debates – could listen in. The metal grilles were installed to keep women in their 
place. On several occasions, suffragettes challenged this physical social arrangement. In 
coordinated actions, they threw leaflets promoting votes for women through the grilles into 
the chamber, transcending the physical boundary with their message on paper and through 
their chants. Two activists padlocked their bodies to the grilles, drawing attention to the 
physical restraint that the grilles posed to their political freedoms and to demonstrate their 
unmovable political convictions. Suffragettes also used the garrets and shafts of the parlia-
mentary building to secretly gain access to the closed spaces of parliament, disrupted de-
bates, and inscribed their messages as graffiti on walls. The aim of such contestation and 
partial alteration of physical space was not just to remove physical restrictions, such as the 
grilles separating silent women from vocal men, but also to rearrange social relations, 
which ultimately led to female bodies joining the exclusive male assemblage (Puwar, 2010, 
300ff). 
These examples of feminist protest in parliament illustrate how the original architectural 
intent of closed spaces can be contested through the instigation of temporary claimed 
spaces. Claiming space in itself illustrates the social production of space. This becomes 
particularly evident when the original purpose of physical space is resignified. Squatting 
provides a good example of such repurposing. The Athenian squatter collective K*VOX, 
for instance, occupied a former commercial café. The commercial space was repurposed to 
host the anarchist collective’s regular assemblies, a social clinic, a library, and a meeting 
space for any political group that wished to use it (Poulimenakos & Dalakoglou, 2017). In 
both cases, namely the suffragette protest in parliament and the anarchist collective, it is 
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not primarily the alteration of physical space, but the alteration of its use through the pres-
ence and action of human subjects that reconfigures space.  
Thus, social relations are an essential part of democratic spatiality. They constitute social 
space as eventful relationality between subjects. The physical and social dimensions of 
participatory spaces are deeply intertwined with discursive things that explain them and 
constitute their own dimension of space. 
2.4.3. The Discursive Dimension of Participatory Spaces  
To explore the discursive dimension of democratic spatiality, the etymology of the word 
“thing” is instructive. Medieval things were public assemblies that emerged in the 9th cen-
tury within Viking societies. Constituting the common governing bodies throughout Scan-
dinavia and parts of today’s territory of the UK, these assemblies can be seen as successors 
of the Ancient Greek polis and predecessors of current parliaments. Things took place in 
public spaces and fulfilled their legislative and judicial functions with the participation of 
all free men. Assembly types were differentiated as althings, which discussed various mat-
ters compared to lawthings, which focused on legislative matters (Sanmark, 2013). This 
terminology can still be found today in the Danish Parliament, the Folketing (the people’s 
thing), the Parliament of Norway, the Storting (the great thing), and the Parliament of the 
Isle of Man, Tynwald (thing meadow). Importantly, the meaning of the term “thing” shifted 
from denoting these public assemblies themselves to the topics that were discussed in them. 
Assemblies were thus called to discuss public things. It was not until the 13th century that 
the meaning of “thing” shifted once again from discursive subjects of deliberation to phys-
ical objects (Kullmann, 2018; Olwig, 2013).  
I would like to revive this early meaning of “things” as subjects of debate to explore the 
discursive dimension of participatory spaces. Discursive spatiality then consists of an as-
semblage of topics in public debate – a continuously changing arrangement of discursive 
formations. Referring to these discursive things as subjects of debate rather than as objects 
also draws attention to their affective nature. Discursive things affect the social relations 
between human bodies and the perception of physical space. 
To make this point, I draw on Butler’s work on performativity (Butler, 2004; 1993; 1990). 
Through this perspective, we can understand physical space as the discursive articulation 
of humans. This evidently applies to the human creation of physical space as an artefact 
and product of architectural planning. Physical space appears as a human product when it 
is discursively constructed by relating discursive things in people’s minds. It is described 
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in words, drawn on paper, and then physically constructed. Yet, following Butler, such an 
understanding of the discursive production of space goes deeper. Butler claims that (gen-
der) identity and reality itself can only be perceived through our socialized perceptions. We 
can never know an objective reality. The subject is positioned within a citational web of 
discourses from which it can never escape. Any perception of reality is only a subjective 
interpretation that is shaped by the words through which it is articulated. Accordingly, the 
perception of any space – be it human-made artefact or natural environment – is always 
perceived subjectively and thus the product of human discursivity.  
In this sense, Mondada (2011, 290) states: “discourses simultaneously represent and con-
stitute the relations and places they depict and that give rise to them”. Her case study anal-
yses an invited space in which governmental actors engage citizens in a participatory city-
planning project. In observing participants’ interaction, Mondada differentiates between 
interactional space (which has been discussed as social spatiality in the previous section) 
and represented space. Represented space, addressing spatial imaginations and their lin-
guistic representations, is what I refer to as discursive space.  
This example of the discursive production of spatiality in an invited space illustrates what 
Mustafa Dikeç (2012) calls “space as mode of political thinking”. Understanding “space 
[as] a sensible manifestation of things”, Dikeç (2015, 2) conceptualizes the act of spacing 
as a cognitive process. Perceiving physical space means establishing relationships between 
physical things through visual, haptic, and/or olfactory perception. Such a process of phys-
ical spatialization can be equated to processes of discursive meaning-making: understand-
ing or articulating spoken or written content means ordering concepts – discursive things – 
and establishing relations between them that make them intelligible:  
Political thinking brings together a disposition to be moved by and a capacity 
to relate and order what we perceive. Spatial imagination – seeing connections 
that cannot always be deduced rationally from the givens, establishing new re-
lations and gathering, envisaging new forms and configurations – is thus an 
important part of political thinking. (Dikeç, 2015, 4) 
Following this argument, any discursive act entails spatialization. Thinking, speaking, and 
writing all produce discursive space by generating linguistic structures of orientation. They 
articulate a path that others can follow. Such spatialization always entails establishing terms 
of inclusion and exclusion. This entails the delimitation of the discursive boundaries of a 
topic. Cornwall and colleagues, for example, explain participatory spaces in relation to pol-
icy spaces as the discursive constellations of debates on one particular policy issue (Brock 
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et al., 2001, 7). Yet, discursive boundaries also limit what is sayable and thinkable in a 
particular context (Cornwall, 2004b, 75). Drawing on Foucault’s (1979) symbolic bounda-
ries of discourses, Cornwall alerts us to the fact that the availability of words is the prereq-
uisite for expression (Cornwall, 2002b, 8). Such availability can be limited by the existence 
of words, the limits of the meaning of words, the knowledge or recollection of words, and, 
lastly and importantly, the social norms permitting the utterance of words in particular con-
texts.  
Discursive boundaries do not simply have their own independent dynamics. Instead, they 
are linked to the social and physical dimensions of space. As mentioned earlier, the per-
formative production of space refers not only to the actual creation of physical space, but 
also to its discursive creation which is directly linked to the perception of physical space. 
The words that describe physical space bring the latter into being. The physical boundaries 
of space, then, are never stable, but always contingent products of discursivity. This can be 
illustrated by the example of the Athenian squatter collective K*VOX mentioned earlier. 
The authors of the study show how the perception of the occupied space of the former 
commercial café changed through its discursive production, leading to the expansion and 
shrinking of this space. Discursively, K*VOX was often articulated as a small group of 
political activists. In these instances, its participatory space merely existed in the regular 
activist meetings held in a room of a former commercial café. An incident in which the 
squatter space was attacked by the Mafia, however, triggered a wave of solidarity in the 
neighbourhood. As residents perceived their own livelihood at risk through the Mafia at-
tacks, the discursive boundaries of K*VOX expanded to include the entire neighbourhood 
(Poulimenakos & Dalakoglou, 2017).  
This discursive production of space cannot be delimited from social and physical spatiali-
zation. Physical things that demarcate space can only be perceived through the discursive 
things that indicate their meaning, which are in turn produced within a network of social 
relations between human bodies. Differentiating between the physical, social, and discur-
sive dimensions of democratic spatiality is merely analytical. In the end, however, it is the 
mutual affectivity and insurmountable interconnectedness of the three dimensions that de-
fine participatory spaces.  
2.5. Spatializing Identity, Identifying Space 
The discussion above has shown how the interrelation between physical, social, and dis-
cursive spatialities constitute intricate affordance structures of participatory spaces 
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enabling and limiting freedom and equality. To fully understand how participatory spaces 
affect democratic subjectivity, the role of the subject and the constitution of its identity 
needs to be explored in more depth. An understanding of subject and identity will also 
enable us to grasp what it means for the subject to change. To develop this understanding, 
I will start with the concept of the space of appearance that explains the democratic subject 
as visible agent coming into being through speech and action (Arendt, 1958; Butler, 2015; 
Dikeç, 2015). Here I will show that the boundary drawing practices of space making and 
identity creation are the same. Assemblages of identity and space are deeply intertwined 
and converge at times. I will then go on to explore the democratic subject as agentic assem-
blage whose many parts interact with the things that constitute space. Different spatial 
things enable the appearance and expression of different identity things. Spatial rearrange-
ment as interruption then potentially affords temporary reconfigurations of the self. 
2.5.1. The Space of Appearance: Of Visible Bodies and Exclusive Boundaries 
Following Arendt (1958), participatory spaces are directly linked to identity because it is 
the public visibility of the speaking and acting body that constitutes democratic subjectiv-
ity: “It is the space of appearance in the widest sense of the word, namely, the space where 
I appear to others as others appear to me, where men [sic]9 exist not merely like other living 
or inanimate things but make their appearance explicitly” (198f).  
This notion of the space of appearance as constituted by the public visibility of the demo-
cratic subject is picked up and further elaborated by other authors on democratic spatiality. 
Dikeç (2012, 672), for example, notes: “What spatialization does for Arendt is that it pro-
vides the stage for disclosure of the self in her distinctiveness”. Butler (2015), also building 
on Arendt’s space of appearance, draws attention to current movements such as Black Lives 
Matter (48) or protests of undocumented immigrants in the US (41), which by assembling 
publicly gain visibility: 
… when bodies assemble on the street, in the square, or in the other forms of 
public space (including virtual ones) they are exercising a plural and performa-
tive right to appear, one that asserts and instates the body in the midst of the 
political field, and which, in its expressive and signifying function, delivers a 
bodily demand for a more livable set of economic, social, and political condi-
tions no longer afflicted by induced forms of precarity. (Butler, 2015, 11) 
 
9 See footnote 7.  
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What is significant in the conception of the space of appearance by these authors is that the 
appearance of the democratic subject is tied to its visibility. The argument for political 
participation through visibility is also at the heart of Hénaff and Strong’s conception of 
democratic spaces: “sight involves us most immediately with other human beings. In seeing 
someone or something, I create a space that is ours” (Hénaff & Strong, 2001, 6). Like Par-
kinson (2012, 34ff), they conceptualize participatory spaces as stages of democracy on 
which different actors perform different roles. It is the visibility of the actors and the glance 
of the audience that constitutes democratic subjectivity. In the same vein, Simon Springer 
(2011, 537) stresses the theatrical aspect of democracy. He contrasts the coming together 
of deliberating people in public assemblies with the individualistic practice of voting. De-
mocracy, according to this argument, requires face-to-face communication with subjects 
physically present and visible to each other.  
Butler’s focus on the bodies that publicly assemble further emphasizes the aspect of visi-
bility in Arendt’s original work: “our bodies must be viewed and their vocalized sounds 
must be heard: the body must enter the visual and audible field” (Butler, 2015, 86). Butler 
goes beyond Arendt, however, by discussing the question of inclusion and exclusion in the 
space of appearance. Arendt’s work gives the impression that anyone could cross the 
boundaries of the private into the public sphere and acquire visibility. Such publicity, ac-
cording to Butler, is, however, highly regulated and dependent on social hierarchies tied to 
embodied identity. Discourses and practices of discrimination exclude many from being 
visible. Most notably in Western societies, women have been confined to the private sphere 
and barred from appearing publicly through political engagement. Today undocumented 
migrants remain out of sight (Butler, 2015, 35, 41, 73ff). One could add that currently chil-
dren are hardly perceived as democratic subjects (Nishiyama, 2018).  
When Butler highlights the exclusive and inclusive aspects of the space of appearance, she 
signals towards the argument of the convergence between space and identity that I would 
like to establish. Affective things establish not only the bounds of space but also the lines 
that demarcate identity. Physical boundaries such as walls and national border crossing 
points, social things such as human bodies which carry various identity markers, and dis-
cursive things such as names all simultaneously demarcate space and identity. Butler claims 
that democracy cannot exist without the demarcation of the demos as subject. In other 
words, democracy is always based on exclusion through boundary making practices: “there 
is no possibility of ‘the people’ without a discursive border drawn somewhere, either traced 
along the lines of existing nation-states, racial or linguistic communities, or political 
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affiliation. The discursive move to establish ‘the people’ in one way or another is a bid to 
have a certain border recognized” (Butler, 2015, 5).  
In my view, demarcations of inclusion and exclusion are simultaneously practices of space 
making and identity creation. National territories, human bodies, and discursive terms are 
all constituted through exclusion. Linguistic definition and human cognition depend on ex-
clusion per se (Phillips, 2010, 48f). Hence, we can understand identity and the formation 
of the subject as a process of including affective things within an agentic assemblage. The 
subject is constituted by the association of physical, social, and discursive things, by its 
blood flows, skin, and muscles, its religion, party affiliation, and opinions, its name, social 
security number, and signature. Rather than being constructed or articulated, identity is 
assembled. The subject emerges as a spatial configuration navigating through a discursive 
field of concepts, meanings, and identity interpellations. This discursive identity space is 
intertwined with physical locations of birth, living, and work, and social relations with other 
humans. The subject as spatial assemblage is not simply the effect of physical, social, and 
discursive spaces. It is inseparably intertwined with them, their product, their maker, and 
at times one and the same thing.  
To get a better understanding of how subjects are constituted in participatory processes, we 
need to explore the workings of physical, social, and discursive things that bound partici-
patory spaces in more depth and see how each of them affords and restricts democratic 
subjectivity.  
2.5.2. Democratic Subjectivity as Spatial Configuration 
Several authors on democratic spatiality elaborate how space creates different identity af-
fordances. Beyond the claim discussed previously that physical spaces affect human be-
haviour, they claim that spaces affect who we are. Cornwall (2004b, 80), for example, 
claims that the configuration of participatory spaces affects what roles participants play and 
what sides of themselves they express. In the same vein, Parkinson (2012) introduces a 
performative account of democracy, which “alerts us to the staging of democracy: the need 
for and utility of particular platforms for the performance of particular roles” (10). And 
Brown (1997, 3) argues that participatory spaces give rise to different articulations of po-
litical identity. In short, these authors show that space affects identity. As we have seen 
above, others highlight that subjects create space. Subjects build and arrange physical 
spaces, produce discursive constellations, and generate social relations. Taken together, we 
thus see a bidirectional affectivity between space and identity. Identity and space are the 
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product of a dialectical process of co-constitution (see Springer, 2011, 537). As we will 
see, the two directions of this dialectical process even collapse at times and converge. As 
Doreen Massey (1995, 285) claims: “we make our spaces/spatialities in the process of con-
structing our various identities”. Identity itself is constituted as spatial assemblage as the 
subject navigates through a web of discursive meanings and culturally coded things. 
Through affiliation with these things that are products of hegemonic identity interpella-
tions, the subject assembles itself and demarcates identity space.  
In what follows, I will develop a concept of democratic subjectivity as product and producer 
of space. The discussion will show how the physical, social, and discursive dimensions of 
democratic spatiality are intertwined with agentic identity assemblages that facilitate dem-
ocratic subjectivity.  
Physical spaces and democratic subjectivity. The physical spaces we inhabit are one of the 
prime factors defining our identities. Being born or living in a country for a long period of 
time makes us Australians, Brits, or Nigerians; being at universities makes us students, 
scholars, or academics; on basketball courts we become basketball players, on shopping 
streets shoppers, on dancefloors dancers, and in our living rooms couch potatoes. The cur-
rent controversy about gender-neutral toilets to break up the male/female binary and ac-
commodate trans and intersex people is another example of how physical space creates 
identity boundaries that include and exclude (Gershenson & Penner, 2009). If you have 
ever lived abroad for a certain time, you might have experienced the feeling of being some-
one else. Often the feelings of excitement and liberation in different locations give way to 
frustration upon returning home when the old environment does not acknowledge the 
changes so deeply experienced abroad and forces the old self to come out again. The new 
self appears to be left on the other side of national borders.  
The way we experience and express ourselves in different physical spaces also plays a cru-
cial role in respect of democratic participation. When examining physical democratic 
spaces, in particular the buildings that host participatory processes, it makes sense to dif-
ferentiate between internal and external effects on the production of identity and subjectiv-
ity (McCarthy-Cotter et al., 2018, 55). Internal effects can be observed, for example, when 
examining the architecture of Westminster Palace, which is characterized by a clear divi-
sion running through the entire building, separating the spaces of the House of Commons 
from the spaces of the House of Lords. The furniture and decor of the rooms signal a class 
divide that affects identities expressed within them. Standing in the central lobby of West-
minster Palace, the corridor to the right leading to the House of Lords is lined with leather 
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benches in royal red; the seating of the benches lining the corridor to the left leading to the 
House of Commons is simple green. The rooms assigned to the Lords convey royalty 
through their rich golden decorum covering the walls and ceilings. Not just the chamber 
where debates take place, which is furnished with three royal thrones, golden clocks, and 
wooden lions, but all of the rooms, chapels, halls, and lobbies assigned to the Lords display 
grandeur and nobility. The spaces assigned to the Commons, in contrast, are furnished in a 
simple style with green benches and plain wooden panels covering the walls. The two 
realms of the Commons and the Lords are architecturally strictly separated, so that people 
within these spaces never cross paths except when entering the central lobby that connects 
the two wings (Dovey, 1999, 88; Puwar, 2010, 304).  
The external effects of physical spaces on the constitution of the subject can be illustrated 
by examining the exteriority of parliamentary buildings. National parliaments perform na-
tional identity and construct an image of unity and belonging (McCarthy-Cotter et al., 2018, 
55). It is not just a national identity that is constructed, but also a democratic identity that 
entails citizenship and invokes political rights. Parliamentary buildings as diverse as the 
traditional neogothic palaces in London and Budapest, the neoclassical US Capitol remi-
niscent of Ancient Greek democracy, and the modern Parliament of Australia in Canberra 
all express both a national and a democratic collective identity. Parkinson (2012) calls this 
the symbolic effects of architecture. Buildings, monuments, and gravestones tell stories. 
These stories integrate personal life experiences into the narrative of a nation. Architectural 
narratives thus generate identity. Parkinson points to “the way that forms act as symbols, 
anchor points for memories and identity… [P]hysical anchor points of memory help people 
to think that people like them are taken seriously by the collective, which in turn matters 
for political efficacy” (74). 
Social spaces and democratic subjectivity. The same claim Parkinson and others make 
regarding the identity producing function of physical space, Cornwall makes for social 
space. Different social spaces configured by different constellations of human bodies and 
the power relations and emotive bonds between them give rise to different identity perfor-
mances. It is the betweenness of human bodies, much in the sense of Arendt’s space of 
appearance, that produces identity (Arendt, 1958, 198). In Massey’s (1995, 285) words: 
“the identities, including the political identities, on which the project of radical democracy 
focuses are themselves formed in a spatialised interlocking of power-filled social rela-
tions”. The identity performances through human bodies are afforded and restrained by the 
social relationality between subjects. The potential for freedom to express the self is thus 
in a state of constant flux: 
  55 
People move between domains of association in everyday life in which the 
ways they come to be seen by others, and seen themselves, may be strikingly 
different, with implications for the extent to which they are able to influence 
and indeed act as agents in particular spaces. Someone who is voluble and as-
sertive in one setting may be silenced in others; someone looked up to with 
respect in one sphere may find themselves patronized and even derided in an-
other. The mutual impingement of relations of power and difference within and 
across different arenas conditions possibilities for agency and voice. (Cornwall, 
2004b, 80) 
For Cornwall, it is not the physical space, as it is in Parkinson’s approach, but the social 
space that constitutes the subject. Different people within a participatory space, different 
ways of moderating deliberation, and different rules of engagement afford the expression 
of different selves. Participatory spaces then fulfil a democratic function that is often over-
looked. While many scholars ask about the real-world outcomes of democratic innovations, 
Cornwall and colleagues point to the function of identity constitution of such spaces. Dem-
ocratic subjects do not enter and leave participatory spaces with predetermined, fixed iden-
tities. Rather, they produce, re-create, and alter their identities within the process of partic-
ipation (Cornwall, 2004a, 6; Cornwall & Shankland, 2013, 315; see also Lloyd, 2005). 
Focusing on social spatiality, it is not the qualities of the physical space, but the way phys-
ical space is used – the way it is socially acquired – that configures identity. For example, 
the Women’s Social and Political Union (WSPU) of the UK suffragette movement, known 
for its disruptive action including breaking shop windows and bombing public letter boxes, 
founded a number of commercial shops. The shops sold the weekly newspaper “Votes for 
Women”, postcards, tea, toiletries as well as a series of other suffrage merchandise in the 
purple, white, and green colour scheme of the movement. These shops both supported the 
movement financially and provided meeting spaces for political debate and planning. But 
the shops did more than this. They publicly constructed an identity of suffragettes as re-
spectable, reliable, and commercially successful women, which counteracted the militant 
image of the movement. Moreover, the products sold in the shop, such as cosmetics and 
scarfs, connoted with femininity and wealth, constituted an image of domesticity and do-
cility in line with established gender roles: “By couching their outlets in terms of affluent, 
feminine retailing, branches distanced themselves from the image of hysterical militants, 
presenting themselves instead in terms of conventional, mainstream femininity. And, nota-
bly, this femininity – manifested in the (very) conspicuous consumption of material goods 
– was a predominantly middle-class one” (Mercer, 2004, 6). It was not the physical space 
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of the shops itself; it was the way it was used, the fact that it was occupied only by women 
and created for women, and the culturally coded things for sale that performed identity. 
Discursive spaces and democratic subjectivity. In the discursive dimension of democratic 
spatiality, the democratic subject emerges not out of social relations but rather from the 
constellation of terms and meanings. The names available and the terms that exist to de-
scribe democratic subjects brings them into being. Cornwall (2002b, 8) explains:  
What “participation” is taken to mean makes available particular subject posi-
tions for participants to take up within particular spaces, bounding the possibil-
ities for inclusion as well as agency. Being constructed as “beneficiaries”, “cli-
ents”, “users” or “citizens” influences what people are perceived to be able to 
contribute or entitle to know or decide.  
According to this account of the discursive spatialization of identity, subjects are consti-
tuted by the boundaries of terms that include and exclude. In the same vein, Butler contends 
that subjects only exist by the terms available to describe them. Subjects are born into a 
world of pre-established discourses that shape reality. Trying to orient themselves in such 
discursive webs of meaning, subjects have no choice but to accept the established terms, 
norms, rules, and discursive structures to express who they are (Butler, 2015, 40). While 
this account provides a good understanding of how subjects are constituted through dis-
courses, we need to supplement it with a notion of discursive spatiality in order to under-
stand how such processes relate to democratic spaces.  
This point can be made by drawing on Dikeç’s (2012) concept of space as mode of political 
thinking discussed earlier. Dikeç sees the space of appearance as the location for the subject 
to articulate identity: “Space becomes a form of appearance and a mode of actuality, mak-
ing manifest established orders, generating particular relationships to them, and providing 
relational domains of experience for the constitution of political identities” (Dikeç, 2015, 
2). Recall that Dikeç understands thinking as a mode of spatialization because any cognitive 
process consists of relating and ordering abstract concepts. Just as subjects perceive phys-
ical space as the relationship between physical things, so thinking consists of a process of 
mapping terms, concepts, and ideas. From this vantage point, we can see how identity con-
stitution comprises the relating of discursive things. Being born into a world of pre-existing 
discourses – as Butler (2015, 40) claims – spatializing identity means relating points of 
identification to each other. These points of identification constituting personal identity 
such as gender, race, profession, class, sexuality, religion, and political affiliation mark 
different social positions. They mark locations within a web of meaning. Constituting 
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personal identity, then, means navigating within a web of meaning – an identity space – 
both actively searching for affiliation and being hailed by others. In this process of the 
spatial constitution of identity, the subject is not stable as it navigates through the web of 
possible identifications, nor is identity space stable itself, as the meanings of categories 
such as “man”, “lesbian”, “immigrant”, “racist”, and “Catholic” are constantly rearticulated 
and reinterpreted.  
To conclude, the many identity elements that constitute democratic subjects interact with 
the many things that constitute democratic spatiality in various ways. The red colour of a 
leather bench cushion may call upon the sentiments of nobility in MPs while historical 
monuments may prompt a sense of patriotism in citizens. Experts taking part in a citizens’ 
assembly call upon participants as reasoned deliberators, while the exclusion from partici-
pating in parliamentary debates may bring out the terrorist in feminists. And for all these 
identity constructions we depend on the constellation of words that we use to describe our-
selves and that are used to hail us. All of these things matter for how subjects assemble. 
The different physical, social, and discursive arrangements of space resonate with different 
sides of the multiple self (Elster, 1986) from the homo sociologicus to the homo economi-
cus, from the id, to the ego, and superego, from different desires and impulses to reflected 
reasons. But the relationship works the other way around too. Closed, invited, and claimed 
spaces are shaped by human agents who actively arrange physical, social, and discursive 
things. Who we perceive ourselves to be and who others perceive us to be within these 
spaces configures the space itself. The presence of a freedom fighter affects a space differ-
ently from the presence of a terrorist. Thus, space depends on the interpretation of identity. 
This dialectical process, the mutual affectivity of space and the subject, configures different 
relations of freedom and equality.  
2.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to lay the theoretical groundwork for this thesis. It has developed 
a deep understanding of participatory spaces by bringing two sets of literature together, 
combining conceptions of space as socio-discursive constellations in participatory pro-
cesses with literature on “actual” physical sites of participation. By integrating these two 
debates, the concept of participatory spaces developed in this chapter overcomes both the 
mere metaphorical use of the term “space” and the assumption of unidirectional effects of 
physical space on human behaviour. This new concept explains participatory spaces as 
agentic assemblages based on the mutual affectivity between physical, social, and 
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discursive things that demarcate an inside and an outside. The agentic boundaries of par-
ticipatory spaces delimit and produce the potentials for freedom and equality. 
These participatory spaces function as a space of appearance. Closed, claimed, and invited 
spaces provide stages for the democratic subject to become visible to others. The subject is 
constituted through its corporeal public performance and through the gaze of the audience. 
The various things that constitute such spaces interact with different aspects that constitute 
the multiple self. Seating arrangements and the size of physical space, the combination of 
people present and the social protocols, the terms that describe identities and the discursive 
formations emerging from debate all afford and restrict how subjects see themselves and 
others. This relationship is not unidirectional, however; rather, it consists of a dialectical 
process in which physical, social, and discursive things defining space call upon subjects 
and at the same time subjects rearrange things thus reconfiguring space. The identities that 
subjects express are, on the one hand, afforded by space, while, on the other, they are con-
stitutive of space. As subjects change, so do spaces. These mutually productive processes 
are so closely related that space assemblages and identity assemblages converge at times. 
Understanding any linguistic expression as the production of discursive space through the 
mapping of discursive things, identity itself becomes a spatial engagement. The self navi-
gates its way through a web of identity interpellations.  
When understanding participatory spaces as assemblages of physical, social, and discursive 
things, the question arises as to how the constellation of these things can be altered to ad-
vance freedom and equality and how the subject can gain agency over self-constitution. 
Here, the question of identity becomes paramount. To what extent democratic subjects can 
express themselves freely and how they are judged by others within participatory spaces is 
closely related to their identities. These questions are explored by a feminist discourse in 
democratic theory identified with the term “difference democracy”. The next chapter will 
engage with difference democrats’ politics of presence, which seeks to advance inclusion 
and equality in participatory spaces. The politics of presence, as will become apparent, 
shares some core features with the space of appearance. It is through the visibility of em-
bodied identities that subjects articulate political claims.  
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3. The Politics of Presence Revisited: Mapping Feminist Demo-
cratic Theory* 
3.1. Introduction 
In an early essay entitled “Throwing Like a Girl” Iris Marion Young (2005 [1977]) dis-
cusses the gendered nature of space. She observes that the personal space that an individual 
inhabits is not gender-neutral. Rather, men, overall, tend to use their bodies in a more dy-
namic and uninhibited way than women. Women tend to make small steps, cross their legs 
when sitting, and generally try to occupy a smaller space. When throwing a ball, boys tend 
to use their entire body to achieve maximal momentum while girls tend to stand still, fixed 
in space, and only use their arms. These gendered behavioural patterns are not rooted in 
biology, but in the different positions gendered bodies occupy within society. In this gen-
dered matrix, female space appears confined: “a space surrounds us in imagination that we 
are not free to move beyond; the space available to our movement is a constricted space” 
(33). This variance in identity space is based on different gendered body perceptions. Men 
tend to perceive their bodies as natural and hardly pay attention to them. Male bodies facil-
itate subjectivity and create space through their presence. In contrast, “feminine existence 
experiences the body as a mere thing – a fragile thing” (39). As objects, female bodies are 
positioned in space and acted upon by male subjects and masculine power structures. The 
confinement of female identity space is partly due to defensiveness, as women tend to avoid 
colliding with the things that threaten them. The “invasion of her body space” (45) always 
poses a threat to a woman, of which subtle forms of sexual harassment are a common and 
rape the most extreme form (see also Phillips, 2013, 42ff).  
Although Young’s study on gendered space must be read in the specific context of the 
1970s, it still has a lot of explanatory power today. It shows how the size of identity space 
and the freedom to move within it varies according to the social status of the identity in-
scribed in the body. The space of marginalized groups such as women and racial and sexual 
minorities has markedly increased over the past decades. While Young discusses male sex 
offenders as intruders, Nirma Puwar’s (2004) more recent work turns this observation 
around and describes those bodies with marginalized identity inscriptions as “space in-
vaders” as they push into the participatory spaces of the public sphere. She draws attention 
to the maleness of democratic spaces that are commonly perceived as neutral. The 
 
* Parts of this chapter have been published in a research article in Politics & Gender, see 
Asenbaum, 2019a. 
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normalization of male space as default arenas for public interaction rests on boundary draw-
ing practices that exclude those bodies identified as deviant: “Some bodies are deemed as 
having the right to belong, while others are marked out as trespassers, who are, in accord-
ance with how both spaces and bodies are imagined (politically, historically and conceptu-
ally), circumscribed as being ‘out of place’. Not being the somatic norm, they are space 
invaders” (8). Puwar describes an incident in which Diane Abbott as the first black and one 
of only a few female members of the UK Parliament entered one of the smoking rooms of 
Westminster Palace. The cigar-puffing white men were struck with bewilderment as a per-
son who could only be a cleaner was present among them as an equal. The entering of a 
black, female body into white, male space “represents a dissonance; a jarring of framings 
that confuses and disorientates. It is a menacing presence that disturbs and interrupts a cer-
tain white, usually male, sense of public institutional place” (42). 
The invasion of participatory spaces by bodies with marginalized identity inscriptions re-
configures the space of appearance where the democratic subject becomes visible. For Ar-
endt plurality is a central precondition for the space of appearance, which facilitates the 
democratic exchange of diverse ideas. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Arendt’s 
space of appearance is criticized by Butler (2015, 73ff) for its unreflected masculine bias 
that replicates naturalized exclusion, which renders the marginalized invisible. Arendt, ac-
cording to Butler, overlooks the crucial role of materiality both concerning the material 
preconditions of appearing publicly, such as food and shelter, and the centrality of bodies 
and their identity inscriptions. Arendt’s pluralism, in other words, is limited to what Anne 
Phillips (1996; 1995) calls the politics of ideas. Phillips argues that liberal theories of plu-
ralist democracy foreground the diversity of competing interests and forget about the di-
versity of identities. To overcome this omission, she proposes a politics of presence, which 
gives visibility to the marginalized in the space of appearance.  
The politics of presence is the central theme of a feminist discourse in democratic theory 
associated with the term “difference democracy”, which promotes the inclusion of the mar-
ginalized in participatory spaces. Through quotas in the closed spaces of parliaments, ran-
dom selection in invited spaces, and identity politics in claimed spaces, the inclusion of 
marginalized bodies works as a visible claim for equality. The proposed techniques of in-
clusion can be seen as a structural interference with the order of things that make up spatial 
assemblages, altering the composition of bodies that constitute them. The politics of pres-
ence shifts marginalized bodies from private spaces to spaces of public visibility which 
challenges entrenched power asymmetries and thus contributes to the core democratic value 
of equality: “Challenging [power] structures… acknowledge[s] the group-structured nature 
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of social and political hierarchies, and thereby opens up space for political and policy 
change” (Phillips, 2019a forthcoming). 
This chapter will explore the potential of the politics of presence to alter the space of ap-
pearance by including marginalized bodies. As we will see, this has beneficial effects on 
equality but it also entails essentializing tendencies that limit the freedom of the democratic 
subject to change. In accordance with the democratic paradox, an increase in equality is 
accompanied by limitations of freedom. This chapter also seeks to contribute to democratic 
theory more generally. While there is an abundance of texts on democratic theory that dif-
ferentiate realist, pluralist, participatory, agonistic, deliberative, environmental, and cos-
mopolitan perspectives, difference democracy remains absent. Although the impact of dif-
ference democratic debates on democratic theory is undisputable, comprehensive attempts 
at mapping difference democracy are scarce and often brief (Dahlberg, 2005; Marx Ferree 
et al., 2002, 306ff; Saward, 2003a, 134ff; see also Wingenbach, 2011, 132ff).  
Dryzek’s (2000) “Difference Democracy: The Consciousness Raising Group Against the 
Gentlemen’s Club” is an exception. Yet, it takes a specific angle. Instead of focusing on 
the constructive ideas that characterize other models of democracy, it sketches difference 
democracy as primarily an oppositional discourse that is critical of deliberative democracy 
(see also Dahlberg, 2005).10 While this may well be an important aspect, it is – from my 
perspective – not its defining feature. Deliberative democracy is rooted in a critique of the 
realist model of democracy, yet it is hardly comprehensible in purely oppositional terms. 
The understanding of difference democracy primarily as a critique of deliberative democ-
racy appears to have a gendered aspect. Women are often defined via their relationship to 
men. They are perceived as lovers, daughters, and mothers, but not as agentic subjects.  
Rather than defining difference democracy in terms of a feminist critique of “the gentle-
men’s club”, this chapter will focus on its constructive features and explore it as a perspec-
tive in democratic theory in its own right. As outlined in the introduction, this thesis is 
making use of various radical democratic perspectives (Parkinson, 2012, 9; Smith, 2019 
forthcoming). To the participatory, deliberative, and agonistic perspectives, which are 
widely known and will be discussed in the next chapter, this chapter will add a difference 
democratic perspective to answer the following question: how can freedom and equality be 
advanced from a difference democratic perspective? 
 
10 Since Dryzek frames difference democracy primarily as a critique of deliberative democracy 
and not as feminist discourse, he includes other authors beyond the ones discussed in this chapter 
such as William Connolly and Chantal Mouffe. 
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3.2. Feminists Rattling at the Doors of Democratic Theory: A Triple Call to Action 
Within a decade, three essays by different feminist democratic theorists appeared with the 
same title, “Feminism and Democracy”. The first was by Carole Pateman, who in 1983 sent 
out a fervent call to no longer ignore the democratic insights feminism can offer to demo-
cratic theory. The aim of the essay reprinted in Pateman’s The Disorder of Women (1989) 
was to instigate a debate in democratic theory about the role of women in democracy and 
about the refusal to admit feminist scholarship into the canon of democratic theory. Pate-
man’s call proved successful as it was followed by Anne Phillips’ “Feminism and Democ-
racy” (1991), with Jane Mansbridge’s (1998) text with the same title following soon there-
after.  
Both Pateman and Phillips point to the significant overlap between feminist and democratic 
principles: “The two traditions [feminism and democracy] have much in common for both 
deal in notions of equality and both oppose arbitrary power” (Phillips, 1991, 1). If femi-
nism, in broad terms, is understood as the equality of the sexes and the emancipation of 
women from the social position of subordination, and democracy is understood as equality 
and freedom in the political organization of society, their mutuality becomes evident 
(Pateman, 1989, 212; see also Ferguson 2007, 33; McAfee & Snyder 2007, VI). Mans-
bridge joins Pateman and Phillips in pointing to the democratic experience of the US 
women’s movement (Mansbridge, 1998, 154; Pateman, 1989, 220; Phillips, 1991, 120ff). 
Phillips describes the democratic ethos of the participatory practices in feminist claimed 
spaces:  
For the women’s movement, questions of internal democracy returned to the 
centre of the stage, this time imbued with an almost anarchist critique of au-
thority, an intensely egalitarian approach. In most of the newly formed 
women’s groups, any kind of hierarchy was automatically suspect. Meetings 
were informal and only loosely structured. (Phillips, 1991, 121) 
To arrange participatory spaces in an egalitarian manner, activists invented new modes of 
engagement. For example, to facilitate equal opportunity to speak, verbal contributions 
were limited through an equal number of discs that each participant could “spend”. Fur-
thermore, tasks and responsibilities were allocated among the activists by lot.  
Pateman’s engagement with feminist perspectives inspires her to push the boundaries of 
her democratic vision even further than in her earlier work on democratizing various spaces 
such as the workplace, schools, public services, etc. (Pateman, 1970). Participatory democ-
racy is not just about claiming the privatized spaces of work and opening the closed spaces 
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of the state. Instead, “democratic ideals and politics have to be put into practice in the 
kitchen, the nursery and the bedroom” (Pateman, 1989, 222).  
This wide vision of democracy is based on the critique of the invisibility of women in 
mainstream political theory (see Mansbridge, 1998, 142):  
The power of men over women is excluded from scrutiny and deemed irrele-
vant to political life and democracy by the patriarchal construction of the cate-
gories with which political theorists work… The feminist challenge is particu-
larly pressing in the case of radical democratic theory which argues for the ac-
tive participation of all citizens, but has barely begun to acknowledge the prob-
lem of women’s standing in political order in which citizenship has been made 
in the male image. (Pateman 1989, 14) 
This invisibility of women, then, is based on the division of private and public spaces, with 
the private sphere – the domain of women, reproductive work, and sexuality – left out of 
sight. While liberal democratic theory, according to Pateman, is based on a contract, in 
which “men” consent to being governed, women are seen as naturally subordinate to men 
as their consent is not sought (Pateman, 1988; see also Phillips, 1991, 3). “In sexual rela-
tions more generally, a woman’s refusal of consent – her utterance of the word ‘no’ or other 
clear indication of refusal – is systematically invalidated; her refusal is reinterpreted as 
‘yes’” (Pateman, 1989, 12f).11 Pateman then goes on to ask how a person who is sexually 
humiliated and abused in the private sphere and who carries the double burden of house-
work, including rearing children and caring for old or sick family members, and profes-
sional work, can function in the public sphere as an equal and free citizen (221). 
Pateman ends her argument for a feminist democratic theory with an emphatic call to ac-
tion: “The lesson to be learned from the past is that a ‘democratic’ theory and practice that 
is not at the same time feminist merely serves to maintain a fundamental form of domina-
tion and so makes a mockery of the ideals and values that democracy is held to embody” 
(223). And this call, indeed, was heard.  
3.3. The Problem of Internal Exclusion in Participatory Spaces 
The feminist response in democratic scholarship that Pateman had hoped for quickly fol-
lowed. In the same year as her call to action, Jane Mansbridge’s Beyond Adversary 
 
11 While Pateman’s observation was made before marital rape was made illegal across the United 
States in 1993, it still bears relevance today in light of the series of rape and sexual molestation 
accusations being raised in the #MeToo debate. 
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Democracy (1983) investigated race, class, and gender inequalities in townhall meetings 
and workplace democracy. Throughout the ensuing decade, the feminist discussion in dem-
ocratic theory intensified with central publications by Iris Marion Young (1990; 1989), 
Nancy Fraser (1990), Jane Mansbridge (1993; 1991), Anne Phillips (1995; 1991), and Carol 
Gould (1996).  
Pateman had argued that feminist insight with its sensibility to identity related discrimina-
tion and marginalization could enrich democratic theory. And indeed, the ensuing discourse 
about the value of difference in democracy focused on modes of inclusion and exclusion 
along identity categories. Difference democrats discuss boundary making practices that de-
cide who is present, who has the right to appear in participatory spaces. The difference 
democratic perspective goes further than just registering the physical presence of the cor-
poreal subject. Rather, it provides a vocabulary with which to understand the boundary 
making practices of inclusion and exclusion within participatory spaces. Young differenti-
ates between external and internal exclusion. External exclusion asks who is physically 
present. The established study of democracy focuses on external exclusion, telling the story 
of continually expanding political rights, in particular through suffrage. In respect of closed, 
claimed, and invited spaces, access to political participation is greatly influenced by the 
unequal distribution of economic, social, and educational resources (Young, 1999). Internal 
exclusion, on the other hand, determines the social standing of participants within partici-
patory spaces. Respect and appreciation appear to be distributed just as unevenly as mate-
rial resources. Inequality in resources correlates with group identities inscribed in the hu-
man body. Internal exclusion, then, draws attention to patterns of devaluation of discursive 
content uttered by participants whose physical appearance is identified with marginalized 
social groups (Young, 2000, 52ff). While being physically present in participatory spaces, 
some still remain outside the boundaries of appearance (Butler, 2015, 73ff).  
It is not simply the physical body of the marginalized that triggers discrimination. Rather, 
their socially acquired cultural forms of expression are encoded with inferiority. Thus, it is 
the manner of expression that signals status. This observation leads difference democrats 
to criticize the particular forms of expression – namely reasoned, verbal argumentation 
– that conceptions of deliberative democracy call for. In “Against Deliberation” Lynn 
Sanders (1997, 348) argues:  
Taking deliberation as a signal of democratic practice paradoxically works un-
democratically, discrediting on seemingly democratic grounds the views of 
those who are less likely to present their arguments in ways that we recognize 
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as characteristically deliberative. In our political culture, these citizens are 
likely to be those who are already underrepresented in formal political institu-
tions and who are systematically materially disadvantaged, namely women; ra-
cial minorities, especially Blacks; and poorer people. 
And in reference to Habermas’ public sphere theory, Fraser (1990, 63) notes: “Discursive 
interaction within the bourgeois public sphere was governed by protocols of style and de-
corum that were themselves correlates and markers of status inequality. These functioned 
informally to marginalize women and members of the plebeian classes and to prevent them 
from participating as peers”.12 
Deliberative democrats have responded in two ways. A first defence of deliberative democ-
racy holds that diversity has always been at the core of deliberative democracy. Without a 
variety of opinions, deliberation would not be possible (see Chambers, 1996, 158f). Sec-
ond, deliberative democrats (Dryzek, 2000; Parkinson & Mansbridge, 2012) and scholars 
of democratic innovations (Fung, 2003, 344; Smith, 2009, 20ff) have incorporated differ-
ence democrats’ objections and have developed improved conceptions that are sensitive to 
the problem of internal exclusion. 
While these theoretical debates partly alleviate the problem, internal exclusion persists, as 
a plethora of empirical studies demonstrates. In her detailed study of a New England town 
meeting and a participatory workplace, Mansbridge (1983) finds clear patterns of inequality 
along the lines of social identities. In the invited spaces of the town meeting only 29% of 
participants who contributed to the debate were women. In qualitative interviews, women 
reported that they felt intimidated by the setting (106). The town meeting was dominated 
by the disproportionate participation of large property-owning men (100). In the participa-
tory workplace, women reported less often than men that “people seem to respect my opin-
ion” and more often that “articulate people intimidate me” (192). Elsewhere, Mansbridge 
(1993, 362f) cites several studies showing that in both private and public settings women 
speak less compared to men, ask more questions, and state information rather than giving 
opinions and making arguments. Their verbal contributions are characterized by greater 
uncertainty, which Mansbridge explains with a long history of exclusion of women from 
the public sphere. Similarly, Sanders (1997, 363ff) investigates the closed spaces of US 
 
12 The criticism of deliberative democracy expressed by difference democrats and other feminist 
scholars is extensive and is dealt with here only briefly. For further elaborations see Fraser, 1995; 
Ferguson, 2007; Kohn, 2000; Lupia and Norton, 2017; Mansbridge, 2012; Pajnik, 2006. 
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juries and cites findings that men tend to speak more. Moreover, while the juries consisted 
of two-thirds of women, in 90% of the cases men were chosen to head the jury. 
The problem of internal exclusion continues to be the subject of ongoing empirical work. 
A study on deliberative polling creating a transnational invited space for 350 participants 
of 27 EU countries finds that in the 25 face-to-face discussion groups, women and members 
of the working class spoke significantly less (Gerber, 2015). Another study on the parlia-
mentary closed spaces of seven European countries shows that women take the floor less 
than their male colleagues (Bäck & Debus, 2018). The gender gap in traditional forms of 
political participation, such as voting, indicating external exclusion has closed recently in 
Western societies (Nancy Burns et al., 2018). Upon closer examination, however, inequal-
ity between the sexes persists. A recent study of 18 Western countries finds that while 
women vote and petition at higher rates than men, they are less likely to participate in civil 
society initiatives and collective action (Coffé & Bolzendahl, 2010). Another study finds 
that women are significantly less likely to participate in small group deliberation in Canada 
(Beauvais, 2019). These patterns of self-selection are also mirrored in a dramatic gender 
gap in political ambition to engage in politics among youth (Fox & Lawless, 2014).  
The extensive work of Christopher Karpowitz and Tali Mendelberg documented in The 
Silent Sex (2014) and several other publications (Karpowitz et al., 2012; Mendelberg et al., 
2014; Mendelberg et al., 2014) is of particular interest regarding internal exclusion. It in-
vestigates the effects of the gender composition of deliberative groups and the decision 
rules (consensus vs. majority) in a series of experiments supplemented with data from 87 
different school board meetings. The results show that overall women speak significantly 
less than men; they only speak at equal rates to men if they far outnumber male participants. 
Moreover, when women are in the minority and decisions are taken by majority rule, there 
is a substantive gender gap regarding speaking time and subjectively perceived authority. 
Women are also interrupted more often than men and report loss of confidence. The authors 
explain this as a spiral of discouragement due to the lower status society attributes to 
women so that: “the fewer women [are] in the group, the lower their status, the less they 
may speak, and the lower their influence” (Karpowitz et al., 2012, 534). In comparison, 
men’s participation and influence is unaffected by their share of the group.  
The observed male dominance does not come into effect when women are in the majority 
and decisions are taken with a majority vote. Men also do not dominate when women are 
in the minority, but decisions are taken by consensus principle, which gives the minority 
veto power. Women also engage in substantive representation and voice women’s 
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distinctive concerns such as family issues, only if they are in the majority. The authors 
conclude: “Women are often disadvantaged in speech participation, whereas men are never 
disadvantaged” (Karpowitz et al., 2012, 544). The work of Karpowitz, Mendelberg et al. 
goes to show that it is the presence of bodies with marginalized identity inscriptions and 
the decision-making rules that affect the configuration of democratic spatiality.  
I made similar observations in my own work on citizens’ councils in Austria, comparing 
two case studies. In the first case with an equal number of men and women participating, 
men spoke slightly more than women. In the other case with a majority of women among 
participants (58%), women spoke 60% of the time, per capita, pointing to a dynamic of 
peer encouragement also observed by Karpowitz and Mendelberg. This demonstrates how 
power relations within participatory spaces are altered through the constellation of gen-
dered bodies (Asenbaum, 2016). 
The same exclusionary patterns are observed in non-Western societies. A recent study 
shows, for example, that in a Gram Sabha village assembly in India, women only accounted 
for a third of speaking time and received fewer responses by state officials compared to 
their male counterparts (Parthasarathy et al., 2019). Internal exclusion is also illustrated by 
a study on invited spaces in South Africa. Here local authorities set up forums for citizens’ 
discussions, which in the context of a long history of segregation were characterized by 
deep racial and gendered inequalities. The formalized spatial arrangement instituted by 
government officials intimidated those in marginalized social positions:  
The public silencing of women such that they are largely passive observers in 
formal spaces of citizen participation is a spatialized construction of identity 
since the same women are often very active participants in less formal political 
spaces, such as street and area committees, savings and housing associations 
and other community groups. (McEwan, 2005, 982) 
Black women, however, reconfigured the spatial ordering to make it more inclusive by 
starting with African greetings, anti-apartheid dances, and resistance and liberation songs. 
These performances of cultural and political identity, which actively articulated presence, 
reconfigured the space of appearance.  
3.4. The Vision of Difference Democracy: Combining Equality and Diversity 
The example of black women articulating their identity in participatory spaces illustrates 
the core argument difference democrats are making. To respond to the problem of internal 
exclusion, difference democrats promote diversity as a democratic value. They understand 
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difference as the essence of democracy. This section will provide a brief introduction to the 
core ideals of difference democracy, which will be elaborated in more depth in the sections 
thereafter. 
Iris Marion Young (1990) formulates her vision of a diverse democracy in spatial terms. 
She discusses the city as the physical location of an ideal democratic society. This marks a 
profound break with participatory democratic thought, which is prominent in other differ-
ence democratic texts (e.g. Gould, 1996; Mansbridge, 1983). Participatory democrats focus 
on small democratic spaces of local communities such as town meetings and neighbour-
hood organizations that facilitate emotive connections of trust and friendship. Young, in 
contrast, shifts the focus to the big city. City life is characterized by the being together of 
strangers that form a polity rather than a community resulting in a diverse spatial assem-
blage: “Our social life is structured by vast networks of temporal and spatial mediation 
among persons, so that nearly everyone depends on the activities of seen and unseen 
strangers who mediate between oneself and one’s associates, between oneself and one’s 
objects of desire” (Young, 1990, 237). What makes the city the ideal place for democracy 
is the heterogeneity it provides. In contrast with the homogenic tendencies of the local 
community, the city’s geographic complexity facilitates multiple encounters and a diversity 
of content: “A place of many places, the city folds over on itself in so many layers and 
relationships that it is incomprehensible” (240). Besides the diversity of activities, the erot-
icism of unexpected encounters, and the accessibility of public space for political engage-
ment, the core feature of the city is the plurality of its inhabitants’ identities. City dwellers 
participate in identity groups that articulate difference as part of what Young calls the het-
erogeneous public. 
The heterogeneous public forms an internally inclusive space that combines difference with 
equality. Young starts from the observation of new social movements in the USA from the 
1960s into the ’80s, which affirm and reinterpret their marginalized group identities in pos-
itive terms. The Black Power movement reframed the African American identity with slo-
gans such as “black is beautiful” and critically distanced itself from the Civil Rights move-
ment’s assimilationist strategy. Soon Red Power followed suit, promoting the self-determi-
nation of Native Americans. The gay and lesbian movement fought for sexual liberation 
and promoted alternative conceptions of life and family. While one arm of the women’s 
movement advocated a reformist path to equal rights (equality feminism), the other criti-
cized this strategy as conformist and refused to adapt to institutions they had no part in 
shaping (difference feminism) (159ff). From the engagement with these movements, 
Young derives a vision of democracy that combines equality with difference: “In this vision 
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the good society does not eliminate or transcend group difference. Rather, there is equality 
among socially and culturally differentiated groups, who mutually respect one another and 
affirm one another in their differences” (Young, 1990, 163).  
The heterogeneous public is partially realized in social movements’ claimed spaces that 
form rainbow coalitions. Instead of trying to overcome or cover up their differences to 
appear united, heterogeneous publics affirm their differences. While they jointly promote 
a certain cause, they may disagree on other issues and thus maintain their particular identi-
ties (Young, 1990, 188ff; 1989, 264ff; 1987, 75f). The street demonstrations of such coali-
tions reflect this diversity with “gaily decorative banners with ironic or funny slogans, gue-
rilla theater or costumes serving to make political points, giant puppets standing for people 
or ideas towering over the crowd, chants, music, songs, dancing” (Young, 1987, 75). Draw-
ing on these social movements’ experiences, Young claims that difference is to be under-
stood as a resource rather than an obstacle for fruitful deliberation. In what Young terms 
communicative democracy, inclusive institutional design needs to promote difference to 
include a diversity of perspectives and experiences in the discussion. This diversity in com-
munication represents the core of democracy (Young, 1997b, 398ff; 1996, 127f; 1989, 
264). 
In contrast with the coalition politics of the heterogeneous public, Nancy Fraser (1990) 
contends that diversity can best be realized through enclave deliberation. The universality 
of the Habermasian public sphere is challenged by a long history of counterpublics. Parallel 
to the bourgeois public clubs, associations, and cafés described by Habermas (1992 [1962]), 
peasants, women, nationalists, and workers held their own gatherings. Today, subaltern 
counterpublics, as claimed spaces drawing their boundaries along lines of group identifica-
tion, serve two functions: First, they provide a safe space for members of marginalized 
groups to reflect their experiences of oppression and form a community free from domina-
tion. Second, this safe space serves to reinterpret marginalized identities in positive terms 
and develop counter arguments and ideas to challenge hegemonic discourses. Mansbridge 
(1996b, 58) elaborates on the functions of counterpublics: 
The goals of these counterpublics include understanding themselves better, 
forging bonds of solidarity, preserving the memories of past injustices, inter-
preting and reinterpreting the meaning of those injustices, working out alterna-
tive conceptions of self, of community, of justice, and of universality, trying to 
make sense of both the privileges they wield and the oppressions they face, 
understanding the strategic configurations for and against their desired ends, 
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deciding what alliances to make both emotionally and strategically, deliberat-
ing on ends and means, and deciding how to act, individually and collectively.  
Fraser (1990) calls these claimed spaces of identity groups weak publics as they are lacking 
ultimate decision-making power in contrast with governmental closed spaces which she 
refers to as strong publics. Fraser suggests that the institutional arrangement of strong pub-
lics should be extended to include participatory spaces in the workplace, universities, and 
health facilities (74ff). Her ultimate vision of democracy consists of a classless society that, 
through its egalitarian economic and social conditions, provides the ground for cultural 
diversity and creativity (68). This vision resonates with Young’s ideal of a society charac-
terized by both equality and diversity. 
In the same vein, Anne Phillips’ more recent The Politics of the Human (2015) stresses that 
equality as a claim and commitment is compatible with difference. Equality does not denote 
homogeneity but the recognition of rights and chances. The equality inherent in being hu-
man goes along with the diversity of identities. In her earlier work, Phillips points out that 
the diversity at the heart of the difference democratic visions is not a new concept but has 
always been a core principle of liberal, and in particular pluralist, democratic thought. How-
ever, pluralism was always applied to ideas and not to social groups and identities. While 
the liberal perspective aimed at overcoming inequality by declaring individuals equal in 
rights but indefinitely different – thus perfectly individual – in their identity, it overlooked 
and obscured structural inequalities. According to Phillips (1995, 5f), pluralism in demo-
cratic theory needs to be reinterpreted to include social identities. This new perspective on 
pluralism is promoted by the identity politics of new social movements, which overcome 
the binary outlook of the category of class. These movements claim that while class may 
be a salient category and the workers’ movement has brought about progress, it is time to 
draw attention to a greater diversity in society consisting not only of capital owners and 
workers, but also of male and female, black, white and brown, gay, lesbian, bi and trans-
sexual people (Phillips, 1993, 144). The diversity that results from paying attention to group 
differences is the foundation of plural deliberation bringing various perspectives together. 
Such deliberation will, however, never result in consensus or unity (158f):  
This is not to say that difference per se will disappear, or that if we only work 
hard enough on our mutual understanding we will converge on some single set 
of shared ideals. What distinguishes a radical perspective on democracy is not 
its expectation of future homogeneity and consensus, but its commitment to a 
politics of solidarity and challenge and change. (161)  
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3.5. A Different Perspective in Democratic Thought 
The brief introduction above illustrates how difference democratic thought engages in a 
rearrangement of democratic spatiality through the inclusion of marginalized bodies. Con-
cepts such as the heterogeneous public and subaltern counterpublics modulate the access 
to participatory spaces to advance the regulative principle of equality. By redrawing the 
boundaries of participatory spaces to include the marginalized, the composition of human 
bodies that constitute the social dimension of democratic spatiality changes. The studies 
discussed earlier, showing that female presence is correlated with women’s confidence to 
speak, for example, demonstrate such a reconfiguration of social space. This social modu-
lation in turn reconfigures discursive space as different topics acquire prominence. For ex-
ample, the study on female participation in parliamentary closed spaces discussed earlier 
(Bäck & Debus, 2018) shows that female representatives engage in not only descriptive but 
also substantive representation (see Pitkin, 1967).  
Given that the overall objective of difference democracy is the inclusion of the marginal-
ized in participatory spaces, the following will discuss difference democratic thought along 
three strategies of inclusion that rearrange democratic space. First, difference democracy 
promotes a politics of presence that includes different bodies in participatory spaces. Sec-
ond, difference democracy draws attention to emotions that find expression through a mul-
tiplicity of modes of communication. And third, difference democracy calls for the 
acknowledgement of diverse self-interests that challenge established power asymmetries. 
The admission of different bodies, emotions, and interests into participatory spaces alters 
the spatial configuration toward the ideal of diversity and equality. 
3.5.1. The Politics of Presence: Representing Identity Through the Physical Body 
Pateman argues that the universalizing conceptions of established democratic theory makes 
women invisible as the default citizen is implicitly conceptualized as male: “There is no set 
of clothes available for a citizen who is a woman, no vision available within political theory 
of the new democratic woman. Women have always been incorporated into the civil order 
as ‘women,’ as subordinate or lesser men, and democratic theorists have not yet formulated 
an alternative” (1989, 14). 
In response, difference democrats call for increasing the visibility of marginalized bodies 
through their physical presence in participatory spaces. In The Politics of Presence, Phillips 
(1995) argues that in democratic engagement it is not just what is said that counts, but also 
who says it. The identified body itself conveys a message. Only by claiming presence in 
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participatory spaces, only by drawing attention to social inequalities represented by their 
physical bodies and their culturally specific ways of expression can members of marginal-
ized groups draw attention to their particular experiences, claims, and perspectives. Phillips 
(1991, 60ff) observes that liberal democracy conceptualizes representation according to 
geographic locality. Constituencies are represented according to their location of residence 
which partly affords the representation of class and race due to their reflection in geographic 
divides, but it entirely neglects the representation of gender. Reflecting more recently on 
the politics of presence, Phillips upholds her preference for descriptive over substantive 
representation. The goal of descriptive representation is not necessarily substantive repre-
sentation, that is, the presence of women need not result in more women-friendly policies. 
Rather, “descriptive representation matters because of what it symbolizes to us in terms of 
citizenship and inclusion – what it conveys to us about who does and who does not count 
as a full member of society” (Phillips, 2012, 517).  
Similarly, Mansbridge argues that the attendance of members of marginalized groups in 
public assemblies is crucial because already by their presence, they remind others of their 
particular interests. In relation to parliamentary representation, she argues: “Even when the 
descriptive legislator is silent, his or her mere physical presence reminds the other legisla-
tors of the perspectives and interests of the group of which he or she is a descriptive mem-
ber” (Mansbridge, 2005, 62). It is the visibility of the physical body as an affective thing 
that articulates a political claim.  
In the difference democratic perspective, the value of a diversity of identities goes beyond 
the mere corporeal articulation of a political claim, however. Rather, only those with mar-
ginalized bodies share particular life experiences and can thus authentically represent them. 
The politics of presence brings not only a diversity of bodies, but also a diversity of qualities 
to participatory spaces (Phillips, 2019b). Since men and women, heterosexual and homo-
sexual, black and white people are forced into different social positions and are thus social-
ized in different ways, they also develop different social qualities and character traits. 
Philips (1991) states that “the sexual differentiation in conditions and experience has pro-
duced a specifically woman’s point of view” (63). Accordingly, women “have perceived 
themselves as bringing something new to the political stage. Their much delayed entry will 
not only add to the dramatis personae, but of necessity alter the play” (3).  
The presence of women in participatory spaces is often advocated in difference democracy 
by pointing to specific womanly qualities stemming from particular forms of socialization. 
According to this argument, women tend to be more caring and nurturing than men. 
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Womanly virtues of mothering could contribute to democratic exchange by focusing on the 
common good rather than self-interest, persuading rather than forcing, listening carefully, 
asking questions, moderating and integrating rather than competing to win the argument. 
Mansbridge (1991, 126ff) discusses the work of difference feminists, who speak of 
women’s superior democratic culture. Empathy, sensitivity, and intuition as female char-
acteristics are constitutive of the democratic community as they facilitate social connec-
tions of trust, love, and duty (Mansbridge, 1993, 345). While Mansbridge does not fully 
subscribe to the perspective of difference feminists, she takes it as inspiration for her own 
work. Difference feminist notions are reflected in Mansbridge’s concept of “unitary de-
mocracy”, which is based on friendship, trust, and agreement within small groups such as 
the early hunter and gatherer tribes and later the Athenian polis (1983, 10ff).  
In the same vein, Carol Gould (1993) argues that women can strengthen deliberative values 
such as concern for others, reciprocity, and mutual respect. Moreover, their nurturing per-
spective also shifts the focus to the redistributive functions of the state:  
I also believe that the typical concern for providing for the specific needs of 
others associated with mothering or parenting or with family relations more 
generally can usefully be imported into the larger democratic community in 
terms of a focus on meeting the differentiated needs of individuals and not 
simply protecting their negative liberties. (405) 
According to Gould, the best way of ensuring the presence of marginalized groups is by 
expanding participatory democratic institutions to the workplace, schools, the social system 
and, furthermore, by including social movements’ claimed spaces in our understanding of 
democracy. This plurality of face-to-face assemblies multiplies the opportunities for the 
presence of marginalized bodies (Gould, 1996, 181).  
Similarly, both Young (1989, 265f) and Phillips (1998, 238) advocate the expansion of 
participatory democratic institutions to facilitate presence. Both, however, also argue that 
representation is indispensable in modern, large-scale democracies (Phillips, 1995, 30; 
Young, 2000, 124f; 1997a, 352). The politics of presence thus gains another dimension: it 
includes not only the presence of the physical body, but also the replication of identity 
across time and space through group identification. Representation gives presence to those 
not physically present. In Pitkin’s (1967, 8f) terms, “representation, talking generally, 
means the making present in some sense of something which is nevertheless not present 
literally or in fact”. The extensive debate undertaken by difference democrats concerning 
representation focuses on two concepts: mirror representation (also referred to as 
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descriptive representation) replicating the quantitative relations of different groups within 
society (see current debates on mini publics, e.g. Ryan & Smith, 2014) and special repre-
sentation in the spirit of affirmative action. 
Mansbridge (2005; 1999b) and Phillips (1995; 1993; 1991) argue that mirror representation 
in state institutions is a necessary means to facilitate inclusion in the face of structural ine-
qualities. Only members of specific social groups can bring authentic, lived experience and 
insight from particular social perspectives to deliberation. As mirror representation is not 
achieved automatically, they call for quotas along the lines of gender and ethnicity. Quotas 
are to be applied not only to the closed spaces of parliaments but also to some invited 
spaces. In “Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent 
‘Yes’” (1999b), which she later reprises in “Should Workers Represent Workers?” (2015), 
Mansbridge elaborates the value of mirror representation through random selection. And 
Phillips (1991, 60ff) points to the successes of gender quota policies in Scandinavian par-
liaments. These policy recommendations call for a redefinition of the use of power in de-
mocracy. Mansbridge (1996b) describes the use of power as coercion as a necessary evil to 
counter injustice. Gender and ethnic quotas are an example of such coercion. Facilitation 
through moderators in participatory spaces can be seen as the coercive redistribution of 
speaking time. Thus, coercive power secures equal presence, while it also infringes on per-
sonal freedom (Mansbridge, 1996b, 46ff; Mansbridge et al., 2010, 82). 
Young, in contrast, advocates special representation of disadvantaged groups, who suffer 
from the effects of historical oppression. Exceeding the efforts of mirror representation, 
disadvantaged groups need to receive economic and social resources to self-organize, such 
as dedicated airtime on public media to communicate their agenda. The current system of 
party representation is to be supplemented by a structure of self-organized associations of 
marginalized groups. According to Young, special representation also needs to come into 
effect in the participatory spaces of schools, workplaces, and neighbourhood communities. 
Furthermore, in decisions, which directly affect these communities, they need to wield veto 
power. These measures need to be accompanied by affirmative action in education and 
employment and the expansion of bilingual and bicultural education and state services 
(Young, 2000, 141ff; 1997a, 371f; 1992, 532f; 1990, 184ff; 1989, 261ff). 
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3.5.2. Emotions as Part of Democratic Discourse: Communication Beyond Reasoned 
Argumentation  
A second way to facilitate the inclusion of marginalized bodies in participatory spaces is to 
re-evaluate the role of emotions, passion, and affect. According to difference democrats, 
emotions are undermined in deliberation by a focus on dispassionate, impartial rationality: 
“When deliberation turns into a demonstration of logic, it leaves out many who cannot work 
their emotionally felt needs into a neat equation” (Mansbridge, 1991, 130). Embracing the 
role of emotions in participatory processes can contribute to the inclusion of those who 
have been socialized to express themselves more emotively. Against early deliberative 
democratic reservations according to which emotions obstruct impartiality, distort truth, 
and subvert efforts to arrive at a rational consensus, Young (1987, 69) claims: “As long as 
the dialogue allows all perspectives to speak freely, and be heard and taken into account, 
the expression of need, motive and feelings will not have merely private significance, and 
will not bias or distort conclusions because they will interact with other needs, motives and 
feelings”. Emotions can go beyond impartial reasoning as they enrich the experience of 
perspective-taking.  
Mansbridge further elaborates the crucial role of emotions in deliberation: “Solutions often 
require the emotional capacity to guess what others want, or at least to ask in a genuinely 
curious and unthreatening way… [E]ngaging the emotions helps create the self-transfor-
mations necessary to think ‘we’ instead of ‘I’” (Mansbridge, 1996a; see also Young, 1987, 
69). According to Mansbridge (1993, 357), both reason and emotion are essential elements 
of deliberation. Hence, deliberation should not be reasoned but rather considered, a term 
expressing a combination of reason and emotion (Mansbridge, 1999a, 213, 226).  
Cheryl Hall’s work investigates the exclusion and undermining of passion in both classical 
philosophy and current conceptions of democracy (Hall, 2005; 2002). Hall (2007) goes 
beyond Mansbridge’s assessment that both reason and emotion are part of deliberation and 
elaborates their interdependency. For every emotion – be it grief, anger or happiness – there 
is a logical reason. Emotions can be reasonably explained. Deliberation as a process of 
reasoning, on the other hand, is always driven by passion. Deliberation is based on emo-
tional resources to engage in debate. Thus, passion and reason cannot function without the 
other; they are dialectically interrelated. Emotions are based on reasons and reasoning is 
motivated by emotions.  
To facilitate the expression of emotions in participatory spaces, difference democrats turn 
to modes of expression beyond the verbalization of arguments. This expansion of 
  76 
communicative modes may enhance inclusion as it acknowledges the diversity of expres-
sions of marginalized groups who may not articulate their claims in the manner of verbal-
ized arguments (Pajnik, 2006). Young (1987, 75), for example, draws attention to the di-
verse communication techniques of carnivalesque protest movements: “Liberating public 
expression means not only lifting formerly privatized issues into the open… but also af-
firming in the practice of such discussions the proper place of passion and play in public”. 
Today’s age of communicative plenty in which different media channels and different 
modes of expression provide a broad variety of means of participation, may contribute to 
the inclusion of disadvantaged groups (Ercan et al., 2018).  
Young suggests supplementing rational arguments with greeting, rhetoric, and storytelling. 
Greeting encompasses not only short phrases such as “Good morning!” and “How are 
you?” but also compliments and bodily gestures such as handshakes, hugs, nods, and 
smiles. Greeting serves the expression of mutual respect and trust and aims at making par-
ticipants feel appreciated. The example of the African greetings and anti-apartheid dances 
in the invited spaces in South Africa mentioned earlier are a good example of how greeting 
has an impact on the configuration of participatory spaces. Greeting can be more than a 
gesture of sympathy. It can formulate political claims for inclusion and express cultural 
identity (McEwan, 2005, 978). Rhetoric in speech consisting of word play, jokes, flirtation, 
and metaphors are often denigrated in democratic theory. Yet, Young argues that rhetoric 
provides a specific channel to introduce affective, intuitive, and situated knowledge into 
participatory spaces. Storytelling entails the narrating of certain events without necessarily 
transmitting an argument. Stories aid mutual understanding as they make specific social 
perspectives comprehensible through their affective qualities. They afford listeners the time 
to become immersed in different points of view and different ways of thinking. Stories can 
give expression to emotions as they are told from a personal point of view without requiring 
objectivity or impartiality (Young, 2000, 57ff; Young, 1996, 129ff). 
Similar to Young’s storytelling, Sanders (1997, 372f) notes how testimony can enhance 
democratic participation: “Instead of aiming for a common discussion, democrats might 
adopt a more fundamental goal: to try to ensure that those who are usually left out of public 
discussions learn to speak whether their perspectives are common or not, and those who 
usually dominate learn to hear the perspectives of others”. Rather than engaging in a con-
versation, one person at a time gets to share his or her perspective. An example of testimony 
can be found in US-American rap culture, in which young people of marginalized class/race 
backgrounds find a critical voice. In contrast to a hierarchy of knowledge in a rational dis-
course, “[t]estimony is also radically egalitarian: the standard for whether a view is worthy 
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of public attention is simply that everyone should have a voice, a chance to tell her story” 
(Sanders, 1997, 372). In comparison to common conversational modes, testimony allows 
speakers to narrate and reflect without interruption and without having to respond to others. 
They are given a chance to engage in their thought while listeners are given a chance to 
hear the full story before making a judgement. Some versions of testimony have been real-
ized in invited spaces through particular facilitation techniques whereby moderators focus 
attention on one participant at a time with others listening (Asenbaum, 2016). 
By focusing on the democratic contributions of everyday talk, Mansbridge (1999a) adds 
another mode of communication that enhances the role of emotions. Rather than focusing 
on reasoned arguments, democrats should acknowledge the contribution of mundane verbal 
exchange that is often deemed unpolitical. Everyday talk, however, always entails a politi-
cal component. Since it emerges in the context of everyday life rather than in the political 
sphere, it is more intimate and more closely connected to emotions. Mansbridge and col-
leagues add two other modes of communication. Deliberative negotiation and fair strategic 
bargaining contribute to democratic exchange, as long as this is done on the grounds of 
equality, mutual respect, and non-coerciveness (Mansbridge et al., 2012, 798f; Mansbridge 
et al., 2010, 69ff). While negotiation and bargaining might be seen as more rational than 
emotional modes of communication, they play a crucial role for emotions when they are 
understood as part of contestation. As the next section will discuss, difference democrats 
argue that those with marginalized identities cannot always participate in empathetic delib-
eration but at times need to engage in passionate contestation to defend their interests. 
3.5.3. Contestation and the Rightful Self-Interest of the Marginalized  
The third strategy of inclusion in difference democracy aims at bringing marginalized in-
terests to the public sphere through contestation. Similar to conceptions of agonistic de-
mocracy, difference democrats stress the role of conflict and even competition in democ-
racy. The argument for conflict is partly linked to arguments of emotion. Instead of sup-
pressing anger and dissensus, frustration needs to be vented. Allowing for conflict to 
emerge in participatory spaces can contribute to equality as anger often emerges in response 
to oppression: 
Both in a public forum and in everyday talk, there are justifiable places for 
offensiveness, non-cooperation, and the threat of retaliation – even for raucous, 
angry, self-centred, bitter talk, aiming at nothing but hurt… These uncivil forms 
of talk are also often necessary as means to the end of approaching both liberty 
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and equality in deliberation. Sometimes only intensity in oppositions can break 
down the barriers of the status quo. No one always listens attentively to every-
one else, and members of dominant groups are particularly likely to find they 
do not need to listen to members of subordinate groups. So subordinates some-
times need the battering ram of rage. (Mansbridge, 1999a, 223) 
According to this argument, subordinate groups need to engage in disruptive action to chal-
lenge inequality. To develop a notion of justified conflict in discursive terms, Mansbridge 
draws on Foucault’s work on communities of resistance (Mansbridge, 1993, 365), which 
bears some resemblance to Fraser’s counterpublics (Fraser, 1990). Subordinate groups “os-
cillate between protected enclaves, in which they can explore their ideas in an environment 
of mutual encouragement, and more hostile but also broader surroundings in which they 
can test those ideas against the reigning reality” (Mansbridge, 1996b, 57).  
Like agonists (e.g. Wenman, 2013, 34, 46), difference democrats not only favour contesta-
tion that challenges domination, but also display some affinity for competition. Fraser 
(1990, 68), for example, speaks of the “contestation among competing publics”. Likewise 
(1997a, 359), Young highlights the value of competition for democracy when she calls for 
the “contestation of the constituency with itself about the content of a decision-making 
agenda”. And Mansbridge sees elements of adversary democracy, such as voting and party 
competition, as an essential part of participatory societies. She argues that these competitive 
modes are necessary to overcome the conformist tendencies of consensus decision-making. 
Where no consensus can be reached on the grounds of fundamental disagreement, majority 
rule through voting needs to be employed to break the deadlock (Mansbridge, 1990; 1983; 
1981; Mansbridge et al., 2010). In line with agonists (e.g. Mouffe, 1999), Mansbridge con-
tends that consensus can mask conflict. Everyday talk and emotive expression, on the other 
hand, help to reveal conflict (Mansbridge, 1999a, 226). Karpowitz and Mansbridge (2005) 
illustrate this in an empirical study comparing a consensus-oriented and an adversary-ori-
ented participatory space. They find that in the consensus-oriented participatory planning 
process, conflict was supressed and dissenting voices marginalized. In the adversary public 
hearings, citizens aired their anger and conflicts took centre stage.  
Difference democrats, who are sympathetic to deliberative democracy, such as Young, seek 
to reconcile deliberative norms of reason with notions of contestation.  
Especially under circumstances where there are serious conflicts that arise from 
structural positions of privilege and disadvantage, and/or where a subordinated, 
less powerful or minority group finds its interests ignored in public debate, 
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members of such groups do not violate norms of reasonableness if they engage 
in serious disruptive actions, or express their claims with angry accusations. 
Disorderliness is an important tool of critical communication aimed at calling 
attention to the unreasonableness of others. (Young, 2000, 48f) 
Young (2001) engages in a fictive dialogue between an activist and a deliberative democrat. 
Without coming to a conclusion or aiming to resolve the tension, Young constructs ideal 
positions of the deliberative democrat, who strives to change the system from within by 
persuading those in power to take a path of progressive reform, and the activist who calls 
for disruptive action. In conclusion, Young calls for a critical theory of democracy, encom-
passing both cooperation and conflict. 
By calling for confrontational politics, difference democrats promote the recognition of the 
self-interest of the marginalized. While in conceptions of deliberative democracy the re-
quirement to focus on the common good restricts members of disadvantaged groups to 
challenge inequality, in difference democracy the subject is legitimately self-interested: 
“Women, for example, have often been socialized to put the interests of others ahead of 
their own in ways that interfere with understanding their own interests. The articulation of 
self-interest has a legitimate role in democratic deliberation, particularly in discussions of 
fair distribution” (Mansbridge, 1999a, 226). In the context of the unequal distribution of 
resources along the lines of sex, race, and class, difference democratic contestation explic-
itly includes material self-interest (Mansbridge, 2012, 797; 1996b, 49, 57; 1991, 126; 1990; 
Mansbridge et al., 2010; Young, 1997a, 362f). Phillips (1991, 70) explains: “Because of 
their materially different position in society, women have objectively different interests 
from men”. 
Mansbridge et al. (2010) embrace self-interest as a vital element of democracy. Accord-
ingly, subjects in participatory spaces need the freedom to articulate their own particular 
needs while also taking the common good into account. Acknowledging self-interest con-
tributes to transparency as the aim of the common good often functions as ostensible cover 
for private interests. The open articulation of self-interest thus promotes more honest polit-
ical debate. Moreover, identifying a multiplicity of self-interests contributes to democratic 
pluralism. It “embraces the diversity of human objectives as well as the diversity of human 
opinions” (73).  
As this overview has shown, a difference democratic perspective reconfigures the assem-
blages of participatory spaces by including marginalized bodies, emotions, and self-inter-
ests. This reconfiguration of democratic spatiality advances equality as it includes 
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disadvantaged groups. At the same time, however, the politics of presence also limits the 
personal freedom of self-expression, as will be discussed in the next section. 
3.6. The Dilemma of Difference: Democratic Freedom and the Limitations of the 
Identified Body 
Authors contributing to difference democratic debates have repeatedly pointed to a conun-
drum that emerges from the politics of presence: The strategy of including the marginalized 
through physical presence within participatory spaces achieves visibility and thus furthers 
equality, but at the same time this strategy entails essentialist tendencies. It affirms existing 
identity constructions along with their limitations, confinements, and stereotypes (Gould, 
1996, 182ff; Mansbridge, 2005; 1999b, 637f; 1993, 371; Phillips, 2019a forthcoming; 
2010; 2009; 1996, 146; Young, 1997a, 350f; 1997b, 389; 1994, 714; 1990, 172). Young 
calls this the “dilemma of difference” (Young, 1989, 268).13 While identity politics through 
social movements such as the Black Power movement or feminist groups might be success-
ful in reinterpreting their identities in positive terms, in doing so they recreate the limita-
tions inherent to all identities. Labels such as woman, man, gay, lesbian, black, Asian, Jew-
ish and so on always create confinements of self-expression and self-definition, no matter 
if their image is positive or negative. This is even more problematic considering intersec-
tionality: Identity categories such as “woman”, for example, mostly emerge in discourses 
produced by white, heterosexual, educated, able-bodied women with higher incomes and 
thus rarely reflect the experience of LGBTIQ, non-white, disabled, and poor women 
(Fraser, 1996, 200ff; Mansbridge, 2003, 357; Phillips, 2019b; Wojciechowska, 2018).  
Mansbridge acknowledges that descriptive representation in parliaments through quotas 
comes at the expense of essentialism:  
One broad cost derives from focusing citizens’ attention on their own and leg-
islators’ background characteristics rather than the capacity and desire of those 
legislators to promote effective public policies… [A]ny proposal to select some 
characteristic for conscious representation has the potential for encouraging a 
kind of essentialism in identities… As a specific identity becomes the focus, 
the identity of citizen may be lost. (Mansbridge, 2015, 261, 267) 
Elsewhere Mansbridge explains that such essentialist tendencies in descriptive representa-
tion are problematic because they reify and fix identification and thus curtail the freedom 
 
13 Young borrowed the term from Martha Minow (1985) who used it in a somewhat different way 
in the context of bilingual and special education. 
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of the democratic subject. Instead of increasing diversity through inclusion of multiple 
identities, the politics of presence might actually undermine diversity as it creates rigid 
identity categories and homogenizes multiple and intersectional identifications:  
Essentialist beliefs reinforce stereotypes, trap the individuals in the group in the 
images traditionally held of the group, make it hard for those individuals to treat 
their identities flexibly and performatively, de-emphasize lines of division 
within groups to the advantage of dominant groups within the group, and 
harden lines of division between groups. (Mansbridge, 2005, 623) 
The problems of essentialism through the politics of presence that Mansbridge  observes in 
closed spaces, Phillips (2010) discusses in relation to claimed spaces: “The irony, as many 
feminists and critical race theorists acknowledge, is that movements to combat the hierar-
chical structure that generate and sustain these stereotypes often invoke a collectivity that 
itself seems to presume a unified, perhaps essentialised, group” (54). In reference to femi-
nist movements, Phillips goes on to argue:  
The “women” brought into existence through this politics may, moreover, ob-
scure many differences between women along axes such as class, sexuality, 
race, nationality, or religion… A loose categorisation of multiple locations and 
perspectives then comes to figure almost as a person, capable of acting, willing, 
challenging, and having a consciousness all of its own. Even if we are suspi-
cious of the notion of individuals having unified identities, the treatment of 
collectives as quasi-persons endows them with more unity than they can justi-
fiably claim. (55f) 
In her early work, Young (1990; 1987) discusses the “logic of identity”. While Young uses 
this concept to draw attention to the workings of domination, in my reading it also aptly 
explains the confining tendencies of the politics of presence. Young argues that the enlight-
ened subject, conceptualized as rational thinker, stands in contrast to the democratic ideal 
of pluralism: “The logic of identity also seeks to reduce the plurality of particular subjects, 
their bodily, perspectival experience, to a unity, by measuring them against the unvarying 
standard of universal reason” (99). However powerful the unifying move of the logic of 
identity, according to Young, it is bound to fail. Identity can only be constructed in demar-
cation to difference (Butler, 1993, 3; Connolly, 1991, 64; Mouffe, 2005 [2000], 21). Ulti-
mate unity is impossible. The failed attempt at unification results in binary identity con-
structions, which are, however, not perceived as equal in value. Those racial, sexual, and 
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gendered identities perceived as inferior are expelled from the public and banished to the 
private sphere (Young, 1990, 99ff; 1987, 62f).  
Inferior identities linked to “ugly, fearful, or loathsome bodies” (Young, 1990, 124), how-
ever, do not entirely disappear in privacy. Young identifies a paradox: marginalized iden-
tities are both made invisible and stereotyped at the same time. They are made invisible as 
democratic subjects, as agents in the public realm, but concurrently they are constructed as 
the Other, the embodied deviation from the norm (123). Young describes this kind of ste-
reotyping as confining marginalized subjects to their bodies. Their realm of creative self-
realization is confined by narrowly defined stereotypes. The identities of those who domi-
nate, in contrast, remain largely undefined. White, upper class men are immune to stereo-
typing and perceived as impartial and universal – as the norm (100, 125ff).  
While Young herself does not make a link between the logic of identity and the dilemma 
of difference, the connection is apparent. It is not just the problem of hierarchization be-
tween different identity groups, the identities themselves bear problematic tendencies. As 
Young explains: “The unifying process required by group representation inappropriately 
freezes fluid relational identities into a unity, and can recreate oppressive segregation” 
(350). I agree with Young that the confining tendencies of identities come into effect to a 
different degree for those born into positions of marginalization and those in positions of 
domination. Maleness, whiteness, able-bodiedness, and heterosexuality are indeed estab-
lished as the norm and undergo far less scrutiny. The fundamentally confining nature of 
identity nevertheless comes into effect even for those with privileged identities. Exposed 
to the gaze of others in the space of appearance, even they are not free to change. The logic 
of identity curtails freedom for all.  
3.7. Conclusion 
The difference democratic perspective provides valuable answers to the question raised by 
this thesis. With the concept of internal exclusion, it draws attention to inequality within 
participatory spaces. Difference democracy suggests reconfiguring the order of things that 
constitute democratic spatiality by including marginalized bodies, suppressed emotions, 
and neglected interests. The visible presence of the marginalized changes the dynamics of 
the assemblages that constitute the space of appearance. The shift from the politics of ideas 
to the politics of presence advocated by difference democrats answers Butler’s call to in-
clude the corporeal identity performances of the marginalized. Here, Butler goes along with 
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difference democrats who explain even the silent democratic subject as expressing content 
through the body (Mansbridge, 2005, 62): 
it matters that bodies assemble, and that the political meanings enacted by 
demonstrations are not only those that are enacted by discourse whether written 
or vocalized. Embodied actions of various kinds signify in ways that are, 
strictly speaking, neither discursive nor prediscursive. In other words, forms of 
assembly already signify prior to, and apart from, any particular demands they 
make. (Butler, 2015, 8) 
The body, then, functions as an affective thing in participatory spaces. As difference dem-
ocrats acknowledge, however, the politics of presence also entails limitations to personal 
freedom of expression. Equality is achieved through a reification of group identity. The 
marginalized body as affective thing becomes not only an agentic subject, but also an object 
of prejudice and stereotyping. One way of dealing with the dilemma of difference is to 
simply reject the affectivity of the body and focus on the content that subjects utter rather 
than on their appearance. Saward (2010, 77), for example, counters the claim of the agency 
of silent bodies: “There is no self-presenting subject whose essential character and desires 
and interests are… evident enough to be ‘read off’ their appearance”. But in my view, the 
intent to look beyond difference of identity not only threatens to obscure inequalities, as 
difference democrats rightfully argue, but also overlooks the nuanced ways in which our 
corporeal identity performances indeed affect democratic participation.  
While identified bodies as things in spatial assemblages give democratic subjects agency 
through their inherent affectivity, they also limit free expression. In Young’s study on gen-
dered spaces discussed in the introduction to this chapter, she claims: “To the extent that a 
woman lives her body as a thing, she remains rooted in immanence, is inhibited, and retains 
a distance from her body as transcending movement” (Young, 2005 [1977], 39). I believe 
that the confinements described by Young do not only concern women but affect everyone 
to a certain degree, as identities have an inherently limiting effect. These limitations go 
along with the constitution of spatiality that depends on demarcating an inside and an out-
side, as discussed in the previous chapter. Hence, everyone moves in a personal identity 
space bound by discursive identifications, human bodies, and culturally coded objects. Phil-
lips (2010, 48f) raises an important point in explaining how the act of essentializing forms 
an inherent part of cognition. Any thinking and understanding, any construction of discur-
sive space, rests on judging what is. The construction of reality is based on cognitive acts 
of boundary drawing: “when we decide that the crucial distinction is that between man and 
  84 
woman, or human and animal, or heterosexual and gay, we settle on definitions and bound-
aries that then mark our ways of thinking and living” (Phillips, 2015, 20). 
The question that arises then is: what other forms of identity expression could afford a 
greater degree of freedom in exploring and expressing the multiple self – the freedom for 
the subject to change? The next chapter will seek ways out of the dilemma of difference by 
exploring democratic theory’s conceptions of self-transformation and identity change. It 
will engage with various approaches in democratic theory and seek to enrich them with 
queer and gender theory in order to develop concepts of disidentification and a politics of 
becoming, which is seen not to replace but rather to augment the politics of presence.  
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4. Identity, Interrupted: Disidentification as Radical Demo-
cratic Practice 
 
Democracy is that which dissolves the 
power of the identities used to dis-
criminate between us, that differenti-
ate and hierarchise… Democracy is 
the possibility to build better worlds 
which will no doubt comprise new 
identities, but that can overcome the 
inequalities of today.  
Clare Woodford, 2018 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Recently, my boyfriend and I took a bus from Edinburgh to Glasgow. After the bus ride, a 
woman who had taken the same bus and sat close to us approached us. She asked in a 
friendly manner if she was right in her assumption that the two of us were “queenies”, 
which she had deduced from our affectionate interactions. It took me a moment to respond. 
I identify as a gay man and had not been confronted with the term “queenie” before. I could 
see that her intentions were benevolent so I hesitantly agreed with her proposition. I allowed 
the conversation to move along without challenge – she obviously asked for this confirma-
tion to let us know that she had many friends who were “queenies”, which was obviously 
meant as an approval of our relationship and sexual identity. I nevertheless remember a 
strong feeling of reluctance to respond to this identity interpellation. Being hailed as a 
queenie did not feel right. It had a feeling of bitter consent that went along with muted 
disagreement. It was a feeling of disidentification. 
The problem reflected in this incident is that of the ability to self-identify, to wield agency 
in the process of the construction of one’s own identity, and to have the freedom to change 
how we are identified by others. This problem is reflected in the dilemma of difference 
discussed in the previous chapter, which calls for the public visibility of marginalized iden-
tities to further equality but at the same time curtails the freedom for the subject to change.  
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This is an important point for this thesis where its scope is extended beyond the question 
of the marginalization of disadvantaged groups in democracy. The question of democratic 
freedom, which is the topic of this chapter, directly affects all members of society. It is the 
question of how the perception of our selves limits or expands the scope of self-expression 
and self-realization. Recall Mansbridge’s (2005, 62) claim that through descriptive repre-
sentation even silent subjects communicate political claims through their identified bodies. 
Arthur Lupia and Anne Norton cast a critical light on the confining aspects of such embod-
ied communicative acts:  
The silent body speaks, whether it wills that speech or not. It speaks of its place 
in the social order: of race, sex, age. The black man must speak as a black man, 
the white woman as a white woman. The old speak from the shell of age. Some 
speak from the haze of beauty. The text written on the body, read from the 
body, may amplify or mute what the speaker says, but it cannot be easily si-
lenced… We have spoken before we speak, we have been read before we write. 
The people who enter a room carry not only the inscribed body, but the many 
texts they have written on that body. (Lupia & Norton, 2017, 68) 
This chapter will seek ways out of the dilemma of difference and will pose the question of 
personal freedom to express the multiple self in participatory spaces. Exploring this prob-
lems in difference, participatory, deliberative, and agonistic democracy reveals that none 
of these perspectives offers satisfying solutions. They all remain limited by their respective 
logics. What is more, all of their conceptions of self-transformation appear to be envisaged 
as a process from above, be it through notions of self-transformation into a particular (en-
lightened, educated, reasoned) subject or through the concept of hegemonic identity con-
struction.  
To generate a democratic theory that facilitates the freedom for the subject to change, this 
chapter will explore a transformative perspective that allows for rethinking the spatial order 
that constitutes democratic subjectivity. The disorder that Pateman (1989) attributes to 
women entering male spaces is also at the core of postanarchist thinking that understands 
freedom and equality as disruptive forces that disturb the established order (Newman, 
2011). This transformative character of identity assemblages rests on an understanding of 
space as a volatile construct: “space… is neither naturally given nor immutable, but rather 
a product of interrelations always in the making, and thus both disrupted and a source of 
disruption (Massey, 1999). This dynamism and the contested nature of space offer trans-
formative possibilities” (Dikeç, 2015, 3). Here Arendt’s space of appearance that facilitates 
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a politics of presence is reconfigured as space of becoming through modes of disidentifica-
tion. The politics of becoming queers identity through the rejection of hegemonic identity 
interpellations and through strategies of resignification. Queering democratic subjectivity 
through modes of interrupting hegemonic identification can be seen as “strategies for more 
genuinely transformative social action” in the “arenas of transformation” that Cornwall 
(2004, 75f) describes in her theory of participatory spaces.  
The transformative perspective introduces an entirely different understanding of the rela-
tionship between freedom and equality as discussed in this thesis so far. Rather than seeing 
the two core values of democracy as in tension, as described by the democratic paradox, 
postanarchist conceptions define them as mutually dependent. Freedom is only possible on 
the grounds of equality and vice versa. This casts an entirely new light on the core questions 
raised by this thesis.  
To explore ways out of the dilemma of difference, this chapter will draw on several per-
spectives in radical democratic thought. First, it will consult the difference, participatory, 
deliberative, and agonistic perspectives with regard to their conceptions of self-transfor-
mation. As all four approaches only generate limited conceptions of freedom for the subject 
to change, a fifth perspective in democratic theory that focuses on social transformation 
will be introduced. Through the lens of the transformative perspective, the difference dem-
ocratic politics of presence will be re-read as part of a politics of becoming, which focuses 
on identity disruption through disidentification. Disidentification in transformative demo-
cratic theory, however, only explains radical democratic subjectivization on a collective 
level, so that the democratic subject is caught up in group dynamics. To tackle this problem 
and explore disidentification on a micro level of democratic subjectivity, the politics of 
becoming will be further enriched with insights from gender and queer theory, which ex-
plain identity via the concepts of performativity and masquerade and develop strategies of 
resignification as a way forward. 
4.2. Ways out of the Dilemma of Difference: Democratic Subjectivity in Perspective 
The question at hand is how to tackle the confining tendencies in the politics of presence 
and combine the enhanced equality, which this strategy successfully pursues, with the free-
dom of self-exploration and self-expression. In accordance with the perspectival approach 
adopted by this thesis, it will interrogate four perspectives in democratic theory in pursuit 
of ways out of the dilemma of difference. The obvious first port of call for this undertaking 
is difference democracy itself. As will be seen, difference democratic strategies to 
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overcoming the dilemma of difference, while generating promising approaches, remain 
limited by and in conflict with essentialist tendencies. Hence, three other radical democratic 
perspectives – namely participatory, deliberative, and agonistic democracy – will be con-
sulted and evaluated with regard to their approaches to self-transformation.  
4.2.1. Essentializing Constructed Identities: The Difference Democratic Perspective 
As discussed in the previous chapter, identity fulfils a positive function in difference dem-
ocratic strategies for inclusion. Nevertheless, difference democrats also point to the prob-
lematic role of identity in democracy, confining the democratic subject. Young describes 
identity as a confining space that limits physical motion and personal expression. In partic-
ular, the freedom of marginalized groups, such as women, is bound by hegemonic spatiality 
as gendered codes suggest how to act and what to say. While “some women escape or 
transcend the typical situation and definition of women in various degrees and respects” 
(Young, 2005 [1977], 33), overall women are like objects that are placed into and confined 
by a web of social relations. The logic of identity described by Young elsewhere (1990) 
that reduces plurality to unity and supresses diversity – as I have argued in the previous 
chapter – limits not just the freedom of those with marginalized identities, but that of eve-
ryone. We are all limited by our stable identity constructs and the expectations of identity 
continuity and integrity. This critical view on the confining function of identity, then, calls 
for a positive reinterpretation of marginalized identity as in the politics of presence, and at 
the same time raises the question as to how the fixities and confinements of the spaces that 
bound identity can be loosened.  
To counter the confining tendencies of the politics of presence, difference democrats pro-
pose that their strategies of inclusion, most notably quota solutions, are not incompatible 
with an understanding of the democratic subject as a contingent identity construction. In 
various texts, difference democrats develop performative accounts of identity that are com-
patible with a politics of presence. Understanding identity in constructivist and performa-
tive terms opens up identity spaces to potential transformations of the self. 
Mansbridge (2003, 358), for example, argues that although focusing on identity categories 
“is dangerous, not only because it exaggerates reality but also because it underlines the very 
stereotypes that have been used to keep women in their place, the existence of danger does 
not mean that we should forswear [quota strategies]”. In order to counter essentializing 
effects, the introduction of quotas needs to be justified by a public debate explaining gender 
identities as relational and a product of historical processes of subordination (Mansbridge, 
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2005). The category “woman” is not to be understood in essentialist terms but rather in 
terms of positionality. Women are a product of specific, gender-coded experiences, which 
are distributed unevenly among men and women (Mansbridge, 1991, 133). This point is 
also central to Phillips’ claim that “those who have experienced marginalisation have con-
cerns, interests and perspectives that those lacking this experience may not even under-
stand, let alone be able to represent” (2019 forthcoming). Acknowledging different social 
positionalities and particular experiences does not rule out an understanding of identities as 
fluid constructions. Phillips (1993, 161) calls for a contingent conceptualization of group 
identities and claims that “an attention to difference does not entail an essentialist under-
standing of identity” (Phillips, 1996, 142).  
Young’s work goes the furthest in outlining an approach to thinking identity in contingent 
terms (Young, 2000, 92ff; 1997b, 389ff; 1990, 43ff; 1989, 260; 1987, 72). She employs the 
concept of seriality, which Jean-Paul Sartre (2004 [1960]) used to describe class, to under-
stand the category “women”. While the term “group” is commonly used to describe people 
with the same identity markers, it is misleading as it implies direct interaction between its 
members. In a group, people know each other and gather consciously for a specific reason. 
In contrast, a series puts individuals in a similar structural position defined by specific 
physical objects, practices, routines, and cultures. Women, understood as a series rather 
than a group, are individually unknown to each other. Nevertheless, they identify with one 
another as they are socialized within the same material milieu marked by a gendered divi-
sion of labour and heterosexuality. They employ the same physical things such as specific 
clothing, cosmetic products, toiletries, etc. However powerful the structures confining se-
riality, they do not ultimately define each individual woman; they only enable and constrain 
certain actions (Young, 1994). This serial understanding of identity can be understood as 
spatial assemblage with culturally coded objects, human bodies, and social constructs in-
terwoven in a terrain that constitutes and bounds identity expression. A series marks a spa-
tial order in which one follows the other. This also suggests that one can stop following, 
step out of the series, and break new ground. 
In order to break out of such identity space, Young (1990, 124) calls for “a revolution of 
subjectivity. Rather than seeking a wholeness of the self, the subjects of this plural and 
complex society should affirm the otherness within ourselves, acknowledging that as sub-
jects we are heterogeneous and multiple in our affiliations and desires”. This revolution of 
subjectivity is furthered by the identity politics of social movements in two key respects: 
First, these movements reclaim the definition of their own identity. The newly generated 
identifications are not stable; rather, they overlap with other identities which are part of a 
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process of continuous redefinition. Second, these movements do not claim the definition of 
any identity but their own. Such a participatory and self-organized process of identity pro-
duction is thus inherently democratic (169ff). The politics of presence, then, consists of a 
continuous redefinition of contingent identity space.  
These approaches of difference democrats to overcome the dilemma of difference are 
promising. Understanding identity spaces as contingent constructions opens up the poten-
tial for transcendence of the self and greater freedom of identity articulation. Difference 
democratic approaches to contingent identities are, however, hampered by some essential-
izing tendencies that run through their work. In making the argument for a politics of pres-
ence, difference democrats repeatedly fall back into essentialist thinking. Young, for ex-
ample, describes the liberating effects of reclaiming and affirming ones marginalized iden-
tity:  
I am just what they say I am – a Jewboy, a colored girl, a fag, a dyke, or a hag 
– and proud of it. No longer does one have the impossible project of trying to 
become something one is not under circumstances where the very trying re-
minds one of who one is. (Young, 1990, 166, emphasis added) 
In response to constructivist notions of identity, Young states: “it is foolish to deny the 
reality of groups” (47). Similarly, in reference to the abstract individualism of Enlighten-
ment thought, Phillips (1993, 95) warns of the “distorting consequences of trying to pretend 
away group differences”. And Mansbridge describes the process of socialization in quite 
essentialist terms: “Because healthy people want to be who they are, children usually value 
being a boy or a girl long before they understand the full social connotations of this iden-
tity” (Mansbridge, 1993, 344, emphasis added). This notion of identity does not prove to 
be fluid or contingent, as claimed elsewhere.  
The argument that particular gendered or racial qualities stem not from a biological core 
but from socialization only provides a partial remedy to this problem. The stabilization of 
identity constructions in a politics of presence remains. When a person is approached with 
the expectation of being particularly good at listening, or multi-tasking, or dancing because 
of her gender or race, this always limits the freedom of that person to express and explore 
the multiple self, no matter what explanation underlies this assumption. From this point of 
view, the call of Phillips  (1995, 162) and Young (2000, 124ff) for citizens to place special 
trust in representatives who share the same physical identity features based on similar po-
sitions in society is problematic. So too is Mansbridge’s (1991) call for introducing wom-
anly qualities into the polity. Here women are called upon to embrace their socialized 
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nurturing and mothering qualities. However positive the interpretation of these features, 
they nevertheless limit the possibilities of self-definition. Positive identity affirmation al-
ways implies inflexibility of and confinement by identity. 
We have seen that while difference democrats extensively problematize the dilemma of 
difference and elaborate ways to overcome its essentialist tendencies, they are only partially 
successful. Despite the rich potential of the constructivist notions that call for a revolution 
of subjectivity and understand gender as seriality, difference democrats forgo the explora-
tion of what this means for changing identity and exploring the multiple self. Instead, they 
use constructivism to justify the recommendation of continuous identity performances. The 
question thus remains as to how the freedom of the democratic subject to change can be 
advanced within participatory spaces.  
4.2.2. Shaping Enlightened Subjects: The Participatory Perspective 
In contrast to liberal conceptions of democracy that locate participation in the institution-
alized closed spaces of the state and restrict citizens’ engagement to the voting booth 
(Schumpeter, 1947; Downs, 1957), conceptions of participatory democracy emerging in 
the 1960s and ’70s relocate political activity to new participatory spaces from self-managed 
workplaces (Dahl, 1986; Gould, 1988), to neighbourhood associations (Barber, 2003 
[1984]), participatory parties with democratized structures (Macpherson, 1977), and sites 
of self-organization of education and public services (Hirst, 1994; see also Smith & 
Teasdale, 2012). Theories of participatory democracy focus largely on the question of how 
individuals change through interaction within participatory spaces. They see participation 
as self-realization and an antidote to alienation from politics (Pateman, 1970, 45ff). The 
notion of the development of personal potential also explains why the role of education 
holds such a central place in theories of participatory democracy (Dacombe, 2018, 31ff). 
Participatory spaces function as schools in which democratic subjects learn about various 
issues and enhance empathy with others (Pateman, 1970, 42). This educative process in 
participatory spaces entails deep personal transformation. 
Participatory democrats take their inspiration from the republican tradition and particularly 
from Rousseau (1998 [1762], book 1, chapter 8) who argues that: “The passage from the 
state of nature to the civil state produces a very remarkable change in man… [H]is faculties 
are so stimulated and developed, his ideas so extended, his feelings so ennobled, and his 
whole soul so uplifted” that he is transformed from “a stupid and unimaginative animal” 
into “an intelligent being and a man”. In the same vein, participatory democrats understand 
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participatory spaces as educational institutions which facilitate personal development. As 
a means of socialization, they provide the democratic subject with opportunities for self-
expression and self-discovery. It is the social contact with others that facilitates personal 
growth (Macpherson, 1977; Pateman, 1970).  
The notion of self-realization in participatory democracy can be traced back not only to the 
humanist and republican tradition (Dacombe, 2018), but also to socialist thought 
(Asenbaum, 2013; 2012; Held, 2006 [1987]; Muldoon, 2018), and particularly the utopian 
socialism of thinkers such as Robert Owen, Charles Fourier, and Henri de Saint-Simon 
(Taylor, 2016 [1982]). Utopian socialists developed detailed conceptions of future societies 
with the goal of achieving liberation from oppression, individual freedom, and self-realiza-
tion. Such ideas often opposed the professional specialization imposed by emerging capi-
talist societies and advocated instead integrative approaches that allowed the individual to 
cultivate multiple talents and inclinations and thus explore diverse aspects of the multiple 
self. Although Marx and Engels harshly rejected such utopianism in the name of scientific 
socialism, it is nevertheless clearly reflected in their writings: 
For as soon as the distribution of labour comes into being, each man has a par-
ticular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which 
he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a herdsman, or a critical critic, 
and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood; while 
in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but 
each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the 
general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and 
another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in 
the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming 
hunter, fisherman, herdsman or critic. (Marx & Engels, 1998 [1845], vol. 1) 
The Marxian argument, inspired by early utopian socialists, challenges the fixity of identi-
ties and calls for a multiplicity of the self. Such an approach is also reflected in current 
pedagogics which emphasize practical experiences in art, handicrafts, theatre, and intercul-
tural exchange over the knowledge of facts (e.g. Miller et al., 2014). Yet, the notion of 
personal development through education has also inspired the authoritarian strands of so-
cialist thinking, resulting in conceptions of the “new man” in Marxist and Soviet texts. Here 
the original thought of liberation through self-exploration takes an unintended turn: educa-
tional institutions in particular and social and political institutions more generally are used 
to shape a specific subject from above. This idea runs counter to participatory democratic 
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thinking, where self-development is instituted outside of state influence. Referring to civil 
society’s participatory spaces, Schmitter and Karl (1991, 79f), for example, write: “The 
diverse units of social identity and interest, by remaining independent of the state, can also 
contribute to forming better citizens who are more aware of the preferences of others, more 
self-confident in their actions, and more civic-minded in their willingness to sacrifice for 
the common good”.  
However, theories of participatory democracy do not manage to completely rid themselves 
of the authoritarian legacy. It is not any kind of self-transformation that participatory insti-
tutions facilitate. Rather than providing a realm of self-exploration, they set out a certain 
path of self-development. The experience of the needs of others through participation cre-
ates a public-minded and other-regarding democratic subject, as Barber elaborates: 
Strong democracy creates the very citizens it depends upon… because it man-
dates a permanent confrontation between the me as citizen and the “Other” as 
citizen, forcing us to think in common and act in common. The citizen is by 
definition a we-thinker, and to think of the we is always to transform how in-
terests are perceived and goods defined. (Barber, 2003 [1984], 153, emphasis 
added)  
The compulsion addressed by Barber echoes Rousseau’s argument, to wit: “man, who so 
far had considered only himself, finds that he is forced to act on different principles, and to 
consult his reason before listening to his inclinations” (Rousseau, 1998 [1762], book 1, 
chapter 8, emphasis added). The spatial reconfiguration suggested by participatory demo-
crats, thus, serves the production of particular subjects. The outcome of this transformative 
process is to a certain extent predetermined. In many ways, the subject is seen as a product, 
an object of creation, rather than an autonomous self-explorer.  
4.2.3. Creating Better Citizens: The Deliberative Perspective 
In contrast with participatory democrats, thinkers in the deliberative democratic tradition 
bring a whole new set of expertise to the discussion. Rooted in the linguistic turn with 
structuralism and later poststructuralism becoming the dominant paradigm in social sci-
ences, deliberative democracy draws on notions of discursive identity construction (e.g. 
Mansbridge et al., 2010, 79). They take inspiration from Habermas’ Theory of Communi-
cative Action and its ideal of personal autonomy and freedom from domination: “Corre-
sponding to the ideal communication community is an ego-identity that makes possible 
self-realization on the basis of autonomous action” (Habermas, 1984, 98). This focus on 
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autonomy and freedom from domination provides a promising outlook for overcoming the 
authoritarian tendencies in the participatory democratic concept of subject formation. 
Based on a deliberative perspective on discursive identity production, Dryzek (2000, 74ff) 
responds to the difference democratic politics of presence. He criticizes difference demo-
crats for simply replacing the masculinist view in deliberative democracy with a feminist 
view. Instead of a politics of presence that focuses on contestation along the lines of group 
identity, he proposes a contestation of discourses and calls for discursive representation 
(Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2008). Understanding discourses as producing identities calls for a 
focus on discourses rather than on identities, the latter being merely the result of the former: 
“One way of interpreting the whole idea of difference is therefore in terms of discourses 
rather than identities” (Dryzek, 2000, 75).  
The problem here, I think, is clear enough. In principle, Dryzek simply reverses the theo-
retical move that difference democrats undertake. While Phillips (1995) argues that liberal 
democratic theory has ignored identities and the inequalities linked to them and only fo-
cused on content which calls for a perspectival shift toward identities, Dryzek reverses this 
with an argument for refocusing on content. In other words, Dryzek supports the difference 
democratic notions of contestation and diversity, but rejects the notion of presence. This 
appears problematic as a focus on content might obscure inequalities tied to identities in 
the same way that the original liberal theory did. However, Dryzek’s notion of the discur-
sive production of identities through the contestation of discourses warrants further inves-
tigation. 
In theories of deliberative democracy, discursive identity creation is conceptualized with 
the ideal of freedom from domination in mind, which might overcome the authoritarian 
inclinations in participatory democratic conceptions of self-transformation. Investigating 
this idea in detail, however, constraints similar to those in participatory democracy become 
apparent. Simone Chambers (1996, 103), for example, elaborates: “Our inner selves (who 
we are and what we want) are shaped through the communicative relationships we enter 
into. Practical discourse rationalizes this process by asking participants to reflect upon and 
evaluate their needs and interests rationally from the point of view of their generalizability”. 
Chambers insists that the freedom of self-expression lies in these modes of communication: 
“deliberative democracy, because it asks participants to examine, justify, and deliberate 
about their preferences and interests, gives the individual the opportunity to shape her pref-
erences and interest autonomously” (189). The element of compulsion identified in both 
Rousseau’s and Barber’s writing, however, is also clearly reflected in Chamber’s text:  
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Citizens themselves come under a publicity requirement in deliberation such 
that they must offer reasons for their positions and claims. Reason giving initi-
ates a learning process in which participants acquire discursive skills. Partici-
pants are asked to defend their preference in terms that others could find con-
vincing. They are asked to look at their preferences from both the partial and 
the impartial point of view. (190, emphasis added)  
These are exactly the tendencies of compulsion criticized by difference democrats. The 
requirement of reasoned argumentation produces specific democratic subjects. They are 
not only recreating a masculinist, Eurocentric subject, as difference democrats argue. More 
importantly for the question of freedom in self-transformation, the subjects created in de-
liberative democracy appear to be restricted in the development of their personality. The 
logic of deliberation dictates that subjects need to be reasoned, open-minded, other-regard-
ing and so on. Such a conception of self-transformation is particularly worrying when ob-
jectivist assumptions about knowledge are employed. Some studies in deliberative democ-
racy have been particularly keen to point to knowledge gain through deliberation, implying 
that knowledge is an objective resource to be acquired. In the same vein as participatory 
democrats, Fung claims: “Deliberative institutions in this mode should offer training and 
education to create informed participants” (2003, 345, emphasis added). And in an empir-
ical study, the authors observe: “[participants’] knowledge about the issue, as well as their 
capabilities to engage in political debates, increased. In this sense, deliberation created 
‘better’ citizens” (Andersen & Hansen, 2007, 552, emphasis added; see also Newton, 
2012).  
This position is criticized by Mark Warren (1993; 1992), who investigates the deliberative 
democratic potential for self-transformation. In accord with the accounts outlined above, 
he states that through deliberation citizens “would become more public-spirited, more tol-
erant, more knowledgeable, more attentive to the interests of others, and more probing of 
their own interests” (Warren, 1992, 8). This transformation of the self in deliberative de-
mocracy especially affects political identities: “only democratic processes can transform 
hardened opposition into other kinds of identities. They do this indirectly, through struc-
tural inducements to deliberate, negotiate, and adjust… Democracy holds open the space, 
as it were, in which to build” (Warren, 1996, 254f). 
Warren contends that deliberative means of self-transformation increase freedom and au-
tonomy. This is for two reasons. First, deliberation induces self-reflection and makes sub-
jects more aware of their own interests which is liberating in itself (Warren, 1996, 254f). 
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And second, conflict is to be understood as limiting freedom because it entails confronta-
tion which constitutes relations of domination. When conflict is diminished through delib-
eration and mutual understanding, this increases freedom. Like Chambers, Warren under-
stands this as an increase in personal autonomy. Yet, he remains critical of the notion of 
consensus to which many deliberative democrats adhere. He distances himself from Rous-
seau’s conception of the subordination of all individual wills under the general will 
(Warren, 1992, 11). In “the process of self-discovery (or self-creation)” (12), conflict can-
not always be transformed into mutuality, hence there need to be spaces for conflict and 
confrontation that do not require identity change (9). Like Dryzek, Warren thus identifies 
a legitimate role for conflict within deliberative democracy. However, in contrast with 
Dryzek who proposes to shift the focus toward a contestation of discourses, Warren sides 
with difference democrats in favour of conflict along the lines of identity.  
To conclude, while deliberative conceptions of democracy provide notions of self-transfor-
mation that try to strengthen individual autonomy, these attempts are only partly successful 
and ultimately do not provide adequate conceptions of personal freedom of the democratic 
subject to change. Although Warren and Chambers point to some important gains in per-
sonal autonomy through deliberation, this does not overcome the inherently limiting paths 
of self-transformation laid out in the deliberative perspective. Participatory spaces for de-
liberation are constructed with the purpose of producing “better” (empathetic, public-spir-
ited, knowledgeable) citizens. Thus, democratic subjects are not free to change, but instead 
are subject to particular transformations designed by others.  
4.2.4. Articulating the Tormented Self: The Agonistic Perspective 
Warren’s argument linking the reification of identity to confrontation finds support in the 
agonistic perspective. Agonists conceptualize the formation of alternative collective iden-
tities as a precondition to any challenge to the neoliberal hegemony. Firmly rooted in the 
linguistic turn, agonistic thinkers such as William Connolly (1991, 75) or Aletta Norval 
(2007) explain identities as the product of discursive contestation with subjects at the mar-
gins of society developing aversive identities to challenge domination. The self in the ago-
nistic perspective is conceptualized in anti-essentialist terms as multiple, contingent, and 
fraught with inner contradiction (Connolly, 1995a; 1995b; Honig, 1994). This opens up 
new potential for self-transformation. Such potential, however, remains unfulfilled as ago-
nism is limited by its tragic horizon and the notion of hegemonic identity construction.  
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Mouffe (1995) directly responds to the difference democratic politics of presence. She fer-
vently argues against any kind of essentialism which she detects in the work of Pateman 
(1989) and Young (1989; 1987). While sympathizing with these feminist approaches, 
which contest the universal construction of the citizen in the image of men and confine 
women to the private sphere, Mouffe (1995, 322) criticizes their fixed conceptions of (gen-
der) identity: “I do not believe, however, that the remedy is to replace [the modern category 
of the individual] by a sexually differentiated, ‘bigendered’ conception of the individual 
and to bring women’s so-called specific tasks into the very definition of citizenship”.  
Instead, Mouffe argues for a radical constructivist position. In this view, identities are con-
stituted through discursive articulation. Elsewhere Mouffe (1995b) elaborates such a pro-
cess of identity construction in more detail. Here she positions her discourse theory devel-
oped with Ernesto Laclau (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985) in what Lars Tønder and Lasse 
Thomassen (2005) call the ontology of lack (see also Marchart, 2005). Based on the work 
of the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan who points to the vast field of the unconscious which 
indicates the decentred nature of human identity, Mouffe argues that the core of human 
identity, on which subjectivity is based, consists of a lack, nothing, an empty space. Identity 
which is constructed upon this lack is characterized by instability. Attempts at permanently 
reifying and fixing identity through the articulation of nodal points in a web of discourses 
are bound to fail due to the intrinsic contingency of discursive meanings. Identity, then, 
emerges through a continuous dialectical process of fixity and non-fixity (Mouffe, 1995b). 
The understanding of lack at the core of the subject opens prospects of deconstruction. The 
disentanglement of discursive constructs that constitute the democratic subject, according 
to Mouffe (2006, 5f), always has to go hand in hand with the constitution of new identities: 
“This is why the transformation of political identities” consists of “practices that will mo-
bilize [the subject’s] affects towards the disarticulation of the framework in which the pro-
cess of identification is taking place, thereby opening the way for other forms of identifi-
cation”. 
In terms of Mouffe’s (1995a, 319) response to the politics of presence, this means that there 
is no essential core on which a feminist claim for a female identity can be based: “we no 
longer have a homogenous entity ‘woman’ facing another homogenous entity ‘man,’ but a 
multiplicity of social relations in which sexual difference is always constructed in very 
diverse ways”. According to Mouffe, sexual difference would not and should not disappear 
in a pluralist conception of radical democracy, but it would lose its significance in political 
interaction: “in the domain of politics, and as far as citizenship is concerned, sexual differ-
ence should not be a pertinent distinction” (323). The de-identification with sexual 
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constructs needs to be followed by a rearticulation of an identity as radical democratic cit-
izen, which is open enough to allow for various identifications while still orienting the 
subject toward freedom and equality.  
Mouffe’s anti-essentialist conception of democratic subjects who are defined by their lack 
of a foundational core provides new fertile ground for the exploration of the freedom of the 
subject to change. Instead of an essential core, Mouffe – like many other agonists – under-
stands the subject as defined by inner diversity (Mouffe, 1989, 44). Honig (1994), for ex-
ample, describes the self as plural and inherently contradictory. And Connolly (1995a) pro-
poses an ethos of pluralization in which democratic subjects embrace, explore, and further 
develop their inner plurality. Here Connolly echoes Young’s call for a revolution of sub-
jectivity that embraces the otherness within the self mentioned earlier (Young, 1990, 124).  
Despite this promising outlook, the liberating potential of the multiple self is not fulfilled 
in the agonistic perspective for three reasons. First, the tragic horizon of agonism thwarts 
any substantive self-transformation. Second, the inherent conservativism of the agonistic 
perspective constructs a subject of submission rather than a subject of emancipation. And 
third, the notion of a hegemonic struggle suggests a top-down construction of democratic 
subjectivity.  
As agonistic democracy is defined by conflict, there can never be a final resolution to such 
conflict. The end of conflict would mean the end of democracy. This is the tragedy of ago-
nistic democracy (Tambakaki, 2017, 581; Wenman, 2013, 33ff;). Mouffe (2013a, 84) clar-
ifies that there is no such thing as radical democracy: “the extension and radicalization of 
democratic struggles will never have a final point of arrival in the achievement of a fully 
liberated society”. This tragic view also stifles any real self-transformation. Honig explains 
that the perpetual conflictuality that positions different actors and different discourses in 
society in constant confrontation with each other is mirrored within the self. The many 
things that constitute the assemblage of the self are in unresolvable conflict (Honig, 1994). 
Helen McManus explores the agonistic self in political participation. The contradictory self 
needs participatory spaces as forums in which to release the tension of constant inner con-
flict that it endures:  
it is precisely in the experience of inner conflict as “torment”, as something that 
needs to be addressed and yet can never be entirely resolved, that individuals 
find themselves compelled to act… The individual knows that the exhilarating 
“release” of action will in turn bind her up in another set of torments, another 
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set of excesses along with the attendant perturbation and relief of acting on 
those excesses. (McManus, 2008, 525)  
The multiple self that is caught up in inner torment is situated in a spatial arrangement that 
itself can never fundamentally change. The social structures surrounding and constituting 
the subject can be contested by collective subjectivity, but its hierarchical relations and 
competitive principles cannot be overcome (Tambakaki, 2017, 581). So the subject is 
bound to endure agony without any prospects of internal or external change. 
This tragic horizon of agonistic democracy is owed to an inherent conservativism that 
stands in contrast with its emancipatory impetus. Since a true alternative to the ruling order 
can never be achieved, improvements within the liberal order are the best that agonistic 
contestation can hope to achieve. Wenman (2013, 180ff; 2003) points to the agonistic con-
servativism within Mouffe’s work. The fear of fascist tendencies in the recent surge of 
right-wing populism leads Mouffe, according to Wenman (2013, 182), to develop “a model 
of agonistic democracy built around the need to construct order, unity and authority”. This 
conservativism has far-reaching consequences for freedom in identity construction. Mouffe 
(2013, 28) suggests that “the moment of ‘de-identification’ [must] be accompanied by a 
moment of ‘re-articulation’” reconstructing the subject in terms of radical democratic citi-
zenship. Elsewhere, this radical democratic citizenship is outlined in conservative terms 
fulfilling primarily the function of maintaining the liberal order rather than facilitating self-
expression. To be accepted into the community of citizens, the subject has to submit to the 
dominant order: 
To belong to the political community, what is required is to accept a specific 
language of civil intercourse… Those rules prescribe norms of conduct to be 
subscribed to in seeking self-chosen satisfaction and in performing self-chosen 
actions. The identification with those rules of civil intercourse creates a com-
mon political identity among persons otherwise engaged in many different en-
terprises. (Mouffe, 1992, 77) 
And elsewhere democratic citizenship is described as “a common political identity of per-
sons… who accept submission to certain authoritative rules of conduct” (Mouffe, 1992a, 
30f). Apart from the hegemonic function of radical democratic citizenship that dominates 
rather than emancipates the subject, Mouffe (1995b, 264) also calls for a “‘civic’ national-
ism”. Such civic nationalism is not to be understood as homogenous, but rather as a plural 
and open category. However, this pluralism does not simply fulfil the democratic value of 
diversity; it is a tool for diverting potentially destructive energies. Multiple identifications 
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within the civic national identity do not serve to bolster experience of the multiple self, but 
merely disperse potentially destructive energies into multiple directions and diffuse outlets. 
Rather than one antagonistic relationship, Mouffe (1994, 111) advocates many agonistic 
identifications.  
It becomes apparent that Mouffe’s theory is driven by a fear of destructive forces that make 
conserving the status quo more appealing than risking upheaval in the name of substantive 
change. Wenman is right to point to the parallels between Mouffe’s later texts and the con-
tractual theory of Thomas Hobbes (1968 [1851]), who pitted the monstrous Leviathan 
against the monstrous wolf in all of us. Mouffe’s criticism of essentialism in difference 
democracy ultimately fails to afford any perspectives for self-transformation.  
Lastly, it is not only the insurmountable inner conflict of the subject and the conservative 
conception of a subject of submission to the liberal order that limits the freedom of the 
agonistic subject to change; so too does the notion of hegemony. Understanding identity as 
the product of collective contestation, as suggested by Norval (2007), limits personal free-
dom as the subject appears to be constructed from the top down as a subject to leadership.  
Mouffe’s recent work on populism makes clear that the actors who articulate new identities 
are political parties and their charismatic leaders who vie for attention in a competitive 
corporate media environment (Mouffe & Errejon, 2016; Mouffe, 2018). Although the goal 
of left populist movements is to increase freedom and equality, processes of identity con-
struction are advanced by leaders rather than the grassroots, which is in line with the Gram-
scian thought on which Mouffe builds and which partly overlaps with Leninist conceptions 
of a vanguard leadership. In a similar vein, Kioupkiolis (2017, 42) criticizes Laclau’s 
(2005; 2000; 1996) conception of hegemony, in which “the people are an ‘amorphous 
mass’ that need to be educated, moulded, and directed by enlightened leaders”. As long as 
agonistic democracy is limited by its tragic horizon that disallows fundamental change, and 
the fear of upheaval results in aspirations of social conservation, theories of identity con-
struction inevitably wind up as tools in the hands of elites who lead the masses. Ironically, 
in a similar way as in theories of participatory and deliberative democracy, identities are 
shaped by enlightened, intellectual elites and paths of transformation are predetermined.  
To conclude, agonistic conceptions of the democratic subject as a contingent identity con-
struction offer great potential to explore self-transformation in participatory spaces. Yet, 
this potential remains unrealized on account of the tragic horizon of agonism, its conserva-
tive outlook that maintains the liberal, capitalist order, and the notion of hegemonic identity 
construction as a top-down process.  
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4.3. Transforming Systems and Selves: A New Perspective in Democratic Thought 
While the different radical democratic perspectives discussed here provide promising ap-
proaches to performative identity constitution through embodied presence (difference de-
mocracy), self-development through participation (participatory democracy), autonomous 
self-constitution through deliberation (deliberative democracy), and the construction of 
new collective subjectivities through contestation (agonistic democracy), they all fall short 
of realizing freedom within these processes. Although the limitations of each of these per-
spectives derive from their respective ontologies, they nevertheless all share a common 
problem. They outline a process of subject constitution that serves particular aims: to create 
more educated, civil, empathetic citizens who submit to established rules, citizens who en-
gage in reasoned deliberation or agonistic respect. The limited social change advanced in 
these theories is reflected in the limited, bound, and channelled transformations of the sub-
ject. The particular self-transformations outlined here appear to be advanced from the top 
down, by enlightened academics, intellectual leaders, and populist parties. What is needed, 
thus, is a perspective in democratic theory that provides the grounds for freedom in identity 
construction, freedom for the subject to change. 
To this end, I believe that another perspective in democratic thought that emerged in the 
wake of the new millennium offers some fruitful ground. What I call transformative de-
mocracy was entangled with the agonistic perspective in the early writings that identified 
with the term “radical democracy” but it has developed its own distinctive features in recent 
years. In critical response to and clear demarcation from earlier agonistic approaches, texts 
on post-hegemony try to overcome the tragic perspective of agonism (Day, 2005; Beasley-
Murray, 2011). While agonists such as Mouffe focus on the populist movements and parties 
with new modes of leadership, writers in the post-hegemonic field focus on grassroots 
movements, social collectives, and self-organized commons. Although this literature, de-
spite its partial theoretical complexity, is very well received publicly, it has yet to be 
acknowledged in the texts defining the canon of democratic theory. This chapter provides 
one of the first attempts at outlining this perspective and relating it to other theories of 
democracy (other, slightly different approaches to describing this perspective are developed 
by Tambakaki, 2017, 578ff and Wenman, 2013, 89ff). 
Texts in the transformative perspective articulate the same criticism of the politics of pres-
ence as put forward by Mouffe and other agonistic thinkers. They challenge the essential-
izing assumptions and confining constructions of identity politics. Sheldon Wolin (1994, 
12), for example, argues: “Postmodern cultural politics follows in the footsteps of 
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nationalism in insisting upon boundaries that establish differences (as in gender or racial 
politics) but proclaims identities as well. Here, too, the political becomes associated with 
purification”. Wolin’s aversion to the boundaries that fix identity is also constitutive of his 
conception of fugitive democracy. He claims that democracy can never be captured and 
institutionalized. Institutionalization eradicates the spirit of democracy, which can only live 
in the moment of deeply experienced mutuality. Applying Wolin’s notion of democracy to 
the self, I suggest that we speak of a fugitive self, whose reification through identification 
equates to its death. Attempts to capture the self can produce continuous identity perfor-
mances of the legally identified persona in the public sphere, but, as I will argue later, this 
is only a form of masquerade (Butler, 1990). The self can never be captured in its multi-
plicity. The many aspects of the multiple self might rather be set free by modes of disiden-
tification, which will be explored in the next section. First, however, I will lay the ground 
for a politics of becoming through disidentification by exploring the transformative per-
spective in democratic theory.  
4.3.1. Towards a Transformative Perspective in Democratic Theory 
What most clearly distinguishes the transformative perspective from the other radical dem-
ocratic perspectives discussed so far is the bold articulation of systemic alternatives. In 
contrast with the discourse on the revitalization of democracy in the participatory, deliber-
ative, difference, and agonistic perspectives, it puts social transformation at its centre. This 
is aptly illustrated by its use of the spatial concept of utopia. In the literal translation from 
Greek, utopia denotes “no-place”, it describes a space that is “nowhere” or “elsewhere”. 
Transformative democrats use the notion of utopia not only for the imagination of alterna-
tive systemic configurations but also as a way to point to “real utopias” that establish alter-
natives in the here and now. The founding of collective alternatives, such as cooperative 
modes of production, occupied buildings, and self-managed spaces, are not just insular 
phenomena but form part of a transformative movement. The late Erik Olin Wright explains 
that at times there is only a thin line between reformist and transformative strategies. Yet, 
what differentiates the two is the fact that the transformative perspective always keeps the 
systemic alternative in clear sight: “Real utopias, in contrast [with reformism], envision the 
contours of an alternative social world that embodies emancipatory ideals and then look for 
social innovations we can create in the world as it is that move us towards that destination” 
(Wright, 2013, 17).  
The notion of utopia is also central in Saul Newman’s (2016) postanarchism, which en-
riches traditional anarchist work of the 19th and 20th centuries with poststructuralist and 
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postfoundationalist thinking. Here utopia denotes a break, a transformative divergence 
from the presence of domination as “a utopian moment of rupture and excess which disturbs 
the limits of politics” (Newman, 2010b, 7). This interruption of domination as part of a 
transformative strategy consists of a reconfiguration of space. The project of transforming 
social relations on a macro level is pursued by reconfiguring democratic spatiality in vari-
ous sites on a micro level. Postanarchism is aimed “at fostering the emergence of new au-
tonomous political spaces, where communal and free relations can develop. This would 
involve an experimentation with new ways of living, different non-authoritarian political 
practices and structures, and even alternative economies” (128). To advance an idea of the 
autonomous constitution of “insurrectional spaces” by democratic subjects, Newman 
(2011, 355) reinterprets the term of design and describes it as “forms of autonomous self-
ordering from below”.  
Postanarchism, thus, introduces a disorder of things by interrupting established modes of 
domination and reordering space to foster freedom and equality. Compared to the liberal 
conceptions of freedom and equality discussed in this thesis so far, the anarchist perspective 
introduces an entirely different understanding. Liberal thinking, on which Mouffe builds 
the democratic paradox, positions freedom and equality in an unresolvable tension, so that 
an increase in the freedom of one subject means the decrease in freedom of another. Equal-
ity works as a regulatory function that distributes freedom among individuals (see Spencer, 
1851). The opposition between freedom and equality in liberal thinking rests on the con-
ceptions of individualism and competition. If each individual is in direct competition with 
all others, she needs to increase her resources, power, and freedom at the expense of others. 
Freedom is perceived as a limited resource. Anarchism, in contrast, argues that the freedom 
of one individual depends on the freedom of others. Freedom is never realizable individu-
ally but only collectively. Freedom and equality are not at odds with one another, but rather 
intimately intertwined. Postanarchism suggests a conception of collective freedom  
… in which liberty can be shared without being diminished; in which the liberty 
of one is only imaginable in the context of the liberty of all; and in which liberty 
must come not only with formal equality (of liberty), but with social and eco-
nomic equality. It is at this point that the difference between liberty and equality 
becomes indistinct, one term merging into the other. (Newman, 2010b, 22f) 
Newman explains that freedom and equality are not two different concepts; rather, they are 
one, as “for anarchists, democracy must be conditioned by an ethics of equal liberty” (2016, 
176). Where there is inequality, there cannot be freedom, because some are confined by 
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domination while others are confined by dominating. Only when all are equal can all be 
free. Furthermore, when equality is enforced by the state – in socialist conceptions of re-
distribution or in feminist conceptions of quota regulations – equality is always achieved 
through inequality. The use of force rests on an accumulation of power (Newman, 2010b, 
3, 20ff).  
To develop this postanarchist approach, Newman draws on several thinkers including 
Jacques Rancière and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. While these authors do not define 
themselves as anarchists, Newman claims that their thought is clearly rooted in and con-
tributes to developing a new anarchist project (Newman, 2010b, 104). Rancière’s work 
explains democracy as the moment of freedom and equality interrupting the dominant order 
(Rancière, 1999). In Dikeç’s re-reading of Rancière’s democratic theory in spatial terms, 
he describes Rancière’s police as the attempt by the established order to fix relations of 
domination. The hierarchical space of the police constitutes a stable, measurable, empty 
terrain from which dominant forces assign names and places to their subjects. In naming, 
counting, and ordering subjects, the police fixes social constellations and conserves the 
established hierarchical order (Dikeç, 2005, 172ff). This process of hierarchical spatializa-
tion is, however, periodically intercepted by moments of rupture, when democratic subjects 
“construct a space, a polemical common space for addressing a wrong and demonstrating 
the equality of anyone with anyone” (178). 
The moment of rupture that is central to the work of Rancière and Newman shares with the 
agonistic perspective a focus on conflict. Conflict plays an important role in the transform-
ative perspective as the means for transformation. Only through the struggle of social 
movements can equality and freedom be achieved. Social movements, then, become the 
site of both striving toward democracy and the lived experience of democracy itself. What 
clearly differentiates transformative from agonistic democrats is that the transformative 
perspective does not understand democracy itself as a state of conflict but defines conflict 
as a mode of democratization – a move toward democracy. This becomes apparent when 
looking at definitions of politics and the political. While Mouffe defines the political as the 
potential antagonistic conflictuality inherent in every human relation, Wolin conceptualizes 
the political in contrary terms as the democratic moment of communality: “I shall take the 
political to be an expression of the idea that a free society composed of diversities can 
nonetheless enjoy moments of commonality when, through public deliberations, collective 
power is used to promote or protect the wellbeing of the collectivity” (Wolin, 1994, 11).  
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The experience of commonality in the moment is at the same time the actualization of de-
mocracy and a transition toward democracy: Democracy is “a rebellious moment” (Wolin, 
1994, 23) – a subjective state of mind. In contrast with agonistic tragedy, the transformative 
perspective opens prospects for systemic change. This change is sometimes referred to as 
transformation, revolution, insurrection or rebellion. What is crucial is that democracy does 
not just lie beyond this process; democracy is realized within it:  
Democracy is not about where the political is located but how it is experienced. 
Revolutions activate the demos and destroy boundaries that bar access to polit-
ical experience. Individuals from the excluded social strata take on responsibil-
ities, deliberate about goals and choices, and share in decisions that have broad 
consequences and affect unknown and distant others. Thus revolutionary trans-
gression is the means by which the demos makes itself political. (18) 
It is this democratic moment of transformation, which is at the heart of Hardt and Negri’s 
Multitude (2004). As the social category of class is becoming increasingly less relevant due 
to a new globalized world order, the term “multitude” captures a new radical collective 
subjectivity which preserves the multiplicity of singularities but simultaneously affords the 
recognition of the common. Hardt and Negri reconceptualize the supposed oppositions of 
pluralism and equality and define the multitude as a continuous production of commonality 
and difference: “while remaining different, we discover the commonality that enables us to 
communicate and act together” (Hardt & Negri, 2004, xiii). This productive reconfiguration 
affords the transformative power of the multitude: “The intensification of the common, 
finally, brings about an anthropological transformation such that out of the struggles come 
a new humanity” (213). Rejecting the binary opposition between reform and revolution, 
Hardt and Negri (2017, 254) trust in the transformative power of “antagonistic formations 
within and against the state”. Rather than in terms of institutions and decision-making rules, 
they understand democracy as the intuitive coordination in the production of the common 
akin to concepts of swarm intelligence (Lewis, 2010).  
In contrast with the other radical democratic perspectives discussed so far, which all see 
the necessity for both representative and direct democratic institutions, the transformative 
perspective collapses this division and understands democracy in its original sense as self-
rule. Hardt and Negri (2017, 247) describe what they call absolute democracy as the “rule 
of everyone by everyone”. This form of self-rule is constituted by the common. The notion 
of the common, which is central in the transformative perspective, bears some resemblance 
to participatory democrats’ notion of democratic community. Wolin (1994, 24), for 
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example, writes: “Individuals who concert their powers for… common concerns of ordi-
nary lives are experiencing a democratic moment and contributing to the discovery, care, 
and tending of a commonality of shared concerns”. In the transformative perspective, the 
common, however, goes beyond the participatory democratic spirit of communal organiza-
tion by addressing the question of property and the social distribution of wealth. Rancière 
(2014 [2005], 57f) argues that while capitalist forces of privatization aim to constantly ex-
pand the commercial sphere, democratic forces expand the common as public sphere in-
cluding everyone.  
Hardt and Negri, like Rancière, use the term “common” in the singular and thus present an 
expansion of the notion of the original commons (in plural). The commons as originally 
described by Garrett Hardin (1968) and later Elinor Ostrom (1990) are common-pool re-
sources including land, water, public places, and knowledge. The concept of the commons 
thus addresses the question of property ownership and develops an understanding of par-
ticipatory communal control and self-management. Many insist, however, that the com-
mons are never owned, but only preliminarily used so that they function as hosts to their 
users. Commons then create a community of commoners and it is their social relations and 
activity which define the commons (Deleixhe, 2018, 63f). Rather than property or any kind 
of object, the commons are defined by the interactive process of commoning – the creation 
and recreation of the respective resource.  
This notion of cooperative production also plays a crucial role in the current freedom of 
information and the open source movements, which confront the capitalist drive towards 
the commercialization and privatization of knowledge. In the digital age, the logic of com-
moning through sharing knowledge online challenges the capitalist logic of property rights 
enforced through online paywalls that confine digital knowledge space (Beyer, 2014b). 
Wikipedia is a particularly illustrative example of how common-based knowledge produc-
tion can work (Konieczny, 2010). And the notion of liquid democracy as practiced by Pirate 
Parties shows how open source principles and wiki technology can be used to produce col-
lective decisions, texts, and even laws (Blum & Zuber, 2016). 
Considering the immateriality of digital objects and the discursive nature of knowledge, 
Hardt and Negri take the notion of the commons further, and besides arguing for the so-
cialization of traditional commons, such as water, banks, and education (Hardt & Negri, 
2012), they define the common (in singular) in discursive terms: the common is the out-
come of any social and communicative interaction. If the common is understood as 
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knowledge production, then any linguistic or performative articulation is part of the process 
of commoning.  
While Hardt and Negri put their conception of a common-based democracy in more con-
crete terms in Declaration (2012), where they speak of a federative structure of assemblies, 
it remains abstract in most of their writings. The work of Alexandros Kioupkiolis picks up 
their notion of the common and provides an idea of how it might be applied to democratic 
decision-making. What he calls common democracy denotes the self-rule of the people 
which eliminates the distinction between the rulers and the ruled: “the public political gov-
ernance becomes a common affair: a public process accessible to all members of a commu-
nity on the basis of equality” (Kioupkiolis, 2017, 37f). These principles of transparency 
and accessibility of common decision-making are illustrated by the movement of the 
squares, which, in contrast with the practices of political negotiation behind closed doors, 
assemble in public for everyone to see and join. While common democracy eliminates the 
separation between rulers and ruled, it does not, according to Kioupkiolis, eliminate some 
forms of representation and does not require everyone to participate at all times. Instead, 
through a combination of various mechanisms, such as rotation, limited tenure, and sorti-
tion (see Owen & Smith, 2018), and through the variation of participants who feel the 
strongest about respective issues, an organic kind of representation of the physically absent 
emerges. These principles of common democracy, Kioupkiolis argues, can be found not 
only in recent social movement mobilizations, but also in Ancient Greek forms of direct 
democracy and current digital commons such as Wikipedia. In a similar vein, Wright (2013, 
17ff) illustrates the realization of democratic utopias here and now through examples such 
as Wikipedia, workers’ cooperatives, participatory budgeting, unconditional basic income, 
and “randomocracy” through sortition.  
To conclude, the transformative perspective outlined above differs from other radical dem-
ocratic perspectives in advocating fundamental systemic change. The constitution of par-
ticipatory spaces, or insurrectional spaces in Newman’s (2011) terms, is part of a deep re-
configuration of democratic spatiality through an interruption of domination. The notion of 
equal liberty in anarchist debates uncovers entirely new perspectives in relation to the ob-
jectives of this thesis. If equality and freedom are not at odds, as the democratic paradox 
suggests, then it appears that they can both be advanced simultaneously within participatory 
spaces. I will return to this question in the next chapter. The transformative perspective 
outlined here provides fresh and fertile ground for the self-transformation and self-explo-
rations of the democratic subject. So, how can democratic subjectivity be re-imagined 
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through a transformative democratic lens, and what possibilities can it provide for demo-
cratic self-constitution?  
4.3.2. From the Politics of Presence to a Politics of Becoming: Disidentification as 
Radical Democratic Practice 
The freedom for the subject to change in the transformative perspective is based on a dif-
ferent conception of democratic spatiality. The difference, participatory, deliberative, and 
agonistic perspectives discussed so far understand space as stable and only partly changing. 
The rearrangement of spatial assemblages they recommend is limited by the liberal, capi-
talist context in which they are produced. The transformative perspective, in contrast, ex-
plains space itself as a morphological entity. The transformation of the self goes along with 
the transformation of space as two intertwined assemblages, as discussed in Chapter 2 
(2.5.2). The utopian and insurrectional spaces of postanarchism not only interrupt domina-
tion on the level of society as a whole, but also this destabilization of ground interrupts 
established practices of identification. The self is never fixed but always becoming: “Post-
anarchism, or if you like, post-foundational anarchism, conceives of a political space which 
is indeterminate, contingent and heterogeneous – a space whose lines and contours are un-
decidable. Postanarchist political space is, in other words, a space of becoming” (Newman, 
2011, 355). In contrast with the Arendtian space of appearance in which the gaze of spec-
tators actualizes and reifies the subject (Arendt, 1958), the space of becoming constitutes 
morphological subjectivities that are in constant flux. This change is, of course, not an en-
tirely autonomous process. The subject always depends on the interpellation of others. But 
this interpellation, as will become clear, is interrupted by freedom and equality enlarging 
the identity spaces through which the subject moves. This freedom of self-creation is based 
on the morphological nature of space. As spaces produce subjects and subjects produce 
spaces in a dialectical manner, the freedom of self-exploration becomes a project of ex-
tending the spaces that break with the logic of domination. Thus, we can understand “au-
tonomy as an ongoing project of political spatialization” (Newman, 2011, 356). Exploring 
freedom in democratic self-constitution, this section will augment the politics of presence 
with a politics of becoming by supplementing modes of continuous identity performance 
with modes of disidentification.  
Many theorists contributing to the transformative perspective challenge the core assump-
tions of identity politics. Their critique addresses the constraining elements of the politics 
of presence that imagines the democratic subject as physically embodied and identified, 
confined to its particularities of one dominant identity that overshadows other intersectional 
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identifications. Wolin likens identity politics to the logic of the state which, in defining the 
boundaries of a territory, a nation, and a culture, creates a hegemonic group identity: “Both 
as container and excluder, boundaries work to foster the impression of a circumscribed 
space in which likeness dwells, the likeness of natives, of an autochthonous people, or of a 
nationality… Likeness is prized because it appears as the prime ingredient of unity” (Wolin, 
1994, 12). The construction of group identity as an exclusive unity undermines “heteroge-
neity, diversity, multiple selves” (24). In contrast, democracy needs to be imagined as “a 
mode of being” (23), as “a project concerned with the political potentialities of ordinary 
citizens, that is with their possibilities for becoming political beings through the self-dis-
covery of common concerns and of modes of action for realizing them” (11, emphasis 
added). 
Newman takes a similarly critical stance toward identity politics and points not only to its 
confining aspects, but also to its divisive tendencies that impede a common democratic 
project: 
A politics that is based around the assertion of an identity, or seeks an institu-
tional recognition of a specific difference… [is] confining itself to a certain 
particularity, thus closing itself off from struggles and identities outside itself. 
What is foreclosed is an egalitarian, collective, democratic dimension which 
embodies a necessary openness to the other. (Newman, 2010, 8) 
The democratic dimension that overcomes division as indicated by Newman is reflected in 
Hardt and Negri’s multitude, which they describe as “the living flesh that rules itself” (2004, 
100). Not unlike Laclau and Mouffe’s chain of equivalence (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, 176) 
and Young’s heterogeneous public (Young, 1990, 188ff; 1989, 264ff; 1987, 75f), the mul-
titude emerges as a new democratic subjectivity with a mosaic-like character: “The multi-
tude is an internally different, multiple social subject whose constitution and action is based 
not on identity or unity (or, much less, indifference) but on what it has in common” (Hardt 
& Negri, 2004; see also Hardt & Negri, 2017, 231). 
It becomes apparent that in contrast with the politics of presence, the subjectivities de-
scribed here undergo transformation. To best capture such identity reconfigurations, I will 
build on Connolly’s notion of a “politics of becoming”. Interestingly, Connolly uses the 
term to describe exactly the same social phenomena that in the difference democratic per-
spective are associated with the politics of presence. He argues that the LGBTIQ, the 
women’s, and the anti-slavery movement all engage in a politics of becoming, not by rei-
fying their identities through physical presence, but through pursuing an agenda of identity 
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change. They aim to become citizens with equal rights deserving of equal respect: “The 
politics of becoming occurs when a culturally marked constituency, suffering under its cur-
rent social constitution, strives to reconfigure itself by moving the cultural constellation of 
identity/difference then in place” (Connolly, 1996, 255f). While participants in these 
claimed spaces often define themselves in essentialist terms, the lack of a natural essence 
of their identities allows them to engage in a transformative politics (264).  
This offers a complete reinterpretation of identity politics. This perspectival shift allows us 
to understand an aspect of identity transformation that is already inherent in the politics of 
presence and yet seldom acknowledged in debates on difference democracy. The confine-
ments of the dilemma of difference can partly be tackled by a focus on the contingency of 
identity constructions created through identity politics. Paradoxically, physical presence is 
a performative act of becoming. Participants in these movements are always becoming; 
they always strive to be what they are currently perceived not to be. Young (1990, 124, 
169ff) hints toward such an understanding when she calls for a revolution of subjectivity 
and explains the self-definitions of the marginalized as contingent constructions. Even in 
its physically embodied form, the subject is always a subject to change. 
In the perspective I am suggesting, the politics of becoming does not replace the politics of 
presence. The two concepts are rather in a relation of augmentation. The politics of becom-
ing suggests that presence is not fixed in time and space. Rather, presence itself needs to 
be understood as a transformative process of becoming. The identity claimed through pres-
ence in participatory spaces is a becoming identity, one that claims a future self. Suffra-
gettes, for example, did not take a stance in claimed spaces as housewives but as future 
voters and politicians. They emerged in the space of appearance as who they aspired to be. 
In that brief moment of experiencing democracy, they became equal citizens. Thus, the 
concept of the politics of becoming allows us to rethink the politics of presence.  
The understanding of a politics of becoming and its compatibility with a politics of presence 
can be further explored through the work of Moya Lloyd (2005). According to Lloyd, in-
stead of perceiving identity as pre-political, so that the politics of presence can represent 
the category “woman” in participatory spaces, identity needs to be understood as a product 
created within participatory spaces. The democratic subject needs to be understood as a 
subject-in-process. This does not preclude the strategic use of essentialism. Rather, partic-
ipatory spaces need to express diversity through the presence of the marginalized. How-
ever, at the same time, they need to function as the sites of critiquing and deconstructing 
essentialism. Even when engaging in strategic essentialism, the performative nature of 
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identities must be kept in mind: “even when an essence becomes hegemonic, it is never 
simply locked down. It remains performative – producing that which it means as it names 
it through reiteration and re-citation. For this reason, performative identities are always 
susceptible to subversion, transgression and even transformation” (Lloyd, 2005, 67). 
Understanding the self as inherently fugitive – as that which tries to escape reification 
through identification and representation – we can see that a politics of presence temporar-
ily stabilizes identity as a communicative act. The self, however, remains fugitive. The 
subject to change keeps transforming in different spatial contexts. Its identity assemblage 
is altered as it interacts with different things in other spaces, which are themselves in con-
stant flux. The subject is always becoming. 
I propose, however, to take the meaning of the politics of becoming beyond identity politics 
to include all aspects of self-transformation in participatory spaces. Beyond Connolly’s 
original notion, which focuses on claimed spaces, this also includes identity transfor-
mations in invited and even in closed spaces. More importantly, however, by overcoming 
the agonistic constraints of tragedy and a continuous struggle for hegemony of both Con-
nolly and Lloyd, I will investigate the politics of becoming through the transformative per-
spective to explore the potentialities of a democratization of subject constitution.  
To explore the emancipatory potentialities of the politics of becoming, I will draw on 
Rancière’s work on subjectivization and in particular on the concept of disidentification, 
which denotes an interruption of identity assemblages. To understand the meaning of dis-
identification, let us start with its opposite: identification. As mentioned earlier, Rancière 
explains the established political order as consensus or post-democracy, which he calls the 
police. The police rests on the logic of identification. Moved by an impetus of control and 
conservation, it names its subjects and assigns them a place and a part. This logic of control 
and conservation counteracting freedom and equality aims at eradicating democracy: “Post-
democracy… is an identifying mode, among institutional mechanisms and allocation of the 
society’s appropriate parts and shares, for making the subject and democracy’s own specific 
actions disappear” (Rancière, 1999, 102). Thus, “little by little the identity of the whole 
with the all is obtained” (124).  
This process of homogenization through identification advanced by the police is disrupted 
by processes of subjectivization. Subjectivization consists of the collective creation of new 
identities that contest the police order. These processes of becoming are, however, not pro-
cesses of identification which follow the police logic of reifying, assigning, and controlling 
identity. Subjectivization, Rancière explains, is rather to be understood as disidentification. 
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Disidentification is the political act of disrupting the identificatory processes of the police 
by rejecting the names it assigns. Instead of creating another identity, which would, again, 
comply with the logic of police, disidentification creates an improper identity, a wrong 
name.  
That “wrong name” identified nothing. Instead it put to work a process of dis-
identification. A process of dis-identification is what creates a political subject. 
A political subject is a being that arrives as supplement to the social distribu-
tion, since it cannot be identified as a part of the police order. (Rancière, 2007, 
561)  
This wrong name articulates the positionality of a gap in which it is created. The disidenti-
fying subject is an outcast, a nobody, somebody who does not count and is not assigned a 
share in the social order. Between this nowhere, where nobody is located, and the precisely 
localized position controlled by the police, emerges a new ground through disidentification. 
It is the gap between identification and nothing where subjectivization through disidentifi-
cation occurs. Through this “identification with an anybody that has no body” (Rancière, 
1992, 62), new collective subjectivities arise which cannot be controlled and administered 
by the police.  
Rancière explains disidentification through various examples. The emergence of the prole-
tariat as political subject is one such case. In the early 19th century, those people who in the 
eyes of the police merely served the production of wealth, but did not count as individuals 
in the liberal-capitalist order, were named after their most valuable attribute: their produc-
tion of offspring that would further produce wealth. While the police order hailed those 
outcasts as proletarians, many workers rejected this ascription by disputing the identity 
category assigned to them. Their disidentification consisted of a rejection of the class sys-
tem altogether by promoting the Marxist notion of the classless society in which neither 
capitalists nor proletarians would exist. “In this way”, Rancière (1992, 61) notes, “a process 
of subjectivization is a process of disidentification or declassification”.  
According to Rancière, the position of the outcast earlier occupied by proletarians is now 
the place of immigrants. In a more recent piece, he engages with the immigration debate in 
Australia and asks what it means to be “un-Australian”. By expanding this question to the 
meaning of Un itself, he argues that the terms “Unaustralians” residing in the imaginary 
place of “Unaustralia” do not simply create a counter-identity. The re-appropriation of the 
racist slur by immigrants does not simply create a positive identity in opposition to a na-
tionalist Australian identity. The positionality of Unaustralians between an individual 
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identity produced and administered by the police and the position of the unnamed immi-
grant as outcast and nobody creates an un-identity, a purposefully wrong name that clearly 
neither signifies a “real” registered and administered person, nor a nobody: “politics as 
such”, Rancière (2007, 562) claims, “rests on the anarchic power of the… un-identified”. 
Lastly, Rancière uses the example of the phrase “We are all German Jews” to illustrate the 
re-appropriation of a derogatory term as an improper name. When, at the students’ demon-
stration of May 1968 in France, conservatives tried to discredit the student leader Daniel 
Cohn-Bendit by pointing to his German-Jewish roots, protesters engaged in subjectiviza-
tion by chanting “We are all German Jews!” Again, neither are these German Jews “real” 
people in the sense that they would be countable and nameable, nor were (at least the vast 
majority of) the protesters actually German or Jewish. These German Jews purposely em-
ployed a wrong name, creating new identifications to express their political convictions 
(Rancière, 2007, 561; 1999, 126; 1992, 61). 
Rancière’s notion of improper names is further developed in the work of Marco Deseriis, 
who explores these novel collective identities as the actualization of Hardt and Negri’s 
multitude. Improper names bring together individuals who form agentic assemblages as a 
condividual. In contrast with the individualistic subject of liberal theory, the condividual is 
based on a shared identity. The human bodies that form the collective subject interact with 
the discursive articulations they produce, forming a space of becoming. In doing so, they 
reject the individual names assigned to them by creating an improper name that interrupts 
hegemonic identity interpellations: “improper names function as assemblages of enuncia-
tion that are common and singular, impersonal yet individuated. Although these aliases 
retain the formal features of a proper name, their multiple and unpredictable iterations in 
the public sphere put into crisis the referential function of the proper name” (Deseriis, 2015, 
4f).  
Improper names can take two forms: multi-user names and collective pseudonyms. The 
latter are exemplified by the hacktivist collective Anonymous, which reifies its improper 
identity through the Guy Fawkes mask, both in its physical version in street demonstrations 
and its digital version in online protest. The improper face of Anonymous belongs to a 
proper historical figure. Guy Fawkes is known for his role in the failed Gunpowder Plot of 
1605 (Asenbaum, 2018; Cambre, 2014; Koch, 2014). Similarly, in the late 18th century the 
name Ned Ludd was associated with the politically motivated breaking of stocking frames 
as a form of workers’ protest against increasing industrialization. Although Ludd’s actual 
existence is disputed, a popular folk tale tells of him breaking a stock frame in anger. 
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Whenever a piece of industrial machinery was broken, it was jokingly blamed on Ludd. 
The political movement protesting the devaluation of special skills in the industry through 
automation took over this name. Declaring the mythical Ned Ludd their leader, the Luddites 
signed proclamations and letters with his name, thus assuming an improper identity 
(Deseriis, 2013). In contrast to collective pseudonyms, multi-user names can be exempli-
fied by Robin Hood, a name that was used by different people to steal and redistribute 
property (Deseriis, 2015, 2). 
The use of improper names is explained by Deseriis as a spatial practice. Improper names 
disrupt the spatial order of the police: “Because the state apparatus produces the subject as 
a political, epistemological, and biological unit that is always fundamentally in place, those 
subjectivities that cannot properly be located pose a fundamental threat to state power” 
(Deseriis, 2015, 24). By breaking down established boundaries and introducing a disorder 
of things, improper names create new spaces of becoming: 
Because they are open to unforeseen appropriation, improper names imply an 
opening of closed spaces and a constant subversion of fixed relations… [B]y 
making themselves available to unforeseen appropriations, they let the outside 
slip into the inside, and vice versa. This means that improper names do not 
designate fixed identities. Rather, they are heterogeneous assemblages in which 
the whole (the ensemble of an improper name’s iterations) is unable to unify 
and totalize the parts, among which, nevertheless, it establishes relationships 
and paths of communication. (Deseriis, 2015, 6, 18) 
Modes of disidentification through improper names that disrupt the established order gen-
erate new potentials of freedom for the democratic subject to explore its multiple self. The 
augmentation of the politics of presence through a politics of becoming and the re-reading 
of the Arendtian space of appearance as space of becoming opens new prospects for the 
subject to change. In contrast with other radical democratic approaches, the transformative 
perspective allows for a deeper reconfiguration of spatial assemblages that constitute the 
identities of democratic subjects.  
However, as the notion of improper names makes especially clear, these approaches only 
explain the becoming of collective subjectivities. One potential problem in understanding 
the democratic subject primarily as condividual or multitude rather than as individual is 
that it presupposes submission to group identity. While the democratic subject is thought 
here in more morphological terms than in other radical democratic theories, the individual 
subject in participatory spaces has to adjust and go along with swarms and networked flows. 
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Understanding identity in Hardt and Negri’s terms of commoning means that identity – 
whether proper or improper – is a product of collective production through the multitude, 
limiting the freedom for the individual subject to self-identify.  
The postanarchist conception of democracy cautions against this danger: “the revolution 
against power and authority must involve a micro-political revolution which takes place at 
the level of the subject’s desire” (Newman, 2010a, 6). Yet guidance on how to achieve such 
micro-political revolutions is scarce. I suggest that debates in gender and queer theory gen-
erate a promising outlook for the question of a micro revolution that addresses personal 
desires and affords the opportunity for individual change. Enriching the politics of becom-
ing with queer theoretical concepts will allow for a focus on the individual level of demo-
cratic subjectivity. Of course, the democratic subject can never simply constitute itself in-
dependently. The whole notion of identification rests on networked affiliations through 
cognitive associations with other humans, objects, and concepts. It denotes the connections 
and overlaps between various assemblages that constitute a person’s individual identity. In 
contrast with the notions of subjectivization articulated by Rancière and others in the trans-
formative perspective that explain the individual as a part of swarms, collectives, and mul-
titudes, queer theories allow for a focus on the question of what the individual subject can 
do to disidentify. How can hegemonic identity interpellations be rejected in everyday in-
teraction? And how can those identities that define us on a very personal level be reworked?  
4.3.3. Queering Democratic Subjectivity: Masquerade and Resignification 
Feminist thought has undergone profound changes in the last few decades. This shift is 
often described as the move from second to third wave feminism. While feminists from the 
1960s into the ’80s engaged in a fight for sexual liberation through concepts of the female 
body and female experience as particular (and sometimes superior), from the 1990s on-
wards feminist debates shifted to postmodern concepts that understood identity as a volatile 
construction. This transition can also be observed in academic labels turning from 
“women’s studies” to “gender studies”, not only including queer and intersectional thought, 
but also broadening their scope through the lenses of masculinity, critical whiteness, and 
disability studies. Notions of identity politics through the presence of second wave femi-
nism were contested by third wave notions of performativity, which describe gender as an 
active process of doing rather than a fixed state of being. The divide between second and 
third wave feminism is also reflected in the debates of this thesis between the identity pol-
itics of the difference democratic perspective and the notion of identity construction in the 
transformative and agonistic perspectives. In this thesis, the two “camps” will, however, 
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not be understood as standing in opposition to one another, but rather as different and mu-
tually enriching perspectives. 
While second wave feminism has made its way into democratic thought in the debates be-
tween difference democrats, third wave feminism and queer and gender studies have hardly 
been acknowledged by democratic theory (an exception is Lloyd, 2009; 2005). In the last 
section of this chapter, I will employ queer and gender theory to explore the transformative 
potential of democratic subjectivity as part of a politics of becoming. In doing so, the sec-
tion pursues two objectives. First, to enrich democratic theory with the specific expertise 
of queer and gender theory in relation to identity change. The concept of disidentification 
will be explored in further depth and, moreover, supplemented with the notions of mas-
querade and resignification. Second, queer and gender perspectives will be employed to 
focus on the micro level of democratic subjectivity to explore the revolution on the level of 
desires that Newman (2010a, 6) calls for.  
Hardt and Negri acknowledge the potential contribution of queer and gender theory and 
particularly the work of Judith Butler to democratic thought. They position the conceptions 
of gender performativity in opposition to identity politics to illustrate the multitude as a 
transformative democratic subjectivity: “Queer politics… is not really an affirmation of 
homosexual identities but a subversion of the logics of identity in general. There are no 
queer bodies, only queer flesh that resides in the communication and collaboration of social 
conduct” (Hardt & Negri, 2004, 200). The authors are right in pointing to the subversive 
potential of the term “queer” that goes beyond gay and lesbian liberation. Queering identity 
denotes an understanding of identity as fugitive, escaping and subverting the heterosexual 
matrix. I disagree with Hardt and Negri’s contention, however, that queer politics signify 
the morphology of the collective of the multitude, which implies submission to group dy-
namics. I rather go along with Butler who does not see second wave feminism and third 
wave queer politics as mutually exclusive, as Hardt and Negri suggest. Through Butler’s 
work, the politics of presence and the politics of becoming through disidentification can be 
seen as complementary:  
Although the political discourses that mobilize identity categories tend to cul-
tivate identifications in the service of a political goal, it may be that the persis-
tence of disidentification is equally crucial to the rearticulation of democratic 
contestation. Indeed, it may be precisely through practices which underscore 
disidentification with those regulatory norms by which sexual difference is ma-
terialized that both feminist and queer politics are mobilized. Such collective 
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disidentifications can facilitate a reconceptualization of which bodies matter, 
and which bodies are yet to emerge as critical matters of concern. (Butler, 1993, 
4)  
With Butler, I will argue that it is not about taking sides with either a politics of presence 
or a politics of becoming, but about their mutual enrichment. If a politics of becoming is 
understood as the contingent performance of future selves (Connolly, 1996), as continu-
ously rearticulating a subject-in-process  through embodied presence (Lloyd, 2005), then 
there is nothing that makes a politics of presence incompatible with a politics of becoming. 
Rather, the politics of becoming partly depends on sites of physical presence, on a space of 
appearance where the democratic subject is co-constituted by the gaze of spectators in a 
constant process of rearticulation and reinterpretation of the self. At the same time, the 
politics of presence is constituted by corporeal performativity, by a subject that is always 
subject to change.  
As discussed above, Rancière explains disidentification as the rejection of a name assigned 
by the police order: “It always involves an impossible identification” (Rancière, 1992, 61). 
Citing the incident in 1961 when French police killed hundreds of Algerian liberation pro-
testers in the name of “the French people”, Rancière observes that this interpellation failed. 
Many rejected the interpellation as the French people. Queer theorist José Esteban Muñoz 
conceptualizes disidentification in similar terms, albeit on the level of personal identity. He 
describes various personal stories of different people located at the intersectional social 
position of queers of colour struggling to identify as they are being hailed by different iden-
tity categories. Disidentification occurs when dominant interpellations fail, which, accord-
ing to Muñoz, are part of heteronormative, sexist, and racist discourses that stabilize state 
power and conserve established social relations (Muñoz, 1999, 5).  
Muñoz recounts several incidents when he was drawn to the identity performances of others 
not associated with his identity group. Transsexual, gay, and female identity performances, 
for example, had an exciting and enticing effect. Disidentification, thus, consists not just of 
the rejection of dominant interpellations, but also of accepting the interpellation of others: 
“To disidentify is to read oneself and one’s own life narrative in a moment, object, or sub-
ject that is not culturally coded to ‘connect’ with the disidentifying subject. It is not to pick 
and choose what one takes out of an identification” (12). Rather than freely constructing 
one’s own identity at will, the disidentifactory modes of becoming depend on alternative 
interpellations. Muñoz explains this in terms of a democratization of identity construction 
as subjects gain some degree of freedom in articulating their public personae. This identity 
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construction depends first and foremost on the deconstruction of hegemonic identity inter-
pellations. Discourse, however, can never be completely broken out of. Rather, democratic 
subjects have to work with the terms available and try to stretch, alter, and reconfigure 
discursive meaning. Hence, disidentification can never be a counter-identification in the 
sense of constructing alternative counter-identities that oppose hegemonic discourse from 
outside. Instead, disidentification always navigates within dominant discourse, negotiating 
new terms and creating free spaces:  
Disidentification is about recycling and rethinking encoded meaning. The pro-
cess of disidentification scrambles and reconstructs the encoded message of a 
cultural text in a fashion that both exposes the encoded message’s universaliz-
ing and exclusionary machinations and recircuits its workings to account for, 
include, and empower minority identities and identifications. Thus, disidentifi-
cation is a step further than cracking open the code of the majority; it proceeds 
to use this code as a raw material for representing a disempowered politics or 
positionality that has been rendered unthinkable by the dominant culture. (31) 
Like Muñoz and Rancière, Butler uses the term “disidentification” to describe failed iden-
tity interpellations. Other than Rancière’s focus on collective identities such as the “French 
people”, Deseriis’ improper names such as Ned Ludd, and Muñoz’s sole relevance of dis-
identification to intersectional groups such as queer people of colour, Butler explains how 
disidentification is relevant for everyone. She points to the potential failure of interpella-
tions of broad categories such as “woman” or “man”. Binary gender categories do not 
acknowledge the wide variety of internal differences of people associated with these cate-
gories, so that even those who clearly identify as either of the sexes might feel unease about 
the package of preconceptions and expectations that accompany these categories. In other 
words, even those who express their identities within categories of the heterosexual matrix 
of masculinity, femininity, and attraction to the opposite sex might disidentify to a certain 
extent. In Mouffe’s (1995a) terms, one could argue that closure of identity is never possible 
because consensus with one’s own self about who one is can never be achieved. The bound-
aries of personal identity space cannot be closed because the self remains fugitive. With 
regards to disidentification, Butler (1993, 219) states: “it may be that the affirmation of that 
slippage, that the failure of identification, is itself the point of departure for a more democ-
ratizing affirmation of internal difference”. Here it becomes clear how queer and gender 
theory can contribute to a democratization of subjectivity on the individual, rather than a 
collective, level. It advances the freedom to rework or decrease the significance of collec-
tive identities with their confining tendencies and promotes freedom for the individual 
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subject. By loosening the confinements of hegemonic identity constructions, disidentifica-
tions afford the exploration of alternative identity performances: 
Paradoxically, the failure of such signifiers – “women” is the one that comes to 
mind – fully to describe the constituency they name is precisely what consti-
tutes these signifiers as sites of phantasmatic investment and discursive reartic-
ulation. It is what opens the signifier to new meanings and new possibilities for 
political resignification. It is this open-ended and performative function of the 
signifier that seems to me to be crucial to a radical democratic notion of futurity. 
(191) 
According to Butler, it is thus not always necessary to create new terms to signify new 
identities. Rather, new identities can be expressed through the resignification of established 
categories. Such practices of resignification, to which I will return shortly, can be under-
stood in the terms of a politics of becoming. Identity categories can be resignified to express 
the meaning of future and alternative selves.  
While Butler is not a democratic theorist and only occasionally refers to other democratic 
theorists and the term “democracy”, her work on performativity has much to contribute to 
democratic thought (Lloyd, 2009; 2007; 2005; Schippers, 2009). Butler’s approach is based 
on a radical deconstructivist ontology, articulated in her famous claim that there is no dif-
ference between biological sex and social gender. Rather, sex is constructed, from the mo-
ment of the doctor’s exclamation: “It’s a boy!” In Butler’s terms, the discourses through 
which identities are performed depend upon citation and re-citation. Subjects can only ex-
press themselves in the terms that are already established. Because there is no pre-discur-
sive subject, hegemonic discourse has no origin. Identity, then, is the product of discursive 
formations, which subjects are born into and constantly reproduce (Butler, 1990).  
The term “performativity” draws attention to the naturalized effort it takes to produce iden-
tity. Butler explains all gender identities as parody and drag, indicating the artificiality of 
such human products. By studying the gender crossings of travesty, she points to the cita-
tionality of gender performances. To illustrate the imperceptible artificiality of all identity 
performances, Butler employs the concept of masquerade. Borrowing the original concept 
from Joan Riviere (1997 [1929]), who uses the term “masquerade” to describe female iden-
tity performances as a charade to navigate a world dominated by masculinity, Butler (1990, 
50) reinterprets masquerade as a mode of recitation of established identity performances of 
all genders: “The mask is taken on through the process of incorporation which is a way of 
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inscribing and then wearing a melancholic identification in and on the body, in effect, it is 
the signification of the body in the mold of the Other”. 
When understanding identity performance as masquerade, what is of interest for this thesis, 
and democratic theory more generally, is how the mask is produced and which freedoms 
exist or could be expanded in the construction of the mask. As the theory of performativity 
conceptualizes citationality as a pre-established process with no original author, the free-
dom to author identity seems to be fairly limited. And indeed, Butler clearly rejects inter-
pretations of her work that suggest one is freely able to choose a gender. However, the 
recognition that performative structures are the product of human interaction also opens up 
the perspective to the remaking of such structures, which has great significance for demo-
cratic theory: “The terms by which we are recognized as human are socially articulated and 
changeable… [They] have far-reaching consequences for how we understand the model of 
the human entitled to rights or included in the participatory sphere of political deliberation” 
(Butler, 2004, 2). Thus, while the performative structures of citationality in which subjects 
navigate are limiting, they also provide the space for re-negotiation and re-imagination: 
“The ‘I’ that I am finds itself at once constituted by norms and dependent on them but also 
endeavors to live in ways that maintain a critical transformative relation to them” (3).  
Butler further argues that the potential for personal autonomy to decide over one’s own 
identity depends upon the institutional settings that facilitate such identity expression:  
Indeed, individuals rely on institutions of social support in order to exercise 
self-determination with respect to what body and what gender to have and 
maintain, so that self-determination becomes a plausible concept only in the 
context of a social world that supports and enables that exercise of agency… 
[C]hanging the institutions by which humanly viable choice is established and 
maintained is a prerequisite for the exercise of self-determination. (7) 
Here Butler evidently refers to legal arrangements that afford, for example, the registration 
of a third sex in official documents and other laws that facilitate the inclusion and self-
expression of trans- and intersexual people. When such legal and institutional arrangements 
– or participatory spaces, for that matter – are understood in terms of performativity them-
selves, and thereby as discursive articulations and social expressions as suggested in Chap-
ter 2 (2.4.2. and 2.5.2.), then we can see how the theory of citationality can explain identity 
change and institutional change in the same vein. The perpetuation of political institutions, 
such as the US presidency or the UK Parliament, can be understood in terms of recitation 
and their reforms and changes as partial resignifications. While invited and claimed spaces 
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are more volatile than closed spaces, it is nevertheless apparent how their citational articu-
lation embeds them in performative structures that afford their stabilization and perpetua-
tion. 
It follows that a democratization of the performative production of both identities and in-
stitutions entails strategies of resignification (Lloyd, 2007). According to Schippers’ radical 
democratic reading of Butler’s resignification, what is crucial to its understanding is that 
discursive terms or performative acts carrying the intended meaning of the subject are al-
ways subjected to reinterpretation by interlocutors. The subject can never control how its 
utterances are perceived. This lack of control signifies the multiplicity and inherent insta-
bility of meanings. While there is no perfect control over meaning making, the inherent 
volatility of discursivity also entails that the meaning of established terms can be changed 
through conscious effort. And these meanings, according to Butler, make identity, so that, 
through intentional resignification, the masks that reify identities can be remoulded. This 
can be exemplified through various cases where derogatory terms intended to demean in-
dividuals associated with marginalized group identities have been re-appropriated and con-
noted positively by members of the respective group. The term “queer” is exemplary of 
this, which from its original pejorative intention in the late 19th century was redefined in 
activist and academic discourses over the last few decades. According to Schippers, such 
resignification fulfils its democratic potential if it is the product of an open and participatory 
process. If so conducted, “resignification challenges and contests linguistic norms in an 
everyday setting, opening up a new terrain for transformative struggles and participatory 
democratic practices” (Schippers, 2009, 84).  
In strategies of resignification, the overlaps between difference democratic and the trans-
formative perspective become apparent. The politics of presence stands for the reappropri-
ation and reinterpretation of the terms that denote marginalized identities. What is more, 
physical presence in the space of appearance goes beyond the reinterpretation of words and 
reconfigures meaning through the corporeal performance of marginalized identities. The 
politics of presence is always part of a politics of becoming. 
4.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has set out to tackle the confining implications of the politics of presence in 
participatory spaces. The dilemma of difference reifies hegemonic identity constructions, 
impedes self-transformation, and stifles the exploration of different aspects of the multiple 
self. Discussions in the difference democratic perspective develop promising concepts of 
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discursive identity production, but they remain entangled in essentialist assumptions. Par-
ticipatory and deliberative perspectives generate conceptions of self-transformation, which, 
however, lay out a concrete path of self-development toward particular qualities such as 
empathy and rationality. Agonistic approaches, rooted in a constructivist ontology, develop 
fruitful conceptions of identity articulation, but remain limited by their tragic horizon and 
the logic of hegemony. All of these radical democratic approaches tend to imagine identity 
change as a process that is advanced by intellectual, academic or party elites. The trans-
formative potential of these theories, moreover, is restricted by the limited social change 
that they envision. A transformative perspective in democratic theory that has developed in 
recent years provides a new vantage point with a focus on systemic transformation. En-
riched with queer and gender theories, the transformative perspective articulates a politics 
of becoming that allows for the imagination of the democratic subject in transformative 
terms. According to Butler (2004, 4), “to remake the human” requires an “interrogation of 
the terms by which life is constrained in order to open up the possibility of different modes 
of living; in other words, not to celebrate difference as such but to establish more inclusive 
conditions for sheltering and maintaining life that resists models of assimilation”. 
Employing a politics of becoming situated in the transformative perspective does not entail 
opposing the practical mechanisms proposed by difference democrats to realize the politics 
of presence. Rather, as Mansbridge (2005) argues, both quotas as the most effective means 
of a politics of presence and the discursive terms which create identity categories need to 
be rethought from a perspective of performative identity construction. By understanding 
the politics of presence as a performative act of becoming, the transformative aspects in-
herent in a politics of presence become apparent. Both the representation of identity groups 
through embodied presence as a mode of constructing future and alternative selves and the 
resignification of pejorative identity conceptions are central strategies of a politics of pres-
ence understood through a transformative perspective. The Arendtian space of appearance 
is reconfigured as spaces of becoming when situated in the context of transformative de-
mocracy. This convergence becomes apparent when Butler describes the spaces of appear-
ance that are constituted by demonstrations in Syria: “we can see how the existing public 
space is seized by those who have no existing right to gather there, who emerge from zones 
of disappearance to become bodies exposed to violence and death in the course of gathering 
and persisting publicly as they do” (Butler, 2015, 82, emphasis added). And later Butler 
asks: “is appearance not necessarily a morphological moment…?” (87) 
But the theory of a politics of becoming developed here needs to be interrogated about its 
own limitations to facilitate freedom for the subject to change. These limitations are due to 
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the poststructuralist ontology that both transformative democrats and queer and gender the-
orists employ. Situating the subject within a tight corset of discursivity only allows for 
limited stretching, reinterpreting, and rearticulating. The concepts of interruption and dis-
identification can help to alleviate this problem. The Rancièrian rupture affords a radical 
break. Disidentification as the rejection of hegemonic identity interpellation further ex-
plains such a rupture on the level of personal identity. The fugitive self that always escapes 
permanent reification through identification and representation expresses different sides of 
its inherent multiplicity in moments of disruption.  
Situating these concepts in the spatial theory based on new materialist inspirations outlined 
in Chapter 2 further emphasizes the democratic impetus of the transformative perspective. 
Understanding spaces and subjects as assemblages of volatile things allows for thinking 
rupture as a radical democratic intervention in the order of these things. Rather than think-
ing in the claustrophobic notions of hegemonic discourse that also creates the tragic horizon 
of agonistic democracy, the politics of becoming advanced here thinks in terms of assem-
bling and reassembling the things that constitute reality. These things are seen not as simply 
being acted upon as objects, but as agentic products in the making that are themselves con-
tinuously becoming (Barad, 2008, 139). Their inherently vital nature constantly reassem-
bles the space of appearance that produces subjects and is produced by subjects in different 
ways. Instead of navigating through the thicket of discursive structures, we move in spaces 
made of things that can be shifted, realigned, and reinvented. This does not denote a break 
with discursive theory by all means; rather, it denotes a different angle that strengthens the 
agency of the subject. 
While the politics of becoming provides a valuable outlook for rethinking democratic sub-
jectivity and the making of identity in contingent and performative terms, there are two 
decisive questions that remain unanswered. The first is how to engage in such modes of 
disidentification practically. The theory of disidentification through a politics of becoming 
remains abstract for the most part, so how can disidentification be engaged with on a prac-
tical level? The second question is: if disidentification affords greater freedom for the dem-
ocratic subject to self-identify, how does this newly won freedom relate to equality? Does 
freedom through anonymity counteract equality, as the democratic paradox suggests, or do 
the two core values of democracy work to their mutual amplification, as suggested by the 
anarchist concept of equal liberty? 
Some fruitful answers to the question of the practical realization of disidentification are 
given in the debates on transformative democracy in terms of critique and deconstruction: 
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The critical examination of the process of identity production can contribute to its denatu-
ralization. Resignification of the terms that describe identity categories and the performa-
tive enactment of alternative versions of the self are means of stretching the discourse and 
exploring free spaces. While this is a promising approach, Rancière (2007, 569) expresses 
a convincing criticism of this strategy. He engages with the practical difficulties to disiden-
tify and notes that “[i]t is not so easy to be un”. After pointing to the many academic tools 
of discourse analysis available for deconstructing meaning, he asks: “Are we framing a 
world of idiots where we play the part of the smart guys?” While deconstruction can also 
be understood as everyday practice rather than as academic exercise, Rancière makes a 
valid point. Gaining a critical distance and decoding everyday discourse takes a lot of work. 
So, what practical tools are available that may help to realize radical democratic practices 
of disidentification? And how can the arrangement of participatory spaces afford such dis-
identifactory practices? 
We find some hints in Rancière’s work. Recall that with disidentification Rancière de-
scribes how those who do not have a part form a visible collective subjectivity. They take 
part through the disruption of established modes of identification and the subsequent alter-
ation of their identity. Rancière equates this moment of interrupting identification by the 
police order with democracy. The subjectivization resulting from such modes of disidenti-
fication is defined by not having a proper name: “The name of an injured community that 
invokes its rights is always the name of the anonym” (Rancière, 1992, 60, emphasis added). 
It is not that this new emergent identity is entirely nameless; rather, disidentification “is a 
crossing of identities, relying on a crossing of names” (61). Disidentification, however, 
produces intentionally wrong names, not with the purpose of deception but as evidently 
artificial constructs, which Rancière refers to as improper names. Building on Rancière, 
Deseriis (2015, 3) writes: “Contrary to a proper name, whose chief function is to fix a 
referent as part of the operation of a system of signs, an improper name is explicitly con-
structed to obfuscate both the identity and number of its referents”. 
Such improper names, I propose, are based on anonymity that may function to realize prac-
tices of disidentification. An improper name, a mask, a pseudonym, an online avatar or 
even a blank space where a name would be expected function to visualize alternative dem-
ocratic subjectivities on both an individual and a collective level, which has great signifi-
cance for democratic theory and practice. Anonymity serves to interrupt established modes 
of identification and create new improper identities. Such improper identities often afford 
the expression of otherwise hidden aspects of the self. Anonymity as the disruption of con-
tinuous identity performances is often employed to counter surveillance and control by the 
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established order, particularly in the digital age, as will be examined in Chapter 6. It recon-
figures identity assemblages by bringing things into disorder, altering the configuration of 
the multiple self. While anonymity should not simply be understood as the realization of 
disidentification, I propose that it can function as a practical strategy of a politics of be-
coming. 
The second question raised here as to whether the freedom of disidentification will lead to 
new modes of domination relates to the central research interest of this thesis. This thesis 
seeks to advance the core democratic values of freedom and equality in participatory spaces 
through alternative modes of identity performance. As outlined in the introduction, liberal 
theories of democracy have positioned freedom and equality as being in insurmountable 
tension. In the democratic paradox (Mouffe, 2005 [2000]), the freedom of the subject al-
lows for its domination over others and enforcing equality infringes the freedom of all. 
Freedom and equality can never be fully realized together. This tension is also reflected in 
the dilemma of difference elaborated in Chapter 3. This chapter, however, has introduced 
a radical juncture that challenges this paradigm. The postanarchist conception of equal lib-
erty provides an entirely different explanation of the relations of the two central features of 
democracy: “the two principles of equality and liberty – which in liberal theory are often 
separated or seen to be in tension with one another – are, for anarchists, inextricably bound 
together, animating and giving meaning to one another” (Newman, 2010b, 12). So, there 
are two competing explanations of the relations of freedom and equality: The democratic 
paradox sees them in tension, while the transformative perspective sees them as mutually 
constitutive. The question to explore is thus whether modes of disidentification through 
anonymity demonstrate the mutual exclusivity or the mutual dependency of freedom and 
equality. 
The next chapter will explore anonymity in various participatory spaces. It will ask whether 
anonymity can realize modes of disidentification on a practical level and how freedom and 
equality relate to each other in these processes. While anonymity is commonly associated 
with the absence of identity, I will discuss anonymity as mode of presence. Anonymity 
reconfigures presence through absence. This uncovers novel perspectives for a new politics 
of presence. Rancière (1999, 100f) hints at such an understanding of presence when he 
writes: “There is democracy if there is a specific sphere where the people appear. There is 
democracy… if there are groups that displace identities… [T]here is democracy if there is 
a dispute conducted by a nonidentary subject on the stage where the people emerge”. 
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5. Anonymity and Democracy: Absence as Presence in the Pub-
lic Sphere* 
 
I need to become anonymous. In order to be present. 




In an interview for a film documentary, the former president of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff 
says: “There is a huge freedom in being anonymous. Immense. Which we had when we 
were in hiding. That’s the thing. The immense feeling of freedom, which I never had again. 
For a short time”.14 This quote, which refers to Rousseff’s activity as a guerrilla during the 
military dictatorship in Brazil from the 1960s into the ’80s, exhibits many prominent fea-
tures of anonymity. Anonymity’s main effect is a deeply felt sensation of liberation, which 
is, however, temporarily restricted. Anonymity appears as a disidentifactory practice that 
realizes a democratic moment of freedom – the freedom of the subject to change. In the 
case of Rousseff, anonymity transformed a faceless, supressed citizen into an empowered 
freedom fighter. Anonymity can work to make the absent present. This is achieved through 
an interruption of modes of identification that stabilize the established order of domination 
– whether this order takes the form of a brutal military dictatorship, a neoliberal surveil-
lance state or the discursive networks of disciplinary identity interpellations we engage with 
every day. As one strategy of a politics of becoming, not only can anonymity contribute to 
contesting the political order, but it also challenges the integrity and uniformity of the self, 
setting free an inner multiplicity. Anonymity can work to liberate the fugitive self:  
In providing the means to belong, simultaneously, to several mental universes, 
[anonymous action] enables the possibility of playing them out against each 
other and, in this way, to put to work a prosses of dis-identification and de-
 
* A different version of this chapter was published as a research article in the American Political 
Science Review. Several substantial changes have been made in this version (see Asenbaum, 2018a). 
14 Interview with Dilma Rousseff, the former president of Brazil, in the film documentary The 
Edge of Democracy, 2019, by Petra Costa, Busca Vida Filmes. 
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simplification of oneself vis-à-vis institutions: to promote practices that are 
freer and more selective – more and more emancipated from the psychic hold 
of external and arbitrary constraints. Thus, we could consider “anonymity” the 
term for a technique of desubjugation. (de Lagasnerie, 2017, 72) 
The subversive forces of anonymity as described here rest on modes of identity negation. 
Anonymity is commonly understood in terms of concealment – as a negative act of detract-
ing or eradicating identity, as effacing the democratic subject. In the established interpre-
tation, anonymity is framed as the opposite of identity. It negates the legally identified, 
officially registered, and physically embodied persona. Anonymity, then, appears deeply at 
odds with the politics of presence as continuous identity articulation in the space of appear-
ance. And indeed, while in some places difference democrats are sympathetic toward ano-
nymity and acknowledge its liberating effects for marginalized groups by protecting them 
from personal harm (Mansbridge, 1983, 60f; Young, 1990, 238) and by advancing meri-
tocracy (Phillips, 2019b, 5; 2015, 35), overall they appear sceptical of concealing identity: 
“Women should not have to present themselves as disembodied abstractions – from behind 
a curtain that conceals their bodily peculiarities – in order to claim their equal status in the 
world. Those with dark skins should not have to insist on us all being the same ‘under the 
skin’” (Phillips, 2015, 36). Rather than a distance between communicators through anony-
mous, disembodied participation in voting or textual deliberation, the difference democratic 
perspective calls for embodied engagement through the physical appearance of diverse bod-
ies in participatory spaces (Phillips, 1995, 150; 1991, 11, 130, 132). 
The sceptical position of difference democrats is also reflected in Butler’s discussion of the 
space of appearance. Butler (2004, 3) acknowledges that concealing identity may have lib-
erating effects for marginalized groups: “There are advantages of remaining less than in-
telligible… [I]f I have no desire to be recognized within a certain set of norms, then it 
follows that my sense of survival depends upon escaping the clutch of those norms”. This 
kind of being “under the radar” denotes a state of not appearing in the public sphere and 
remaining outside the boundaries of the space of appearance. The space of appearance, in 
contrast to acts of concealment, is characterized by the democratic subject entering the 
public stage exposed to the gaze of its spectators: “If we consider what it is to appear, it 
follows that… our bodies must be viewed and their vocalized sounds must be heard: the 
body must enter the visual and audible field” (Butler, 2015, 86). Butler’s space of appear-
ance is thus demarcated by a clear boundary separating a sphere of visibility from a sphere 
of invisibility. As noted in Chapter 2, this logic of presence in the space of appearance 
resonates and is further accentuated in Hénaff and Strong’s (2001) work on public space, 
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which maintains that those who are not visibly perceptible on the stages of the public sphere 
are located in the private sphere (5). Geoffroy de Lagasnerie pushes this interpretation even 
further. For him, anonymity is diametrically opposed to the space of appearance. Anonym-
ity breaks with the public sphere. It organizes a secession from the public: “Anonymous 
subjects are not subjects who appear. On the contrary, they dissolve as public subjects and 
organize their own invisibility… Anonymity, then, enables the field of politics and democ-
racy to be disconnected from the public sphere” (de Lagasnerie, 2017, 62f). 
In this chapter, I will oppose this interpretation of anonymity. De Lagasnerie’s erroneous 
interpretation of anonymity rests on a long history of public misconception of the term. 
This misconception stems from a lack of theorization of anonymity. There are hardly any 
coherent explanations of anonymity in academic discourses (Gardner, 2011, 939; Ponesse, 
2014). This is particularly evident in democratic theory. It is surprising that while anonym-
ity plays a crucial role in the various modes of participation, such as secret voting, campaign 
funding, textual political debates in newspapers, manifestos, pamphlets, online political 
engagement, graffiti, and masked protesting, there is to date no coherent explanation of 
anonymity in democratic theory. In contrast to the absence of anonymity in democratic 
theory (with Moore, 2017, being a recent exception), there is a plethora of diverse, empiri-
cally driven literature discussing anonymity in various forms of political participation. This 
literature, however, suffers from a lack of theoretical attention to its main subject of re-
search. Eric Barendt’s book Anonymous Speech (2016), for example, discusses anonymity 
in various forms of political participation but fails to provide a definition of anonymity. 
The meagre traces of definitions that are to be found in the literature on anonymity in po-
litical participation are lacking in crucial respects. Firstly, they fail to acknowledge the 
complexity of the phenomenon. Many scholars treat the concept of anonymity as simple 
and self-explanatory. For example, Jonker and Pieters (2010, 216) state: “anonymity means 
that it is impossible to determine who sent which message to whom”. Secondly, and more 
importantly, anonymity is often equated with privacy. Akdeniz’s (2002, 224) only defini-
tion of anonymity, for example, consists of the sentence: “As a concept anonymity is 
closely related to free speech and privacy”. Julie Ponesse (2014) refers to such descriptions 
of anonymity as privacy as the reductionist approach. These two interrelated shortcomings 
– the oversimplified definition of anonymity as privacy – result in a lack of theoretical 
attention to the complexity of anonymity in a democratic context. 
De Lagasnerie’s understanding of anonymity as secession from the public sphere, thus, 
rests on an understanding of anonymity in negative terms as identity negation and re-
striction to the private sphere. This is in line with Butler’s understanding of the space of 
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appearance as defined by the physically embodied subject stepping into a sphere constituted 
by the gaze of its spectators. In short, if the subject remains invisible, it does not appear. I 
contend that this is an erroneous conclusion. In contrast, I argue that anonymous subjects 
do appear even when their physical bodies remain invisible. Anonymity reconfigures pres-
ence as a mode of becoming in participatory spaces and, in my reading, is compatible with 
a difference democratic perspective. What is more, this appearance is public. In contrast to 
privacy, which demarcates a spatiality shielded from public view, anonymity depends on 
communication and is thus inherently public. Anonymity, then, is not at all equivalent to 
privacy. It reconfigures the boundaries that divide public and private spatialities and allows 
elements of private spaces bleed into the public realm. To be clear, I am not arguing that 
anonymity is not also about (in)visibility. I contend that the visibility of the physically em-
bodied persona is not a condition for appearing in public.  
The inherent connection between anonymity and public space is also apparent in Deseriis’ 
work on improper names: “It is through circulation in the public sphere that the use of an 
alias becomes a process of subjectivation whereby those who do not have a voice of their 
own seek to acquire a symbolic power outside the boundaries of an institutional practice” 
(Deseriis, 2015, 5, emphasis added). The oversight of anonymity’s inherently public char-
acter is due to the common interpretation of anonymity that focuses on the negative moment 
of effacing the subject. As the notion of improper names demonstrates, however, anonym-
ity always entails identity creation. Thus, what is needed is a focus on the constructive 
moment of anonymity as public articulation. Ponesse (2014) calls for a positive conception 
of anonymity (see also de Lagasnerie, 2017, 57). This positive moment is emphasized by 
Mouffe (2006, 5): 
[T]o construct oppositional identities it is not enough to simply foster a process 
of “de-identification” or “de-individualization”. The second move, the moment 
of “re-identification”, of “re-individualization” is decisive. To insist only on 
the first move is in fact to remain trapped in a problematic which postulates that 
the negative moment is sufficient, on its own, to bring about something posi-
tive…  
I will attend to the positive moment of identity construction by employing Rancière’s no-
tion of aesthetics. The interpretation of anonymity as identity negation that effaces the sub-
ject emerges from an emphasis on public visibility as the prime mode of identification. 
Public identity performance, however, consists of more than the visibility of the physically 
embodied persona. For instance, it might also entail the perception of sounds, written or 
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spoken words, images, avatars, and blank spaces. Rather than focusing solely on the visi-
bility of the body, to properly understand anonymity we need to focus on the “sensible 
manifestation of things” (Dikeç, 2015, 2). Instead of mere vision, a focus on experience is 
needed to grasp appearance. It is not only through the presence of the visible body but 
through communication more generally, of which corporeal presence is one mode among 
many, that subjects appear. Here Rancière’s work on aesthetics is helpful. According to 
Rancière (2004, 8), aesthetics is a spatial practice that divides the political realm of the 
perceptible: 
aesthetics… is a delimitation of spaces and time, of the visible and the invisible, 
of speech and noise, that simultaneously determines the place and the stakes of 
politics as a form of experience. Politics revolves around what is seen and what 
can be said about it, around who has the ability to see and the talent to speak, 
around the properties of spaces and the possibilities of time.  
To understand how anonymity reconfigures the space of appearance, we need an expansion 
of the senses that account for appearance. It is not visibility per se, but perceptibility that 
enables the subject to appear. This opens up a perspective for understanding presence as a 
mode of becoming. Presence is actualized through the articulation of the subject through 
various means of communication. In this sense, presence is indeed always tied to the body 
as it is the body that articulates. Yet, it is not tied to the body’s visibility, but rather to its 
perceptibility.  
When Rancière says that the delimitation of political space creates boundaries for what can 
be said and done, we can see how anonymity’s interruption of the established order recon-
figures participatory spaces in a way that allows for other things to be said and done. The 
reconfiguration of physical spatiality through physical things, such as masks, hoods, veils, 
voting booths, and computer screens, that intercept identification serves to reconfigure so-
cial spatiality as relations among human bodies are altered, which in turn reconfigures dis-
cursive spatiality as new things are said and enter public discourses. 
To develop an understanding of anonymity that does justice to its complexity, we need to 
focus on its inherently contradictory character. Anonymity does not just entail identity ne-
gation, as the common perception would have us believe; it also involves identity creation. 
Through an interruption of identification, modes of subjectivization (Rancière, 1999) and 
rearticulation (Mouffe, 2006) produce new subjectivities. Anonymity’s contradictory char-
acter is well explained by Pitkin’s concept of representation. As mentioned in Chapter 3, 
representation, according to Pitkin (1967, 8f), makes present what is physically absent. I 
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will argue that anonymity as an interruption of the dominant spatial order takes this logic 
further. Anonymity makes the absent present. As Ponesse notes: “Anonymity and other 
techniques of nonidentifiability function as the gatekeepers of the boundary between our 
private selves and the public domain” (2014, 351). Here I go further. Anonymity does not 
only open the door to privacy while leaving the spatial boundaries separating the private 
and the public sphere intact. It reconfigures the boundaries between public and private 
spaces by channelling private sentiments into the public sphere. It affords a performance of 
the private self in public space.  
This can also be explained with Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) concept of the constitutive 
outside employed in Chapter 2. The definition of the inside by the absence of the outside 
makes the outside present (see Butler, 2015, 4f). Woman is defined as “not-man” and 
straight is defined as not queer. In this sense, anonymity makes present what is absent. It 
affords experiences of sides of the multiple self that are not represented in the official ver-
sion of the self. It allows for Dryzek and Niemeyer’s (2008) discursive representation and 
Saward’s (2010; 2006) representative claims while blocking established modes of authen-
tication. This denotes a liberation of the construction of discursive representation through 
representative claims. Anonymity potentially enlarges the identity space surrounding the 
democratic subject, in which she navigates a set of possible identifications. As the free 
space of the democratic subject to articulate itself expands, the many things that constitute 
the multiple self are reconfigured into new assemblages.  
While it may appear that this assessment adopts an overly optimistic view on anonymity, 
this chapter will also account for the negative aspects of anonymity in participatory spaces. 
Owing to the inherently contradictory character of anonymity’s core functions of identity 
negation and identity creation, and its quality of reconfiguring private and public spatiality, 
anonymity results in deeply contradictory effects for democracy. Exploring the workings 
of anonymity in various participatory spaces will show that anonymity affords both inclu-
sion and exclusion, subversion and submission, and honesty and deception. While anonym-
ity thus has both positive and negative effects, all of these effects, I will argue, are liberating 
for the democratic subject. John Suler (2004) describes anonymous online communication 
as inherently disinhibiting, freeing the subject of social constraints – for better or worse. 
Even if the subject engages in exclusion, submission, and deception – which limits the 
freedom of others – the subject itself does so because anonymity loosens its constraints, 
enacting the famous words of Isaiah Berlin: “the liberty of some must depend on the re-
straint of others” (1969 [1958], 124). Or, as the Brazilian philosopher Paulo Freire ob-
serves, elites in societies marked by class, race, and gender inequality experience the fear 
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“of losing the ‘freedom’ to oppress” (Freire, 2005 [1970], 46). In this way, anonymity al-
ways enlarges the free space in which the democratic subject can act. I arrive at this under-
standing by conceptualizing anonymity not in terms of negative liberty, which protects in-
dividuals from unwanted intrusions. It is this negative understanding of freedom that goes 
along with a focus on identity negation, equating anonymity with privacy. Rather, freedom 
needs to be understood as the positive liberty to act. Hence, freedom enables action (Berlin, 
1969 [1958]; Fromm, 1941).  
It becomes apparent that interruption is not always good for democracy, at least in the case 
of anonymity. While anonymity can contribute to the disidentifactory interruptions of the 
dominant order by equality, as discussed by Rancière (1999), anonymity can also facilitate 
domination which interrupts equality (see Fraser 1997). Honig’s (2013) notion of interrup-
tion – contributing either to equality or to domination – appears most apt in this context.  
The ambiguous role of interruption through anonymity, and the contradictory role of anon-
ymous freedoms both advancing and undermining equality, sheds new light on the central 
question of this thesis. This chapter will investigate two competing assessments of the re-
lations of freedom and equality. While the democratic paradox sees them in irresolvable 
tension, the anarchist concept of equal liberty understands them as co-constitutive. Accord-
ing to the democratic paradox, an increase in freedom through anonymity should undermine 
equality. Just as Berlin states in the above quotation, the freedom of some is used to domi-
nate others. According to equal liberty, an increase in freedom should amplify equality. I 
will show that what appear as competing hypotheses are actually compatible. The increased 
freedom of anonymity undermines equality when subjects use their freedom to exclude, 
submit, and deceive, which amplifies social hierarchies. Anonymous freedoms advance 
equality, however, when they lead to inclusion, subversion, and honesty, which flattens 
hierarchies.  
To develop this concept of anonymity and elucidate its affordances, I pursue two strategies. 
First, I review etymologies and conceptualizations of anonymity and their relation to pri-
vacy in various academic disciplines. Both their merits and shortcomings provide inspira-
tion for the new definition of anonymity rooted in democratic theory to be developed here. 
Second, the chapter turns to empirical studies on anonymity in participatory spaces. It 
briefly describes anonymity in voting, campaign funding, textual political discussions, and 
masked collective action. It then identifies anonymity’s three sets of contradictory free-
doms, offering illustrations from the empirical literature on political participation. Building 
on these insights, I finally elaborate the theoretical conceptualization of anonymity in 
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contrast to privacy and the workings of the three sets of contradictory freedoms in more 
depth. Here anonymity is understood as one form of the everyday masquerade described 
by Butler (1990). Yet, in contrast with the everyday masquerade, it relies on an interruption 
of common modes of identification. The form that anonymity takes, I will argue, depends 
on a spatial reconfiguration of all three dimensions of democratic spatiality elaborated in 
Chapter 2. In the physical dimension of participatory spaces, anonymity depends on the 
interruption of identification with the help of physical things, such as masks, hoods, veils, 
voting booths or computer screens. In the social dimension, it depends on the configuration 
of power structures between humans. And in the discursive dimension, it depends on the 
constellation of identity knowledge among participants.  
5.2. What is Anonymity? 
The etymological development of the term “anonymity” is characterized by a continuous 
expansion of meaning. To trace this development, I bring together three sets of literature, 
moving from literary studies to computer science – which each describe anonymity in a 
specific context – and finally to more general elaborations of anonymity in communication 
studies, sociology, political science, and philosophy. The same expansionary development 
of meaning can be observed in the use of the term “privacy”. The expansions of both “an-
onymity” and “privacy” coalesce with the development of new communication technolo-
gies, resulting in their overlapping and partial convergence. The task undertaken here of 
developing a definition of anonymity rooted in democratic theory consists of disentangling 
anonymity and privacy. 
The term “anonymous” entered the English language in the late 16th century, referring to 
publications whose authors remained unknown. While the meaning of the Greek original, 
which translates to “nameless”, is already quite confined, its meaning in English became 
even more narrow: “Anonymity [was] defined broadly as the absence of reference to the 
legal name of the writer on the title page” (Griffin, 1999, 882; Kopley, 2016, 2). “Anonym-
ity” thus did not refer to any kind of unidentified communication, but solely to nameless 
textual publications (Ferry, 2002). The practice of anonymous publishing was common 
even before this time. It was only then, however, that the blank spaces on pamphlets, po-
ems, and books were replaced by the word “Anonymous”. The question arises as to why 
the blank space was not simply left blank but filled with the name-like “Anonymous”. This 
move appears to be a collective effort to draw attention to the author and his or her con-
scious decision to remain unidentified. In the linguistic establishment of “anonymity” we 
thus find the first traces of identity creation rather than solely identity negation. Here 
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“Anonymous” begins to function as an improper name (Deseriis, 2015) as a nascent form 
of the identity rearticulation (Mouffe, 2006), which, as I will argue later, is a core element 
of anonymity. 
Current conceptualizations of anonymity in computer science and technology studies illus-
trate the significant qualitative shift that the term has undergone through the emergence of 
digital communication. The nameless author now becomes the unidentified communicator. 
The recipient of a message perceives “all subjects in the anonymity set as equally probable 
of being the originator of a message” (Diaz et al., 2003, 57). This literature acknowledges 
the complexities of anonymity as part of a communicative process that goes beyond textual 
publication. Moreover, it insists on the scalability of anonymity. Anonymity is not a state 
that is present or not, but a matter of degree to be measured on a scale between two opposing 
poles: anonymity and identity. To acknowledge the different degrees of anonymity, this 
literature introduces not only quantitative measures, but different types of anonymity, spe-
cifically insisting on its demarcation from “pseudonymity”: the use of pseudonyms in con-
trast with communication without any identifier (Pfitzmann & Hansen, 2010). 
This qualitative shift in anonymity’s meaning, expressed in quite technical terms in com-
puter science and technology studies, is also recognized in sociology, political science, 
communications studies, and philosophy. Exceeding definitions of anonymity in literary 
publications and online communication, authors such as Helen Nissenbaum and Craig Scott 
generate more complex understandings of anonymity as a social phenomenon both online 
and offline. Scott (1998, 387) defines anonymity as “the degree to which a communicator 
perceives the message source is unknown and unspecified”, thus drawing attention to sub-
jectivity: Anonymity is not an objective state but defined by the perception of communica-
tors. Similarly, Thorsten Thiel explains: “‘anonymity’ describes a situation of intersubjec-
tive action in which it is not possible either to conclusively attribute a particular action or 
communication to an individual or subject or to render an individual or subject accessi-
ble/responsible” (Thiel, 2017). Beyond the emphasis on (inter)subjectivity, this definition 
also points to the inherently communicative nature of anonymity, which differentiates it 
from privacy. Moreover, it views anonymity as an interruption of continuous identity artic-
ulation, a disconnection between communicator and content. This disconnection is also at 
the centre of Ponesse’s (2014) definition of anonymity as dissociability divorcing the 
speaker from the message.  
Marx (1999), Wallace (1999), Nissenbaum (1999), and Véliz (2018) all draw attention to 
the plethora of identity markers that define a person. While for anonymous textual 
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publishing, the name was the sole identifier, in today’s information age and in light of in-
creasingly complex understandings of anonymity, factors such as location (address), social 
security numbers, looks, social categories (race, class, gender), profession, family relations, 
etc. comprise a set of highly diverse identifiers that constitute a person. Accordingly, ano-
nymity is defined as the non-identifiability of one or several of these traits (Marx, 1999), 
“the noncoordinability of traits” (Wallace, 1999, 24), and the inability to “join the dots” 
(Véliz, 2018, 2).  
Nissenbaum (1999, 143) describes anonymity as unreachability: “Deepening our under-
standing of the issue of anonymity in an information age… requires an appreciation of what 
it takes to be ‘unreachable’ or ‘out of grasp’ in a world where technologies of knowledge 
and information are increasingly efficacious at reaching, grasping, and identifying”. In a 
similar vein, anonymity is defined by Matthews (2010, 351) as “a suite of techniques of 
nonidentifiability that persons use to manage and protect their privacy. At the core of these 
techniques is the aim of being untrackable”. And Moore (2017) names a lack of traceability 
as one dimension of anonymity.  
But if anonymity means unreachability, untrackability, or untraceability, how, then, is it 
different from privacy, which can be broadly understood as an individually defined per-
sonal sphere protected from external intrusion? In the information age, the meanings of 
anonymity as one’s personal identity being undetectable in a communicative network and 
privacy as personal information being undetectable in a communicative network become 
virtually indistinguishable. The term “privacy” has undergone an expansion similar to that 
of anonymity (see Westin, 1984). Its original meaning in the work of Ancient philosophers 
such as Aristotle and Plato referred to private property as personal control over objects 
(Papacharissi, 2010, 27). In its modern sense, the term “privacy” was first used by Warren 
and Brandeis in 1890 as “the right to be let alone”. When newspapers – at the time of the 
emergence of the printing press in Europe and the US – started publishing details about the 
lives of public persons, this was perceived as an intrusion into their personal affairs. This 
notion of privacy, thus, constitutes a sphere that is shielded from outside intervention. Pri-
vacy in this version has not lost its original meaning of ownership, as the private sphere is 
characterized by its control by the individual subject (Reiman, 1976). It relies on a physical 
demarcation of space, distinguishing between private locations (such as the home) and pub-
lic locations (such as cafés, squares, etc.). It is this demarcation of private and public space 
in the context of patriarchal modes of domination that has been aptly criticized by feminist 
scholars (Cohen, 1992; Wagner Decew, 2015).  
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This physical geography is upset by new forms of communication. Zizi Papacharissi (2010) 
goes so far as to describe the public/private dichotomy as collapsing as new online spaces 
are both “privately public and publicly private” (142). Public digital communication relies 
on private websites, with participants located in private homes (132). To grasp this new 
hybridity, Nissenbaum (2010; 1997) develops the concept of “privacy in public”. The in-
dividual’s control over who has access to personal information is compromised by govern-
ment surveillance and commercial data mining. This new understanding of privacy still 
contains original elements of personal control and the demarcation of a sphere to be left 
alone. It is uprooted, however, by the physical dislocation of this sphere. Privacy becomes 
mobile. 
This brief review explains why and how the terms anonymity and privacy overlap. Their 
parallel expansion in meaning has peaked following their digitization, resulting in overlap-
ping and blurred understandings. In response to these conceptualizations of anonymity, a 
new understanding of anonymity has to not only overcome this amalgamation, but also 
confront several other key challenges.  
Current discussions successfully deepen the understanding of anonymity by explaining it 
as subjective, a matter of degree, depending on various identifiers, and resulting in several 
types of anonymity. However, these definitions suffer first from their conceptualization of 
anonymity as mere identity negation, neglecting the possibilities of identity creation. This 
is observable in the use of terms such as unidentifiability, unknowability, undetectability, 
unreachability, untrackability, untraceability, and noncoordinability. These terms suggest 
that anonymity marks the impossibility of communicators being identified by the audience, 
rather than as an action undertaken by communicators themselves. The sole focus on iden-
tity negation is also evident when anonymity is defined as the opposite of identity. This is 
another reason why anonymity and privacy appear to be so closely related. When anonym-
ity is conceptualized as concealing identity and privacy is seen as restricting access to per-
sonal information, they are hardly distinguishable. Second, the terms employed to describe 
anonymity do not coincidently share the suffix -ity, which indicates that they are concep-
tualized as a state rather than as a process. And third, the differentiation of types of ano-
nymity is helpful to a certain extent. But terms such as “pseudonymity”, “physical anonym-
ity”, “discursive anonymity”, “offline anonymity”, “online anonymity”, “self-anonymity”, 
“other-anonymity” (Scott, 1999), “agent anonymity”, “recipient anonymity”, and “process 
anonymity” (Wallace, 1999) can lead to confusion and overcomplication. A new definition 
of anonymity must provide clarity and, at the same time, encompass these various subtypes 
of anonymity.  
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I generate this new definition of anonymity by employing the concept of democratic spati-
ality and by focusing on freedom. First, current understandings of anonymity as closely 
related to privacy emerge from concerns over the infringement of civil rights. The associa-
tion of anonymity with privacy results in defensiveness. Anonymity is related to the private 
spaces that shield one from public intrusion. A focus on the spatialities that form the context 
of anonymity, however, makes clear that anonymity does not describe a sphere shielded 
from engagement with others. On the contrary, anonymity is inherently communicative. It 
is not primarily a matter of hiding in isolated spaces, but rather one of showing, exchanging 
opinions, and creating identities in common spaces. Anonymity is a mode of presence. It 
articulates the self in the public sphere. Anonymous identity performances cross the bound-
aries between public and private, channelling private things into the public sphere. The 
anonymous subject steps into the space of appearance by making itself perceptible through 
an aesthetic self-formation in vocalized or written words, through physical body language 
or digitized symbols and images.  
Second, the inherently liberating effects of anonymity as unidentifiability have been con-
ceptualized as negative freedoms, freedoms to be protected from external intrusion. Again, 
the overlap with privacy is all too apparent. However, I suggest that we also need to take 
into account positive freedoms, freedoms to act: “anonymity functions to increase an indi-
vidual’s agency… Being anonymous widens the sphere of possible action” (Ponesse, 2014, 
312). Thus, while privacy is closely related to negative freedoms protecting from intrusion, 
anonymity also relates to positive freedoms of expression and identity creation.  
Since the original conceptualization of negative and positive freedoms by Erich Fromm 
(1941) and later Isaiah Berlin (1969 [1958]), critics have contended that the two cannot be 
easily demarcated, since every freedom contains both positive and negative aspects (Blau, 
2004; MacCallum, 1967). I agree with and build on this critique by drawing attention to 
the positive freedoms of anonymity that add to its negative freedoms of concealment. Thus, 
while anonymity in current debates is conceptualized as the impossibility of interlocutors 
to identify the subject, I define anonymity as the self-expression of the democratic subject. 
Anonymity is not the opposite of identity; it is a precondition for creating identity in a freer 
manner, drawing on both positive and negative freedoms. Anonymity allows the subject to 
assemble in new ways. 
In my view, the definitions discussed above, which primarily focus on identity negation, 
understanding anonymity in purely negative terms – as a technique to protect privacy 
(Matthews, 2010, 351) – miss the point. Here Moore’s (2017) work is helpful since it 
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defines anonymity not only in terms of lacking traceability but also in positive terms of 
durability and connectedness, which points to newly created identities. But I also believe 
that there is indeed a negative moment in anonymity. This moment of negative dissociation 
constitutes an interruption of established modes of identification. The interruption that fa-
cilitates the negative freedom not to be detected by dominant forces, however, can only be 
understood in direct relation with the positive freedom of exploring the multiple self. Our 
understanding of anonymity, as Mouffe (2006) aptly points out with regard to disidentifi-
cation, should not linger in the moment of disarticulation; rather, it needs to focus on 
rearticulation. It is the interruption of identification that frees the fugitive self to explore its 
multiplicity by creating new selves in the public sphere. The gap that this interruption opens 
up provides an empty space that enables the experience of lack at the core of the subject 
(Mouffe, 1995b). On the basis of this lack, new identities are articulated in anonymous 
engagements that afford presence in the space of appearance.  
I therefore define anonymity as follows: 
Anonymity is a context-dependent mode of presence expressing private senti-
ments in the public sphere by negating some aspects of the legally identified 
and/or physically embodied persona. 
Unlike previous definitions, the above definition gives priority to the creative and construc-
tive aspects of anonymity, while not neglecting or diminishing its concealing and negating 
aspects. Moreover, it defines anonymity as a public, communicative process, rather than as 
a private state, stressing its performative and agentic nature. And finally, it is broad enough 
to encompass various subtypes, both providing unity and allowing for differentiations, 
which will be further elaborated in the final section of this chapter. The following sections 
will investigate the workings of anonymity in various participatory spaces and illustrate 
how its positive freedoms both advance and undermine equality.  
5.3. Anonymity in Participatory Spaces 
Anonymity plays a key role in different modes of political participation in democracy. In 
what follows, I briefly outline anonymous (a) voting, (b) campaign funding, (c) textual 
political discussions, and (d) masked collective action. In comparison with the invited, 
claimed, and closed spaces discussed earlier, anonymous participatory spaces often have a 
more decentred character. The interruptive moment of anonymity mediated through inter-
faces such as computer screens, avatars, sheets of paper, and walls often entails asynchro-
nicity. Anonymous textual discussions via political pamphlets, letters to the editor, graffiti 
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or online forums connect participants by providing a common forum for content, but with-
out assembling them physically at the same time and in the same space. In other instances, 
anonymous interaction entails the geographical separation of interacting participants, for 
example in anonymous voting and synchronous online chats. Whether synchronous or 
asynchronous, anonymity creates a common discursive space but does not depend on a 
common physical space. Through anonymous participation, then, decentred kinds of par-
ticipatory spaces emerge. Just like the invited, claimed, and closed spaces discussed so far, 
however, they always depend on physical space and a material infrastructure. They also 
entail social relationalities between participants and the generation of discursive space. 
Anonymous participatory spaces are more amorphous. This amorphous character contrib-
utes to their quality of freeing the fugitive self and functioning as spaces of becoming. 
Voting as the central mode of political participation in representative democracies is in its 
current form strongly linked to the notion of anonymity. However, the correlation between 
anonymity and voting is a relatively recent phenomenon. Open voting either by voice, rais-
ing of hands or on a visually identifiable ballot provided by different parties in different 
colours was the common practice in the US for more than 100 years from its constitutional 
founding in 1789. Under these circumstances, political parties heavily influenced citizens’ 
voting behaviour either by threat or patronage. This was the reasoning behind introducing 
the secret ballot in the US and the UK in the late 19th century (Barendt, 2016, 156ff; 
Gardner, 2011, 942; Hunter, 2002). The opposite legal trend to voting procedures, from 
anonymity to public identification, occurred in the case of private campaign contributions. 
In the late 20th century, the US introduced requirements for the mandatory disclosure of 
financial contributions to candidates and political parties that exceeded a certain threshold 
(Gardner, 2011, 944). Nevertheless, anonymity is still in place in most countries for dona-
tions below a certain amount. 
Anonymity in textual political discussions has been addressed empirically in at least three 
forms: the publication of political texts, graffiti, and online communication. First, anonym-
ity played a crucial role in circulating political pamphlets and articles as exemplified by the 
political controversy between Federalists and Anti-Federalists in the debate over the US 
Constitution in 1787. The use of pseudonyms was essential in this debate and built on a 
long European tradition of anonymous publication (Smith Ekstrand & Imfeld Jeyaram, 
2011). Second, anonymity is a core feature of graffiti in public bathrooms, as demonstrated 
by studies of one American and one Australian university campus (Butler, 2006; Rodriguez 
& Clair, 1999). Far from just scribbling slogans or jokes, graffiti appear as extensive dia-
logues between students who negotiate their gender, sexuality, race, and political views. 
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Third, the medium of bathroom walls is surprisingly comparable to online forums. Partici-
pants post messages and check back at a later date to see if someone has responded. With 
the advent of the internet, textually anonymous discussions have become more prevalent, 
with increasing publication speed and reach, as well as reduced costs (Akdeniz, 2002; 
Gardner, 2011; Leitner, 2015; Woo, 2006). While asynchronous posts in online forums are 
reminiscent of anonymous political writings from the 18th century and bathroom wall graf-
fiti, real-time chats make political writing more akin to live discussions.  
Another strand of literature investigates masked collective action used by both progressive 
and reactionary social movements. Progressive movements use masking to turn demonstra-
tions into street parties with clownesque performances, street theatre, and carnivalesque 
tactics of disguise (Bruner, 2005; Morris, 2012; Ruiz, 2013; Spiegel, 2015). An example of 
such a carnivalesque guerrilla performance can be seen in the Russian feminist collective 
Pussy Riot who performed their “Punk Prayer” at Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Sav-
iour in 2012. Three of the five women, who used colourful balaclavas to mask their faces, 
were arrested and jailed. A global movement in solidarity with Pussy Riot re-enacted the 
mockery of authority, taking on the colourful balaclavas as their symbol. This form of po-
litical participation builds on carnival traditions that date back to Ancient Rome. Medieval 
carnival was more political than its commercialized reprisals today. The tradition of people 
taking to the streets in disguise was used to challenge authorities through mockery and to 
enact a reversal of social hierarchies (Bruner, 2005). Similar practices of masking are used 
in online protest by hacktivist groups such as Anonymous. The latter group uses anony-
mous online communication to attack Scientology, global corporations, and national gov-
ernments around the world and promotes freedom of speech and social justice (Asenbaum, 
2018; Coleman, 2014). The Black Lives Matter movement uses the guise of hoods to enact 
solidarity with victims of hate crimes and police brutality who are criminalized because of 
wearing hoodies. The “Million Hoodie March” can be read as a proud reclaiming of a mar-
ginalized race/class identity (Kinney, 2016; Nguyen, 2015). On the other side of the polit-
ical spectrum, the Ku Klux Klan uses anonymity to enact white racial homogeneity through 
uniform white hoods and racist acts of intimidation and murder. Emerging in 1865 in the 
US South, the KKK fast became the largest and most influential white supremacist move-
ment (Blee & McDowell, 2013). This example also illustrates that anonymous hate crimes 
predate the internet. The connectivity and reach of the KKK is, however, amplified today 
by the use of online communication (Schmitz, 2016). 
While anonymous voting, campaign funding, textual political discussions, and masked col-
lective action appear as quite distinct forms of political participation, the discussion of the 
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freedoms afforded by anonymity in the following section reveals some surprising similari-
ties. Despite their diversity, all of these modes of political engagement form participatory 
spaces. In these various participatory spaces, different dimensions of democratic spatiality 
take prominence. In anonymous pamphleteering and graffiti, the discursive dimension 
comes to the fore, while in masked protest, social spatiality with the horizontal power rela-
tions among protesters and the vertical relations between protesters and riot police are most 
apparent. Nevertheless, in all of these participatory spaces, physical, social, and discursive 
spatiality are at work and interrelate in affective assemblages. 
5.4. Anonymity’s Contradictory Freedoms 
The starting point for developing a more complex understanding of anonymity, one that 
goes beyond merely equating it with privacy, is the observation that anonymity not only 
facilitates identity negation, but also affords identity creation. Sociologists such as Erving 
Goffman (1956) pointed out decades ago that new identities are constructed on the founda-
tion of the identity hidden through anonymity. Goffman explains these identity perfor-
mances in spatial terms. Subjects act on front stages and back stages. Through this termi-
nology, we can observe how anonymity channels private selves from the backstage to the 
public front stage. The mask – be it physical or virtual – serves both the negation and cre-
ation of identity. 
In the literature on anonymous political participation, identity negation is framed in terms 
of freedom of speech. Concealing identity appears necessary in the face of various repres-
sive forces in society. Anonymity appears as negative freedom – as a means of becoming 
invisible and avoiding detection. Regarding online communication, Akdeniz (2002, 233) 
notes: “anonymity enables users to prevent surveillance and monitoring of their activities 
on the Internet from commercial companies and from the government”. Yet, identity nega-
tion protects not only from interference by state and economic actors, but also from peer 
pressure by family, friends, and colleagues. According to Barendt (2016, 156ff), the secret 
ballot was introduced in the late 19th century in the US and the UK not just to protect work-
ers from their employers; the voting booth also proved especially important to women gain-
ing suffrage in the early and mid-20th century as it shielded them from the influence of 
husbands and fathers. This negative moment inherent to anonymity interrupts identifica-
tion. It protects the subject from external interference through a reconfiguration of space 
by employing physical things such as voting booths, masks, and computer screens, or dis-
cursive things such as pseudonyms, improper names, and blank spaces.  
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The moment of identity negation in participatory spaces is followed by a creative moment 
in which new imaginaries and alternative personae emerge. Ruiz (2013, 2275) claims: “the 
mask does not negate identity; instead it signifies the possibility of a multiplicity of identi-
ties… It suggests a way of thinking about blankness as a means not only of erasing differ-
ence but also as a means of articulating difference”. Employing anonymity bestows demo-
cratic subjects with the ability to reinvent their appearance and thus to influence their per-
ception by others, be it through wearing a mask, designing an avatar, creating a pseudonym 
or narrating the self through text. The literature on masked collective action in claimed 
spaces points to the liberating effects of such playful experimentation with a diversity of 
identities. The democratic subject is temporarily relieved from the constraints of the one 
and only identity in the public sphere, which is subject to governance surveillance and 
commercial targeting. Mikhail Bakhtin, a prominent scholar on the carnivalesque, wrote: 
“The mask is connected with the joy of change and reincarnation, with gay relativity and 
merry negation of uniformity and similarity; it rejects conformity to oneself” (Bakhtin, 
1968, 39, emphasis added).  
Based on this core contradiction of identity negation and creation as anonymity’s founding 
elements, three sets of contradictory freedoms emerge, each consisting of one element ad-
vancing and the other undermining equality. Anonymity in participatory spaces serves (a) 
inclusion and exclusion, (b) subversion and submission, and (c) honesty and deception. 
5.4.1. Inclusion and Exclusion 
Nowhere is the contradictory character of anonymity so clear as in the discussion of inclu-
sion and exclusion. On the one hand, anonymity reconfigures democratic spatiality by lev-
elling the playing field. It strips away identity markers, thus flattening hierarchies and gen-
erating more inclusive participatory spaces. On the other hand, anonymous interaction of-
ten exhibits attacks on marginalized social groups in an attempt to exclude those deemed 
as inferior. This exacerbates internal hierarchies and bolsters the boundaries of participa-
tory spaces.  
Inclusion. The common argument for the equalizing effect of anonymity claims that social 
hierarchies are suspended – or at least that their effects are mitigated – by concealing visible 
markers of gender, race, class, sexuality, disability, age, and so on, thus contributing to 
inclusion. In terms of anonymous online communication, Leitner (2015, 167) claims: “cy-
berspace represents a sphere of existence free from (or at least freer from) socio-economic 
inequalities and social constraints. Without the ex-ante requirement of self-identification, 
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individuals can equally share in the personal freedom to choose how to express themselves, 
including whether and how to self-identify”. 
While unequal power relations are not simply eradicated on the internet, anonymity appears 
at times to contribute to more equal relations. Similarly, among those who participate in 
bathroom graffiti, anonymity structurally impedes discrimination along visual identity 
markers. While identity clues might persist in writing, physically embodied signifiers of 
social status are suspended: “graffiti level the playing field by getting past all of the factors 
– such as social status, hierarchical position, education, access, familiarity with rules, ex-
pertise, communication competence – that advantageously privilege and benefit certain 
members against others” (Rodriguez & Clair, 1999, 2). The same argument is made by 
activists in the Pussy Riot movement. Following their arrests, the media revealed personal 
details about band members and stylized them as celebrities. In contrast, anonymous Pussy 
Riot members claim: “We are anonymous because we act against any personality cult, 
against hierarchies implied by appearance, age and other visible social attributes. We cover 
our heads because we oppose the very idea of using female faces as a trademark for pro-
moting any sort of goods or services” (cited in Groeneveld, 2015, 10). 
These equalizing effects of anonymity result in meritocracy. While in non-anonymous set-
tings, identity markers indicating the status of the speaker influence the perception of what 
is said, anonymous communication can only be judged by the value of its content. Ano-
nymity also blinds the Greek goddess Justicia so she cannot discriminate between subjects 
and all are equal in front of the law. A student participating in bathroom graffiti explains: 
“I like toilet walls because there’s no identity. Because if you knew who wrote it, you could 
think ‘oh, I don’t like that person, I’m not going to respond well to what they said’, but if 
you don’t know who wrote it, you’re going to respond with whatever you think is the best 
response” (cited in Butler, 2006, 23). This argument is curiously echoed in the US consti-
tutional debate. Melancton Smith, writing under the pseudonym Plebeian, claimed that ar-
guments should be judged “on their own merits. If it be good, it stands not in need of great 
men’s names to support it. If it be bad, their names ought not to sanction it” (cited in Smith 
Ekstrand and Imfeld Jeyaram, 2011, 46).  
The principle of meritocracy is also at the centre of both the ideology and practices of 
Anonymous. The hacktivist collective originated on the image board 4chan and its sub-
board /b/, where mostly young North Americans share and discuss digital images with com-
plete anonymity. “With no method of individual identity verification, /b/ becomes a com-
munity made up of non-persistent individual identities. When you post on /b/, nobody can 
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prejudge you based on your looks, age, wealth, status, or style. They only have your words” 
(Wesch, 2012, 92f). The ephemerality of the site, with every post expiring as new posts 
appear, can be interpreted in terms of a critique of digital archiving and monitoring. 
McDonald (2015, 979) sees 4chan and Anonymous as antitheses to the Facebook culture 
of naming, liking, and tagging, which connects value to the persona and not the content, 
and creates an archive easily abused for surveillance (see Cambre, 2014, 305). This leads 
Halpin (2012, 19) to interpret Anonymous as an anti-capitalist project: “Anonymous… is 
an ontological shift on the terrain of identity at the very moment that identity has become 
the highest form of selection and exploitation in cognitive capitalism, the first glimpse of 
life without identity on the Internet”.  
The notion of anonymity as destabilizing capitalist hierarchies by countering the idea of 
personality cults also resonates in the literature on masked protest (Morris, 2012; Ruiz, 
2013). Social movements’ claimed spaces are framed in opposition to capitalist inequality 
as places of horizontality, reciprocity, and solidarity. The movement itself appears as a 
democratic utopia, as in the transformative perspective outlined in the previous chapter. 
This inclusive agenda is expressed in frames like the slogans of the Occupy movement “We 
are the 99%”, Anonymous “We are Anonymous We are legion”, the Pussy Riot movement 
“We are all Pussy Riot”, the Black Lives Matter movement “We are all Trayvon Martin”, 
and the Zapatistas “We are you”. All these slogans begin with self-definitions rather than 
political claims. They rearticulate a common identity based on the de-articulation of indi-
vidual identity (Mouffe, 2006) and engage in modes of subjectivization through improper 
names (Deseriis, 2015; Rancière, 1999). The identification “We are” is then followed by a 
broad, inclusive term. The “We” is constructed as an inclusive space for (almost) everyone. 
Thus, not only the negation of hierarchizing identity markers, but also the creation of new 
collective identities in insurrectional spaces (Newman, 2011) can lead to inclusion. Ruiz 
(2013, 274) elaborates: “the mask creates a space that can be occupied by those who per-
ceive themselves to be excluded”. 
Exclusion. The freedom to dominate, oppress, and exclude is facilitated by anonymity 
when identity negation is used to avoid accountability and discriminate against those whose 
positions are marginalized within society resulting in both internal and external exclusion 
(Young, 2000). Internal exclusion within participatory spaces through a devaluation of par-
ticipants with marginalized identities results from disinhibited misogynist, racist, homo-
phobic or other discriminatory utterances. Although all are unknown to each other within 
anonymous participatory spaces, insults automatically find their addressees as social hier-
archies existing outside the discursive setting are replicated.  
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The phenomena of hate speech and “flaming”, which are largely discussed today in the 
context of online anonymity, were also well known to participants in the US constitutional 
debate. Addressing insults to each other’s pseudonyms, Federalists and Anti-Federalists 
used terms such as “ignorant loggerhead” and “ungrateful monster” to degrade their oppo-
nent: “An onslaught of sparring and often libellous remarks appeared in newspapers and 
pamphlets… The absence of an author’s true identity, however, did not spare anonymous 
authors from attack and may have indeed made such attacks easier” (Smith Ekstrand & 
Imfeld Jeyaram, 2011, 39, 43). 
This is also the central observation in Rodriguez and Clair’s analysis of toilet graffiti. While 
they acknowledge graffiti as an important outlet for suppressed anger, they also observe 
that it is used by those on the top of hierarchies to affirm their position: “dominant groups 
– especially white heterosexual men – use the open nature of graffiti to intimidate and ‘dis-
cipline’ minority groups… [G]raffiti allow for open discourse (sexist, racist, and homopho-
bic speech) that organizations cannot sanction, but which may also act to establish or rein-
force the privileging aspects of patriarchal practice, thus, supporting the hegemonic order” 
(Rodriguez & Clair, 1999, 3). 
The Ku Klux Klan represents a telling example of external exclusion through anonymity. 
Here, anonymity is used in an attempt to cast those with marginalized identities out of par-
ticipatory spaces in order to construct a homogenous cultural and racial space. The most 
appalling use of anonymity can be observed in racist hate crimes and the murder of African 
Americans in the 1920s (Blee & McDowell, 2013). In these cases, masking was used in 
public lynchings to avoid detection. While today the KKK does not engage in public exe-
cutions, their ideology of white supremacy that is disseminated via social media shows how 
the Klan upholds its original ideas of racial purity (Schmitz, 2016). The goal of such actions 
is to expel particular ethnic groups who are perceived as a threat to their own culturally 
cognate community. 
The example of the KKK illustrates not only how identity negation can be used for exclu-
sion, but also identity creation. On the one hand, the ghost-like figures are meant to intim-
idate their victims. On the other, this attire also establishes internal hierarchies. While col-
lective actors such as Occupy, Pussy Riot, and Anonymous use the mask to enact internal 
equality, the KKK employs a system of attire that expresses difference in social status be-
tween Klan members (Blee & McDowell, 2013, 252). The equalizing effects of the hood 
are countered by different coloured robes, stripes, and decorations enacting hierarchy. 
Moreover, Schmitz’s study of hierarchies in the ideology of the KKK, as expressed on its 
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various webpages, shows that racism towards non-members is not the only line of discrim-
ination. Rather, websites also contain misogynistic and heterosexist content. Most pages 
exclusively display Klansmen, often in military attire and combat, while women are un-
derrepresented and depicted as housewives. Thus, while women are formally equal mem-
bers within the KKK, they are informally ranked in a subordinate position in relation to 
their male counterparts (Schmitz, 2016, 208ff). 
The freedom to exclude facilitated by anonymity does not always take the form of discrim-
ination of marginalized groups. It can also be observed wherever those in privileged social 
positions, such as economic elites or state actors, employ anonymity to amplify power im-
balances. In many countries, riot police concerned with maintaining public order at demon-
strations and protests increasingly appear masked. While these black masks, either in the 
form of balaclavas or gas masks, serve physical protection, they also fulfil the dual function 
of anonymity: negating and creating identity. First, by concealing identity police evade 
personal identification and avoid public scrutiny. This is accompanied by trends of police 
refusing to wear their badge numbers and restricting civilians from filming their actions, 
which is most frequently observed in the context of police brutality against ethnic minori-
ties (Spiegel, 2015, 791f). Second, anonymity also allows police to construct menacing 
personae. Riot police uniforms are akin to soldiers’ military gear, evoking the image of an 
army at war. While the camouflage of military uniforms is meant to allow soldiers to dis-
appear, the black police uniforms signal presence, threat, and unity.  
The power imbalance between anonymous police and demonstrators in claimed spaces is 
amplified by bans on face coverings in public gatherings. The Canadian federal ban on 
masks of 2012, for example, punishes mask wearing with up to ten years’ imprisonment. 
This inverts the logic of liberal democracies making state actors identifiable to be held 
accountable by the public and simultaneously upholding citizens’ right to privacy. Accord-
ing to Spiegel (2015, 791f), these tendencies need to be interpreted in a wider context:  
In the United States, cases of individuals arrested and charged for filming po-
lice officers multiply, while high-profile cases such as those of Chelsea Man-
ning and Edward Snowden, both charged with breaching national security for 
exposing to the American people state documents concerning American gov-
ernment activity, further anchor the asymmetrical logic of coding and surveil-
ling individuals while obscuring the actions of public forces that, in principle, 
serve and answer to these same individuals.  
These tendencies can also be observed in online communication. The internet amplifies the 
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possibilities of surveillance: “users’ identities have become increasingly exposed, while the 
subject of surveillance and their activities have become less identifiable. Therefore, the 
major impetus for the power imbalance between the subject and the object of surveillance 
in the network is their differences in identifiability” (Woo, 2006, 961). 
This imbalance of invisible power holders and the identified citizens can also be seen when 
economic actors influence the legislative process, both directly through lobbying and cor-
ruption and indirectly through campaign and party funding. Where there are no transpar-
ency laws in place requiring the identification of donors, anonymous financial contributions 
establish secret connections between the donor and the candidate or party. Although the 
donors are known to the beneficiary, they remain unknown to the public. While in clear 
cases of corruption the donation is tied to explicit political demands, in less explicit cases 
the beneficiary might act in the donor’s interest in the expectation of further donations. 
Such concerns were raised in 1997 when the British Labour government proposed to ex-
empt motor racing from a ban on tobacco advertising shortly after the Labour Party received 
a £1 million donation from business magnate and Formula One chief executive, Bernie 
Ecclestone (Barendt, 2016, 163ff). Thus, anonymous party financing can distort democratic 
legislative processes, which translates economic inequality into political domination.  
5.4.2. Subversion and Submission 
By allowing dissidents and marginalized groups to avoid detection (identity negation) and 
to form new collective identities through improper names (identity creation), anonymity 
facilitates the contestation of hegemonic power structures. Simultaneously, however, ano-
nymity evokes conformist tendencies when anonymous participants give up individual be-
liefs and critical thinking in exchange for a feeling of belonging to a community. Anonym-
ity, thus, facilitates both subversion and submission. 
Subversion. Some of the most influential texts contesting political power relations that are 
today clearly attributed to certain authors were originally published anonymously, such as 
Thomas Paine’s Common Sense attacking the English government published in 1776 by 
“an Englishman”. The Communist Manifesto by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, calling 
for a proletarian revolution, was first published anonymously in 1848 and only attributed 
to its authors more than two decades later. 
The importance of anonymity for subversion has remained ever since. Morris argues that 
neoliberal developments of commodification and surveillance create a political context in 
which anonymity becomes an empowering tool:  
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Anonymity is not only a politically-motivated response to the encroachments 
of data-gathering devices and the bioinformatics that underwrite the impersonal 
efficiency of contemporary biopolitical control societies. It is also an aesthetic 
revolt against the era of navel-gazing narcissism that has hypnotized the subject 
of these regimes… A form of resistance to the State, then, is to eliminate its 
access to its economic subjects by scrambling the informatics networks it uses 
to delineate, organize and manage them, effectively de-activating oneself as a 
political subject. (Morris, 2012, 110)  
Whistleblowing, for example, is a subversive practice in which individuals “leak” infor-
mation about illegal or immoral actions from an insider perspective (Barendt, 2016, 75). 
This contests the capitalist logics of privatization and commodification of knowledge. Wik-
iLeaks, one of the most prominent examples, provides a website for the anonymous publi-
cation of information on US governmental wrongdoings. In 2010, Bradley/Chelsea Man-
ning, a soldier in gender transition, leaked the largest amount of classified military and 
diplomatic material to the public in US history via WikiLeaks and other channels, exposing 
human rights violations such as the purposeful killing of civilians by the US military in Iraq 
and Afghanistan (de Lagasnerie, 2017). The story of WikiLeaks appears at the centre of a 
global cultural rupture of identity reconfigurations. The anonymity of its whistleblowing 
practices contrasts dramatically with the celebrity status of Julian Assange, its public face 
overshadowing the drama of Manning, a young person searching for a new identity between 
army barracks and prison walls.  
WikiLeaks is part of a broader “freedom of information movement” (Beyer, 2014b; 
Coleman, 2019; McCarthy, 2015), evolving from the hacker counter culture that upholds 
the principle of free speech and open source. Political groups such as the Pirate Party derive 
their name from the notion of online piracy, consisting of stealing and publicly sharing 
digital private property. Anonymous is another actor in the freedom of information move-
ment that engages in the practices of hacking and leaking. It is most notorious for its Dis-
tributed Denial of Service Attacks (DDoS), making their opponents’ websites inaccessible 
by flooding it with access requests. This tactic is often equated with analogue forms of 
claiming space such as sit-ins or occupations. Anonymous illustrates how employing ano-
nymity enables some “computer nerds” to inflict serious harm on powerful institutions such 
as the Church of Scientology, Visa and MasterCard, and governments around the world 
(Asenbaum, 2018b).  
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The mask becomes a common focal point of diverse movements contesting practices of 
identification and surveillance. What the Guy Fawkes mask is for Anonymous, the colour-
ful balaclava is for the Pussy Riot movement. In contrast to the white-faced, bearded man 
who is associated with the digital culture of disembodiment and Western reason, the hand-
knit balaclavas in different colours enact physical embodiment, femininity, cultural diver-
sity, and passion much in the spirit of difference democracy. This contrast between Pussy 
Riot and Anonymous shows how Pussy Riot’s performative interventions are deeply rooted 
in a feminist contestation of patriarchy. Pussy Riot’s “Punk Prayer” directly attacked Vla-
dimir Putin’s government and the Russian Orthodox Church – the two centres of patriarchal 
rule in Russia. This act of anonymous subversion opens up new spaces by claiming and re-
appropriating old spaces of power:  
The spectacle of brightly colored balaclavas on the five women standing on the 
altar of a sacred but also fraught religious space not only occupies space but 
offers an example of the new kinds of bodies and sensations that can take place 
in a public space. They open up room to consider the cathedral otherwise. 
(Bruce, 2015, 52) 
The global movement in support of Pussy Riot reinterprets their political objectives and 
resituates them in a Western context, not as protest against dictatorship but as protest 
against state surveillance and police brutality. While the Western and Eastern perspectives 
differ in certain respects, they both focus on the balaclava as a subversive object that thwarts 
identification. The balaclava circulates as a physical thing in street protest and as a digital 
thing in online discourses. Interpreting an image of a policeman pulling the balaclava off a 
female protester’s face at a US solidarity demonstration with Pussy Riot, Bruce (2015, 54) 
states: “In this image the balaclava circulates as vehicle for drawing parallels between US 
and Russian state repression”. 
It was no coincidence that Pussy Riot staged their “Punk Prayer” protest in February – the 
carnival season. Medieval carnival provided a temporary chance to enact the inversion of 
social hierarchies as “the lower classes had an opportunity to dress up as the ruling classes 
and mock their power” (Spiegel, 2015, 808). Political dissidents and disenfranchised 
groups “used carnival festivities to critique government officials and state institutions and 
demand significant political reform” (Bruner, 2005, 139). Bruner reports one such example: 
In 1580 Romans-sur-Isére, a small town in France, the gap between the rich and the poor 
widened as the ruling elite exempted themselves from paying taxes. In response, the carni-
val festivities organized by the common people ran under the theme “eat the rich”. The 
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crowd in disguise held mock armed military parades, marched with rakes and brooms to 
sweep away the rich, and enacted selling the meat of the rich at a market. This fictive per-
formance had real consequences as the mock rebel leaders were prosecuted, tortured, and 
hanged (Bruner, 2005, 142).  
The parallels with Pussy Riot’s “Punk Prayer” are apparent: “Medieval carnival is known 
to have included mockery of church authorities, even swearing and indecent behaviour 
from pulpits and altars” (Steinholt, 2013, 123). While both Pussy Riot and medieval carni-
val encompass elements of humour, they combine these with serious threat. The threat “eat 
the rich” is echoed by the chorus of the Punk Prayer “Virgin Mary, chase Putin away”. The 
Punk Prayer consists of aggressive rock music and swear words. The balaclava itself, how-
ever colourful, contains aspects of threat: “the circulatory power of the balaclava means 
that such endless reproduction can become monstrous and terrifying” (Bruce, 2015, 49). 
This can also be observed in the techniques of the black bloc in anti-capitalist demonstra-
tions. Hiding their faces behind black balaclavas, scarves, and hoods, the creation of a men-
acing persona is not an unintentional side effect, as one anti-globalization protester ex-
plains: “part of the effectiveness of our mass mobilizations rest on this threat of implied 
violence” (cited in Ruiz, 2013, 269).  
Hiding faces in hoods is also an essential practice in the Black Lives Matter movement. 
The hood affords a performance of defiance through its association with youth riots, gang 
wars, and anti-capitalist insurgency. In the “Million Hoodie March” hundreds took to the 
streets of New York City in hoods to protest the killing of Trayvon Martin, a 17-year-old 
African American, whose killer, white neighbourhood watchman George Zimmerman, 
walked free. As the anonymity of Martin’s hood was blamed for creating a threat which 
justified Zimmerman’s actions, Black Lives Matter activists wear hoodies to perform soli-
darity with the victim and claim their race/class identity (Kinney, 2016; Nguyen, 2015). 
Kinney (2016, 71) elaborates: “But even when, and sometimes because, authorities brand 
the hood as criminal or illegitimate, people keep wearing their hoods for resistance, revo-
lution, and transformation. For self-expression, defiance, and play”. 
Lastly, the subversive freedom of anonymity can be illustrated by the controversy surround-
ing the veiling of Muslim women. In her book, Veil, Rafia Zakaria (2017) contends that in 
the context of the enforcement of burka bans and Islamophobic media discourses, the prac-
tice of publicly wearing the veil becomes an act of political participation. The veil functions 
as a tool for subversion confronting Islamophobia and claiming diversity in the public 
sphere. The state, or, in Rancière’s terms, the police, demands access to the individual 
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person’s face as prime identifier. The veil interrupts identification just as the hood does. 
The forced unveiling of Muslim women in schools and courts by the state and the politically 
motivated hate act of other citizens pulling a headscarf off a woman’s head is echoed in 
media threats addressed to black youth to unhood, not to become the next shooting target. 
The disciplinary power that confronts anonymous subversion takes the form of a physical 
threat to life and freedom of the defiant subject.  
Submission. From the 1930s on, studies in social psychology have tried to find explana-
tions for the strong group dynamics of crowds, particularly regarding the emerging fascist 
movements in Europe. They found that individuals appeared to give up or lose their indi-
viduality in groups and tend to follow group dynamics and leadership. An explanation for 
this deindividuation was the anonymity of the crowd. Perceiving themselves as unidentifi-
able, individuals not only felt less accountable for their actions, but were also swayed by 
emotive group dynamics (e.g. Le Bon, 2009 [1896]). Current models of deindividuation 
clarify that it is not just that negative behaviour is emulated, or that crowds are always 
deindividuating; indeed, they can have the opposite effect. Stephen Reicher (1987; 1984) 
argues that whether individuals conform to group dynamics under the condition of ano-
nymity depends on the salience of certain features of identity that are shared between both 
the individual and the group. In other words, anonymity leads individuals to submit to a 
group, if that group is defined by a strong group identity that individuals share with the 
group. The salient collective identity amplifies those aspects that the individual shares with 
the group. The identity of the assemblage gains control over individual action. The individ-
ual subject is free from making decisions, free to submit to the group, and free from the 
constraints of accountability: “The mob has all the power of its aggregate of members, who, 
embedded as they are in the group, are virtually invisible as individuals; they feel liberated 
from responsibility, and thus the chain of personal accountability is all but destroyed” 
(Boyd & Field, 2016, 340). 
The most horrendous consequences that submission to the collective through anonymity 
can have in the political sphere can be illustrated by the racially motivated lynchings that 
occurred in the US in the 19th and 20th centuries. Lynching as a political hate crime against 
black people was used by groups such as the KKK, as discussed above. In these hate crimes, 
individuals’ submission to a group identity of terror played an important role. The affectiv-
ity of hate that spreads through groups is partly facilitated by the anonymity of its partici-
pants who negate their individual identity through the group identity of the crowd. In con-
trast with the KKK who actively seeks anonymity through the physical object of the hood, 
lynch mobs did not need guises; they simply depended on the multiplicity of their members 
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to hide individual identity: “One form of anonymity has been substituted for another: un-
masked, the lynch men can both claim public credit for their reign of terror and dodge legal 
responsibility” (Boyd & Field, 2016, 341). 
The freedom to submit to collectivity does not always come in such drastic and ap-
palling forms. More subtle forms can be observed in current political collectivities 
such as Anonymous, who, as illustrated above, create inclusive collective identities. 
Individuals included in the collective not only occupy equal positions in the social 
hierarchy, but also submit to a commonly constructed persona. They tend to adjust 
their modes of expression to collectively perform and reinforce this improper iden-
tity. Gabriela Coleman (2012, 86), for example, claims that: “donning the Guy 
Fawkes mask associated with Anonymous… entails trading individualism for collec-
tivism”. The absence of individual identifiers on discussion boards such as 4chan and 
its forum /b/, where Anonymous participants engage with each other, results in mu-
tual mimicry. A sort of group think emerges. As Halpin (2012, 22) observes: “After 
a certain amount of time, one loses one’s individuality and enters the ‘hivemind’ of 
‘/b/’”. The use of the Guy Fawkes mask can be understood both as facilitating inclu-
sion as well as a performance of deindividuation. Cambre (2014, 316) witnesses a 
conscious effort on the part of Anonymous activists to overcome individuality: “an 
Anonymous twitter user claimed: ‘Today I took off my face.’ Whereas many activist 
movements have used carnivalistic components as part of a strategy of resistance and 
embraced masking, others have emphasized the removal or erasure of the human face, 
the defacement of the subject”. In her analysis of images generated and circulated by 
Anonymous activists, Cambre shows a picture with a man taking off the Guy Fawkes 
mask with no face behind it. Another image bears the caption: “It is time to leave 
behind your names. It is once again time to become Anonymous” (Cambre, 2014, 
316f). In Mouffe’s (2006) terms, it appears that there are tendencies in Anonymous 
where a de-articulation of identity through a process of de-individualization is not 
followed by a re-individualization. Here de-individualization appears as a final dis-
solution of the individual subject into the collective. 
This inclination towards homogeneity can be witnessed elsewhere too:  
a trend shared in twenty-first century protest from Tahrir Square to Occupy is 
the refusal to have a “representative face come forward as the avatar of the 
revolution” – a move which is both tactical and ideological. In order to disci-
pline and control, the police need to be able to identify individuals and 
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personalize their crimes as the wrongdoing of delinquents. Anonymous protest, 
however, not only skirts disciplinary tactics but also asserts the protesting body 
as collective and depersonalized (Spiegel, 2015, 795, emphasis added). 
What appears to be happening here is that participants in these movements more or less 
consciously give up their individuality to a certain degree so as to form an unassailable unit, 
while, with the same move, adhering to the ideology of equality. In addition to these stra-
tegic and ideological motives, this unity of equals also satisfies a psychological function: 
the yearning for belonging. Building a community that accommodates a feeling of belong-
ing, mutual appreciation, and acceptance is an important aspect of inclusion. If belonging 
and acceptance is the participants’ main motive, their political beliefs might prove flexible. 
This is particularly relevant in the context of the increasing openness – and at times empti-
ness – of the content of current social movements engaging via social media, in which 
anonymity plays a central role. Concepts such as networked social movements (Castells, 
2012), connective action (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012), and cyborg activism (Asenbaum, 
2018b) point to an increasing eclecticism and even nihilism in the content of these move-
ments. When political causes and content become less important and increasingly vague, 
deindividuation through anonymity can contribute to submitting to group dynamics and 
anonymous leadership. 
Moreover, there is a practical reason for tendencies of conformity in anonymous collective 
action. Improper names exemplified by the Guy Fawkes mask, the Pussy Riot balaclava, 
and the pseudonyms in the US constitutional debate entail that different people can take on 
the same anonymous persona (Deseriis, 2015). To the many arrests of hacktivists, Anony-
mous responds: “You can’t arrest an idea”. This implies that participants within movements 
or civil society organizations need to adhere to a common ideology or set of ideas even if 
these diverge from their individual political beliefs. While in non-anonymous movements, 
individual participants can be authorized to speak for the group and held accountable, in 
collectives such as Anonymous this is hardly possible due to the unidentifiability of partic-
ipants. This leads to intense controversies within Anonymous with sub-groups accusing 
one another of being inauthentic or individual participants being “doxed” – expelled and 
publicly shamed by finding and publishing their legal identities (Dobusch & Schoeneborn, 
2015). In the case of sharing a pseudonym, such as Publius used by Alexander Hamilton, 
James Madison, and John Jay, the pressure to stick to a consistent line of thought might be 
even stronger as participants try to “pass” as the same person. 
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5.4.3. Honesty and Deception 
Lastly, accounts of anonymity in participatory spaces describe how anonymous subjects 
are more willing to reveal their true beliefs. Identity negation helps to avoid peer pressure 
which in turn leads to more sincerity in public discourse. Others, however, point to ano-
nymity’s affordance of lying as it allows for the construction of fake identities and deceit 
through a lack of accountability. Anonymity, thus, contributes to both more honesty and 
more deception in democracy. 
Honesty. Oscar Wilde famously wrote: “Man is least himself when he talks in his own 
person. Give him a mask and he will tell you the truth” (Wilde, 2007 [1861]). These words 
were based on 19th century practices of masked balls allowing for sexually frivolous be-
haviour and anonymously published novels that often contained strong political undertones 
(Barendt, 2016, 14). The same can be observed today in all modes of anonymous political 
participation discussed here: escaping domination through anonymity – be it from state 
institutions, economic actors or peers – contributes to a diversity of opinions in the public 
sphere:  
There are certain unpopular positions which some people might want to ex-
plore, but not if they know they will be exposed to ridicule and perhaps even 
physical harm if they are tied to such views in public. To completely forbid 
anonymity would therefore result in no unorthodox views ever reaching the 
public sphere of debate. (Hunter, 2002) 
Through the secret ballot in elections and referendums, voters can uninhibitedly express 
their interests. Similarly, anonymity is used in polling to detect the electorate’s true prefer-
ences on various political issues (Kuran, 1993, 41f). Anonymity’s freedom to speak the 
truth also plays into the freedom of subversion as dissidents such as Pussy Riot and Anon-
ymous reveal their true beliefs when shielded by anonymity. Anonymous media channels 
are established as truth-promoting institutions such as WikiLeaks’ whistleblowing website 
or Anonymous’ independent media platform anonews.co that challenges the mainstream 
media narratives (McDonald, 2015). However, honesty does not just contribute to subver-
sion; it can also aid exclusion and submission. Aggressive and derogatory speech directed 
at marginalized groups is an expression of true sentiment. Thus, Gardner’s (2011, 929) two 
sides of anonymity might actually be seen as one and the same: “anonymity has been both 
praised for freeing citizens to vote and speak their true beliefs, and condemned for provid-
ing convenient cover to harmful or democratically undesirable behavior”.  
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Both Butler (2006) and Rodriguez and Clair (1999) report in their respective accounts on 
bathroom graffiti on university campuses how, in these anonymous dialogues, students ver-
balize political opinions that are deemed inappropriate in classroom discussions and student 
newspapers. Thus, the more formally regulated public sphere has exclusive effects: “Graf-
fiti allow the key benefit of anonymity, that is, protection against any form of retribution. 
All can say whatever, however, and whenever, to whomever” (Rodriguez & Clair, 1999, 
2). Rodriguez and Clair claim that the bathroom stall functions as a kind of confession 
booth where social identities and political views are expressed and negotiated. One might 
add the comparison to a voting booth, also serving the expression of true beliefs. The study 
of bathroom graffiti at a US university with predominantly African American students in 
the late 1990s illustrates how, under conditions of anonymity, taboo topics such as homo-
sexuality could be addressed. As the following dialogue shows, both sides of the argument 
– those defending and those opposing homosexuality – expressed their opinions in a candid 
and unrestricted manner:  
(D) I really don’t understand how a woman could be attracted to another woman 
and I agree with the sister girl to the left of me. Homosexuality is very unnatural 
and since God says its wrong in the bible I don’t [think] he would create a 
human being that way. It’s a learned behavior.  
(E) You have to learn to interpret the bible. King James was a racist woman 
hater. Reading is Fundamental. You also think God is a HE. Question every-
thing that contradicts your Freedom and liberty. 
(A) African American women. Look! Don’t judge people. You don’t under-
stand homosexuality at all! If it was a choice I wouldn’t choose it because of 
all the abuse. Why can’t I just be myself in this world? (cited in Rodriguez & 
Clair, 1999, 6ff) 
This dialogue is indicative for a few reasons. Not only can the construction of sexual iden-
tity be observed, but we can also witness a genuine dialogue that most likely would not 
have taken place without an anonymous medium. The question (A) poses at the end is es-
pecially telling: “Why can’t I just be myself in this world?” implies that she can only ex-
press her real self publicly under conditions of anonymity. Both freedoms of subversion of 
hegemonic identity constructions and internal exclusion within a peer group resulting from 
frankly speaking one’s mind can be observed in the dialogue. 
The case of bathroom graffiti illustrates that anonymity is especially important to margin-
alized social groups in allowing them to publicly express their identities. The internet 
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provides another outlet to articulate queer identities. Leitner (2015, 2010) elaborates the 
situation of LGBTIQs in South Korea who often face stigmatism and social ostracism: 
“many persons identifying with a homosexual (or other non-heterosexual) identity find an 
anonymous Internet to be the only recourse for open expression… A lack of expressive 
opportunity deprives homosexual persons of reasonable opportunities to develop their iden-
tities”. In countries with more accepting cultures toward queer sexualities, anonymity nev-
ertheless plays an important role. Annual Gay Pride parades are characterized by masquer-
ade and carnivalesque identity performances enacting gender changes and fusions through 
masks, makeup, and disguise (Baxter, 2015). 
Deception. Paradoxically, while enabling a more honest discourse by concealing identity 
is an undisputed feature of anonymity, facilitating deceit appears just as plausible. In stark 
contrast to Oscar Wilde’s assessment of the mask as facilitator of truth, Leonardo da Vinci 
wrote the following in his notebooks from the late 15th and early 16th century: “the mask 
[represents] lying and falsehood which conceal truth” (da Vinci, 2005, 684).  
While today hiding one’s identity when casting the ballot in elections is perceived as a core 
political right, the role of the secret ballot was far more contested in 19th century Britain: 
“secret voting was contrary to the English cultural traditions of honesty and openness; it 
would lead to habits of falsehood and deception” (Barendt, 2016, 157). While one was 
supposed to vote in accordance with the common good, the secret ballot gave the oppor-
tunity for selfish voting, either concealing or even lying about one’s decision. Voting based 
on the common good was particularly important in the face of exclusion of certain social 
groups from the franchise – most prominently women. Thus, John Stuart Mill argued that 
men had to reveal their voting behaviour not only to a wider public, but specifically to their 
wives and daughters whose interests they were supposed to include in their considerations.  
In contrast to single voting acts, the internet provides multiple and continuous opportunities 
for deception. The case of A Gay Girl in Damascus is a telling example. In the wake of the 
uprisings in many Arab countries in 2011, the blog A Gay Girl in Damascus told the per-
sonal story of the Syrian LGBTIQ activist Amina, resisting the ultra-conservative Syrian 
regime from within. Amina’s blog posts were promoted by Lez Get Real, a US-based 
LGBTIQ news website run by Paula Brooks. After the blog rapidly rose in popularity in 
just a few months, news spread that Amina was abducted, causing her loyal community to 
spring into action under the hashtag #FreeAmina. However, it soon turned out that Amina 
was really Tom MacMaster, a 40-year-old, white, heterosexual, American man. Paula 
Brooks, who had promoted Amina’s blog through Lez Get Real and engaged in private and 
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allegedly romantic contact with Amina, later turned out to be Bill Graber, a 57-year-old, 
heterosexual American. Both men claimed to have invented fictive personae to more cred-
ibly rally for a social group that they were not part of. Cardell and Maguire’s (2015) pointed 
analysis uncovers the relevance of the power structures in which this case is situated:  
The hoax is dangerous because it cloaks the dominant narrative under the dis-
guise of a subversive narrator who corroborates rather than disrupts the domi-
nant narrative… It places a US readership in the privileged position of card-
carrying listener to the voice of a subordinate object whose “true” story con-
firms the rightness of Western democracy and Orientalist discourses about 
Middle Eastern Otherness, evident, for example, in the cultural stereotype of 
the Arab woman as being in need of rescuing. (Cardell & Maguire, 2015, 215f)  
Conscious deceit is also used to troll or infiltrate political opponents and to spread fake 
news. Anonymous, for example, employed deception facilitated by anonymity to attack the 
white supremacist Hal Turner. Turner propagated racist views via his radio show and web-
site. Anonymous activists flooded the radio show with anonymous prank phone calls and 
the website with prank comments (Coleman, 2014, 19f). This is not an isolated case. 
Groups such as Expose attempt to document the illegal activities of extreme right-wing 
groups online and report them to the police. While this is not the official policy of the group, 
some members create fake accounts on social media – so-called “sock puppets” – to post 
racist comments, add right-wing individuals as friends, and “like” right-wing groups in 
order to gain the trust of the online community. When they are ultimately invited to secret 
chat rooms where strategy and future actions are planned, they gain access to valuable in-
formation (Bartlett, 2015, 62ff).  
More sophisticated forms of deception are employed when anonymous programmers de-
sign social bots to present themselves as human social media users. On Twitter, bots posing 
as political supporters or activist groups tweet and retweet political content, heavily influ-
encing which political messages are read online and potentially having an impact on the 
results of elections and referendums. Donald Trump’s presidential campaign in 2016 and 
the campaign for Brexit in the UK’s 2016 referendum were both heavily supported by ar-
tificial agents whose puppeteers remained in the dark (Bastos & Mercea, 2017; Bessi & 
Ferrara, 2016). 
5.5. Conclusion 
When considering the antithetical character of anonymity as identity negation and creation, 
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and the resulting three sets of contradictory freedoms, the stark contrast between privacy 
and anonymity becomes evident. Neither inclusion, exclusion, subversion, submission, 
honesty, nor deception have much, if anything, in common with privacy. This is because 
they all relate to a crucial aspect of anonymity besides concealment. They all hint at the 
inherently communicative character of anonymity. This is also illustrated by the four modes 
of anonymous political participation discussed above: voting, campaign funding, political 
writing, and masked collective action are all modes of communication in the public sphere. 
Thus, anonymity does not entail being let alone. On the contrary, anonymity gives the dem-
ocratic subject presence in the space of appearance. The public sphere – the opposite of 
privacy – is the precondition for anonymity (see Barendt, 2016, 13).  
That said, this does not mean that privacy and anonymity do not share any features in com-
mon. They clearly overlap in their functions of shielding the democratic subject from in-
terference by others – be they state actors, economic actors, or peers. However, while pri-
vacy withdraws content from public scrutiny and the identity of the subject remains known, 
anonymity shields identity while communicating content in the public sphere. Anonymity, 
thus, conveys one crucial feature of privacy, the concealment of identity, into the public 
sphere (see Moore, 2017, 13; Ponesse, 2014, 316). It reconfigures the boundaries between 
private and public space and facilitates a private form of engagement in the public discur-
sive arena. In her elaboration of the defiant act of public veil wearing by Muslim women, 
Zakaria (2017, 71f) claims: “Veils thus are… an extension of the private space of the harem 
where [the women] are protected, into the public realm”. By negating some aspects of the 
legally identified and physically embodied persona, anonymity transcends publicity and 
privacy, transforming private sentiments into political claims and transmitting them into 
the public sphere, thereby facilitating absence as presence.  
As such, we need a new understanding of presence – one in which visibility of the physi-
cally embodied persona does not function as the only criterion. When common modes of 
identity performance are interrupted through anonymity, subjects appear differently. Anon-
ymous presence is expressed through voice, sound, written words, images that represent 
the body, improper names, and blank spaces. Presence is perceptible through many ways 
that partly include and partly go beyond the visibility of the body. It takes multiple forms 
and in doing so it reconfigures the identity assemblage of the self. It brings often hidden 
aspects of the self to the fore when anonymous subjects are free to express themselves 
honestly or when they playfully engage with the many things that constitute their identities. 
The multiple self is reconfigured through the decentralizing effects of anonymity. What we 
usually engage in when we present ourselves publicly is an effort of integration that keeps 
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our identity assemblage coherent. In performing our established persona, we enforce and 
harden the boundaries of identity space that confine the fugitive self. Anonymity’s inher-
ently liberating effects make these boundaries more porous:  
An adequate concept of anonymity, therefore, will need to take account of the 
ways in which anonymization dissociates or disintegrates what is naturally in-
tegrated. Because anonymity is a way of segregating an otherwise integrated 
self – of packaging selves piecemeal for the world – anonymity involves a 
loss of visible integrity, and as such creates ambiguous identities. (Ponesse, 
2014, 316)  
Rather than speaking of natural coherence, as suggested by Ponesse, I think that integration 
is an artificial act, a forceful act resulting from the disciplinary power that Rancière (1999) 
describes as the police. In postanarchist terms, it is an act of self-domination or voluntary 
servitude (Newman, 2010c). The act of forcing the multiple self into a unity is described 
by Butler (1990) as masquerade, as discussed in the previous chapter. The everyday per-
formance of the self consists of an effort of picking up and constantly reproducing a mask 
that is handed to us through citation and recitation. Interestingly, the etymology of the term 
“person” leads to the Latin personare “to sound through”, which is derived from the use of 
wooden masks in dramatic performances in the Roman Empire (Napier, 1986). The original 
persona as mask or “false face” inverts our current understanding of the identifiable person 
as real while the mask is understood as fake. However, when applying the original meaning 
of the word “person” to its current use, the identifiable person appears not as the true self, 
but as public performance, as masquerade. Anonymity is not masquerade, but the intercep-
tion of masquerade. This is achieved through the disidentifactory practices of rejecting the 
mask, rejecting the hail of dominant discourses (Muñoz, 1999) thus interrupting the iden-
tification through the police (Rancière, 1999).  
Such a rejection can never be entirely successful, since the subject can never break out of 
discourses. But the interruption of continuous identification through practices of anonymity 
opens up new spaces for exploring and reassembling the multiple self, for playing with the 
many things that constitute us. Anonymity does not end identification; it merely interrupts 
it. It creates a space, a gap between periods of continuous identification. After the interrup-
tion, identification takes hold and puts the subject back into its place in the normalized 
order of things.  
These reconfigurations through anonymity in participatory spaces have important implica-
tions for freedom and equality as core values of democracy. Anonymity’s inherently 
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liberating character always widens the free space of democratic subjects. Anonymity’s neg-
ative freedoms of escaping surveillance are accompanied by often overlooked positive free-
doms to act. In accordance with the democratic paradox that sees freedom and equality in 
tension, anonymity’s freedoms often undermine equality. This reconfigures space, creating 
new hierarchies or reinforcing established modes of domination. Anonymous subjects can 
use their positive freedoms for external exclusion, expelling others from participatory 
spaces or for internal exclusion to exert their superiority over others. Within anonymous 
crowds, they can submit to group dynamics and leadership, which establishes a hierarchy 
of leaders and followers. And they can employ anonymity to deceive others, creating a 
hierarchy of knowledge. In these cases, the democratic paradox is in place. Freedom un-
dermines equality. But at other times, the postanarchist concept of equal liberty understand-
ing freedom and equality as mutually amplifying each other is at work. Anonymous spaces 
are reconfigured as realms of equality when anonymity contributes to inclusion and meri-
tocracy; when subjects engage in subversion to challenge domination; and when they ex-
press honest sentiments, thus flattening knowledge hierarchies. In conclusion, both the 
democratic paradox and equal liberty explain anonymous interaction in participatory 
spaces.  
The question, then, is how the democratic paradox and equal liberty relate to each other. 
Are there some participatory spaces in which one of them is at work and in other spaces 
another? I believe that a clear-cut separation of the two does not explain reality. Rather, the 
two always go together, in varying constellations and intensities. This becomes clear when 
we observe both freedoms undermining and freedoms advancing equality in the same case. 
In the anonymous discourses scribbled as graffiti on bathroom walls, for example, subjects 
challenge power asymmetries by venting honest sentiments, but at the same time they en-
gage in exclusion by disciplining marginalized groups. Anonymous prank phone calls to 
troll white supremacists and the social media sock puppet accounts of Expose entail both 
deception and subversion. In all of these cases, both the democratic paradox and equal lib-
erty are at work. Anonymity’s freedoms always both undermine and advance equality and, 
thus, remain contradictory.  
Often even the two opposing freedoms of one binary (e.g. inclusion and exclusion) are at 
work simultaneously. Anonymous, for example, engages in subversion confronting social 
inequality, while at the same time exhibiting internal tendencies of submission. The inclu-
sive, levelled playing field in the debate about the US Constitution is characterized by a 
highly exclusive language of personal insult. The same can be observed regarding honesty 
and deception. The German democratic theorist, Hubertus Buchstein (1997), argues in an 
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essay on online deliberation: “the network presents an unreal world which allows all of us 
to create one or even more virtual identities… In most cases people pretend to have those 
positive characteristics they feel they lack” (Buchstein 1997, 258f, emphasis added). The 
literature on masked collective action offers a different explanation. It interprets identity 
creation as revealing aspects of the multifaceted self: “The mask is related to transition, 
metamorphoses, the violation of natural boundaries, to mockery and familiar nicknames. It 
contains the playful element of life” (Bakhtin, 1968, 40). While this chapter has compared 
cases of deception with cases of honesty for the purpose of analytical clarity, in practice all 
cases contain both aspects as the boundaries between reality and fiction are blurred. Refer-
ring to the Guy Fawkes mask (V-mask) employed by Anonymous, Cambre (2014, 318) 
states: “The generative trait of the V-mask, as Deleuzian multiplicity, like the quality of 
undecideability, ensures resistance to representation because it provides a riddle rather than 
a clear relationship, it is a non-identity acting as-if an identity, but instead of choosing one 
or the other it oscillates between them. It rejects dominant ‘either/or’ alternatives”. Rather 
than viewing the contradictory freedoms as mutually exclusive, I suggest that we under-
stand them as interacting dialectically. 
The dialectic of anonymity’s contradictory freedoms is further complicated by a normative 
aspect. While the division in the dichotomies of freedoms advancing and undermining 
equality might be a helpful heuristic, it is also necessary to think about the positive and 
negative effects within each freedom. Suzanne Dovi (2009), for example, argues that ex-
clusion contributes to democracy, as the access of privileged groups needs to be restricted 
in public decision-making. In the same vein, we can observe that submission to commonly 
established rules and deception as an expression of the multifaceted subject are all positive 
aspects that contribute to democratic life, while inclusion can further privilege the more 
powerful, subversion can compromise security, and honesty might lead to hurt.  
One further step is necessary to fully understand anonymity in participatory spaces. As 
discussed above, the academic debate on anonymity provides several suggestions as to how 
to differentiate particular types of anonymity. Authors speak of pseudonymity, physical 
anonymity, discursive anonymity, offline anonymity, online anonymity, self-anonymity, 
other-anonymity (Scott, 1999), agent anonymity, recipient anonymity, and process ano-
nymity (Wallace, 1999). The definition developed here, in contrast, is broad enough to 
encompass all of them, but in turn loses the sharp distinctions offered by these terms. In-
stead of developing complicated terminologies of subtypes, I believe that the spatial theory 
developed in this thesis can help to sharpen our view of different forms of anonymity, while 
not losing the macro view afforded by the definition of anonymity advanced here. The 
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spatial theory (Chapter 2) differentiates between physical, social, and discursive spatiali-
ties. Each of these dimensions, as I will briefly show here, can explain particular contextual 
conditions that determine the different forms that anonymity takes.  
The physical dimension of space draws attention to the physical things that constitute ano-
nymity; in other words, it depends on the materiality of the medium. These things include 
pens and paper, marker pens and bathroom walls, keyboards and computer screens, type-
writers, masks, hoods, veils, voting booths, and even human bodies (when they are so nu-
merous that they become indifferentiable). All these things constitute new interfaces be-
tween communicators. What is curious about these interfaces is that they both mediate 
communication and interrupt identification. This interruptive communication allows for the 
constitution of new self-reifications through which the subject exerts presence. The specific 
materiality of the things that interrupt identification plays an essential role. The perceived 
reality of the identity, for example, differs depending on whether physical masks or digital 
pseudonyms are used. The socio-cultural identity of the speaker is constructed differently 
if a political message is written on a bathroom wall or in a newspaper as a letter to the 
editor. This is well illustrated by the hood that came to represent the murder of Trayvon 
Martin. Nguyen (2015, 792) writes: “Because clothing is both contiguous and not contigu-
ous with what it covers – skin, flesh – it is a mutable boundary that asserts itself within a 
field of matter, forcing us to confront the intimacy between bodies and things, and the in-
terface between their amalgam and the environment”. The raced and classed object of the 
hood articulates a representative claim (Saward, 2010) making the absent Martin present. 
A special case among the things that interrupt identity are large assemblages of human 
bodies. Here it is the quantity of bodies that impedes individual identification and thus 
interrupts the continuous identity performance of the subject. The visible bodies themselves 
create an interface that articulates a new collective identity. 
Turning to the social dimension of democratic spatiality, we can see how the constellation 
of human bodies, their emotive connections and power relations affect which form ano-
nymity takes. These relations between anonymous participants do not simply emerge out 
of nothing in a participatory space. Rather, they partly mirror and partly suspend and re-
configure external relations. Their respective social locations afford different power re-
sources to protesters and riot police, affluent and poor party funders, and heterosexual and 
homosexual graffiti scribblers. These pre-established hierarchies can be disrupted or am-
plified by anonymity. Alison Kinney (2016) explains how the material object of the hood 
reverses its meaning when it is employed by activists to protest against racism in compari-
son to its use in executions. While the anonymity afforded by the hood enhances the 
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position of protesters, it dehumanizes and degrades the condemned criminal. Similarly, the 
veil can amplify patriarchal structures disciplining its wearer, while also empowering its 
wearer to confront state repression (Zakaria, 2017). To understand specific cases of anon-
ymous political engagement, the pre-existing and the newly emerging power structures de-
fining social space, thus, need to be taken into account.  
Finally, discursive space and in particular the configuration of identity knowledge form 
another crucial contextual condition of anonymous political participation. First, it matters 
which identity knowledge is conveyed by the identifiers used (pseudonyms, social security 
numbers, initials, etc.) and which identity markers (gender, age, ethnicity, etc.) of the le-
gally identified and physically embodied persona are revealed. Second, it matters who is 
anonymous within a participatory space and who is not. The confrontation between un-
masked protesters who are legally prohibited from covering their faces and masked riot 
police is an obvious example. A more subtle level can be illustrated by the question of 
whether the identities behind online pseudonyms anonymizing users-to-user interaction are 
known to operators of websites and accessible to hackers and government agents. Third, it 
matters whether or not anonymous participants have previous knowledge of each other and 
have pre-established social relations. In workplace participation via anonymous online 
feedback tools, for example, participants might be formally unidentified but as the ano-
nymity set is small, their identity might be easily deduced via social cues such as recog-
nizable wording or content (Hayne et al., 2003). In short, the form anonymity takes is af-
fected by the constellation of discursive space and the question of who knows what about 
whom. Together, the contextual constellations of physical things that interrupt identifica-
tion and mediate communication, social power relations, and discursive identity knowledge 
explain which form anonymity takes.  
This chapter has shown how anonymity can function as a practice of disidentification and 
can contribute to a politics of becoming by reconfiguring presence in the space of appear-
ance. As illustrated in the discussion of the history of anonymity, this phenomenon has 
grown in importance throughout history from anonymous publishing to anonymous online 
communication. The emerging digital age has rapidly accelerated this process. While a 
hundred years ago anonymity was mostly the privilege of those with access to publishing, 
already the invention of the telephone made anonymity more accessible. With the advent 
of the internet, however, anonymity has become an inherent aspect of everyday communi-
cation. Online tools both mediate communication and simultaneously interrupt identifica-
tion. A decentring of identity assemblages through anonymity becomes an integral part of 
our selves. The next and final chapter will explore which new democratic subjectivities 
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emerge through anonymous online communication, what this means for freedom and equal-
ity in participatory spaces, and what potential it harbours for the subject to change.  
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6. Becoming Cyborg: Toward a Digital Politics of Presence*  
 
The radio is one-sided when it should be two-. It is purely an 
apparatus for distribution, for mere sharing out. So here is a 
positive suggestion: change this apparatus over from distri-
bution to communication. The radio would be the finest pos-
sible communication apparatus in public life, a vast network 
of pipes. That is to say, it would be if it knew how to receive 
as well as to transmit, how to let the listener speak as well as 
hear, how to bring him into a relationship instead of isolat-
ing him. 
Bertolt Brecht, 1932 
 
6.1. Introduction 
Technological progress has always inspired imaginations of democratic futures. Bertolt 
Brecht’s vision of a decentralized multi-user network of communication via radio frequen-
cies developed in the 1930s bears some striking resemblances to today’s digital communi-
cation network known as the internet. Brecht’s radio democracy was followed by concep-
tions of teledemocracy that imagined telephone and later teletext voting following televised 
political debates (Arterton, 1987). New electronic communication tools are also central to 
discussions about participatory democracy (Chapter 3), for example in Barber’s strong de-
mocracy employing electronic townhall meetings and televoting (Barber, 2003 [1984]; 
1998; 1997). With the spread of popular access to the internet in the 1990s, such imaginings 
found new inspiration. The poststructuralist-inspired discussions about cyberdemocracy 
envisioned a new digital public sphere (Vedel, 2006). Anonymity was at the heart of these 
debates, which assumed that the interruption of established identity performances would 
enable the exploration of alternative selves.  
Cyberdemocracy viewed the democratic subject as being reconfigured in the context of 
new spatialities captured under the term “cyberspace”, which was seen as a sphere separate 
 
* Parts of this chapter have been published in a research article in Communication Theory, see 
Asenbaum, 2019b. Other parts have been published in a research article in Politics & Gender, see 
Asenbaum, 2019a. 
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from “real life”. Here the democratic subject would dwell as a disembodied self, perceptible 
only by virtue of the words it uttered. While the disembodiment thesis has been rigorously 
criticized from feminist, postcolonialist, and materialist perspectives and is commonly 
acknowledged as outdated in current debates (Beyer, 2012; Kennedy, 2006; Robinson, 
2007), the notion of cyberspace as a realm of equality and freedom overcoming corporeal 
constraints is still a matter of debate. In the recent Politicizing Digital Space Trevor Smith 
(2017) outlines the digital as a realm of disembodied universal reason:  
The simple act of going online and entering into a pseudonymous space auto-
matically strips away identities, as your body and social background are invis-
ible to the other commenters as a source of prejudice… Online interactions 
within a website dedicated to political discussion are the ultimate form of Car-
tesian subjectivity, as what we think and share with others is what defines us to 
the others, not the sight of our bodies. (47) 
Smith employs Arendt’s concept of the space of appearance to argue that in digital space 
all that counts is the content of speech and action, while bodies and their inscribed identities 
are left behind. According to Smith, digital space entails “separating political participation 
from presence” (54). This separation of the embodied subject from its political articulation 
is necessary because “[b]ecoming a political subject means elevating oneself out of the 
particulars of identity and into the realm of universal concern” (43). 
In this final chapter, I will contest the disembodiment thesis as articulated by Smith and 
many cyberdemocrats before him. I will make the argument that a politics of becoming 
through disidentification employing online anonymity does not preclude embodied pres-
ence. Rather than overcoming a politics of presence by leaving the body behind when en-
tering cyberspace, the chapter will show how digital modes of communication reconfigure 
a politics of presence. Performing the self through the technological tools that both mediate 
and interrupt identity illustrates how presence is always a mode of becoming. Rather than 
understanding the democratic subject in digital space as defined as universal being stripped 
of all particularities and existing merely through reasoned verbal articulation, the chapter 
will explore the materialities both of digital space and of the subjectivities emerging on its 
grounds.  
In the previous chapter, I argued that the space of appearance does not rely on the visibility 
of the body. This, however, does not entail leaving the body behind and understanding the 
space of appearance as a realm of universal reason. Rather, bodies and identities always 
matter in participatory spaces. Here, once again, Butler’s work is insightful. Looking at the 
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role of smartphones and social media in street protest, Butler challenges the disembodiment 
thesis. Rather than seeing physical corporeality and the materiality of spaces as sperate 
from a digital world, Butler observes how the digital and the analogue blend into new sub-
jectivities and new spatial configurations: 
And if this conjuncture of street and media constitutes a very contemporary 
version of the public sphere, then bodies on the line have to be thought of as 
both there and here, now and then, transported and stationary, with very differ-
ent political consequences following from those two modalities of space and 
time. (Butler, 2015, 94) 
Elizabeth Grosz points to the transformative potential of such reconfigurations of digital 
and physical materiality. They disrupt conventional perceptions and open up spaces of be-
coming for new subjectivities to emerge: 
The virtuality of the space of computing, and of inscription more generally, is 
transforming at least in part how we understand what it is to be in space… it 
threatens to disrupt or reconfigure the very nature of information, communica-
tion, and the types of social interaction and movement they require. (Grosz, 
2001, 87) 
These reconfigurations of space uncover potential for “transformations, the usage of 
spaces outside their conventional functions, the possibility of being otherwise – that 
is, of becoming” (90).  
From the beginnings of the popular use of the internet to this day, the imagination of online 
communication was dominated by metaphors of space and movement through space as 
reflected in Butler’s and Grosz’s statements. When subjects go online, they surf through a 
network of websites and homepages employing browsers such as Safari. As space cowboys 
and cybernauts they push the electronic frontier further. They travel on the information 
superhighway to visit various chatrooms and forums. Their navigations are limited by fire-
walls and paywalls. On their search for information they follow others, become trapped in 
echo chambers or leak information from secret spaces to the public sphere. And, of course, 
all this happens in cyberspace.  
But what the “space” in cyberspace stands for – and thus what constitutes the spatiality of 
cyberspace – has changed over time. Today, a radical counter thesis has developed that 
opposes the notion of cyberspace as a separate realm following its own unique logics. As 
reflected in the quotations from Butler and Grosz, analogue and physical space appear to 
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merge. Current theories argue that through the Internet of Things, which positions the hu-
man subject amid a network of various smart devices and common things such as clothing, 
refrigerators, cars, and thermostats equipped with sensors, chips, and smart technology, 
new spaces emerge. These spaces overcome the distinction between analogue and digital 
space, so that the two collapse into one. While I find a lot of value in this position, it also 
leaves us with a problem. If digital space and analogue space are conflated, we lack an 
adequate conceptual framework in which to talk about two things that, intuitively, appear 
to be very different. Does it not make a difference whether I start up a conversation with a 
stranger in the supermarket or on Facebook? Rather than collapsing the digital and the 
physical, we need to understand how the two relate to each other and interact. 
In this chapter, I will generate a theory of digital space that neither understands the digital 
and the physical as separate spheres nor seeks to entirely collapse the distinction between 
the two. Rather, I will explain them as spatial assemblages of physical, social, discursive, 
and digital things. Assemblage theory provides a productive way to understand how the 
digital and the physical relate to each other, while maintaining distinct concepts to describe 
them. This theory will provide new answers to the question of what it means to appear and 
what role the body plays in digital spaces. Drawing on current debates in corporeal cyber-
feminism, critical race studies, and digital new materialism, I will re-read difference dem-
ocratic thought and generate an understanding of a digital politics of presence. Employing 
the concepts generated throughout this thesis, I will argue that it is the disruption of estab-
lished identity performances mediated via interfaces that generates a moment of disidenti-
fication through anonymity as part of the expression of diverse and embodied identities in 
a digital politics of presence. 
To this end, I will first revisit the poststructuralist cyberdemocracy discourse of the 1990s, 
which imagined the self as disembodied. I will then consider the criticism articulated 
against the disembodiment thesis in critical race studies, which condemns the invisibility 
of difference. To find conceptions that overcome the disembodiment thesis, I will engage 
with early cyberfeminist and current corporeal cyberfeminist debates, which offer notions 
of the digital subject as both embodied and transformative. The next section will draw on 
the concepts of the cyborg (Haraway, 1991 [1985]) and evocative objects (Turkle, 1984) 
that will help to explain how the digital and the physical relate to each other. This will 
enable the generation of a new theory of digital space explained as assemblage of physical, 
social, and discursive things. I will then demonstrate how the politics of presence is recon-
figured through these new digital spatial assemblages by exploring several examples of 
digital online engagement. 
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6.2. Revisiting E-topia: Of Disembodied Subjects in Cyberspace  
 
[Being online] means existing in pure lan-
guage… in cyberspace, one dwells in language.  
and through language. 
Internet user cited in Markham, 1998, 204 
 
In the 1990s, the discourse about cyberdemocracy came to prominence, which theorized 
new means of digital communication from a poststructuralist perspective. This discourse 
can be understood in the context of two preconditions. First, the debate on cyberdemocracy 
was spurred by the development of the world wide web in 1989 and the spread of internet 
access in the Global North. Second, this socio-technological development was paralleled 
by increasing academic interest in poststructuralist thought. With Judith Butler’s theory of 
performativity adding to and updating the thought of scholars such as Michel Foucault and 
Jacques Derrida and popularizing these continental European discussions in the US, post-
structuralism acquired an almost hegemonic position in social theory. Theories of the con-
struction of reality through language appeared to be realized in the early popular use of the 
internet that was dominated by textuality and the absence of visual elements. What ap-
peared as new worlds of online interaction became so important, so mesmerizing, that 
scholars paid little attention to its material infrastructure. Virtual reality in cyberdemocratic 
writing is often compared to hallucinating from drug use or travelling to another universe.  
In cyberdemocracy, disembodied democratic subjects, perceptible only by textual expres-
sion, move in cyberspace as a parallel world separated from analogue reality. The disem-
bodied subject appealed not only to deliberative democrats as cyberspace promised to re-
alize a public sphere free from domination (Bohman, 2004; Ward, 1997), but also to post-
modern theorists (Poster, 1997), unwittingly replicating the modern dichotomies of online 
and offline, body and mind, reality and illusion. Waskul and Douglass (1997, 388), for 
example, write: 
When on-line, one does not occupy a fixed physical form. That is, in cyberspace 
there is no such thing as a body, at least not in the sense that we inhabit a body. 
All that exists are fleeting electronic images loosely associated with a self-se-
lected screen name (another fleeting electronic image). In this sense, 
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cyberselves are literally disembodied. The self is freed from any physical form 
and thus challenges the traditionally perceived relationship between body and 
self.  
In what follows, I will first explore the spatial metaphor of cyberspace that is so cen-
tral in cyberdemocratic debates. Then, I will investigate the role of anonymity in the 
emergence of digital subjectivities.  
6.2.1. Cyberspace: Pushing the Electronic Frontier  
The core concept of the cyberdemocracy discourse is cyberspace, a realm imagined as a 
sphere of pure discursive interaction. The promise of cyberspace fosters a sphere of free-
dom and equality by breaking with the logics of the analogue world around it. Cyberspace 
is perceived as discontinuing – as interrupting – “real life”. Cyberspace is: 
… another life-world, a parallel universe, offering the intoxicating prospect of 
actually fulfilling – with a technology very nearly achieved – a dream thou-
sands of years old: the dream of transcending the physical world, fully alive, at 
will, to dwell in some Beyond – to be empowered or enlightened there, along 
or with others, and to return. (Benedikt, 1991, 131) 
As spatial interruption, cyberspace is understood as dispensing with the limitations 
of the analogue sphere and generating a utopian space, a separate realm perceived as 
a mystical dream world: “Cyberspace is a habitat of the imagination, a habitat for the 
imagination. Cyberspace is the place where conscious dreaming meets subconscious 
dreaming, a landscape of rational magic, of mystical reason” (Novak, 1991, 266).  
Cyberspace appears to work according to entirely different rules. It undermines all 
logics of common space and throws reality into disorder (Lipton, 1996, 336). In an 
(auto)ethnographic study, Annette Markham (1998, 23) recalls her experience of go-
ing online, which felt “like entering a strange new world where the very metaphysics 
defied my comprehension of how worlds should work”. This transcendental spatiality 
of electronic networks is founded on one core element: While in analogue space dis-
tance stands in relation to movement and in particular speed of movement, in cyber-
space all distance is overcome. The world appears to shrink in the palm of the user’s 
hand. Interlocutors are perceived as immanently present, while they are physically 
located far away, which results in a reconfiguration of social relations. As an early 
internet user (cited in Turkle, 1995, 198) explains: 
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It was a lot easier to talk to people [about my problems]… because they’re not 
there. I mean, they are there but they’re not there. I mean, you could sit there 
and you could tell them about your problems and you don’t have to worry about 
running into them on the street the next day.  
Collapsing distance and eradicating travel time signals “the end of space through cyber-
space” (Nunes, 1997, 172). A new kind of spatiality emerges that is perceived as “a ‘non-
space’, a hyperdimensional realm that we enter through technology” (Barnes, 1996, 195).  
Apart from the collapse of distance, what characterizes cyberspace as a “nonspace” is its 
perceived lack of materiality. A space entirely constructed of zeros and ones, of digits and 
bytes, of digital simulation, cyberspace is detached from physicality (Markham, 1998, 86). 
This point is also crucial for understanding the cyberdemocratic notion of subjectivity. As 
the digital replaces the physical, cyberdemocracy is defined by the invisible subject. Ano-
nymity strips subjects of their bodies tainted with identities that are subject to discrimina-
tion. Cyberspace promises to liberate the human spirit from its fleshy cage. The notion of 
disembodiment in cyberspace originates in the very text that coined the term “cyberspace”. 
In the cyberpunk novel Neuromancer William Gibson (2016 [1984], 6) writes about “the 
bodiless exaltation of cyberspace”, “contempt for the flesh”, and how the hero of the story 
was denied access to cyberspace and “fell into the prison of his own flesh”. The notion of 
disembodiment created in this dystopian science fiction novel resonated with the personal 
experiences of many early “cybernauts”: “When I spend a lot of time in disembodied 
spaces, I forget my body. Often, I don’t remember it until the physical pain is extreme, and 
then I resent my body’s intrusion on my life online” (Markham, 1998, 59). They often felt 
like stripping off the body and leaving it behind in the world of flesh when entering the 
world of text: “By logging onto my computer, I… exist separately from my body in ‘places’ 
formed by the exchange of messages” (Markham, 1998, 17). Cyberspace, thus, reconfig-
ured not just space, but also the identities expressed in this “nonspace” as online “where I 
am and who I am are up for grabs” (Lipton, 1996, 342). This kind of identity play “offers 
the possibility of forgetting about the real body” (344). 
6.2.2. Exploring the Multiple Self Through Online Anonymity  
These notions of disembodiment and anonymity feature prominently in the central works 
that define the cyberdemocratic discourse. The Network Nation by Starr Roxanne Hiltz and 
Murray Turoff published as early as 1978 – almost two decades before Castells’ The Rise 
of the Network Society (1996) – constitutes one of the founding texts of cyberdemocracy. 
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The book provides detailed empirical work on computer conferencing, comparable to cur-
rent synchronous online chats. As in these early forms of digital communication interlocu-
tors were unidentified by default, this study provides one of the earliest cases of online 
anonymity. Hiltz and Turoff’s analysis resonates with the concept of anonymity developed 
in the previous chapter. Online anonymity does not simply entail the negation of established 
identity; rather, the authors observe acts of identity creation via pseudonyms: “A pen name 
is like a mask or a costume; it helps people to play a role in a conference” (95f). The study 
examines how anonymity enables participants to “feel more free to express disagreement” 
(27) (subversion). Different, ephemeral pen names can be used for deliberate deception 
(89). But anonymity also facilitates the venting of true sentiments, as users “suggest poten-
tially unpopular ideas” (27) (honesty). Moreover, anonymity can fuel the expression of 
aggression toward others (exclusion) (29, 91). Most importantly, however, anonymity con-
tributes to inclusion: 
General appearance, such as height, weight, and other culturally determined 
aspects of “attractiveness” and the clothes, makeup, jewelry, and other props 
used by persons to present themselves to others, provide an important filtering 
context for face-to-face communication. So do the visibly apparent cues that 
are provided by sex, age, and race and by visually apparent physical handicaps. 
In general, those aspects of self that are devalued by a culture – such as being 
black, female, old, “ugly”, or disabled – have the effect of acting as a general 
stigma… [Through online anonymity, however,] it is the content of the com-
munication that can be focused on, without any irrelevant status cues distorting 
the reception of the information… (Hiltz & Turoff, 1978, 78, 91) 
The observations of Hiltz and Turoff as cyberdemocratic pioneers of the 1970s strongly 
resonate with the “e-topias” of the 1990s.15 Howard Rheingold’s work is usually cited as 
the most influential and characteristic of the ’90s discourse. Already in 1991 in the essay 
“The Great Equalizer” Rheingold describes the internet as promoting a shift in the power 
balance from governments to citizens’ grassroots movements employing new means of 
communication to feed their ideas into political discourse. In The Virtual Community 
(1993) he is more cautious and elaborates the dangers of government surveillance and com-
modification of the cyberdemocratic public sphere (276ff). The focus of the book, however, 
is Rheingold’s personal experiences of the WELL (Whole Earth ‘Lectronic Link), one of 
 
15 I borrow this term from William Mitchell (1999), who is himself not a cyberdemocrat but a 
more cyborgian-inspired theorist, see 6.4.  
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the oldest virtual communities with discussion forums on different topics. Anonymity is a 
core feature of this kind of textual interaction: “Mask and self-disclosures are part of the 
grammar of cyberspace, the way quick cuts and intense images are part of the grammar of 
television. The grammar of CMC [Computer-Mediated Communication] media involves a 
syntax of identity play: new identities, false identities, multiple identities, exploratory iden-
tities, are available in different manifestations of the medium” (147). 
While Rheingold welcomes the fluidity of identity boundaries, he conceptualizes digital 
identity performances that diverge from analogue identity as deception. Biological men 
taking on women’s personae online are perceived as imposters (164ff). To illustrate this, 
Rheingold tells a story that is cited repeatedly in many cyberdemocratic texts. An online 
character called Joan in some accounts (Poster, 1997, 222f; Rheingold, 1993, 164f; Turkle, 
1995, 228f) and Julie Graham in others (Stone, 1991, 82ff; Wajcman, 2004, 68), claiming 
to be a psychologist based in New York who had been paralyzed and muted in a car acci-
dent, had won the trust of several women in online communities, who shared intimate de-
tails. When it later turned out that Joan/Julie was really Alex (Lewin in Wajcman, 2004), a 
psychiatrist who was curious about women’s private lives, many users felt exploited and 
betrayed.  
In Life on the Screen Sherry Turkle (1995) tells the same story. While she also frames the 
story of Joan/Alex as deception (228f), she goes into greater depth as to why such deception 
takes place and observes how internet users “use the anonymity of cyberspace to project 
alternate personae” (209). These online personae are not perceived as fake as such, but 
rather as a form of living out a true aspect of the self, which is hidden in common public 
interaction. Thus, “donning a mask, adopting a persona, is a step toward reaching a deeper 
truth about the real” (219). Through digital communication the lines between analogue re-
ality and digital reality blur. What is real is a matter of subjective perception. It is not de-
fined by whether or not communication is technologically mediated (see Markham, 1998, 
120). In an interview, a teenage girl complains about her friends disappearing behind com-
puter screens: “Now they just want to talk online. It used to be that things weren’t so arti-
ficial. We phoned each other every afternoon” (237). While the interviewee perceives tel-
ephone conversations as real – as they are conveyed through an old, naturalized medium 
– online communication appears as fake and isolating. According to Turkle, these shifts in 
the perception of reality do not indicate that the virtual is just as real as analogue reality. 
Rather, online subjectivity is situated in a liminal space between the real and the artificial: 
“In the real-time communities of cyberspace, we are dwellers on the threshold between the 
real and the virtual, unsure of our footing, inventing ourselves as we go along” (10). 
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Turkle provides an extensive ethnographic investigation of MUDs (Multi-User Dun-
geons/Domains) – online spaces for synchronous textual role play, where users collectively 
create an interactive story. In common and one-on-one chat conversations, they construct 
online personae and objects and navigate through textual sceneries. As in analogue role 
play or improvisational theatre, participants can investigate and experiment with sides of 
their personality which are usually excluded from the continuous identity performances in 
everyday interaction. Some users even claim that their online identities feel more real than 
their analogue identities: “I feel very different online. I am a lot more outgoing, less inhib-
ited. I would say I feel more like myself. But that’s a contradiction. I feel more like who I 
wish I was” (179). And another user explains: “I am not one thing, I am many things. Each 
part gets to be more fully expressed in MUDs than in the real world. So even though I play 
more than one self on MUDs, I feel more like ‘myself’ when I’m MUDding” (185). Other 
studies have observed this sense of experiencing a more authentic self online (Bargh et al., 
2002; Markham, 1998, 202). Turkle investigates online role play as a therapeutic activity, 
in which hidden and underdeveloped qualities can be practiced and eventually carried over 
into analogue interaction (189ff). This is why Turkle calls MUDs a “transitional space” for 
“reaching greater freedom” (263). 
In MUDs identities are multiple and ephemeral so that users do not have to commit to one 
of them. This also includes the common practice of gender change, as users define the sex 
of their characters as female, male or neuter. As Turkle tries to perform male characters 
online, she reports feeling freer, more confident, and relieved of certain social pressures 
(210ff). Another female interviewee reports that when communicating through male char-
acters she felt that her firm and strict attitude was appreciated and not perceived as “bitchy” 
(221). A male user, on the other hand, reports feeling relieved of the demands of competi-
tiveness and that he could engage in more cooperative interaction without being perceived 
as too soft or effeminate (216ff). Thus, online gender swapping can relieve users from gen-
der stereotypes which can be perceived as liberating by users of all sexes (see Bruckman, 
1996). 
Turkle’s notion of the decentred, multiple self is deeply rooted in postmodern thought. The 
rhizomatic structure of the internet itself embodies the fragmentation of the online self. 
Turkle illustrates this by the curious digital object called a “window”: 
Windows provide a way for a computer to place you in several contexts at the 
same time… [W]indows have become a powerful metaphor for thinking about 
the self as a multiple, distributed system… The life practice of windows is that 
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of a decentred self that exists in many worlds and plays many roles at the same 
time. (Turkle, 1995, 13f)  
The notion of the internet as an inherently postmodern medium is also reflected in the hy-
pertext structure of the world wide web, through which users navigate. This replaces the 
modern linear logic of teleological thinking with a rhizomatic logic of infinitely multiple 
directionalities. Hypertext increases the reader’s freedom and breaks up established hierar-
chies: “Electronic readers… can genuflect before the text or spit on its altar, add to a text 
or subtract from it, rearrange it, revise it, suffuse it with commentary. The boundary be-
tween creator and critic (another current vexation) simply vanishes” (Lanham, 1993, 6). 
George Landow (1992) elaborates the political implications of these novel configurations 
of subjectivity. While modern writing practices created a stark asymmetry between the 
writer with sole power over the text and the reader as its passive consumer, hypertext flat-
tens these hierarchies. Not only can the reader alter the text, the main liberating force of 
hypertext consists in allowing the reader to decide the order in which text passages are read. 
Thus, readers freely navigate through the text according to their preferences. This funda-
mentally changes the approach to understanding text. While textual interpretation methods 
such as hermeneutics assume that by careful interpretation the correct, essential meaning 
can be detected, in hypertext no one reads the same version of a text as the orders of text 
passages are nearly endless – as are its subjective interpretations (Landow, 1992, 90ff, 
281ff). 
The rhizomatic nature of hypertext also plays a central role in what is arguably the most 
elaborate attempt at developing a poststructuralist theory of new communication technolo-
gies presented in the work of media theorist Mark Poster (2001; 1999; 1995; 1990). He 
argues that the deep transformations of communication cause profound reconfigurations of 
the subject. These reconfigurations carry within them democratic potential:  
the mode of information enacts a radical reconfiguration of language, one 
which constitutes subjects outside the pattern of the rational, autonomous indi-
vidual. This familiar modern subject is displaced by the mode of information 
in favour of one that is multiplied, disseminated and decentred, continuously 
interpellated as an unstable identity. At the level of culture, this instability poses 
both dangers and challenges which, if they become part of a political move-
ment, or are connected with the politics of feminism, ethnic/racial minorities, 
gay and lesbian positions, may lead to a fundamental challenge to modern so-
cial institutions and structures. (Poster, 1995, 57) 
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Poster elucidates how the modern subject of the Enlightenment period is constituted by a 
stable relationship between senders and receivers of communication, who are fixed entities 
positioned in time and space through words that function as a clear representation of intel-
ligible reality. Senders call upon readers as subjects through their sole authority – thus au-
thor – via the word. This configuration is drastically changed through digital communica-
tion: while the spatial distance between senders and receivers remains, the temporal differ-
ence is eliminated. The rhizomatic structure of hypertext alters the representational charac-
ter of the word. Text takes on a performative character, continuously re-situating both send-
ers and receivers in a process of mutual interpellation. Thus, “the subject can only be un-
derstood as partially stable, as repeatedly reconfiguring at different points of time and 
space, as non-self-identical and therefore as always partly Other” (Poster, 1995, 59). 
Like Rheingold, Poster (1997, 222) explains anonymity as a key feature of cyberspace: 
On the Internet individuals construct their identities, doing so in relation to on-
going dialogue, not as an act of pure consciousness… [This] does connote a 
“democratization” of subject constitution because the acts of course are not 
limited to one-way address and not constrained by the gender and ethnic traces 
inscribed in face-to-face communications.  
The mere fact that gender and other identity categories have to be actively chosen and can 
be completely rejected by creating neuter characters provides space for resistance to ana-
logue identity hierarchies:  
Internet communities function as places of difference from and resistance to 
modern society. In a sense, they serve the function of a Habermasian public 
sphere, however reconfigured, without intentionally or even actually being one. 
They are places not of the presence of validity-claims or the actuality of critical 
reason, but of the inscription of new assemblages of self-constitution. (Poster, 
1997, 224) 
The postmodern discussions of democratic subjectivity in digital communication under-
taken by Rheingold, Turkle, Poster, and many others (Benedikt, 1991a; Holmes, 1997; 
Markham, 1998; Waskul & Douglass, 1997) generate invaluable insights for democratic 
thought. While these debates are often perceived as naïve in hindsight, it is important to 
understand that the early internet was indeed a more democratic place: not in terms of ac-
cess, but in terms of its participatory characteristics (Walker Rettberg, 2014, 12f). Most 
importantly, cyberdemocrats highlight how anonymity facilitates the exploration of the 
multiple self. It expands the freedom of the democratic subject to change and opens the 
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perspective on digital communication as part of a politics of becoming. The creation of 
alternative online personae can be seen as a rejection of hegemonic identity interpellations, 
a temporary interruption of identification. Yet, their understanding of cyberspace as a 
sealed-off realm that is separate from analogue space, one that can serve to leave the body 
behind, is problematic. For example, Turkle (1995, 9) claims that by employing digital 
communications “[w]e are able to step through the looking glass”. Employing the metaphor 
of wonderland characterizes virtual reality as unreal, as a dream from which one can awake. 
Elaborating her thesis of the multiple self, Turkle cites an interviewee: “Why grant such 
superior status to the self that has the body when the selves that don’t have bodies are able 
to have different kinds of experiences?” (14) So, is cyberspace really disembodied? Does 
the space of appearance described by cyberdemocrats only allow content to appear, as con-
tended by Smith (2017)? To suggest otherwise, I will explore the work of the critics of 
cyberdemocracy and their alternative conceptions. 
6.3. Diversity Reconfigured: Gender and Race in Cyberspace 
From the second half of the 1990s to the early 2000s, cyberdemocratic thought was criti-
cally expanded. The critical response to the postmodern disembodied self draws attention 
to racialized and gendered bodies both online and offline. What is interesting about these 
discussions is that while on the one hand they promote diversity online by creating spaces 
to perform marginalized identities, very much in line with the difference democratic notion 
of a politics of presence, on the other hand they champion self-transformations through 
anonymity. The two do not appear antithetical, but as complimentary elements of an eman-
cipatory political strategy. 
6.3.1. From Default Whiteness to Claiming Spaces for Racial Diversity 
While much of the classical cyberdemocratic work discussed above addresses gender as an 
example of the fluidity of online identities, scholars in critical race studies shift the focus 
to Race in Cyberspace (Kolko et al., 2000; see also Bailey, 1996). In the textual online 
communication of the 1990s, race had become entirely invisible, much more so than gen-
der. Whereas in MUDs gender is a required category in a user’s character description and 
is also evident in most pseudonyms in online chats, race is absent. Moreover, many users 
in anonymous online spaces ask their interlocutors for their “asl”: age, sex, and location. 
The requested basic information excludes race, which might be perceived as an inappropri-
ate or otherwise uncomfortable question. Any expression of race is often perceived as ag-
gressive, controversial, and attention seeking (Kolko, 2000, 213ff). The mere textuality of 
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early online communication provided users with the opportunity to finally forget about a 
topic commonly perceived as controversial and divisive. This results in “default whiteness” 
(Nakamura, 2002, 46ff). Users whose physical skin colour is not white are under pressure 
to negate their racial identity and try to “pass” as white. The ideal of equality through dis-
embodiment appears to have homogenizing and conformist effects. According to Naka-
mura, while whites express themselves freely, people with other skin colours are limited in 
their self-expression (35). To understand the role of race in online communication, accord-
ing to Kolko, it is also crucial to bear in mind that the internet is not a neutral medium. It 
is designed predominantly by a specific group of people, namely white, middle-class men 
from the Global North. Default whiteness is a design choice (Kolko, 2000, 213ff). 
If Nakamura and colleagues criticize online anonymity for the practice of identity negation 
that erases non-white identity from computer screens, then the other core element of ano-
nymity, identity creation through the construction of racially heterogeneous selves, could 
contribute to enhancing the diversity that these authors advocate. Alas, what Nakamura 
terms “identity tourism” – changing the sex, race or other identity attributes of online iden-
tities – only serves to reproduce existing stereotypes:  
Chat-space participants who take on identities as samurai and geisha constitute 
the darker side of postmodern identity, since the “fluid selves” they create (and 
often so lauded by postmodern theorists) are done so in the most regressive and 
stereotyped of ways. These kinds of racial identity play stand as critique of the 
notion of the digital citizen as an ideal cogito whose subjectivity is liberated by 
cyberspace. On the contrary, only too often does one person’s “liberation” con-
stitute another’s recontainment within the realm of racialized discourse. 
(Nakamura, 2002, XV) 
Users constructing alternative racial identities rely on their limited knowledge and stereo-
typed conceptions of other cultures. Moreover, these constructions need to conform to the 
simplistic and reduced modes of online expression. Racial hierarchies are intertwined with 
gender hierarchies when white men perform heroic samurai while white women perform 
sexualized, docile geishas. According to Nakamura, identity tourism does not represent a 
shift in situatedness as experience of oppression, but rather a recreational endeavour expe-
riencing the self as an exoticized, oriental Other. The resulting racial, stereotyped, online 
personae deter participation of racial minorities and their expression of authentic racial 
identity (Nakamura, 2002; see also Fizek & Wasilewska, 2011; González, 2000; Robinson, 
2007). 
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To counter the problem of default whiteness and stereotyping, critical race scholars advo-
cate an active online presence of racially marginalized groups. They call for claiming 
spaces as a way of expressing difference through the digital embodiment of race. The figure 
of the decentred, fluid, and ephemeral self in cyberdemocratic discussions is opposed by a 
need for stability and clear representation in order to build resilient communities akin to 
difference democratic counterpublics (Kolko & Reid, 1998). Unlike whites, who wish to 
explore their multiplicity, many people with other skin colours living in white majority 
contexts already experience their identities as unpleasantly fragmented and disoriented and 
are longing for consistent identification (Nakamura, 2002, XVI). 
While these debates in critical race studies aptly criticize conceptions of cyberdemocratic 
post-racial selves, they also partly support the core ideals of cyberdemocracy. Nakamura 
(2002, 49) claims: “A diversification of the roles that are permitted and played can enable 
a thought-provoking detachment of race from the body and questioning of the essentialness 
of race as a category. Performing alternative versions of the self and race jams the ideology-
machine”. Nevertheless, these authors point to a crucial problem with the cyberdemocratic 
notion of disembodiment. The negation of established identities can obscure marginaliza-
tion and reinforce the hegemonic identity constructions in our heads. At this point, we are 
back to the dilemma of difference, as the mere continuation of analogue identities online 
limits the freedom of the subject to explore its multiple self. What is needed is a concept of 
a space of appearance, where embodied identities are perceptible yet free to change. 
6.3.2. Cyberfeminism: The Subversive Alliance of Women and Robots 
Debates around the term “cyberfeminism” might provide some answers to our predicament 
here. Early cyberfeminist thought takes a similarly critical position toward the cyberdemo-
cratic disembodiment thesis as that proposed by the critical race theories discussed above. 
They develop alternatives that envision the subject as physically embodied, gendered, and 
racially diverse. At the same time, however, they advance notions of identity transfor-
mation. Their main contributions can be seen in drawing attention to women in relation to 
new technologies and to the materiality of both physical and digital bodies.  
Cyberfeminism as a movement extends beyond academia and brings together discussions 
from three sources: feminist Science and Technology Studies (STS), digital artistic spaces 
such as the Old Boys Network (www.obn.org) and SubRosa (cyberfeminism.net), and dig-
ital spaces for women’s empowerment such as peer-to-peer groups conveying technologi-
cal knowledge and skills. The term “cyberfeminism” was simultaneously coined by the 
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British cultural theorist Sadie Plant and the Australian art collective VNS Matrix (Volkart, 
2004, 97). In their Cyberfeminist Manifesto, VNS Matrix (1991) write: 
we are the virus of the new world disorder 
rupturing the symbolic from within 
saboteurs of big daddy mainframe 
the clitoris is a direct line to the matrix 
VNS MATRIX 
In these few lines, many characteristics of cyberfeminism can be identified. The artistic 
style is used in a postmodern move to break up established logics and make way for novel 
subjectivities, which are connoted with femininity and the female body. 
These themes are also reflected in Sadie Plant’s Zeros + Ones (1997), one of the founding 
texts of cyberfeminism. Plant observes a disorder of binary identity codes rooted in Western 
thinking. This identity disruption is amplified by new possibilities of anonymous commu-
nication and identity play online. Plant illustrates this reconfiguration of gender identities 
along the computational logic of zeros and ones. While in traditional Western thought, the 
phallic 1 is associated with presence, power, and masculinity, women are associated with 
the 0 as absence, passivity, powerlessness, a nothing, a gap, a hole. In this metaphor, men 
are everything and women nothing, an image corroborated by the division of global wealth 
and political power. The computer disrupts this binary logic, however, and turns the estab-
lished binary upside down. In original computer punch cards, the 0 constitutes the some-
thing and the 1 the nothing, so that the world is “[n]o longer a world of ones and not-ones, 
or something and nothing, thing and gap, but rather not-holes and holes, not-nothing and 
nothing, gap and not-gap” (57).  
Plant invokes a post-gender vision. The book starts with the lines: “Those were the days 
when we were all at sea. It seems like yesterday to me. Species, sex, race, class: in those 
days none of this meant anything at all” (3). This image of boundless beings in the primor-
dial soup is mirrored in Plant’s observation of new identity formations in current societies. 
With female emancipation and the increasing acceptance of queer sexualities in Western 
societies, work relations and family models change. Gender identity, even in analogue em-
bodied interaction, is characterized by ephemerality: “No one is or has one sex at a time, 
but teems with sexes and sexualities too fluid, volatile, and numerous to count” (212). This 
trend toward new sexual subject formations is amplified by online communication and its 
possibilities for anonymous interaction and identity play (46, 112f). 
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Plant’s narrative of the history of computing relocates the focus to the forgotten contribu-
tions of women, such as Ada Lovelace whose work in the 1840s foresaw the potentials of 
computing beyond mere calculation (see also Evans, 2018). Primarily, though, women un-
dertook repetitive work to fulfil the plans developed by men. When weaving was automated 
through punch cards as an early form of computational automation, women moved to the 
industrial assembly lines and functioned as gearwheels along with industrial machines. To-
day it is women in the Global South, mainly in Asia, who assemble computers for their use 
in the West:  
When computers were vast systems of transistors and valves which needed to 
be coaxed into action, it was women who turned them on. They have not made 
some trifling contribution to an otherwise man-made tale: when computers be-
came the miniaturized circuits of silicon chips, it was women who assembled 
them… [W]hen computers were virtually real machines, women wrote the soft-
ware on which they ran. And when computer was a term applied to flesh and 
blood workers, the bodies which composed them were female. (37) 
Plant describes an intimate relationship between women and machines, both abused as tools 
of men. She invokes the many popular fictional narratives of robots, often designed as 
women and thus connoted with the idea of sexual objectification, who rebel against their 
human, male creators. The alliance between women and robots in a social revolution, up-
setting gender binaries and global work relations, is, however, imagined by Plant in less 
violent, rather evolutionary terms. With the change from industrial to information societies, 
muscular strength loses its relevance. Contemporary precarious work relations rather de-
mand flexibility, multi-tasking, emotional intelligence, and cooperative teamwork. Accord-
ing to Plant, women are much better equipped for current work relations through their his-
torical positioning as weavers and will soon outplay inflexible, stubborn, and competitive 
men. 
Plant’s work is reflected in many other cyberfeminist texts. Danet (1998) and Sick (2004), 
for example, describe online avatars as masquerade resulting in the performance of new 
gender hybridities and post-gender identities. And Blair (1998) describes anonymity’s ef-
fect of levelling power relations between men and women. Plant’s book undoubtedly con-
tributes a lot to cyberdemocratic thought, drawing attention to women’s subordinate role in 
both the Global North and South, their forgotten contributions to the development of tech-
nology, and the possibilities of new gender constellations online. Nevertheless, the book 
has been rightfully criticized for its techno-determinism and essentialism (Wajcman, 2004, 
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73). Similar to some debates in difference democracy, it affirms established stereotypes in 
positive terms. 
6.3.3. A Corporeal Cyberfeminism: Of Biological and Digital Bodies 
Another strand of cyberfeminism positions itself more critically toward utopian writing 
such as Plant’s and turns toward materiality:  
The utopian promise so often associated with the new technologies demand our 
sharpest critical attention, for it is foolish to believe that major social, eco-
nomic, and political issues can be addressed by throwing technology at them. 
As radical net critics have repeatedly pointed out, cyberspace is not an arena 
inherently free of the old feminist struggle against a patriarchal capitalist sys-
tem. The new media are embedded in a framework of pan-capitalist social re-
lations and economic, political, and cultural environments that are still deeply 
sexist and racist. (Fernandez & Wilding, 2002, 23f)  
This strand of literature, which I term “corporeal cyberfeminism”16, contributes to a new 
emerging materialism (Strowick, 2004, 303). Writers such as N. Katherine Hayles (1999), 
Allucquére Rosanne Stone (1991), Mark Dery (1996), Diane Gromala (1996), and Anne 
Balsamo (1996) criticize both the liberal Cartesian subject as rational thinker whose mind 
is superior to the body, and the postmodern disembodied subject, which navigates through 
cyberspace “as body-free environment, a place of escape from the corporeal embodiment 
of gender and race” (Balsamo, 1996, 123).  
Corporeal cyberfeminists provide two core arguments to counter the disembodiment thesis. 
First, they advocate privileging physical matter as the source and foundation of the digital. 
Stone (1991, 111), for example, contends: “No matter how virtual the subject may become, 
there is always a body attached. It may be off somewhere else – and that ‘somewhere else’ 
may be a privileged point of view – but consciousness remains firmly rooted in the physi-
cal”. And for Hayles (1999, 5) now is the time to “put back into the picture the flesh that 
continues to be erased in contemporary discussions about cybernetic subjects”. Second, 
beyond the acknowledgement of the physical, the digital body itself needs to be understood 
as matter. Reichle (2004, 253) claims that upon entering cyberspace, the body is divided 
into a biological body and a digital body. Turkle (1996, 121) explains digital bodies as 
“objects-to-think-with”. The digital body acquires materiality as a tool for self-exploration.  
 
16 Jessica Brophy (2010) uses the term “corporeal cyberfeminism” for the particular theory she de-
velops rather than the broader discourse to which I am referring here. 
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Corporeal cyberfeminism as sketched above provides a fruitful perspective for the ques-
tions addressed by this thesis. It acknowledges physical and digital embodiment allowing 
for the expression of difference and yet it is nevertheless open to self-transformation: “If 
we think of the body not as a product, but rather as a process – and embodiment as effect – 
we can begin to ask questions about how the body is staged differently in different realities” 
(Balsamo, 1996, 131). However, the bifurcation of the democratic subject into a physical 
and a digital configuration appears only as a partly satisfactory solution. To further develop 
corporeal cyberfeminist thought, I think three aspects are in need of exploration. First, the 
splitting of the subject into a digital and a biological unit appears to replicate the crude 
binarism of the body/mind split so extensively criticized. Subjects in the digital age are 
more complex and diverse configurations. Second, what is needed is an explanation of how 
these physical and digital aspects of the self relate to one another. And third, to situate such 
digitally embodied subjectivities, the outdated theory of cyberspace as divorced from phys-
ical space needs to be revised. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I will employ theories of assemblage to explain the dem-
ocratic subject as a complex spatial configuration of physical, digital, and discursive things. 
To this end, I will first go back to the roots of corporeal cyberfeminism and examine the 
notions of the cyborg (Haraway, 1991 [1985]) and evocative objects (Turkle, 1984). Build-
ing on these concepts, I will then draw on the spatial theory of democracy developed in 
Chapter 2 to advance a new understanding of digital space. This will, finally, put me in the 
position to ask what a politics of presence that allows for embodied subjects to appear and 
transform in participatory spaces looks like in the digital age. 
6.4. A Theory of Digital Space 
“How did the trope of immateriality colonize our imagination to the point where we came 
to believe computing exists beyond the material world?” (Casemajor, 2015, 4). This ques-
tion is at the centre of current debates on digital democracy. Most theorists position them-
selves at a critical distance from the cyberdemocracy discourse and the concept of cyber-
space as a disembodied realm separate from the physical world. Engin Isin and Evelyn 
Ruppert (2015, 41), for example, emphatically argue that digital space and physical space 
are not separate: “there are no two different spaces”. They cite several authors such as Paolo 
Gerbaudo (2012) and Christian Fuchs (2014) who make the same point. However, they all 
fail to provide an alternative. They all fail to explain what it means that there is no separa-
tion between the digital and the physical, that the two are the same thing. Isin and Ruppert 
announce their best intentions to overcome the separation, but foresee that they will also 
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fail as many others before them. In my view, the reason for this failure is that the separation 
actually makes sense, at least to a certain degree. It is as unproductive to speak of cyber-
space as an entirely separate realm that follows completely different logics to physical 
space as it is to deny any distinction between digital and physical space, which intuitively 
makes a lot of sense. Rather than completely conflating or completely divorcing digital and 
physical space, we need to think about how they relate to each other, how they connect, 
and, as I will argue, how they assemble.  
6.4.1. Behold the Rise of the Cyborg 
To develop a theory of digital space, we need a clear understanding of how the physical 
and the digital relate to each other, an understanding that sees the two neither as the same 
thing nor as entirely separate. To generate such an understanding, I will draw on early con-
ceptions that predate the cyberdemocracy discourse, namely the notions of the cyborg 
(Haraway, 1991 [1985]) and evocative objects (Turkle, 1984) and relate these to current 
theories of assemblage.  
Donna Haraway’s trope of the cyborg provides a point of departure for understanding how 
the physical relates to the digital in novel configurations of space and the self (Haraway, 
1991 [1985]). In contrast with the disembodied beings in cyberdemocracy that exist merely 
through the words they utter, the cyborg emerges as a configuration of human-machine, 
organism-technology, mind-software. Its human body of flesh and blood is augmented 
through computer technology. This agentic amalgam of biological and technological parts 
appears as a liberating subject in a world confined by hierarchical identity formations, in 
which “[g]ender, race, or class consciousness is an achievement forced on us by the terrible 
historical experience of the contradictory social realities of patriarchy, colonialism, and 
capitalism” (155). Like Young (1990, 99ff; 1987, 62f), Haraway explains identity catego-
ries as binary constructions that define one element as superior and the other as inferior, 
such as civilized/primitive, mind/body, and male/female (177).  
The cyborg as monstrous agent breaks out of this dichotomous thinking by overcoming the 
boundaries between animal/human, human/machine, and physical/non-physical. It does 
not, however, reconfigure those binaries into a new unity, a higher synthesis as in Hegelian-
Marxist theory, but rather leaves the riddle unresolved. The irony of the cyborg is consti-
tuted by plurality, dissolving unity into permanent contradiction. Haraway encourages us 
to give up the struggle for simple dichotomous thinking and instead to indulge in the pleas-
ures of the cyborg – the pleasures of unresolved riddles, friction, and disorientation. This 
  185 
disorientation has important implications for cyborgian space. As cyborgs experience 
“pleasure in the confusion of boundaries”, existing configurations of space and the self are 
disrupted. Indulging in spatial disorientation, cyborgs leave behind binary gender codes 
and traditional models of sexuality and family. This also affects the constitution of politics 
and of participatory spaces. The cyborgian reconfiguration of the boundaries of private and 
public in many respects echoes Pateman’s Disorder of Women (1989) calling for a democ-
ratization of the private sphere: “No longer structured by the polarity of the public and the 
private, the cyborg defines a technological polis based partly on a revolution of social rela-
tions in oikos, the household” (Haraway, 1991 [1985], 151). This disorder results in “par-
tial, contradictory, permanently unclosed constructions of personal and collective selves” 
(157).  
The cyborg itself can be read as a spatial configuration. Its existence depends on the trans-
gression of established boundaries between binary sets of identification. The cyborg as 
emancipatory subjectivity then rests on an augmentation of space. As the boundaries within 
identity spaces, in which subjects navigate to create a coherent persona, are eroded, the 
freedom to identify – or refuse identification – increases. Rather than being restricted by 
the identity boundaries that define us as men and women, black and white, queer and 
straight, the subject is free to identify and disidentify. The cyborg that disrupts the estab-
lished order by introducing disorder into established identity arrangements can be seen as 
a central agent of a politics of becoming. 
The figure of the cyborg itself is mainly left in the dark in Haraway’s text. When cyborgs 
are part human part machine, however, looking at how humans relate to computers can 
make this figure more comprehensible. While today computers disappear as smartphones 
in our pockets or as smartwatches on our wrists and thus often escape our attention, the 
early generation of household computers prompted curiosity. At the time when Haraway 
developed her cyborg theory, Sherry Turkle wrote about computers as “evocative objects”. 
Whereas in overviews of cyberdemocratic thought, Turkle’s Life on the Screen (1995) dis-
cussed earlier is frequently cited, her book from 11 years earlier, The Second Self (1984), 
goes largely unnoticed – even less attention is given to its cyborgian conceptions. Turkle 
does not use the term “cyborg” in her 1984 book. In her later reprise of her work on evoc-
ative objects, however, she explicitly describes the relationship between humans and com-
puters as cyborgian configurations (Turkle, 2007, 325f). 
Through psychological ethnography, Turkle studies the use of computers by children and 
young adults. Computers appear both as tools, as objects, and at the same time as agentic 
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subjects, which call upon users in different ways. In their double role as evocative objects, 
computers influence their users’ identities. They enter into processes of becoming: “We 
search for a link between who we are and what we have made, between who we are and 
what we might create, between who we are and what, through our intimacy with our own 
creations, we might become” (Turkle, 1984, 2). Users can employ computers as tools to 
create their own individual worlds. As soon as they enter these worlds, they are affected by 
them. Humans become the object of the computer’s creation as “computers enter into the 
development of personality, of identity, and even of sexuality” (6). Not only do users hu-
manize computers as “friends” that “are stupid” at times or need to “rest for a while”, but 
humans also start to perceive themselves in technological terms as they might not “function 
well” or something forgotten is perceived as being “erased from the hard drive” (7).  
Turkle’s point is not to mystify computers and understand them as alive. Rather, she devel-
ops a deep understanding of how we perceive computers as vital objects. Through careful 
observations of how children engage with computers, she provides an account of their con-
ception of vitality. At a very young age, children follow a simple classificatory scheme of 
motion: what moves is alive – a bird, a cloud, a rolling stone. Later they understand that 
not all things that move are alive; they move because outside forces set them in motion. In 
the eyes of children, however, computers upset this system. They move by themselves. 
They appear as autonomous actors that are intelligent. They can talk, ask questions, and 
they have answers. They think! Depending on their age, children are often not sure whether 
computers are alive. At a certain point, they develop a new classification scheme to deter-
mine vitality: Do they have emotions? Their classification develops from motion to emo-
tion (33ff, 51). As adults, while we rationally know that computers are not alive, there is 
still a certain part of us – the child in us, if you will – that believes in the vitality of com-
puters. We humanize them because we have an emotional connection with them. In this 
way, computers “upset the distinction between things and people… The computer too 
seems to have a psychology – it is a thing that is not quite a thing” (33ff, 54). 
The double function as inanimate object and vital subject gives computers a special role in 
the constitution of the self. They function as mirrors for the self. According to Turkle, the 
story of Narcissus can explain the use of computers, although it has been misinterpreted in 
the past. Narcissus did not fall in love with himself out of vanity, but seeing his reflection 
in the water he perceived himself as someone else, thus falling in love with the self as other. 
Computers function as mirrors to see the self as reconfigured other. It objectifies the self, 
resulting in a representational object – a digital thing – vis-à-vis the self (156f). Yet, the 
purpose of this objectified other/self is not vain self-love. It rather serves the anxious search 
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for the self, as reassurance of our own existence, of our stability and unity (319). Unlike 
regular mirrors, which are inanimate objects, Turkle sees computers as agentic. As evoca-
tive objects they do not create objective representations of their subjects. Rather, they call 
upon and co-construct the human subject in certain ways. As agentic force, computers bring 
established processes of self-constitution into disorder, resulting in cyborgian configura-
tions: 
Because they stand on the line between mind and not-mind, between life and 
not-life, computers excite reflection about the nature of mind and the nature of 
life. They provoke us to think about who we are… The effect is subversive. It 
calls into question our ways of thinking about ourselves: most dramatically if 
mind is machine, who is the actor? Where is responsibility, spirit, soul? There 
is a new disorder… Where we once were rational animals, now we are feeling 
computers, emotional machines. But we have no way to really put these terms 
together. The hard-to-live-with, self-contradictory notion of the emotional ma-
chine captures the fact that what we live now is a new and deeply felt tension. 
(Turkle, 1984, 320f, 326, emphasis added) 
In 1.3 and 2.5.2 I outlined a theory of the democratic subject as assemblage and further 
expanded this concept in 2.5.2. At this point, the notions of the cyborg and evocative objects 
enable us to further deepen this concept. If the subject is thought of as an assemblage of its 
physical body parts, skin pigments, sexual organs, and body chemistry interacting with 
culturally-coded things, such as clothing, makeup, and jewellery, and with discursive con-
cepts that describe gender, race, religion, political affiliation, etc., then processes of cy-
borgization can be understood as evocative objects and digital self-representations entering 
these assemblages. Christian Fuchs and David Chandler (2019, 4) write: “Technologies 
have always impacted human capacities. We cannot, therefore, easily separate technologi-
cal objects from human subjects”. In a similar vein, Jennifer González (2000, 27f) describes 
the subject as a conglomerate of electronic and biological appendages: “the appended sub-
ject describes an object constituted by electronic elements serving as a psychic bodily ap-
pendage, an artificial subjectivity that is attached to a supposed original or unitary being, 
an online persona understood as somehow appended to a real person who resides elsewhere, 
in front of a keyboard”. Hayles (1999, 3) describes the posthuman subject as an “amalgam, 
a collection of heterogeneous components, a material-informational entity whose bounda-
ries undergo continuous construction and reconstruction”. Lastly, Haraway (1991 [1985], 
162) herself hints at a possible understanding of the cyborg as assemblage when she writes: 
  188 
“Any objects or persons can be reasonably thought of in terms of disassembly and reas-
sembly; no ‘natural’ architectures constrain system design”. 
I thus propose to understand the democratic subject in the digital age as constituted as an 
assemblage of human body parts, physical artefacts, discursive concepts, and digital ob-
jects. While all these things are connected through their mutual affectivity, smart devices 
fulfil a special role as evocative objects. As illustrated by Turkle (1984), they are, in the 
human perception, more lively than other things. They actively call upon us and thus co-
construct our identities. 
The figure of the cyborg as assemblage can be thought of in spatial terms through the work 
of William Mitchell. According to him, the many things in identity assemblages interact 
with the things that constitute space: “Increasingly, we are living at the points where elec-
tronic information flows, mobile bodies, and physical places intersect… These points are 
becoming the occasions for a characteristic new architecture of the twenty-first century” 
(Mitchell, 2003, 4). Mitchell describes the newly emerging subjectivities as constituted by 
boundaries and connections. The boundaries of the skin that limit the human core interact 
with the carpets, curtains, and windows that bound the room and the walls that bound the 
building (7ff). If the cyborgian assemblage that defines democratic subjectivity in the dig-
ital age is perceived in these spatial terms, then we need a new understanding of digital 
space that overcomes the shortcomings of the conception of cyberspace. 
6.4.2. How Digital Spaces Assemble 
The concepts of the cyborg and evocative objects provide a new vocabulary with which we 
can think about how reality, space, and identities configure in the digital age. They lead the 
way to a new theory of digital space that explains the relationship between the physical and 
the digital. Cyborgs and evocative objects neither entirely collapse the physical and the 
digital nor do they explain them as entirely separate realms. Today, cyborgs are not science 
fiction. Rather, cyborgs are very real in the here and now. They exist through the relation-
ality of physical and digital things that form agentic assemblages. Interhuman relations are 
mediated through the smartphones in our pockets, the smartwatches on our wrists, headsets, 
earpieces, tablets, laptops, and touch screens. These many things that provide connectivity 
do so through wireless networks and cloud computing, which define a new cyborgian space 
in which we constantly move, even when not using digital devices. The Internet of Things 
further extends the connectivity of evocative objects that constantly hail us from different 
angles. We are connected with the thermostats, light bulbs, and refrigerators in our smart 
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homes. The sensors in our shoes connect to the internet, as do the sensors applied to our 
pets and babies. We should not, however, understand such assemblages as entirely breaking 
down the boundaries between human and machine; rather, we should see them as relations 
of human subjects with their evocative objects. Humans shape and are shaped by these 
machines. So, what does a theory of digital space look like that does not conflate the phys-
ical and the digital but at the same time overcomes their stark separation? 
To answer this question, I will employ the spatial theory of democracy developed in Chap-
ter 2 explaining democratic space as an assemblage containing a physical, a social, and a 
discursive dimension. What these dimensions look like as part of digital space will be dis-
cussed with the help of current literature on online engagement. 
Both the main strength and the weakness of the poststructuralist-inspired notion of cyber-
space is its focus on discursivity. With its elaborate analyses of textual engagement on the 
internet, writers such as Rheingold, Poster, and Turkle provide excellent accounts of dis-
cursive spatiality online. However, cyberdemocratic texts, with few exceptions (e.g. Nunes, 
1997), have been rightfully criticized for their blindness to the physical aspects of cyber-
space. Current literature, in contrast, is eager to point to the material aspects of digital com-
munication. Online interaction is explained as mediated through a physical topography of 
a global network of satellites and fibre-optic cables that links servers, data centres, routers, 
modems, and computers (Cohen, 2012, 41ff; Saco, 2002, 75ff). Furthermore, current media 
theorists describe the digital not as being primarily defined by its discursivity as in the 
cyberdemocracy debate, but rather as constituting a new social sphere as users connect via 
social media to communicate with family and friends or to engage in politics (Isin & 
Ruppert, 2015, 35; Saco, 2002). Thus, the current debate allows us to still understand the 
digital in terms of discursivity, but in addition pay attention to its physical and social as-
pects. 
So, if digital space consists of the same three dimensions as analogue space, if it assembles 
physical, social, and discursive things, how is it different? Why do we need a theory of 
digital space at all? In other words, are digital and analogue space the same thing, as the 
current debate would seem to suggest (Isin & Ruppert, 2015)? I will argue that in digital 
space, physical, social, and discursive things assemble in profoundly different constella-
tions compared to analogue space. The main feature that distinguishes digital space is the 
interruption between physical and social space, a gap between the physical location of the 
subject and the space where it appears. Analogue participatory spaces are characterized by 
a physical space in which participants meet face-to-face. It is in this common physical space 
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that social relations between participants form. Physical, social, and discursive spatiality 
directly build on each other and are deeply intertwined. These spaces of appearance are 
constituted by the co-presence of physical bodies. Digital spaces, in contrast, interrupt the 
connection between physical spatiality on the one hand, and social and discursive spatiality 
on the other. Bodies are present, but they are not co-present. They are located in different 
physical sites. I believe this is the key to understanding digital space. The digital does rest 
on physical space, but it is not primarily the technological infrastructure of the hardware 
which current media theorists are so eager to point to. Instead, scholars of democracy need 
to attend to the physical spaces in which participants are located. Digital space, then, is 
constituted as a decentred kind of physical space, much like how anonymous participatory 
spaces were described in the previous chapter (5.3). Participants do assemble. They assem-
ble in the social space constituted on the screens; they assemble in discursive space through 
the words they exchange, but they remain physically remote.  
This particular constitution of digital space is enabled by the things that both mediate and 
interrupt interaction. The physical screens of electronic devices intercept analogue spatial-
ity. As illustrated in the previous chapter, anonymity always depends on the interruption of 
spatial assemblages by various things such as masks, bathroom walls, voting booths, and 
computer screens. These things interrupt identity while at the same time providing an in-
terface for the creation of new personae. Digital communication always entails a moment 
of anonymity and is hence characterized by the same modes of mediation and interruption. 
Digital communication devices always negate some aspects of identity and call for their 
reconstruction. This interruption changes things. It entails a potential for disidentification 
that reconfigures, to a certain extent, how we see ourselves. But this does not entail the 
constitution of an entire new reality – new identities, new spaces – as proposed by cyber-
democrats. Rather than a new world of pure discursivity and disembodiment, digital space 
is comprised of many continuities, continuities of inequalities, discrimination, and social 
hierarchy. Yet these continuities are always partially reconfigured through moments of in-
terruption. They can never be perfectly translated.  
The interruption between the physical, the social, and the discursive that constitutes the 
central element of digital space goes along with several shifts and reconfigurations on all 
three levels of spatiality. In the following, I will briefly look at each of these levels in turn.  
The physical dimension of digital space. The central thesis of Diana Saco’s Cybering De-
mocracy (2002) is that digital space is constituted as social spatiality that rests on a physical 
infrastructure, which is overlooked in cyberdemocratic writing. Beyond the topography of 
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satellites, cables, routers, servers, monitors, and keyboards, the materiality of digital space 
consists of the electronic light pulses and microwaves that travel through this wired land-
scape. Often the information age is thought of as immaterial because what is displayed on 
a screen appears as just an illusion. Yet, in reality, bits and bytes are electronic light pulses 
mediated through cables, transmitted to computers, where they interact with phosphors on 
screens or activate circuits on sound cards (Saco, 2002, 26, 75ff). This vast geography of 
technology providing for connectivity is what Julie Cohen refers to as networked space 
(Cohen, 2012, 41ff). One should add that the internet does not just rely on a physical net-
work; its use also causes very real, material effects as the vast amount of physical data 
storage needed generates CO2 emissions (Gabrys, 2014).  
Conceptualizing digital space in this way, we can begin to understand communication 
online as a physical network of electronic pulses generated by our fingertips typing on key-
boards and touching screens. Each tap sends an electronic signal that makes its way through 
a wide network and ends up on someone else’s screen. While democratic subjects in digital 
participatory spaces might be located in their homes, at work or in public parks, they con-
nect these physical spaces through electronic pulses. As discussed in Chapter 2, the ar-
rangement of physical things that constitutes the physical dimension of participatory spaces 
affects participants’ interaction. It affects the social and discursive dimensions of demo-
cratic spatiality. Decentring physical space, then, means that each participant in digital 
spaces is affected by different physical surroundings that are unknown to other participants. 
These individual physical locations need to be understood as constituting a new kind of 
fragmented, decentred, yet connected spatiality. 
Another aspect of the physical spatiality of cyberspace that I have hinted at earlier is that it 
becomes increasingly cyborgian. What we perceive as “regular” physical space becomes 
progressively more permeated by electronic hardware. In this sense, Kavada and Dimitriou 
(2017, 86) describe space “as made up of both physical and mediated components”. Apart 
from Haraway (1991 [1985], 151) as cited above, several authors elaborate how the bound-
aries between private and public are reconfigured through the infusion of physical space 
with digital technology. Mitchell notes how public spaces are increasingly subject to video 
surveillance from private spaces, generating a private-to-public channel. The information 
flow goes the other way through video conferencing enabling private spaces to be broadcast 
to the public (Mitchell, 2003, 28). Social movements, for example, can enlarge their 
claimed spaces through live streaming (Kavada & Treré, 2019). I recall a recent academic 
conference I attended, where the keynote lecture was given via Skype (a video conferencing 
application). The keynote speaker located in her private bedroom was visible on a large 
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screen in the conference hall. I perceived an odd friction between public and private spaces. 
This “ability of electronic media to remove, or at least rearrange, boundaries between public 
and private space” (Papacharissi, 2010, 68) has significant consequences for the perception 
of the physical spaces in which democratic subjects are located during digital engagement. 
As noted in the previous chapter (5.2.), Papacharissi (2010, 132) argues that because citi-
zens now engage in politics online, their private homes are reconfigured as public spaces: 
“This relocation suggests that we re-examine the spatiality of citizenship. Within this pri-
vate sphere, the citizen is alone, but not lonely or isolated”. The reconfiguration of public 
and private physical spatiality is partly due to the elements of anonymity inherent to digital 
space. As online communication is facilitated by things that mediate and interrupt commu-
nication, the subject can more easily express private things in the public sphere, as sug-
gested in the previous chapter.  
The social dimension of digital space. While the cyberdemocracy discourse in many ways 
simply assumed that cyberspace was indeed a space, without further questioning its spati-
ality, today’s discourse on digital democracy is more aware of the need to provide a con-
vincing explanation. Many scholars agree that the spatiality of digital space is founded on 
social networking. Digital space is primarily a social space. In reference to the cyberdemo-
cratic conception of cyberspace, Cohen (2012, 33) contends: “networked information tech-
nologies do not call into being a new, virtual space that is separate from real space. Instead 
they have catalyzed the emergence of a new kind of social space”.  
What digital space as a social space means becomes apparent when recalling that social 
space, as elaborated in Chapter 2, is constituted by human relations, by their actions and 
performances. It comes into existence where humans interact and vanishes with them 
(Arendt, 1958). While in online communication, subjects do not come together physically, 
digital space is nevertheless constituted by their interaction. Isin and Ruppert (2015, 39) 
describe digital space as “a relational space of digital acts”. This space comes into being 
through clicking, liking, following, sharing, poking, tweeting, messaging, searching, filter-
ing, hacking, tracking, camming, and, of course, social networking. If we imagine all these 
digital acts as electronic light pulses making their way from our fingertips through the vast 
cable and satellite networks of the internet, we can begin to imagine how the physical and 
the social dimension of digital space are interrelated. This is why Saco (2002, 27) calls 
digital space “a unique kind of social space”. She explains that our perception of space is 
based on movement. Digital space is a social space constituted by the networking activities 
of its users. Of course, social interaction differs in several respects from analogue interac-
tion: the main difference being that it comprises a “sociality without a face” in Saco’s  terms 
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(29). Saco wrote these words two years prior to the rapid rise of Facebook. But, as argued 
previously, as online communication is realized through interfaces that mediate and inter-
rupt, the social dimension of digital space is always defined by a moment of anonymity and 
a potential for disidentification. 
The discursive dimension of digital space. The current literature on digital democracy is 
surprisingly silent with regard to the discursive aspects of digital space. It might be that the 
discourse on cyberdemocracy of the 1990s has already said everything there is to say or 
that the current literature might be overly eager to position itself in opposition to earlier 
techno-optimism. Despite the increased presence of visuality on social media such as In-
stagram, Flickr or Snapchat, in digital spaces textuality remains the dominant form of com-
munication. When comparing the discursive spatialities emerging in analogue participatory 
spaces with digital engagement, what stands out is obviously the textual reification of con-
tent in the latter. While in analogue engagement, the spoken word is a discursive thing 
perceptible by sound in one particular moment in time and is thus highly ephemeral, these 
discursive things become reified in text or in voice recordings online. Online, words can be 
read or listened to repeatedly; they can be copied. Discursive space online entails a certain 
durability as text and recordings remain saved on digital interfaces and servers. Discursive 
content online is searchable by keywords and accessible to greater and sometimes unin-
tended publics. Understanding discursive space as a cognitive structure of meaning through 
which the subject navigates as elaborated in Chapter 2 (2.4.3), the hypertextual structure of 
the world wide web appears as an accurate realization of this image. In this regard, many 
texts of the cyberdemocracy debate are insightful given that many of their observations still 
hold true to this day (Landow, 1992; Lanham, 1993; Poster, 1995). This networked nature 
of discursive space is characteristic of so-called hashtag activism today, in which political 
campaigns form around hashtags on social media, such as the #MeToo campaign confront-
ing sexual harassment and rape (Mendes et al., 2018). 
In summary, we need to understand digital space neither as a separate realm disconnected 
from physical space, nor as entirely of a piece with physical space, but rather as an intricate 
assemblage in which physical, social, and discursive spatiality interact. While digital space 
is intimately intertwined with analogue space, they nevertheless differ in many respects. 
Digital spaces are characterized by an interruption and decentralization of physical space, 
by the networked nature of social space, and by the textuality of discursive space. This 
makes digital space a particular kind of assemblage. 
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6.5. Difference Democracy in Digital Spaces: Reconfiguring the Politics of Presence 
The theory of digital space and the subject as cyborgian assemblage provides new insight 
into the dilemma of difference. As discussed in Chapter 3, the politics of presence advanced 
in debates about difference democracy suggests a strategy of physically embodied identity 
performances of marginalized groups in participatory spaces as a way of promoting inclu-
sion. While this successfully advances equality as it draws attention to marginalization and 
gives a voice to particular standpoints, it also limits the freedom of the subject to define, 
transform, and explore their own identity. It limits the freedom of the subject to change. In 
Chapters 4 and 5, I proposed re-reading the politics of presence as a politics of becoming 
and suggested that anonymity might be a practical means to realize moments of disidenti-
fication. The rich accounts of identity change through online anonymity in debates about 
cyberdemocracy lend support to the thesis of a politics of becoming through anonymity. 
While cyberdemocracy appears compatible with a politics of becoming, it stands in oppo-
sition to a politics of presence. Its notion of disembodiment, which renders difference im-
perceptible, threatens to cover up inequalities. These arguments are still prevalent in current 
debates, for example in Smith’s account of digital space, wherein he suggests “untying 
political speech from bodies”. He goes on to argue: 
What really matters for the political realm in terms of appearing and visibility 
is the ability to make one’s opinions heard and for collective actions to have a 
lasting impact. The presence of the body is not necessary for any of this, as what 
distinguishes us from others politically is not our bodies or faces, but our words 
and deeds. (Smith, 2017, 28, emphasis added)  
I find Smith’s conception of digital space as a realm of disembodied, universal reason prob-
lematic. It rests on an erroneous assumption about anonymity understanding anonymity as 
the mere negation of identity. Understood thus, spaces of appearance online only make 
content visible, but negate bodies and identities. As I have argued in the previous chapter, 
however, anonymity entails as much identity creation as identity negation. Digital images, 
text, pseudonyms, selfies, emoticons, and avatars reconfigure bodies and identities. Smith’s 
position is not just problematic politically insofar as it further undermines the status of those 
who are already disadvantaged by encouraging images of default whiteness and default 
masculinity; it also overlooks the fact that the body is always there. Disembodiment means 
ignoring the body rather than actually leaving it behind. We are thus in need of a formula-
tion of a digital politics of presence that allows for the embodied articulation of diverse 
identities and still harbours the potential for the subject to change.  
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To generate such a renewal of the politics of presence in the digital age, a novel under-
standing of presence is needed. In the previous chapter, I argued that anonymity reconfig-
ures presence by channelling the absent located in private spaces into the public sphere. 
This reconfiguration of presence through moments of disidentification, then, becomes an 
inherent part of everyday communication in the digital age. Presence emerges as the recon-
figuration of identity assemblages of the subject bringing different things to the fore at 
different times resulting in constant reconfigurations of the self. Presence itself can be un-
derstood as a performative act, a process of becoming. 
The concept of presence is invoked repeatedly both in the older debate on cyberdemocracy, 
speaking of  “a fantastic presence” (Nunes, 1997, 170), and in the current literature on 
digital democracy, speaking of “telepresence” (Senft, 2018, 55ff), for example. The theory 
of digital space as assemblage of physical, social, and discursive things can help to make 
sense of online presence. It is not only the embodied human subject, but various things in 
cyborgian assemblages that experience presence. Regarding the physical dimension of 
space, Turkle (1984, 3) observes the presence of computers themselves: “People sense the 
presence of something new and exciting. But they fear the machine as powerful and threat-
ening”. On the social level, Markham (1998, 24) describes how users “create embodied 
presence”. She observes how “people who connect to this network often feel a sense of 
presence when they are online” (Markham, 1998, 17). And in relation to discursive spati-
ality, Nunes (1997, 168) states that textuality in online exchange is “a means of calling 
forth presence, of making the subject ‘here’ without being here”. 
The three strategies of inclusion promoted by difference democracy outlined in Chapter 3 
– presence, emotion, and contestation – are reflected in many critical and especially femi-
nist accounts of digital democracy today. Digital democracy is characterized by the emer-
gence of digital counterpublics of marginalized groups who contest domination (Dahlberg, 
2007; Downey & Fenton, 2003; Travers, 2003). Accounts of digital democracy also focus 
on emotions (Asenbaum, 2018b; Castells, 2012; Dahlgren, 2009) and shed light on affec-
tive publics online (Papacharissi, 2015). In what follows, however, I will focus on a new 
politics of presence and examine how marginalized groups articulate their identities in dig-
ital spaces of appearance.  
6.5.1. Digital Spaces of Appearance: Classed, Raced, and Queered Identities Online 
The recent corporeal cyberfeminist debates discussed above in many ways echo the differ-
ence democratic concept of a politics of presence (Phillips, 1995). They draw attention to 
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digitized bodies and corporeal difference in digital engagement. What is crucial in under-
standing this new politics of presence is the fact that presence does not necessarily entail 
physical co-presence. This is corroborated by the original debate of difference democracy, 
in which presence was always thought of as a mode of representation of identity (Phillips, 
1995, 30; Young, 2000, 124f; 1997a, 352). The representative of an identity group in dif-
ference democracy is mirrored by the classed, racialized, and queered bodies of digital av-
atars and online images that stand for marginalization and make the absent present. In both 
the original and the digital politics of presence, the representation of the marginalized body 
functions as an affective thing that reconfigures spaces toward equality. 
Here, I will provide several examples that illustrate how bodies appear online. I start with 
three examples of how classed, raced, and queered bodies claim digital space. The discus-
sion thereafter will draw on further examples to illustrate how cyborgian identity reconfig-
urations facilitate a digital politics of presence. 
Example 1: The classed bodies of the 99 percent. In August 2011, just a few weeks before 
the first major protest erupted in New York’s Zuccotti Park, an Occupy activist named 
Chris created a Tumblr blog titled “We are the 99 percent”. On this blog, he invited people 
to tell their personal stories of hardship caused by austerity politics through selfies: “Let us 
know who you are. Take a picture of yourself holding a sign that describes your situation… 
Below that, pwrite ‘I am the 99 percent’” (We are the 99 percent blog, 2011). Within weeks, 
the blog was flooded with around 100 selfies per day of people telling their stories. These 
images walk a thin line between self-exposure and anonymity. Individual self-portraits of 
people holding up handwritten signs that cover their faces either completely, in part, or not 
at all both reveal and cover physical embodiment. Some are signed with first names or 
pseudonyms, but most carry no name at all (McDonald, 2015, 976).  
An obese man, probably in his 30s, with his naked shoulders, arms, and chest exposed, 
holds up a sign close to his face that reads, “I play World of Warcraft naked 40 hours a 
week. I eat mostly McDonald’s. I am probably unemployable. I am the 99%” (We are the 
99 percent blog, 2011). Another naked man with a noticeable scar on his chest holds up a 
sign telling his story of cancer, precarious work, and difficulties in getting health insurance. 
Another picture shows a pregnant belly with only the lower part of a female face. Her sign 
reads, “At 21 years old I am… about to become mother to a baby whose illness has gotten 
us booted off gov’t health insurance… at 9 months pregnant… Scared for our future. I am 
the 99%” (We are the 99 percent blog 2011). 
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Example 2: The raced bodies of anti-racist raiders. Habbo Hotel is a social media site 
providing a virtual hotel setting in which users create human avatars for social interaction 
and role play. In 2006, users of Habbo Hotel repeatedly faced difficulties navigating in the 
virtual outdoor hotel areas. The entrance to the pool was blocked by African-American 
avatars with big afros in black suits, who shouted, “Pool’s closed due to AIDS”. The re-
peated raids of Habbo Hotel were the work of an online swarm that had formed in response 
to alleged discrimination against black avatars by moderators and the overrepresentation of 
white avatars. As moderators started to block black avatars and automatically impede their 
registration to regain control, the online protesters charged them with racism (Asenbaum, 
2018b). These “online-sit ins”, mimicking peaceful protest tactics of the US civil rights 
movement of the 1960s, were repeated on Habbo Hotel and other sites. Manuals were cir-
culated online that instructed protesters on how to design the uniform black avatar and 
avoid deletion by moderators. In a follow-up action on World of Warcraft, black avatars 
were marched to a virtual marketplace to be sold as slaves (McDonald, 2015). Memes in-
spired by the raids, such as the slogan “Pool’s closed”, spread via social media. The me-
metic protest action even materialized in analogue space as white people dressed in black 
suits with afro wigs formed a swastika out of their bodies in front of the headquarters of 
Habbo Hotel’s mother company, Sulake, in Finland. 
Example 3: The queered bodies of social media users. On the 13th of June 2016, Facebook, 
Twitter, and Instagram were flooded with rainbow flags. Social media users changed their 
profile pictures to the rainbow flags of the LGBTIQ movement or shared the flag in their 
newsfeeds. It was one day after the mass shooting inside a gay nightclub in Orlando, USA, 
in which 49 were killed and 58 wounded by a terrorist claiming to be affiliated with the 
Islamic State. By altering their digitally embodied appearance, social media users per-
formed support for the victims of the attack, made a political statement against homopho-
bia, and advocated values of a pluralist and open society (see Jenkins et al., 2019). The 
practice of replacing one’s profile picture, which usually depicts one’s own face, with the 
rainbow flag served to negate the user’s identity and replace it with an improper name – a 
collective call for freedom and diversity. 
The use of the rainbow flag on social media is not restricted to this individual case. Every 
year in the early summer months, many social media users apply a transparent rainbow 
filter to their regular profile pictures. Faces appear behind a transparent rainbow colour 
scheme (see Gerbaudo, 2015). Annual Pride demonstrations and celebrations recall the 
Stonewall riots in New York in 1969, in which queer people publicly and sometimes vio-
lently claimed their equal rights. Today, many who define themselves as heterosexual use 
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the rainbow filter. By queering their image, they do not proclaim a homosexual identity, 
but they claim the possibility of living queer desires in a diverse society. They perform a 
politically progressive identity that rejects heteronormativity. 
In summary, pictures of pregnant bodies concealing the face, the use of black avatars by 
white activists, and the alteration of profile pictures through rainbow filters all illustrate 
that anonymity and moments of disidentification in online communication that disrupt es-
tablished identity performances do not entail leaving the body behind. Rather, they facili-
tate the expression of diversity through embodied presence. Yet, the mediation and inter-
ruption provided by computer interfaces do entail a reconstruction of embodiment, a 
rearticulation of identity that generates some leeway for the discontinuity of identity and 
the enabling of self-exploration. While the selected examples focus on cases with a high 
degree of anonymity, other examples that explicitly focus on continuing analogue identity 
performances online also lend support to this argument. The #MeToo campaign, for exam-
ple, consists of victims of sexual harassment and rape disclosing their identities through 
social media (Mendes et al., 2018). In another case of hashtag activism, sex workers shared 
pictures of themselves in their everyday lives to counter the prejudice directed toward them 
under #FacesOfProstitution (Middleweek, 2019). In both of these cases, anonymity is not 
an evident element. Yet, the interruption of established modes of identity performances 
through interfaces necessitated a reconstruction of identity. At the beginning of this pro-
cess, the screen is always blank. Hence the subject has some freedom to reconceptualize 
the self, to select specific pictures or to relay certain stories. Regarding social media profile 
pictures Jill Walker Rettberg (2014, 42) notes: “we represent different versions of ourselves 
in each profile picture we choose”. 
6.5.2. Transforming Physical Bodies Through the Digital: From Thinspirations to 
Self-Quantifications 
The continuity of identity addressed in the examples of hashtag activism cited above is the 
central focus of current debates about identity in digital democracy and in particular debates 
in corporeal cyberfeminism. They observe the extension of analogue to online identity per-
formances. Yet, these extensions always entail a moment of interruption and re-constitution 
of the self – a morphological moment is built into online communication. These debates 
add an important observation to the understanding of digital self-transformation discussed 
so far. Digitally enabled self-transformation does not only happen on the screen – as cyber-
democratic discourses suggest; they also bleed into analogue space. This happens in two 
ways. First, as discussed above, physical space today is reconfigured as cyborgian space. 
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The corporeal cyberfeminist literature shows that online body images change how we per-
ceive analogue bodies; they alter how we see ourselves and others offline. Second, online 
body images are used as a tool for the physical transformation of analogue bodies. The 
following examples are less explicitly cases of political participation, although they do il-
lustrate a new participatory culture. They nevertheless have important political implica-
tions. The transformation of bodies affects the abilities and self-perceptions of democratic 
subjects. 
The literature illustrates these transformations of analogue bodies through the digital with 
several examples. On pro-anorexia websites mostly young girls suffering from anorexia 
exchange diet and self-starving tips and share pictures of skinny bodies as “thinspiration” 
(Daniels, 2009, 112ff; Gies, 2008, 321). Other websites serve communities of obese men 
to positively affirm their body image and reinterpret mainstream beauty ideals (Monaghan, 
2005). And websites of transgender communities give advice on physical body transfor-
mations, from makeup tips to hormone therapy and surgery. In relation to pro-anorexia and 
trans websites, Daniels (2009, 117) argues: “Instead of seeing cyberspace as a place in 
which to experience the absence of the body… these girls and self-identified women use 
digital technologies in ways that simultaneously bring the body ‘online’ (through digital 
photos uploaded to the web) and take the digital ‘offline’ (through information gleaned 
online to transform their embodied selves)”. Anorexic girls and trans people strive to trans-
form their physical bodies through the digital and the reinterpretation of fat men’s physical 
bodies is digitally mediated. The digital reconfigures perceptions of analogue reality and 
the body (Cohen, 2012; Daniels, 2009). Reminiscent of Turkle’s (1984) computers as evoc-
ative objects, both Cohen (2012, 46) and Brophy (2010, 938) describe technological appa-
ratuses as calling upon the democratic subject in certain ways by affording and restricting 
possibilities for performing the self. Like everyday expressions of the self through physical 
bodies, clothes, body language, makeup, etc., digital identity performances rely on materi-
ality. Through Butler (1993) and Grosz (1994), Brophy explains the body as a material 
process constituted by performance. The digital body is generated through the performative 
act of going online and extending the established performance of the self through a different 
medium (Brophy, 2010; see also Gies, 2008, 314). 
This attempt at authentic self-representation that always contains elements of self-transfor-
mation can be explained via Butler’s concept of citationality discussed in Chapter 4 (4.3.3). 
Even if the subject tries to replicate its body as authentic self on the electronic interface, it 
is bound to fail as citational representations always differ (Butler, 2004). This is also evi-
dent in the recent emergence of the so-called quantified self movement. Here the idea of 
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the transformation of the physical body and even of personalities with the help of digital 
tools is taken to the next level. Participants in the quantified self movement use various 
websites and smartphone applications to quantify their activities with the goal of achieving 
personal change. Through smartphones and various other wearable devices such as wrist 
bands, clothing clips, necklaces, rings, and even sensors in disposable patches, self-quanti-
fiers measure their calorie intake, physical activity, blood chemistry, blood pressure, body 
temperature, heart rate, and sleeping patterns. Via GPS they track their running routes or 
the location of their pets and babies (Swan, 2012; Walker Rettberg, 2014, 61ff).  
The long-term vision of QS [quantified self] activity is that of a systemic mon-
itoring approach where an individual’s continuous personal information cli-
mate provides real-time performance optimization suggestions… The individ-
ual body becomes a more knowable, calculable, and administrable object 
through QS activity, and individuals have an increasingly intimate relationship 
with data as it mediates the experience of reality. (Swan, 2013, 85) 
Around the practice of self-quantification, a movement formed that promotes these prac-
tices. In regular meetings self-quantifiers share experiences and encourage each other in 
their respective projects of self-improvement (Lee, 2014). Because of these participatory 
aspects of the movement and the personal control over one’s own data, some see self-quan-
tification as democratic practice: “One important outcome of big data QS is the empower-
ment of the individual through an intuitive understanding and ongoing interaction with their 
data. Data is democratized from scientific practices and made universal and meaningful for 
use by all individuals” (Swan, 2013, 95). Jennifer Whitson (2013), in contrast, warns of 
self-quantification as a neoliberal strategy in which discipline is internalized and appears 
as pleasurable. An important aspect of self-quantification is the gamification of every as-
pect of life. Self-quantification apps provide points, ratings, and peer acknowledgement. 
These are the same mechanisms that make social media attractive for many who enjoy the 
attention and competitive elements of quantified likes, friends, and followers. Increasing 
these numbers becomes a game that profoundly affects relationships and identities.  
These activities of self-quantification result in assemblages of data that represent specific 
aspects of the self and, in combination with other data from social media and smartphone 
apps, produce a “data double” – a digital replica or (failing) citation of the self (Walker 
Rettberg, 2014, 68). This “self is one that is spatially expanded, with a broad suite of ex-
osenses” (Swan, 2013, 95). In many ways, this data double resembles the reflection in com-
puters as mirrors described by Turkle (1984, 156f). Her anxious Narcissus, who looks at 
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his own reflection not out of vanity but rather out of insecurity about the coherence of the 
self, corresponds to today’s trends of self-quantification: “Apps which allow us to see our 
own data allow us to see ourselves. We look at our data doubles as we gaze into a mirror 
as teenagers wondering who we are and who we might be” (Walker Rettberg, 2014, 87). 
6.5.3. Can Anonymity Enable Diversity? Claiming Digital Space 
The observations of self-quantification and continuous identity performances on social me-
dia point to a diminishing role of anonymity online when compared to the default textuality 
of the 1990s. Beyond my contention that all of these continuous identity performances en-
tail elements of anonymity through the disruptive power of interfaces, there are still multi-
ple examples of digital spaces in which anonymity plays a central role today (Asenbaum, 
2017). For example, the findings in Tom Boellstorff’s (2008) study on identity performance 
through visual avatars in the online game Second Life bear some remarkable similarities to 
those of Turkle (1995) published 23 years earlier. Although the medium of online role play 
had changed profoundly from text-only to communication through digitally embodied av-
atars, the observations are consistent overall.  
Boellstorff witnesses how individual participants create multiple avatars of various sexes, 
races, and species. Users experiment with aspects of their selves not usually experienced 
offline. These performances are often perceived as revealing true aspects of the self. This 
can be illustrated by the story of the digital avatar Pavia who explains:  
I’m a man in real life, but about three weeks ago I learned that I’m transsex-
ual… Here in Second Life I created something new in myself that I never real-
ized was there before. At first it was just role playing, but then I grew to love 
Pavia. I kept infusing myself into her, but then something unexpected started 
to happen: Pavia started coming out in the real world. I became her, she became 
me. (cited in Boellstorff, 2008, 138) 
These forms of identity play are used in both social and political contexts. Social media 
and online games such as Second Life are often re-appropriated as claimed spaces when 
they are used against their original commercial intentions for political action. The annual 
16 Days of Activism Against Gender-Based Violence, for instance, has recently spread to 
Second Life. Here feminist activists set up virtual discussion events, meetings, and exhibi-
tions around the topic of gendered violence. Participants design female avatars with black 
eyes, bruises, and bleeding wounds as a way of raising awareness (Motter, 2011). In another 
example, a queer community established itself in the virtual role play fantasy game World 
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of Warcraft. The fact that the 5,000 users of the community created 15,000 characters, in-
cluding the practice of gender swapping, is indicative of playful identity exploration. Due 
to its global scope, this community also included participants from countries where homo-
sexual practices are banned. Apart from political discussions on LGBTIQ issues, the com-
munity organized virtual Pride parades (McKenna et al., 2011).  
Besides claiming commercial space on social media, online activists also create their own 
spaces as alternative media. The New York art collective Guerrilla Girls, for example, ex-
tends its analogue interventions in the disguise of gorilla masks through digital images and 
videos of gorilla performances online. In particular, the breakaway group Guerrilla Girls 
Broadband have created a subversive online presence. On their website, users can join by 
virtually dressing up as gorillas. Core members of Guerrilla Girls Broadband themselves 
take on the identities of female artists who have not gained the recognition they deserve in 
the male-dominated art business. A “cartography of choice” maps abortion clinics and 
emails can be sent to “bad bosses” anonymously to address sexual harassment, unequal pay 
or other work-related grievances (Stein, 2011). Precarious work relations were also central 
to the digital claimed spaces of the Euro Mayday Netparades in 2004 and 2005. The annual 
Euro Mayday Parade draws attention to the current precariousness of work, which espe-
cially affects women. On the website of the Mayday Netparade, users could create their 
individual protest avatars as part of a diverse collective. According to a study by Mattoni 
and Doerr (2007), women, who are often underrepresented in the imagery of traditional 
Labour Day parades, took centre stage online as “the parade’s visual icons of protests pos-
itively underlined diversity and differences as an asset of the collective struggle” (132). 
Identity exploration in claimed spaces on the internet does not require an entire virtual 
world with fully animated avatars like in the cases cited so far. Rather, social media provide 
tools for the everyday practice of identity play as part of political engagement. Gerbaudo 
(2015) analyses how users change their social media profile pictures for flags, logos or 
portraits of others. In the Arab Spring, for example, thousands of social media users 
changed their profile picture for the image of Khaled Said, a 28-year-old blogger killed by 
police in Alexandria. These profile pictures then become part of the personal assemblage 
that defines the self. For social media users, employing profile pictures that depict someone 
else or stand for a political cause is “a move that simultaneously anonymises them a little 
and shows how profile pictures can function as metonyms: this is a part of me” (Walker 
Rettberg, 2014, 41). 
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6.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has raised the question of how the space of appearance is reconfigured in the 
digital age. How can subjects appear when they are not physically present? The poststruc-
turalist-inspired cyberdemocracy debate of the 1990s conceptualizes cyberspace as a sepa-
rate realm from analogue space that follows its own logics. Here subjects appear only 
through their words as disembodied beings – a notion that is still advocated today (Smith, 
2017). Along with several critics I have argued, however, that this position overlooks the 
central role that bodies and materiality play in these digital spaces. The subject, even if 
anonymous, is always embodied and performs identity in multiple ways. To develop a new 
understanding of the space of appearance in the digital age in which not only content but 
also bodies and identities appear, this chapter has put forward a new theory of digital space. 
In contrast with the cyberdemocracy debate, which explains cyberspace as divorced from 
physical space, the current literature conflates the two. The distinction between the digital 
and the physical collapses. I find neither of these positions productive. Overcoming the 
distinction between digital and physical space is throwing out the baby with the bathwater, 
since it leaves us without sufficient concepts to differentiate between them. Rather than 
collapsing physical and digital space, we need an understanding of how they relate to each 
other. This will also explain how subjects appear in digital spaces.  
To this end, the chapter employed theories of assemblage to explain digital space as a rela-
tional construct in which physical, social, and discursive things interact. The physical 
spaces in which participants are located and connected through a network of cables and 
satellites interact with the social relations and discursive expressions on social media sites. 
Yet, digital space is special insofar as the interfaces that mediate communication always 
also interrupt identity. The transfer from offline to online entails an interruption, an opening 
that facilitates innovation, exploration, and play. The digital representation of the subject 
fails to perfectly copy the offline self. It has been found, for example, that even Members 
of Parliament, who strive to maintain continuous online self-representations, present them-
selves differently on different websites (Koop & Marland, 2012).  
This interruption that compels the subject to reconstruct its identity, I contend, contains a 
moment of anonymity. The potential for disidentification, even if we are mostly unaware 
of it, is inherent to the act of going online. It resides in the selection of profile pictures on 
social media that represent a certain version of the self rather than another. Potentials for 
disidentification also lie in choosing the skin colour of emoticons in text messages, and in 
the creation of pseudonyms on a news commenting website.  
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All these digital self-representations – selfies, avatars, emoticons, profile pictures, ribbons, 
colour filters, and pseudonyms – enter into the identity assemblages that define us. The 
interaction of these digital self-representations with our physical bodies, clothing, and hair-
style mediated through the technological devices in our pockets, on our wrists, necks, feet, 
and ears, recreate the subject as cyborg. The questions we need to ask are not about the 
separateness or convergence of the digital and physical, but rather about how all of these 
things that constitute the self assemble. In cyborgian assemblages, technological devices 
are never neutral, but have political and social implications. They are created with a pur-
pose. And as evocative objects they call on us in certain ways. More than other things, they 
actively enter processes of subject constitution. 
The notion of digital space as assemblage of physical, social, and discursive things, and the 
concept of the cyborg as assemblage of the human body, digital things, and evocative ob-
jects that mediate and interrupt identity, explain how the space of appearance functions in 
the digital age. The body is not absent from digital engagement. On the contrary, the phys-
ical body is always there; without it, the perception of the digital would not be possible 
(Butler, 2015, 94; Cohen, 2012). The physical body interacts with digital body images cre-
ated online. It is replicated in selfies of the 99 percent who digitize their bodies in protest 
against austerity. New bodies are created as stereotypical black avatars to protest racism. 
Bodies are altered through colour filter rainbow flags to promote open societies. Female 
bodies are shown as bruised to protest sexual violence. Images of human ribs covered only 
by skin are shared through digital networks to inspire self-starvation. Fat bodies are shown 
to counter established beauty standards. Transgendered bodies are digitized to encourage 
those who wish to transition.  
These examples lead the way to a new digital politics of presence by providing novel an-
swers to the dilemma of difference. Digital spaces often serve the representation of bodies 
with marginalized identities as advocated by the politics of presence. Cyberfeminist coun-
terpublics as claimed spaces online provide the context for peer support, reaffirming and 
expressing identity in public discourses. Digital spaces can also be employed for radical re-
embodiment as in the case of the Habbo Hotel raid. The performance of black digital bodies 
by majority white users can be seen as part of a politics of presence as it articulates diversity 
and challenges domination. Whether identities online are performed in a continuous or a 
discontinuous manner, it is crucial that the reconfiguration of identity online always entails 
a moment of anonymity and a potential for disidentification. The interruption of identity 
results in new identities, even if they come in the shape of old ones. The recreation of the 
self online always entails a choice – of images, of avatars, of pseudonyms. This enhances 
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our agency over the performance of the self and can be part of a more conscious politics of 
presence, in which identity articulation becomes an intentional performance of marginali-
zation.  
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7. Conclusion 
This thesis set out to explore new ways to advance freedom and equality as core values of 
democracy in the context of social power asymmetries and modes of discrimination of mar-
ginalized identities. It focused on the potential contribution of participatory spaces as inno-
vative modes of democratic engagement to interrupt such inequalities and raised the ques-
tion of how the structural settings of these spaces can afford different identity performances 
to advance freedom and equality. In particular, the thesis engaged with the strategy of a 
politics of presence that advocates physically embodied identity performances of those with 
marginalized identities in the space of appearance to draw attention to modes of discrimi-
nation and particular standpoints. This successfully advances equality but impedes the free-
dom for the subject to change and explore various sides of the multiple self. The thesis 
sought ways out of this dilemma. To this end, it engaged with a variety of theoretical de-
bates and accounts of empirical work within the scholarship of democracy and beyond. In 
doing so, it generated several insights and theoretical innovations. In this Conclusion, I will 
first recap the answers offered to the central questions raised and then briefly discuss the 
contributions that the thesis makes to democratic theory. Lastly, I will sketch challenges 
and possible agendas for future research in the field. 
To find ways out of the dilemma of difference, which enhances equality through the phys-
ically embodied presence of those with marginalized identities but at the same time limits 
the freedom for the subject to change (Young, 1989, 268), the thesis advanced a reformu-
lation of the politics of presence (Phillips, 1995). In this reformulation, the politics of pres-
ence is understood as part of a broader strategy of a politics of becoming that combines the 
embodied expression of diversity with the freedom of self-transformation. The politics of 
becoming rests on practices of disidentification that entail the rejection of hegemonic iden-
tity interpellations and interrupt established modes of identification (Muñoz, 1999; 
Rancière, 1999). This interruption of the coherent performance of an officially identified 
persona reconfigures the space of appearance by enlarging the subject’s freedom to explore 
different sides of the multiple self. This kind of disidentification always goes along with 
subjectivization. It entails not only the rejection of identity interpellations but also the cre-
ation of new identities (Mouffe, 2013, 28) through improper names (Deseriis, 2015), thus 
allowing for temporary self-transformation.  
The literature on disidentification suggests that such interruption of identity can be 
achieved through a critical engagement with hegemonic discourses that produce hierar-
chical identities. It proposes modes of deconstruction as a means of critically interrogating 
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discourses and thus loosening the grip of identity categories (Mouffe, 1995a; Muñoz, 
1999). It also suggests the resignification of the concepts that describe identity so as to 
recast their meanings in positive terms (Butler, 2004; Lloyd, 2007) – a strategy also advo-
cated by difference democrats (Young, 1990). This thesis went beyond such intellectual 
endeavours and explored more practical means of disidentification. It suggested that dis-
identification can be practically achieved by employing anonymity as radical democratic 
practice. Anonymity and disidentification are by no means the same. Rather, anonymity 
harbours the potential for experiencing disidentification. It can function as a tool that inter-
rupts hegemonic identity interpellations by negating some aspects of the physically embod-
ied and legally identified persona. But anonymity consists of more than mere concealment, 
as is commonly supposed. Anonymity entails articulating new identities and exploring 
sides of the multiple self that are otherwise hidden. It affords the articulation of private 
sentiments in the public sphere. Anonymity makes the absent present. 
To make sense of such identity reconfigurations through anonymity, this thesis suggested 
understanding identity as a spatial assemblage of things. Things such as blood flows, skin 
pigments, sexual organs, clothing, accessories, hairstyles, makeup, and discursive construc-
tions of race, gender, sexuality, class, age, occupation, and religion circulate in agentic as-
semblages that define the self. This new materialist inspired perspective suggests that rather 
than constructing identities as suggested in poststructuralist debates, subjects assemble 
(Bennett, 2010). Anonymity interrupts these assemblages through things such as masks, 
veils, voting booths, pen and paper, public walls and spray cans, computer screens, pseu-
donyms, avatars, and blank spaces. This interruption allows subjects to reassemble. It fa-
cilitates a temporary reconfiguration of the identity assemblage in which the subject can 
experience different sides of the multiple self. After the anonymizing things are ejected 
from the assemblage – after the masks are taken off and the voting booths are left – bodies 
return to their positions assigned by the established order. Normalcy persists, but the expe-
rience of the interruption lasts. 
In the digital age, the subject is reconfigured as cyborg (Haraway, 1991 [1985]) as 
smartphones, electronic wrist bands, clothing clips, necklaces, rings, and sensors in dispos-
able patches are applied to the physical body and thus enter the assemblage of the self. 
These physical objects applied to the human body carry a moment of anonymity that is 
built into them as they both mediate and interrupt identity. Through this interruption, sub-
jects are compelled to reassemble their identities online. They can perform their selves in a 
more continuous manner on social media such as Facebook where they circulate visual self-
representations. In participatory spaces generated through hashtag activism such as the 
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#MeToo campaign, they reify their digital identities, mirroring analogue identities. How-
ever, these digital objects that enter into identity assemblages are not mere replications of 
the offline identity. Rather, they involve acts of curation and expand the sphere of personal 
agency over self-representations. Other digital spaces call for more discontinuous identity 
performances and invite users to construct different avatars or pseudonyms, to employ 
emoticons, colour filters, flags, political symbols, images of others such as partners, rela-
tives, or political figures, or to construct the self through mere textuality.  
In both digital and analogue spaces, which in the digital age are reconfigured as cyborgian 
spaces, it is the particular spatial configurations that invite such varied identity perfor-
mances. The architecture of particular website interfaces, for example, affects the identity 
configurations assembled on them (Beyer, 2014a; Kavada, 2012), as does the physical ar-
chitecture of parliaments and public squares (Parkinson, 2012). These spaces themselves, 
however, are constructed by humans and through human agency. Space and identity, then, 
are part of a dialectical process of mutual constitution. Assemblages of identity and space 
are in constant flux; through their mutual affectivity, they continuously assemble and reas-
semble each other. 
Assembling identity through the modes of disidentification afforded by anonymity explains 
the politics of presence in new terms. Such disidentifactory articulations of the self are 
neither disembodied, private, nor necessarily invisible. They are public identity perfor-
mances that re-embody the subject through digital, textual or physical identity reifications 
that are perceptible in multiple ways through images, sounds, and words. This rearticulation 
of identity, making the absent present, generates new prospects for the politics of presence. 
When subjects reify their bodies as stereotypical black avatars to block an online space in 
protest against racism, when they assemble as bruised, digital bodies to protest against sex-
ual abuse, when they depict their naked, obese or ill bodies in selfies to protest against 
austerity, they take part in the politics of presence. When the activists of Pussy Riot employ 
colourful balaclavas to articulate femininity, strength, and diversity, when Guerrilla Girls 
wear gorilla masks to challenge the entrenched patriarchal structures of the art world, when 
queer teenagers negotiate their identities through the use of graffiti on bathroom walls, and 
when people wear hoods to perform their marginalized race/class identity in protest against 
racially motivated police brutality, they take part in the politics of presence.  
For sure, not all examples discussed in this thesis can be seen as part of a politics of pres-
ence. While the white, grinning Guy Fawkes mask of Anonymous and the pseudonyms 
employed by Hamilton and Madison in the debate about the American Constitution do 
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facilitate an exploration of the multiple self and generate freedom for the subject to change, 
they do not take part in the reification of marginalized identities. For this reason, I devel-
oped a broader concept of a politics of becoming of which the politics of presence is one 
strategy. All practices within the politics of becoming employ moments of disidentification 
to rearrange identity assemblages and explore the multiple self. The politics of presence, in 
particular, focuses on identity reifications that articulate diversity and embody the margin-
alized in the public sphere. This even includes the intentionally continuous performances 
of the #MeToo campaign or the self-representations of Members of Parliament on various 
websites and social media (Asenbaum, 2019a). These continuous identity expressions al-
ways articulate a subject-in-process (Lloyd, 2005) and perform future selves (Connolly, 
1996). Each citation of the self slightly diverges from the previous (Butler, 2004). This is 
because the coherent performance of the self is always an act of masquerade, an effort to 
hold together what drifts apart. The self, however, remains forever fugitive.  
A politics of becoming, then, does not promote one particular type of space that facilitates 
one particular kind of identity performance. Rather, the key conclusion of this thesis is that 
a politics of becoming, as part of a progressive strategy for deep social transformation, 
needs to provide a wide variety of participatory spaces: spaces that allow for discontinuous 
identity performances by constructing alternative selves and spaces that rearticulate estab-
lished identities. Digital spaces of marginalized groups that form counterpublics for peer 
support and the development of strategies to challenge inequality are as central to the poli-
tics of becoming as spaces that facilitate discontinuous digital embodiments that allow for 
identity play. Some spaces might employ mere textuality, while others make use of avatars, 
and others still invite people to meet in the flesh. It is the plurality of such diverse spatial 
configurations that characterizes the politics of becoming. 
Since it was the goal of this thesis to find ways of advancing freedom and equality in par-
ticipatory spaces, we need to ask how a politics of becoming through disidentification can 
contribute to this end. To make sense of the relation between freedom and equality within 
spatial assemblages, I employed two competing concepts: the agonistic democratic paradox 
that understands the two values as in tension (Mouffe, 2005b [2000]), and the anarchist 
equal liberty that understands them as co-constitutive and mutually dependent (Newman, 
2016). The discussion of several empirical examples of anonymity in participatory spaces 
demonstrated that neither the democratic paradox nor equal liberty explains all cases. Ra-
ther, they both come into play, often within the same participatory space. Practices of dis-
identification through anonymity always have liberating effects. Anonymity frees the sub-
ject to act; it loosens the grip of hegemonic identity interpellations and allows for freer 
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expressions of the multiple self. Yet, this newly won freedom at times undermines equality, 
while at other times it enhances equality. The democratic paradox comes into effect when 
the anonymous subject uses its freedom to exclude others through acts of domination, sub-
mit to the group dynamics of crowds or deceive others. Equal liberty emerges when ano-
nymity affords inclusion and meritocracy, the contestation of domination or reducing in-
formation hierarchies through honesty. The key point is that the agonistic and the anarchist 
conceptions of freedom and equality are not necessarily mutually exclusive. As humans, 
we are complex beings living in a complex world in which freedom and equality can go 
together or contradict each other. Their various constellations depend on the spatial assem-
blage in which they are situated. It is the mutual affectivity of many things that influence 
their relations. Anonymity can function as radical democratic practice, but it can also be 
employed for domination. Hence, how the effects of anonymity play out depends on the 
intentions of humans and the spaces they create.  
This thesis advocates the use of anonymity as part of a progressive strategy of social trans-
formation. Such a strategy, however, needs to go beyond questions of identity performance 
and to ask profound questions about the distribution of wealth worldwide and about climate 
justice for future generations. As Pateman (2006) points out, a deep understanding of radi-
cal democracy includes a just distribution of economic resources that facilitate political 
participation. The key contribution of this thesis to such a transformative perspective is to 
draw attention to the role that participatory spaces and the identities assembled within them 
can play and how they can advance freedom and equality. Rather than searching for one 
ideal spatial constellation, as many have attempted in the past, I champion a plurality of 
varied spaces that allow for different identity expressions. The acknowledgement of the 
variety of human existence and the understanding of identity assemblages as constantly 
reconfiguring call for a multiplicity of different spatial arrangements that allow for the ar-
ticulation of the multiple self. We need spaces that challenge inequality while allowing the 
democratic subject to change. 
To develop this answer to the questions posed herein, I engaged with various theoretical 
sources and generated several innovative contributions to democratic theory that I will 
briefly summarize below.  
Anonymity in democratic theory. This thesis provides the first in-depth theorization of the 
concept of anonymity rooted in democratic theory. Although anonymity is a central feature 
in various modes of participation in liberal democracies, it has not received attention in 
democratic and political theory. While anonymity is commonly defined in terms of identity 
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negation and privacy, I described it as an act of identity creation in the public sphere. The 
anonymity of subjects does not situate them outside the space of appearance. Rather, ano-
nymity reconfigures spaces. The anonymous subject is neither private nor invisible; it is 
perceptible in the public sphere. By interrupting coherent identity, anonymity decentres 
identity assemblages and affords the exploration of the multiple self. This increased free-
dom has contradictory effects. It allows for inclusion and exclusion, subversion and sub-
mission, and honesty and deception. The workings of anonymity depend on the specific 
spatial configurations in which it is situated, being affected by the physical tools employed, 
the power relations between participants, and the constellation of discursive identity 
knowledge.  
A spatial theory of democracy. This thesis also generated an in-depth theorization and sys-
tematic explanation of participatory spaces. Democratic theory is rich in the metaphoric 
use of the term “space” to denote new modes of participation (Dryzek, 2009; Mouffe, 1993, 
20). Others have focused on the effects of the concrete, physical spaces on participation 
(Parkinson, 2012). This thesis developed the first coherent concept of democratic spatiality 
that goes beyond mere metaphoric use and brings together insights about physical and so-
cio-discursive aspects of space. It drew on inspirations in debates on new materialism to 
describe participatory spaces as agentic assemblages of physical, social, and discursive 
things that affect each other. In relating these various things, participatory spaces demarcate 
boundaries that separate an inside and an outside. Through their mutual affectivity, these 
things are more than the sum of their parts. Rather than imagining such spaces in terms of 
cause and effect, they are best understood as a network of mutually affective things gener-
ating movement in various directions and being affected by the various things within them. 
Among these things, humans fulfil a special role as they are characterized by consciousness 
and intentionality. This does not make them autonomous rational subjects. Rather, they are 
themselves assemblages of affective things and thus only have partial conscious control 
over their actions. As assemblages, human subjects are intertwined with and partially in-
distinguishable from the assemblages that define space. The assemblages of humans and 
spaces mutually co-produce each other in a dialectical manner. 
A theory of digital space. The debate on digital space is characterized by a discord between, 
on the one hand, conceptions of the 1990s that conceptualize cyberspace as a realm of dis-
embodiment that is separate from analogue space (Benedikt, 1991b) and, on the other, cur-
rent debates that conflate digital space and analogue space (Isin & Ruppert, 2015). In con-
trast, this thesis draws on the theory of space discussed above in order to overcome this 
divide. Digital space is neither separate from nor the same as analogue space. Rather, it 
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consists of the relations between physical, social, and discursive things. In this way, it is 
constituted by the same things as analogue space. What sets digital space apart is the inter-
ruption between the physical spaces in which subjects are located and the social and dis-
cursive spaces in which they appear. A moment of disidentification is thus built into the 
architecture of digital space as it compels subjects to reassemble their identities online. 
Through this interruption, computer devices enter identity assemblages. While this, to a 
certain degree, enhances personal agency over the presentation of the self, it also means 
that evocative objects enter into the very process of identity constitution and call upon the 
subject in particular ways that are mostly motivated by commercial interests.  
Developing the plurality of radical democracy. This thesis contributes to a pluralization of 
democratic theory and in particular radical democratic thought. It insists on the value of a 
plurality of different approaches that provide different lenses through which to view reality 
and further develop the larger radical democratic project. To this end, I proposed to engage 
with several perspectives in democratic theory and assess the same subject of research from 
various vantage points (Parkinson, 2012, 9; Smith, 2019 forthcoming). Beyond applying 
the established participatory, deliberative, and agonistic perspectives, the thesis sought to 
expand the radical democratic horizon by focusing on two perspectives that are often ne-
glected and have yet to find their rightful place in the central texts on democratic theory. 
First, I engaged with feminist discussions identified with the term “difference democracy” 
(Mansbridge, 1998; Phillips, 1991; Young, 2000) and proposed a coherent difference dem-
ocratic perspective articulated along the axes of embodied presence, expressing emotions 
through various means of communication, and the contestation of domination. Second, I 
sketched an emerging perspective in democratic theory that proposes deep social transfor-
mation (Hardt & Negri, 2012; 2017; Newman, 2016; Rancière, 1999). The transformative 
perspective describes utopias and spaces of becoming that facilitate the experience of de-
mocracy in the moment. Democracy is conceptualized as overcoming modes of represen-
tation through self-rule and the commons.  
After this brief summary of the main contributions of this thesis to democratic theory, I will 
end by turning to the future of the field. I believe that the pluralism discussed above is one 
of the strengths of democratic theory and the study of radical democracy in particular (Dean 
et al., 2019). Some current debates in democratic theory advance a pragmatic approach and 
argue for leaving behind the model thinking that has been characteristic of democratic the-
ory since the period of the East-West conflict (Fung, 2012; Saward, 2019 forthcoming; 
2003; Warren, 2017). They might be right in thinking that the current historical context 
characterized by complexity and rapid change will give rise to other debates in democratic 
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theory that do not discuss democracy in terms of clear-cut models. Notwithstanding these 
changes, I believe that democratic theory needs clear normative grounding and, to this end, 
it needs to engage in contestation and deliberation about the meaning of democracy (see 
Held, 2006 [1987], X). This pluralism that has been characteristic of democratic thought 
over recent decades might take new forms. Rather than engaging in model building or ex-
ploring perspectives as in this thesis, novel ways might be found to express such pluralism. 
Beyond exploring multiple perspectives in democratic theory, this thesis also contributes 
to new engagements in the field by taking inspiration from sources located outside of dem-
ocratic theory, such as new materialism and queer theory. A vast field of theoretical debates 
have yet to be engaged with from the vantage point of democratic theory. Critical whiteness 
studies and masculinity studies, for instance, shift the analytical gaze from the marginalized 
to those in positions of power, which generates a new and promising angle for democratic 
thought. 
It will be up to such future scholarly work to assess how democratic subjectivity is altered 
in the digital age and beyond. The question of who we are becoming is an open-ended one 
that needs to be repeatedly raised anew. The process of becoming is in rapid flux. Consider 
that until the 16th century ordinary people did not have mirrors (Zakaria, 2017, 8). 
Knowledge of their own image was confined to reflections in water. If mirrors entering 
identity assemblages change their dynamics, then the introduction and widespread use of 
the “black mirror” – as the popular TV show refers to smart device screens – must revolu-
tionize them. In this sense, Butler (2015, 20) claims: “media has entered into the very def-
inition of the people. It does not simply assist that definition, or make it possible; it is the 
stuff of self-constitution, the site of the hegemonic struggle over who ‘we’ are”. This trig-
gers profound transformations of the self as computer devices take over certain human cog-
nitive functions. They alter how we remember and how we perceive things. When Phillips 
(2010, 48f) notes that cognition is an essentializing process that simplifies reality, we can 
observe how digital devices take over such filtering functions through algorithmic compu-
ting (Walker Rettberg, 2014, 20ff). Once again, this draws attention to the role of computers 
not as neutral tools, but as evocative objects calling upon us in certain ways. We have to 
decide how to respond to these calls. A part of assessing this question rests in analysing 
why these evocative objects call on us in the ways that they do and in whose interests they 
were built. This demands a better understanding of the economic and political forces that 
shape artificial intelligence and the smart devices in our pockets. Rather than engaging in 
self-transformation, the subject, in many cases, is shaped by powerful actors. This gives a 
sense of the growing urgency of the need to increase our agency over processes of self-
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constitution and to enlarge the free spaces for the subject to change.  
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